Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The motive for this research was to provide clarity on the increasingly divergent opinions on the role and behaviour of South African companies in the rest of the African continent. The key question that can be asked is: “Are South African investments, saviour or villain of African Development” (Thomas, 2007)? Are they “exporting Apartheid” (Mkhabela, 2007) or are the fears raised against South African companies unfounded? The primary research objective of this study is to assess MTN-C’s contribution to the economic development of Cameroon. The specific research questions addressed in this study are: 1. What are the possible areas of economic impact? 2. How can the effects of MTN-C’s presence in Cameroon be measured—both qualitatively and quantitatively? 3. What recommendations can be made to MTN-C? To answer these questions, the researcher takes a multi-dimensional view of the economic impact across eight areas, viz., inflow of foreign direct capital, interaction with government, training and development of local staff, employment creation, local procurement, spread of local shareholding, the local mobile communications sector and corporate social investment initiatives. She assesses each of the above-mentioned eight elements and then draws some conclusions on what is perceived to be the true effect of MTN-C’s investments in Cameroon. After close to three years of in-depth research, which included several trips to Cameroon, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, direct observation, group discussions and survey research, it can be concluded that MTN-C has indeed had a positive impact in areas like Corporate Social Investment, training and development of local staff, employment creation and the inflow of foreign capital. However, much still needs to be done. The areas that have been identified as weak include the development of local suppliers, the interaction with government and the spread of local shareholding. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie is gemotiveer deur die soeke na groter helderheid met betrekking tot uiteenlopende beoordelings van die rol en optrede van Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings in die res van die Afrika-kontinent. Die kernvraag is: “Are South African investments saviour or villains of African development?” (Thomas, 2007) Is hulle besig om apartheid “uit te voer” (Mkhabela, 2007) of is dié vrese teenoor Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings ongegrond? Die primêre navorsingsoogmerk is die beoordeling van MTN Cameroon se bydrae tot die ekonomiese ontwikkeling in Kameroen. Spesifiek drie vrae word aangespreek. 1. Watter dimensies word ingesluit in ‘n studie van die “ekonomiese impak”? 2. Hoe kan die invloed van MTN Cameroon se teenwoordigheid in dié land gemeet word – sowel kwalitatief asook kwantitatief? 3. Watter aanbevelings kan op grond van dié beoordelings aan die maatskappy gemaak word? Om hierdie vrae te beantwoord word ‘n multi-dimensionele benadering gevolg, gebaseer op agt verskillende invloed-gebiede. Hulle sluit in die invloei van buitelandse kaptiaal, interaksie met die regering, opleiding en ontwikkeling van plaaslike werknemers, werkskepping, plaaslike aankope, die verspreiding van plaaslike aandeelhouding, die mobiele kommunikasiebedryf en sosiale investerings-inisiatiewe. Elkeen van dié elemente word ontleed op grond van vraelys-reaksies en ander insigte. Dit lei tot gevolgtrekkings op elkeen van die vlakke, wat tesame die volle omvang van die betrokkenheid weerspieël. Na drie jaar se interaksie van die navorser met Kameroen, diepte-onderhoude met vername rolspelers, direkte waarnemings, groepbesprekings en 40 voltooide vraelyste kom sy tot die gevolgtrekking dat MTN Cameroon wel ‘n positiewe rol speel in gebiede soos korporatiewe sosiale investerings, opleiding, werkskepping en die invloei van kapitaal, maar dat daar nog heelwat ruimte vir verbeterings is, veral wat plaaslike aankope, interaksie met die regering en plaaslike aandeelhouding betref.

