Present times are sometimes referred to as "the golden era of regulation", as more and more areas of social life are regulated. But regulation is not only increasing; it is also changing. New regulators are emerging, and they are issuing new kinds of rules. These new kinds of regulation are frequently not legally binding, and are therefore labelled soft regulation as opposed to hard law. It is not compulsory to follow soft rules but many actors - including sovereign states - still do, and the thesis asks the question why this is so. Why do even states, which are powerful regulators themselves, abide by soft regulation, and wherein lies the regulative power of soft rules? Through an in-depth study of the European Union's pre-accession instrument Twinning an answer to the question of the power of soft regulation has been arrived at. Treating Twinning as a critical case of soft regulation, and using theories of imitation to grasp the meaning and evolution of Twinning projects, makes it possible to define three regulative elements involved in soft regulation. These are the combinative, co-productive and constitutive elements of soft regulation, from which the thesis suggests that it derives its power. First of all, soft regulation combines different kinds of rules, the regulation of identity and the regulation of activity, and a variety of sources of legitimacy. Second, it depends on regulators and regulatees interacting to co-produce regulation. And third, as its main result, it constitutes the rule-followers as formal, rational, and modern organisations. Accordingly, soft regulation has rather impressive regulative capabilities, builds on complex, dynamic, and social interactions, and embodies as well as promotes some of Western society's most strongly institutionalised ideas. The thesis argues that it is through these characteristics that actors, including states, are compelled to follow soft rules.

Cette thèse traite des effets des modes de régulation faisant appel à des intermédiaires pour promouvoir des cadres souples d’organisation. Ces effets sont analysés à travers un cas d’intermédiation dans le champ sanitaire français : la participation de l’Agence nationale d’appui à la performance des établissements de santé et médico-sociaux (ANAP) à l’axe virage ambulatoire du Plan triennal 2015-2017 de transformation du système de santé. Ce cas est abordé à travers une approche en régimes de gouvernementalité fondée sur les travaux de Michel Foucault. L’application de cette approche au cours d’une recherche-intervention de trois ans en partenariat avec l’ANAP permet de dévoiler de manière inductive les caractéristiques spécifiques du Plan triennal en tant que régime de régulation, ainsi que le fonctionnement de ce régime à l’échelle nationale, régionale et des établissements de santé. Cette approche amène également à dépasser la seule mesure de l’efficacité de l’intermédiation pour s’intéresser à l’explication de cette efficacité et s’interroger sur son utilité par rapport aux besoins des différentes parties prenantes du système de santé. Dans son ensemble, ce travail doctoral a des implications d’ordre méthodologique, théorique et pratique. Sur le plan méthodologique, il est proposé une démarche d’évaluation des effets des dispositifs de régulation reposant sur le changement organisationnel. Sur le plan théorique, sont identifiés trois effets de l’intermédiation – de capacitation contingente, de conjonction des véridictions et d’apprentissage alèthurgique – qui complètent les modèles existants de cette activité organisationnelle en développement. Enfin, sur le plan pratique, cette thèse suggère qu’un usage constructif de l’appareillage conceptuel foucaldien est possible en sciences de gestion et illustre cet emploi en formulant six préconisations à l’attention des acteurs de la régulation sanitaire en France, ainsi que cinq pistes de recherche pour les chercheurs qui souhaiteraient accompagner ces acteurs à l’avenir. / This dissertation addresses the effects of modes of regulation relying on intermediaries in order to promote soft organizational frameworks. For that purpose, I analyze a case of intermediation taking place in the French healthcare field : the participation of the National Agency for the Performance of Healthcare Facilities (NAPHF) in the outpatient shift programmed by the 2015-2017 Transformation Plan of the healthcare system. My approach, which draws on the work of Michel Foucault, consists in examining the regime of governmentality that has been implemented in that case. Having used that inductive approach during a three-year research intervention in partnership with the NAPHF, I unveil the specific features that have enabled the regulatory regime of the Transformation Plan to operate at the national, regional and intra-hospital levels. Furthermore, that approach leads beyond measuring the efficacy of intermediation to explaining its effectiveness and to questioning its usefulness for answering the needs of the different stakeholders of the healthcare system. As a whole, this doctoral thesis bears methodological, theoretical, and practical implications. On the methodological side, I propose a method for evaluating the effects of regulatory tools aimed at fostering organizational change. On the theoretical side, I supplement existing models for understanding intermediation by identifying three effects of that organizational activity, which is currently expanding. Those effect are namely: contingent capacity-building, conjoined truth-telling, and alethurgic learning. On the practical side, my work suggests that management scholars may use the conceptual apparatus inherited from Michel Foucault in a constructive manner. I illustrate the potential benefits of that constructive stance by providing six recommendations for improving the regulation of the French healthcare system as well as five possible orientations for researchers who are seeking to help the actors of that system in the future.

