This paper examined the claims postulated by the somatic marker hypothesis and compares those claims to the current evidence surrounding the neural basis of alexithymia. The results were then compared to see if they contradict or have a distinct localisation in the brain separate from those behavioural brain regions hypothesized by the somatic marker hypothesis. It was concluded that the somatic marker hypothesis and the neural basis for alexithymia share certain regions of interest, primarily the amygdala and insula, but also potentially the anterior cingulate cortex.

Theoretical procedures are developed to account for the effect of emotion and perception in strategic conflict. The <em>possibility principle</em> facilitates modeling the effects of emotions on future scenarios contemplated by decision makers; <em>perceptual graph models</em> and a <em>graph model system</em> permit the decision makers (DMs) to experience and view the conflict independently; and <em>perceptual stability analysis</em>, which is based on individual- and meta-stability analysis techniques, is employed in analyzing graph model systems when the DMs have inconsistent perceptions. These developments improve the methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution by reconciling emotion, perception, and strategy to make predictions consistent with the actual unfolding of events. <br /><br /> Current research in neuroscience suggests that emotions are a necessary component of cognitive processes such as memory, attention, and reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis, for example, holds that feelings are necessary to reasoning, especially during social interactions (Damasio, 1994, 2003). Somatic markers are memories of past emotions: we use them to predict future outcomes. To incorporate the effect of emotion in conflict, the underlying principle of Damasio?s hypothesis is used in developing the possibility principle, which significantly expands the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution of Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour (1993). <br /><br /> State identification is a crucial step in determining future scenarios for DMs. The possibility principle is integrated into the modeling stage of the Graph Model by refining the method of determining feasible states. The possibility principle enables analysts and DMs to include emotion in a conflict model, without sacrificing the parsimonious design of the Graph Model methodology, by focusing attention on two subsets of the set of feasible states: <em>hidden</em> and <em>potential</em> states. Hidden states are logically valid, feasible states that are invisible because of the presence of negative emotions such as anger and fear; potential states are logically valid, feasible states that are invisible because of missing positive emotions. Dissipating negative emotions will make the hidden states visible, while expressing the appropriate positive emotions will make the potential states visible. The possibility principle has been applied to a number of real world conflicts. In all cases, eliminating logically valid states not envisioned by any DM simplifies a conflict model substantially, expedites the analysis, and makes it an intuitive and a realistic description of the DMs' conceptualizations of the conflict. <br /><br /> A fundamental principle of the Graph Model methodology is that all DMs' directed graphs must have the same set of feasible states, which are integrated into a <em>standard</em> graph model. The possibility principle may modify the set of feasible states perceived by each DM according to his or her emotion, making it impossible to construct a single standard graph model. When logically valid states are no longer achievable for one or more DMs due to emotions, the apprehension of conflict becomes inconsistent, and resolution may become difficult to predict. Therefore, reconciling emotion and strategy requires that different apprehensions of the underlying decision problem be permitted, which can be accomplished using a perceptual graph model for each DM. A perceptual graph model inherits its primitive ingredients from a standard graph model, but reflects a DM's emotion and perception with no assumption of complete knowledge of other DMs' perceptions. <br /><br /> Each DM's perceptual graph model constitutes a complete standard graph model. Hence, conclusions drawn from a perceptual graph model provide a limited view of equilibria and predicted resolutions. A graph model system, which consists of a list of DMs' perceptual graph models, is defined to reconcile perceptions while facilitating conclusions that reflect each DM's viewpoint. However, since a DM may or may not be aware that other graph models differ from his or her own, different variants of graph model systems are required to describe conflicts. Each variant of graph model system corresponds to a configuration of awareness, which is a set of ordered combinations of DMs' viewpoints. <br /><br /> Perceptual stability analysis is a new procedure that applies to graph model systems. Its objective is to help an <em>outside</em> analyst predict possible resolutions, and gauge the robustness and sustainability of these predictions. Perceptual stability analysis takes a two-phase approach. In Phase 1, the stability of each state in each perceptual graph model is assessed from the point of view of the owner of the model, for each DM in the model, using standard or perceptual solution concepts, depending on the owner's awareness of others' perceptions. (In this research, only perceptual solution concepts for the 2-decision maker case are developed. ) In Phase 2, meta-stability analysis is employed to consolidate the stability assessments of a state in all perceptual graph models and across all variants of awareness. Distinctive modes of equilibria are defined, which reflect incompatibilities in DMs' perceptions and viewpoints but nonetheless provide important insights into possible resolutions of conflict. <br /><br /> The possibility principle and perceptual stability analysis are integrative techniques that can be used as a basis for empathetically studying the interaction of emotion and reasoning in the context of strategic conflict. In general, these new techniques expand current modeling and analysis capabilities, thereby facilitating realistic, descriptive models without exacting too great a cost in modeling complexity. In particular, these two theoretical advances enhance the applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to real-world disputes by integrating emotion and perception, common ingredients in almost all conflicts. <br /><br /> To demonstrate that the new developments are practical, two illustrative applications to real-world conflicts are presented: the US-North Korea conflict and the confrontation between Russia and Chechen Rebels. In both cases, the analysis yields new strategic insights and improved advice.

