There is a dearth of position papers on international participation in the South African transition. Political parties and organisations in South Africa instead spend most of their time describing various forms of desirous IC intervention after the transition. This might explain why most articles and academic papers on 'the role of the international community' are suffixed - in the 'new South Africa' or 'post-apartheid South Africa' - few focus on the actual transition and then mostly from a systemic perspective, broadly outlining the constraints imposed by the 'new world order'. Perhaps the first serious attempt to address this gap in the debate over South Africa's future was D. Kempton and L. Mosia's 'The International Community in South Africa's Transition to non-racial Democracy' (1992). Before multiparty negotiations collapsed in June 1992, Kempton and Mosia examined the attitudes toward international intervention of most of the CODESA participants, as well as the major actors that had remained outside CODESA. This paper takes up the issue where Kempton and Mosia left off. It tries to explain transitional politics since the IC introduced an on-the-ground presence after the UN Security Council debates on South Africa in July 1992. It asks why, eight months after multiparty talks were suspended, the IC has been unable to revive multiparty negotiations, has apparently had little or no impact on the violence, and despite events like Boipatong and Bisho, still plays a minor peacekeeping role, confined to observer status. The research describes internal and external components of international intervention, examines the rationale behind the agreed forms of international participation, and assesses the viability of the internationally-supported conflict-resolution and transition-management structures that were formed to facilitate the transition. The evidence uncovered by the research leads the author to the conclusion that more of an international role is necessary, and sooner rather than later, but he concedes that this is not feasible, or likely, under the status quo.

This thesis critiques hegemonic theory – especially the impact of a hegemonic state on the ability of small states to develop an independent foreign policy. The research uses Lesotho as a case study of a subordinate state in relation to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) as a hegemonic state. It draws on the history of Lesotho’s quest for sovereignty and argues that this sovereignty is constantly eroded to the advantage of its hegemonic neighbour. This constrains Lesotho’s ability to develop an independent foreign policy.

M.A. (Political Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

To date, no in-depth analysis has been made of the diplomatic relations that existed between the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) from 1976 to 1997. Current scholarly works on relations between the two countries tend to oversimplify the forces that drew the two countries into close association during the said period, and presume that ROC-RSA bilateral relations were merely the result on the mutual pariah status of both states. In addition, several common misconceptions regarding the nature of ROC-RSA relations are recurrent in the existing research. This thesis, therefore, examines the development of ROA-RSA relations and interactions from the eve of the ROC government’s relocation to Taiwan in 1948 to the severance of ROC-RSA diplomatic relations in 1998 against the background of the overall historical circumstances of both countries. This study argues that the factors in the formation of ROC-RSA ties are manifold and a result of the convergence of anti-communist ideologies and common interests. Pariah status and international ostracism are only part of the array of complex factors. Efforts are made to investigate the historical conditions, foreign policy objectives and national interests that helped cement diplomatic relations, as well as the extent of co-operation in the complete spectrum of ROC-RSA relations, including economic and cultural relations, and military and nuclear collaborations. These various aspects are explored in order to give a fuller picture of ROC-RSA tenses and limitations of these relations are analysed. Furthermore, the causes that led to South Africa’s switch of diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China(PRC) and the prospects of future relations between the ROC and the RSA are also studied. / Thesis (DPhil (History))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Historical and Heritage Studies / Unrestricted

Please read the abstract (Summary) in the section 00front of this document<P/> / Thesis (D Admin (Public Administration))--University of Pretoria, 2008. / School of Public Management and Administration (SPMA) / unrestricted