Mjuk reglering är en icke-bindande uppsättning regler som har blivit socialt accepterad som bindande. Den har blivit vanligare med åren, med frivillig standard som ett exempel. Det ses som ett effektivt verktyg för att skapa multinationell reglering. Det finns dock en del kritik mot mjuk reglering för att vara ineffektiv och att företag endast använder den för att få legitimitet. Hållbarhetsredovisningen styrs delvis av mjuk reglering. År 2021 infördes en ny frivillig standard, GRI 207 Tax 2019. Standarden reglerar transparent redovisning av skatt. På grund av den kritik som finns mot frivilliga standarder och mjuka regleringar är syftet med denna studie att studera effekterna av införandet av en ny frivillig standard. Detta har gjorts genom en studie av hur storbanker kommunicerar sina skatteangelägenheter före och efter införandet av GRI 207 Tax 2019. Studien har genomförts genom data som samlats in från fyra av storbankernas års- och hållbarhetsredovisningar i Sverige. Legitimitetsteorin och den institutionella teorin har använts för att analysera resultatet av studien. Resultatet visar att storbankerna har olika syn på hur de ska presentera sina skatteärenden. SEB och Swedbank valde att följa standarden medan Nordea bara följer en del av GRI 207 och Handelsbanken inte följer GRI 207. Detta resulterade i högre poäng för SEB och Swedbank än Handelsbanken och Nordea men inte i bättre kvalitet på rapportering. Dessutom fann studien att det varierar hur mycket information storbankerna rapporterar om sina skatteärenden. Studien drar slutsatsen att GRI 207 inte har påverkat kvaliteten på skatterapporteringen. Ytterligare frågor som väckts i studiens slutsatser är: Följs frivilliga standarder till störst del för att uppnå legitimitet? Är tax washing ett nytt kommande fenomen? / Soft regulation is a non-binding set of rules that has become socially accepted as binding. It has become more common over the years, voluntary standard is an example of soft regulation. It is seen as an effective tool to create multinational regulation. Though, it exists some criticism towards soft regulation for being non-effective and that companies only use it to gain legitimacy. Sustainability reporting is partly governed by soft regulation. Year 2021 a new voluntary standard was introduced, GRI 207 Tax 2019. The standard regulates transparent accounting of tax. Due to the existing criticism towards voluntary standards and soft regulation the purpose of this study is to study the effects of the introduction of a new voluntary standard. This have been done through a study of how major banks communicate their tax affairs before and after the introduction of GRI 207 Tax 2019. The study was conducted through data collected from four of the major banks annual and sustainability reports in Sweden. Legitimacy theory and the institutional theory has been applied to help analyse the result of the study. The result shows that the major banks have a different approach on how to present their tax affairs. SEB and Swedbank decided to follow the standard while Nordea only follow a part of GRI 207 and Handelsbanken does not follow GRI 207. This resulted in higher scores for SEB and Swedbank than Handelsbanken and Nordea but not an increase in quality. Furthermore, the study found that it various how much information the major banks report about their tax affairs. The study concludes that GRI 207 hasn’t influenced the quality of tax reporting. In the conclusion further questions are raised: Are voluntary standards largely followed to achieve legitimacy? Is tax washing a new upcoming phenomenon?