When trying to make sense of uncertain situations, we might rely on summary information from a description, or information gathered from our personal experience. There are two approaches that both attempt to explain how we make risky decisions using descriptive or experiential information—the cognitive-based explanation from the description-experience gap, and the emotion-based explanation from the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). This dissertation brings together these two approaches to better understand how we make risky decisions. Four options were presented, with options differing in terms of advantageousness and riskiness. How easy or difficult it was to consciously comprehend the reward structure, or cognitive penetrability, was manipulated by displaying single outcomes or multiple, diverse outcomes per trial. Within the description or experience task, participants were randomly assigned to the more or less penetrable version of an all gain or all loss set of options. How often the riskier or advantageous options were chosen served as a measure of risky or advantageous decision making. Regardless of penetrability, risk preferences were generally but not completely as predicted by the SMH. Instead, the primary effect of cognitive penetrability was on advantageous decision making. Furthermore, description was found to be more cognitively penetrable than experience. Overall, the results suggest that clarification is needed regarding how somatic markers are formed in the loss versus gain domain, and future research should consider the difference in penetrability between description and experience when trying to explain preferences between the two decisions.

Theoretical procedures are developed to account for the effect of emotion and perception in strategic conflict. The <em>possibility principle</em> facilitates modeling the effects of emotions on future scenarios contemplated by decision makers; <em>perceptual graph models</em> and a <em>graph model system</em> permit the decision makers (DMs) to experience and view the conflict independently; and <em>perceptual stability analysis</em>, which is based on individual- and meta-stability analysis techniques, is employed in analyzing graph model systems when the DMs have inconsistent perceptions. These developments improve the methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution by reconciling emotion, perception, and strategy to make predictions consistent with the actual unfolding of events. <br /><br /> Current research in neuroscience suggests that emotions are a necessary component of cognitive processes such as memory, attention, and reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis, for example, holds that feelings are necessary to reasoning, especially during social interactions (Damasio, 1994, 2003). Somatic markers are memories of past emotions: we use them to predict future outcomes. To incorporate the effect of emotion in conflict, the underlying principle of Damasio?s hypothesis is used in developing the possibility principle, which significantly expands the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution of Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour (1993). <br /><br /> State identification is a crucial step in determining future scenarios for DMs. The possibility principle is integrated into the modeling stage of the Graph Model by refining the method of determining feasible states. The possibility principle enables analysts and DMs to include emotion in a conflict model, without sacrificing the parsimonious design of the Graph Model methodology, by focusing attention on two subsets of the set of feasible states: <em>hidden</em> and <em>potential</em> states. Hidden states are logically valid, feasible states that are invisible because of the presence of negative emotions such as anger and fear; potential states are logically valid, feasible states that are invisible because of missing positive emotions. Dissipating negative emotions will make the hidden states visible, while expressing the appropriate positive emotions will make the potential states visible. The possibility principle has been applied to a number of real world conflicts. In all cases, eliminating logically valid states not envisioned by any DM simplifies a conflict model substantially, expedites the analysis, and makes it an intuitive and a realistic description of the DMs' conceptualizations of the conflict. <br /><br /> A fundamental principle of the Graph Model methodology is that all DMs' directed graphs must have the same set of feasible states, which are integrated into a <em>standard</em> graph model. The possibility principle may modify the set of feasible states perceived by each DM according to his or her emotion, making it impossible to construct a single standard graph model. When logically valid states are no longer achievable for one or more DMs due to emotions, the apprehension of conflict becomes inconsistent, and resolution may become difficult to predict. Therefore, reconciling emotion and strategy requires that different apprehensions of the underlying decision problem be permitted, which can be accomplished