Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the democratisation of South Africa's foreign trade policy, by evaluating the negotiations surrounding the establishment of a free trade area between South Africa and the European Union (EU). Democracy here is defined as a form of government that rests on three components namely, public participation in and public debate over policy formulation and a governing elite that is responsive to the needs of the majority of the population. The thesis firstly outlines the process of negotiation itself, looking at the developments that shaped the years of talks. It examines the nature of the final agreement, called the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). It focuses on the Co-operation Agreements that were concluded, South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the details of the free trade agreement. It finds that although the negotiations took very long to complete and the EU proved to be a tough negotiator, there are a number of opportunities for South Africans in the TDCA. In the second section the internal process in developing a South African negotiating mandate is examined. This is done to conclude whether or not South Africa's foreign trade policy is being formulated in a democratic manner. However, first of all the question why the democratisation of foreign trade policy formulation is important is addressed. Two possible theories are advanced. Firstly, globalisation has forced countries to lure foreign direct investment (FDI) as a matter of urgency. Seeing as FDI is mostly tied up with western nations that prefer democracies, states are opting to democratise. The focus is to a large extent on satisfying international actors. Or alternatively, the very survival of the nascent democracy today depends on the consultative nature of domestic economic and international economic policy formulation. This is not a question of choice with an external focus, but rather a matter of urgency with purely an internal focus. Four actors in foreign policy formulation, namely parliament, government, the bureaucracy and civil society, are examined in order to understand whether they had access to the process and whether these institutions themselves have been democratised since 1994. The thesis finds that the process was to a large extent democratic in nature. However, the thesis also finds that no matter how democratic policy formulation is in South Africa, the options for policy are limited by a number of international elements. These include globalisation, regional trading blocs like the European Union, and international organisations like the World Trade Organisation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tesis evalueer die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse handelsbeleid deur die onderhandelingsproses tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en Suid-Afrika rakende die sluiting van 'n vryhandelsooreenkoms te ontleed. Demokrasie word in die tesis definieer as 'n tipe regering wat rus op drie komponente, naamlik deelname in en debat oor beleidsformulering en 'n regerende elite wat die behoeftes van die meerderheid van die burgers in ag neem in beleidsformulering. Eerstens omskryf die tesis die gebeure wat die onderhandelingsproses beïnvloed het. Die finale ooreenkoms word oorweeg teen die agtergrond van die samewerkingsooreenkomste wat tussen die partye gesluit is, Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike deelname aan die Lomé Konfensie en die vryhandelsooreenkoms. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat ten spyte van die feit dat die onderhandelings oor 'n hele aantal jare gestek het, en alhoewel die EU 'n uitgeslape onderhandelaar was, die orreenkoms talle geleenthede vir Suid-Afrikaners skep. In die tweede instansie word die interne proses wat tot Suid-Afrika se onderhandelingsmandaat gelei het, ondersoek. Dit is gedoen om vas te stel of die beleid op 'n demokratiese manier geformuleer is. Daar word egter eers bepaal waarom die demokratisering van buitelandse handelsbeleid belangrik is. Twee moontlike teorie word geformuleer. Die eerste stel dit dat globalisering lande forseer om direkte buitelandse beleggings aan te lok. Siende dat buitelandse beleggings van westerlike state afkomstig is, wat verkies om met demokratiese state sake te doen, word ontwikkelende lande as te ware geforseer om veral hulle buitelandse beleidsformulering te demokratiseer. In die alternatief kan dit betoog word dat die voortbestaan van die demokrasie self afhang van 'n ekonomiese beleidsformulering wat beide binnelandse en internasionale prosesse insluit. Dit is nie 'n kwessie van keuse met 'n eksterne fokus nie, maar 'n noodsaaklikheid met 'n interne fokus. Vier groeperinge wat buitelandse beleidsformulering beïnvloed word ondersoek, naamlik die Parlament, the regering, die burokrasie en die burgerlike samelewing, om vas te stelof hierdie instansies toegang tot die proses gehad het en of hierdie instansies self sedert 1994 gedemokratiseer is. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat al is die formulering van buitelandse beleid hoé demokraties, word die moontlikehede vir beleidsformulering beperk deur globalisering, streeksorganisasies soos die EU, en internasionale organisasies soos the Wêreld Handelsorganisasie. Vir Chris, Gitti, Thomas en my ouers, sonder wie hierdie nooit klaar sou gekom het nie. Baie dankie ook aan Prof Philip Nel vir sy hulp, leiding en ondersteuning.