Bibliography: leaves 74-78. / With the ending of the apartheid regime and the transition to power of a government of national unity, South Africa is now a legitimate member of the international community. It has joined the Organisation of African Unity, the British Commonwealth, and the Southern African Development Community, and it is busily fostering trade links with Europe, North America, the Far East, and Latin America. Its diplomats have worked to mediate conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, and its president is widely seen as an international statesman and a moral leader of almost unprecedented repute. Yet the new· government continues to operate within South Africa's traditional international paradigm and has not yet developed a unique global role that reflects the country's internal "negotiated revolution". As a result, substantial challenges face efforts to forge a new south African approach to the world. From outside the country, forces unleashed by the fall of communism and the rise of a truly global marketplace mark a volatile and uncertain transition in world history. From the inside, political transition has sparked a redefinition of what it means to be South African, but this has not been reflected in new policies. The Foreign Ministry is widely recognised as a bastion of old-guard stalwarts; the ANC and NP have done little to reconcile their past international experiences; and. the information flow on international political and economic trends has barely improved since April 1994, leaving interest groups and private citizens in the new democracy generally uninformed and therefore unable to help pressure policy. The result is a foreign policy over the past year that has had little vision and few cohesive threads, and has left a score of unresolved issues. The 'new' South Africa's relations with Cuba and China, its policies on illegal immigration, and regional development plans are all issues that require visionary, decisive leadership but for which none has yet been provided. What energy or vision, for example, has South Africa brought to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since it joined last August? In the global peacekeeping debate, and again with Cuba and China, South Africa has made little effort to recognise more pro-active roles for which it is well equipped. Why is it not asserting itself? Who actually is in charge of its foreign policy? Few thus would deny that a paralysis has settled in on South African foreign policy. A recent analysis in the Weekly Mail lamented, "We are not consistent. We have not formulated clear principles. The formulators of our foreign policy do not consult with the people. The new appointments to our foreign ministry complain of being sidelined. There is no clear break with the past". At the core of this inaction is the fact that policy makers have failed to reconceptualise the way international issues are seen and policy is made. The world has changed and South Africa has changed, both dramatically; yet Cold War debates still divide the policy framework, old style security thinking still dominates higher ranks, and most importantly, the growing inter linkages between domestic and foreign policies in a post-Cold War world have gone largely unheeded. It is thus appropriate to sound a note of urgency: change and uncertainty in the world and dramatic transformation at home combine to make this an inopportune, even dangerous, time to have a directionless foreign policy. The broad purpose· of this paper is to identify the salient external and internal factors that will drive a new South African approach to the world. The first chapter presents a synthesis of dominant global trends, and sets them against the backdrop of major structural changes in international relations. The second chapter discusses change in South Africa in relation to world changes, new state objectives and shifting interest groups, and considers these implications for three major foreign policy areas. The third chapter looks at the policy framework and the ability of policy makers to conceptualise these dual changes and to formulate effective policies. The final chapter offers a 'road map' of policy options towards a true postapartheid, post-Cold War foreign policy.

No description available.