using a perceptual graph model for each DM. A perceptual graph model inherits its primitive ingredients from a standard graph model, but reflects a DM's emotion and perception with no assumption of complete knowledge of other DMs' perceptions. <br /><br /> Each DM's perceptual graph model constitutes a complete standard graph model. Hence, conclusions drawn from a perceptual graph model provide a limited view of equilibria and predicted resolutions. A graph model system, which consists of a list of DMs' perceptual graph models, is defined to reconcile perceptions while facilitating conclusions that reflect each DM's viewpoint. However, since a DM may or may not be aware that other graph models differ from his or her own, different variants of graph model systems are required to describe conflicts. Each variant of graph model system corresponds to a configuration of awareness, which is a set of ordered combinations of DMs' viewpoints. <br /><br /> Perceptual stability analysis is a new procedure that applies to graph model systems. Its objective is to help an <em>outside</em> analyst predict possible resolutions, and gauge the robustness and sustainability of these predictions. Perceptual stability analysis takes a two-phase approach. In Phase 1, the stability of each state in each perceptual graph model is assessed from the point of view of the owner of the model, for each DM in the model, using standard or perceptual solution concepts, depending on the owner's awareness of others' perceptions. (In this research, only perceptual solution concepts for the 2-decision maker case are developed. ) In Phase 2, meta-stability analysis is employed to consolidate the stability assessments of a state in all perceptual graph models and across all variants of awareness. Distinctive modes of equilibria are defined, which reflect incompatibilities in DMs' perceptions and viewpoints but nonetheless provide important insights into possible resolutions of conflict. <br /><br /> The possibility principle and perceptual stability analysis are integrative techniques that can be used as a basis for empathetically studying the interaction of emotion and reasoning in the context of strategic conflict. In general, these new techniques expand current modeling and analysis capabilities, thereby facilitating realistic, descriptive models without exacting too great a cost in modeling complexity. In particular, these two theoretical advances enhance the applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to real-world disputes by integrating emotion and perception, common ingredients in almost all conflicts. <br /><br /> To demonstrate that the new developments are practical, two illustrative applications to real-world conflicts are presented: the US-North Korea conflict and the confrontation between Russia and Chechen Rebels. In both cases, the analysis yields new strategic insights and improved advice.

The present study examines the relationship of emotional awareness to anticipatory psychophysiological markers and performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is a computerized card game that simulates real-life decisions through uncertainty of reward or punishment. The participant’s goal is to make advantageous card choices. Anticipatory somatic markers of physiological arousal, like electrodermal activity and heart rate, have been proposed to bias decisions in the IGT. The central hypothesis is that a participant’s emotional awareness is related to their ability to make advantageous decisions through biasing psychophysiological responses. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale was used to assess each participant’s emotional awareness. Less emotional awareness was associated with enhanced performance on the IGT. However, anticipatory physiological arousal (electrodermal activity and heart rate) and emotional awareness yielded no significant relationships. Findings suggest a need for further research on cognitive models, such as the expectancy valence model, in relation to decision-making.

The present study examines the relationship of emotional awareness to anticipatory psychophysiological markers and performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is a computerized card game that simulates real-life decisions through uncertainty of reward or punishment. The participant’s goal is to make advantageous card choices. Anticipatory somatic markers of physiological arousal, like electrodermal activity and heart rate, have been proposed to bias decisions in the IGT. The central hypothesis is that a participant’s emotional awareness is related to their ability to make advantageous decisions through biasing psychophysiological responses. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale was used to assess each participant’s emotional awareness. Less emotional awareness was associated with enhanced performance on the IGT. However, anticipatory physiological arousal (electrodermal activity and heart rate) and emotional awareness yielded no significant relationships. Findings suggest a need for further research on cognitive models, such as the expectancy valence model, in relation to decision-making.