Thesis (MScAgric)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: European-South African trade relations concerrnng wine and spirits are characterized by various opportunities and, at the same time, a range of conflicts. The latter notably relates to the dispute over geographical indications and designations of origin. Considering this confusing amalgamation of discord and harmony, it is the purpose of this study, entitled "International Trade in Wine and Geographical Indications - Common Interests between the EU and South Africa", to understand the rationale for trade in wine from both sides of the coin. Moreover, this research assesses possible multilateral and bilateral solutions for dealing with trade frictions between the EU and South Africa and identifies common interests with a view to establish a lasting foundation for blossoming trade in wine and sustained growth. The underlying methodology is a qualitative interpretative approach and bases on insights into modern marketing and international management theory. On this basis the "objective" interests of the EU and South Africa in trade in wine are analysed in order to assess the coming into existence of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement as well as the Wine and Spirits Agreement. Pivot of these trade negotiations is the dispute on geographical indications, which is scrutinized by looking into relevant chapters of the WTO and its TR.IPS Agreement. With regards to the Wine and Spirits Agreement it is salient to ask whether it is economically and politically reasonable for South Africa to accept a financial package from the EU to secure the 'voluntary' phasing out of a number of trademarks and geographical indications. The study concludes with an outlook regarding the globalisation of the world's wine market, potential future investment flows between the EU and South Africa and the need for an effective marketing strategy in order to become or remain global player in an increasing competitiveness caused by globalisation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Europese en Suid-Afrikaanse handelsverhoudinge in wyn en spiritualieë word gekenmerk deur verskeie geleenthede en terselfdertyd 'n reeks konflikte. Laasgenoemde hou merkbaar verband met die twis oor geografiese indikatore en aanwysings van oorsprong. Gegewe hierdie verwarrende tweedrag en harmonie, is die doel van hierdie studie, getiteld "Internasionale Handel in Wyn en Geografiese Aanwysings - Gemeenskaplike belange tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika", om die 'rationale' agter die wynhandel van twee kante te beskou. Verder ondersoek hierdie navorsing moontlike multi- en bilaterale oplossings vir die handelswrywing tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika en identifiseer gemeenskaplike belange met die doelom 'n fondament te bou vir volhoubare groei in die wynhandel. Die onderliggende metodologie is 'n kwalitatiewe verklarende benadering, gebaseer op insigte uit moderne bemarkings- en bestuursteorie. Op hierdie vlak word die 'objektiewe' belange van die EU en Suid-Afrika in die wynhandel ontleed om gevolgtrekkings oor die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms en die Wyn- en Spiritualieë- Ooreenkoms te maak. Onderliggend aan hierdie onderhandelinge is die twis oor geografiese aanwysings, wat noukeurig ondersoek is deur relevante hoofstukke van die WHO Ooreenkoms en sy TRIPS-komponent te raadpleeg. Met verwysing na die Wyn- en Spiritualieë- Ooreenkoms is dit voor die hand liggend om te vra of dit ekonomies en polities verstandig vir Suid-Afrika is om 'n finansiële pakket van die EU te aanvaar in ruil vir die vrywillige uitfasering van 'n aantal handelsmerke en geografiese aanwysings. Die studie sluit af met '11" blik op globalisering van die wêreld se wynmarkte, die potensiële toekomstige vloei van beleggings tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika, en die behoefte aan 'n effektiewe bemarkingsstrategie om 'n globale speler te word.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: During the negotiating stages of the TOCA, the EU and South Africa could not reach an agreement on the use of certain EU geographical indications related to wine products. The geographical indication issue threatened the signing of the entire TOCA. At the request of the EU, South Africa agreed to negotiate a separate Wine and Spirits Agreement, in order to finalise the TOCA. The EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement was eventually negotiated and came into effect on 1 January 2002. The initial issue relating to the geographical indications remained controversial throughout the negotiations and matters were made worst when the initial contentious denominations of Port and Sherry were expanded by the EU to include Grappa, Ouzo, Korn, Kornbrand, Jagertee, Jaqertee, Jagatee and Pacharan. South Africa eventually agreed to phase out the use of these denominations over specified time periods. The current wording of the agreement will also result in South Africa having to yield a variety of well known trade marks such as Nederburg and Roodeberg. Article 7(8) of the Wine Agreement implies that in the case of conflict between a South African wine trade mark and an EU geographical indication for wine, the South African trade mark will always have to yield to the EU geographical indication. The entire geographical indication matter is being contested by South Africa and is still under negotiation. South Africa and the EU agreed to allocate reciprocal duty free tariff quotas to wine products. These tariff quotas will remain effective