The global Cold War is used frequently by historians to frame the context of political, economic, social, military, and geographic history of the 20th century. This is often the case in Africa as well. This thesis set out to explore U.S.- South African relations during the 1960s. After conducting research in Record Group 59 (State Department Records) of the National Archives from 1967-1973, three case studies emerged that suggested that reexamination of how historians traditionally view U.S.-South African relations during this time period is necessary. The three case studies include U.S. use of naval ports in South Africa, the strategic geographic location of South Africa and its importance to NASA's satellite and missile tracking stations, and the policy of selling of weapons to South Africa by the U.S. While this is by no means an exhaustive study of this time period due to limited time in the National Archives, it does offer promise for more research involving this topic.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Mega-events such as the Olympic Games have emerged as one of the most significant features of the global era. Not only has the number of participants increased, but also the hosting of these events has been seen as an opportunity for countries to externally market themselves, in an attempt to raise their international profile, and to develop national identity. As such, many nations continue to enthusiastically compete to host these events. Despite the prestige of hosting events, South Africa has in the past been excluded from participating, let alone being considered to bid to host events of such magnitude. This was as a result of the Apartheid policy that extended into sport. After being admitted into the world of sport, it has joined the list of nations that regularly compete to bid. There are two questions that this study sets out to explore. Firstly, how did hosting of the Games market South Africa internationally? Secondly, did hosting the Games help celebrate South Africa's national identity? In trying to answer these questions, the marketing power concept has been used. Part of the proposition is that marketing power is more sought after by state elites who lack national identity. In light of this, South Africa has been used as a case study. Bidding to host the Olympic Games was no easy road for South Africa, and in the aftermath of the Bid, this study identifies the reasons why the Bid was unsuccessful. The findings suggest that South Africa's attempt to host the Games did indeed market the country internationally. However, the findings indicate that bidding to host the Games did not bolster national identity, instead it revealed that there was lack of unity. In addition there are some important lessons that can be drawn from this study. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hoë-profiel gebeure soos die Olimpiese Spele is een van die mees opmerklike gevolge van die globale era. Buiten dat die aantal deelnemers aan sulke gebeurtenisse dramaties togeneem het, het die eise en die kompetisie om sodanige gebeurtenisse aan te bied, toegeneem omdat state hierdeur hulself ekstern kan bemark en intern skep sulke gebeurtenisse 'n geleentheid om nasionale identiteit te bevorder. Ten spyte van die prestige wat die gasheer-staat in sulke gevalle te beurt val, is apartheid Suid- Afrika histories uitgesluit van deelname aan veral hoë profiel sport, en was die aanbieding van sulke gebeurtenisse in Suid-Afrika buite die kwessie. Namate Suid- Afrika weer 'n aanvaarde lid van die gemeenskap van nasies geword het, het Pretoria ook toenemend begin bie om hoë-profiel sportgebeurtenisse aan te bied. Hierdie studie verken twee sentrale vraagstukke. Eerstens, hoe bemark die aanbied van die Olimpiese Spele Suid-Afrika op 'n internasionale grondslag? Tweedens, help die aanbieding van sulke sportgebeure werklik om 'n gevoel van 'n nasionale identiteit onder Suid-Afrikaners aan te wakker? Ten einde die vrae te beantwoord, word in 'n hoë mate van die konsep, 'bemarkingsmag' ('marketing power') gebruik gemaak. Daar word deel geargumenteer dat bemarkingmag juis deur staatselites nagejaag word in samelewings waar nasionale identiteit gebrekkig ontwikkel is. Die Suid-Afrikaanse geval is dus by uitstek 'n toonaangewende voorbeeld van die tendens. In die studie word daar aangedui hoekom die bie proses ten einde die Olimpiese Spele aan te bied so 'n besondere komplekse uitdaging is, hoe dit deurgevoer is en waarom Suid-Afrika misluk het. Die bevindings suggereer dat motivering om die Spele aan te bied inderdaad gedryf is deur die behoefte om Suid-Afrika se bemarkingsmag uit te brei. Ten spyte hiervan, het die bie-proses ook 'n baie brose sin van nasionale identiteit ontbloot het en 'n duidelike rasse-skeidslyn in terme van populere steun vir die bie-proses. Die studie onttrek ook 'n aantal gevolgtrekkings wat vir ander bod-prosesse van waarde kan wees.

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the field of International Relations, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 2016 / In the early 1990s South Africa left the Apartheid-era and transformed into a country based on liberal democratic principles such as freedom and human rights. The soon to be inaugurated president, Nelson Mandela, promised that South Africa would base its new foreign policy on these same principles and the pursuit of the international human rights agenda. Initially this seemed to be the case; South Africa signed on to most international human rights conventions and even acted on these principles condemning Nigeria when the ruling regime executed human rights activists. However, once the country gradually began adopting neoliberal ideological positions, first domestically then in its foreign policy, the prominence of human rights in South Africa’s foreign policy began to wane. This is evidenced in South Africa’s actions on international organisations as well as the country’s approach to human rights challenges such as the Zimbabwean crisis in the early 2000s and the furore over planned visit of the Dalai Lama in 2011. Using a hermeneutic approach it is possible to gain an ontological understanding of the process by which this move towards neoliberalism lead to a economisation and commodification of South Africa’s foreign policy between 1994-2014. This in turn undermined the liberal democratic principles which underpinned the country’s international relations leading to a relegation of the human rights agenda to a subsequent by product which can be achieved through greater market liberalisation. / MT2017