The neuroscience of decision making is laying the puzzle of how the brain computes decisions. It tries to sort out which factors are responsible for causing us to choose one way or the other. This thesis reviews to what extent emotional brain processes and their neural circuits impact decision making. The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) provides a solid dual-system framework for decision making. Dissociating an impulsive system, in which the amygdala is central, and a reflective system mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex(VMPFC). The SMH emphasizes the function of the VMPFC as necessary and crucial formaking favorable long-term decisions. Research on moral decision making also shows that similar systems as used by the SMH has a key role in how we think about moral dilemmas as well. Damage or maldevelopment of these neural circuits can cause myopia for the future and deeply immoral behavior. Abnormalities in emotional neuronal circuits can also be linked to addictive behavior and psychopathy. The findings on decision making and its neuralsubstrates dismantle the common sense notion of free will and moral responsibility. An explanation of how the feeling of free will arises is given using the Interpreter system theoryof consciousness. Moral responsibility without the need for a free will is defended by analternative approach with a framework of a brain in-control versus out-of-control.

本研究檢視軀體標記假說與意識之關係。研究中使用一修改版愛荷華賭博作業，其中與各副牌所連結的情緒為由閾下呈現的情緒圖片在意識下所引發，而意識上每副牌輸贏的訊息則加以控制。本研究透過此作業以及實驗設計上不同的操弄，結果發現：意識應為軀體標記運作時的必要條件。此外，即使是與作業無關的情緒也可以被當作軀體標記加以被處理。再則，軀體標記的運作可以在具有衝突的作業情境下發生。最後，本研究提出了一個軀體標記運作的可能機制。 / The present study aimed to examine the relation between Somatic Marker (SM) Hypothesis and consciousness. A revised Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was created in which emotions attached to different decks are activated unconsciously by subliminally presenting different emotional pictures. On the other hand, conscious information coming from task outcomes is controlled. Based upon this task, and with some variances in experimental designs, it was found that consciousness might be necessary in SM operation. In addition, even emotions that are irrelevant the ongoing task can be taken as SMs. Furthermore, the SM operation can be taken place when the task or situation is with conflict. A possible mechanism for SM operation is also proposed in the study.

This is a review of what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are and where they derive from. While the introduction serves as a common ground to explain what moral decision-making is, the earlier parts of the thesis describe older traditionalist theories within the field,  theories of emotional decision-making, in the form of the somatic marker hypothesis, as well as critique of the older traditionalist theories through the social intuitionist model. Both of these two theories are explained as the foundation of the current theories of moral decision-making and after establishing a clear basis on what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are built on, said theories are introduced in the form of the dual-processing theory and the event-feature-emotion complexes which are thoroughly reviewed, explained in detail and serves as the core of the text. This is afterward followed by criticism as well as arguments in favor of both theories as well as criticisms from other researchers who disagree with the methodology which the theories of moral decision-making are conducted on. The essay reviews the current state of the field of moral decision-making which has been split up into two different approaches, the locationist approach and the constructionist approach. The essay concludes that there are terms which needs to be clarified in order for the field to move forward and studies to be made regarding the social implications of gut reactions in moral decision-making.