until the FTA has been established, following the transitional periods as agreed upon in the TOGA. The duty free funds will however not have such a direct impact on the wine industry as have been envisaged initially, because the funds are in the hands of the EU importers. Various business plans are being implemented to allow the South African wine industry to benefit from these and any future funds. The EU offered financial assistance to the value of €15 million for the restructuring of the South African wine industry as well as for the marketing of the South African wine and spirits products. To date none of these funds have been allocated and various proposals have been made to the South African government in order to obtain these funds from the EU. The EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement is a continuous evolving agreement, where both parties are allowed to modify the existing agreement with the consent of the other party. Such modifications are allowed with the premise that it would contribute to the facilitation and promotion of trade in wine and spirits products between South Africa and the EU. South Africa must take cognisance of the implications of the EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement and ensure that they do not end up losing more than what they are gaining. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sien volteks vir opsomming

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In October 1999 South Africa and the European Union (EU) signed a free trade agreement, the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which came into effect on 1 January 2000. The TDCA was developed to enhance bilateral trade, economic-, political- and social cooperation and consists of three components - the creation of a Free Trade Area between South-Africa and the EU, EU financial aid to South Africa through the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), and project aid. However, the EU, in an effort to secure the best possible deal for itself, often behave in its own interests (through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement) during the negotiations for the TDCA. The goal of this study was to establish what exactly trademarks are, and what implications the EU's protection of intellectual property rights on wine and spirits trademarks will have on i) the South African wine industry, ii) whether South Africa could have exercised another option, iii) whether this action has created a precedent with which the EU can, in future, again force South Africa or any of its other developing trade partners to make concessions, and iv) who gains the most from the TDCA. The concludes that the EU, through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement, left South Africa with no choice by to concede the use of the contested trademarks - something that has already taken its toll on the South African wine industry - in order to save the TDCA. This action created a precedent that the EU will, in future, again be in a position to threaten developing countries with the termination of an agreement should they fail to comply with its demands. Finally, the conclusion is made that even though the TDCA was created to assist South Africa with its reintegration into the world market, it will ultimately be the EU that benefits most from the agreement. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid-Afrika en die Europese Unie (EU) het in Oktober 1999 In vryehandelsooreenkoms, die Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) onderteken, wat op 1 Januarie 2000 in werking getree het. Die TDCA is ontwerp om bilaterale handel-, ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale samewerking te bevorder en bestaan uit drie komponente, naamlik die skep van 'n vryehandelgebied tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika; finansiele steun deur die EU aan Suid-Afrika onder die European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) en projekhulp. Die EU het egter dikwels in eiebelang opgetree (deur middel van die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms) tydens die onderhandelingsproses in 'n poging om die beste moontlike ooreenkoms vir homself te beding. Die doel van hierdie studie was om te bepaal wat presies handelsmerke is, en watter implikasies die EU se beskerming van intellektuele eiendomsregte aangaande wyn- en spiritushandelsmerke op i) die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf sal he, ii) of Suid-Afrika 'n ander opsie kon uitoefen, iii) of hierdie aksie In presedent geskep het waarmee die EU Suid-Afrika of enige van sy ander ontwikkelende handelsvennote in die toekoms weer sal kan dwing om toegewings te maak, en iv) wie die meeste baat vind by die TDCA. Die studie het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die EU deur die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms aan Suid-Afrika geen keuse gegee het nie as om die gebruik van die betwiste handelsmerke op te se - iets wat reeds die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf geknou het - in 'n poging om die TDCA te behou. Hierdie optrede skep 'n presedent dat die EU voortaan in onderhandelings met ander ontwikkelende state weer kan dreig om die hele ooreenkoms te verongeluk indien daar nie aan sy eise voldoen word nie. In die laaste instansie is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat, alhoewel die TDCA daarop gemik was om Suid-Afrika te help met sy herintegrasie tot die wereldmark, dit uiteindelik die EU is wat die meeste daarby gaan baat.

MAAS / Department of Development Studies / See the attached abstract below