Damasio(1994)提出軀體標記假說（Somatic Marker Hypothesis）來解釋情緒如何影響行為決策，認為人們在決策前，與過去的情緒經驗關聯的生理反應會再現，幫助人們做出較好的決策判斷。並利用愛荷華賭博作業（Iowa Gambling Task）來模擬日常生活決策情境，並同時紀錄膚電反應(Skin conductance respons)，量測受試者決策前的預期膚電反應（Anticipatory SCR）和結果呈現後的回饋膚電反應(Feedback SCR)，加以佐證其神經生理機制。本研究將從三個方向進一步驗證其假說，分別是風險因素、生理證據和個別差異。在愛荷華賭博作業中，期望值負的牌也是高風險程度的牌，使結果無法清楚解釋是期望值或者風險程度造成的影響。而過去雖然有許多研究也使用膚電反應當做生理指標，但有許多相異的研究結果，並且較少研究利用事件關聯電位瞭解其中樞歷程。再者，過去相關研究發現個別差異的存在，但是缺乏一致的解釋。因此，本研究以修改版愛荷華賭博作業，控制期望值皆為零的狀況下，操弄風險程度，並且利用膚電反應和事件關聯電位當作周邊和和中樞的生理反應指標，探討受試者在單純風險情境，是否也會受到情緒軀體標記影響風險行為偏好，以及各項生理指標和風險行為偏好間的關聯，並瞭解不同風險偏好的受試者生理指標是否有所差異。結果發現，從行為上顯示有風險追逐和風險趨避兩組受試者，不同風險程度的牌損失回饋對受試者的歷程影響也不一樣，額葉的腦部回饋相關負波(Feedback-related Negativity，FRN)結果顯示，風險追逐的受試者對高低風險損失時的FRN沒有差異，風險趨避的受試者看到低風險損失時的FRN大於看到高風險損失時的FRN。此外，看到高風險酬賞比起低風險酬有較大回饋膚電反應的受試者，和看到高風險損失比起低風險損失有較小回饋膚電反應的受試者，接受高風險牌的比率也較高，其它生理變項對風險行為偏好沒有顯著的預測力。並且預期膚電反應並非過去研究認為單純扮演警訊或者誘因，而有更複雜的機制存在，受試者在接受非偏好的牌和拒絕偏好的牌前有較大的預期膚電反應。預期階段N170的結果顯示，受試者看到刺激之後會拒絕的N170會大於之後會接受的N170，顯示接受或拒絕兩種不同情境時受試者對刺激的處理歷程亦相異。 / Somatic Marker Hypothesis was proposed to explain the influence of emotion on decision making. To examine this hypothesis, Damasio and his colleagues designed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and found that the “anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCR)”, i.e. somatic markers, was elevated before selecting from bad decks to serve as alarms and it warned participants not to select “bad deck” which was negative expected value. However, there are three unsolved problem in these IGT researches: the risk factor, inconsistent physiological evidences, and individual differences. In the original IGT, the bad decks are also more risky and that confounds the interpretations of participants’ choice behaviors and related physiological evidences. There are inconsistent evidences of how the anticipatory SCR and feedback SCR related with choice behaviors. Moreover, there are little event-related potential IGT studies. To solve these issues, the primary aim of the present study is to clarify whether decision making is influenced by risk level even when all options have the same expected value. A modified IGT with high risk deck and low risk deck was used and the expected values of two decks were all zero. Moreover, the procedure was different from original IGT. Participants saw a deck with mark first and then decided to accept or reject this deck. Thus, the role of anticipatory SCR could be clarified more clearly. In addition to SCR, ERP was also recorded for further physiological evidences. To elaborately clarify individual differences of choice behavior and physiological evidences, participants would group to risk-seeking (i.e., accepting more high risk deck and rejecting more low risk deck) and risk-aversion (i.e., accepting more low risk deck and rejecting more high risk deck) according their choice behaviors. The result revealed that the participant who accepted more high risk deck, their reward SCR was higher from high risk deck than from low risk decks, and induced lower punishment SCR from high risk deck than from low risk decks. Moreover, the anticipatory SCR was higher both before they decided to reject the liked deck and before they decided to accept the disliked deck. The results of feedback-related negativity (FRN) from ERP data in frontal region showed that the magnitude of FRN was larger under the conflict punishment (the punishment from low risk decks) condition for risk-aversion participants. The results of N170 from ERP data showed that the magnitude of N170 was larger under the reject condition. These results suggest that the SMH could be explained not only with expected value but also with risk preference. In conclusion, the interpretation of anticipatory SCR by previous study was not completed, and it reflected not merely the negative feeling or positive feeling. This strong anticipatory emotion affects people to change the routine behavior about their risk preference, and there exist individual differences of choice behavior and physiological evidences.