Dissertation (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Dr. A.L. Geyer's appointment in June 1950 as the Union's new High Commissioner to London was largely due to the political objectives of the then government. He was confronted by a number of related challenges, i.e. the furthering of the existing multifaceted South-African-British relations, the promotion of the apartheid policy and convincing the Union's critics as to the merits of the above policy. Geyer, a loyal Afrikaner and staunch republican, experienced soon after arrival that the policy of apartheid and the Union Government's insistence on the transfer of the High Commission territories were placing the existing diplomatic relations under considerable strain. To Geyer's frustration the Union Government failed to realise that the application of the apartheid policy 'was affecting South Africa's foreign relations detrimentally. The effect of the Union's domestic policies was therefore prohibiting any possibility of the transfer of the British-controlled neighbouring territories. Geyer was thus faced with maintaining a delicate balance between white-centred aspirations in South Africa, championing South Africa's interests overseas and his own evolving perspective that the application of the apartheid policy was not going to be acceptable to the outside world. Geyer was also well aware that the Cold War would contribute substantially to the constitutional liberation of the former British colonies in Africa, which in turn would affect the composition of the Commonwealth and South Africa's future membership. He therefore took Union politicians to task for actions that were geared to satisfy short-term party-political expectations, without taking into account both the national and international ramifications of such actions. Geyer did not differ fundamentally with the principles and objectives of apartheid; however, he was no stereotyped Afrikaner who simply supported apartheid without any questioning. In his public appearances he emphasised the historical, cultural and sociopolitical motivation for apartheid, the practical embodiment of the policy and the rights and role of the whites in South Africa. He portrayed apartheid as a political model that envisages equal, but separate development for all races that would ensure the peaceful co- existence of a multi-racial community. Geyer continuously emphasised that only visible and positive results emanating from the application of apartheid, would guarantee acceptance of the policy and also secure the future of the white population in South Africa. Geyer was therefore very critical of the government's inability to give meaningful content to the policy of apartheid. Geyer's biggest personal disappointment was the inability of his mentor and friend, Dr. D.F. Malan, to rise above the role of the party politician in becoming a competent Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Prime Minister, a statesman of international stature. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Politieke oogmerke het daartoe gelei dat die Unieregering vir dr. A.L. Geyer in Junie 1950 na Londen gestuur het as die Unie se nuwe Hoë Kommissaris. Hy is deur verwante uitdagings gekonfronteer, naamlik om die veelvlakkige Suid-Afrikaans-Britse betrekkinge uit te bou, om die apartheidsbeleid te bevorder en om die kritici van die Unieregering te oortuig dat daar geregverdigde meriete in die beleid is. Geyer, 'n lojale en republikeinsgesinde Afrikaner, het na sy aankoms ervaar dat die Unieregering se apartheidsbeleid en die volgehoue aandrang om die oordrag van die Hoë Kommissariaatgebiede, toenemende diplomatieke spanning tussen die lande veroorsaak het. Tot Geyer se frustrasie kon die Unieregering nie insien dat die toepassing van die apartheidsbeleid direkte invloed uitoefen op Suid-Afrika se buitelande betrekkinge nie, wat weer die oordrag van die Brits-beheerde gebiede onmoontlik gemaak het. Geyer moes gevolglik 'n delikate balans handhaaf tussen die blanksentriese verwagtinge in die Unie, die bevordering van Suid-Afrika se belange in die buiteland en sy groterwordende perspektief dat die toepassing van die apartheid nie vir die buitewêreld aanvaarbaar is nie. Geyer was ook terdeë daarvan bewus dat die Koue Oorlog, die grondwetlike ontvoogding van Brittanje se Afrika-kolonies sou verhaas, wat weer beduidende implikasies vir die samestelling van die Statebond en die Unie se voortgesette lidmaatskap ingehou het. Hy het Unie-politici dus gewaarsku teen optredes wat daarop toegespits was om korttermyn partypolitieke verwagtinge te bevredig, sonder om die nasionale en ook internasionale implikasies van die uitsprake te verreken. Geyer het geen fundamentele verskille met die beginsels en oogmerke van apartheid gehad nie, maar terselfdertyd was hy ook nie 'n stereotipe Afrikaner en naprater van apartheid nie. In sy optredes het hy deurentyd die historiese, kulturele en sosio-politieke beweegredes vir apartheid, die beliggaming van die beleid en die blanke se aanspraak op en rol in Suid-Afrika beklemtoon. Apartheid is voorgehou as 'n politieke model wat ten doel het om deur middel van gelykwaardige, maar afsonderlike ontwikkeling die ruimte te skep vir die vreedsame voortbestaan van 'n veelrassige gemeenskap. Geyer het groot erns daarvan gemaak om te beklemtoon dat die aanvaarding van die apartheidsbeleid en die blanke se voortbestaan in Suid-Afrika nou verbind word aan die positiewe en sigbare gevolge van die toepassing van apartheid. Geyer het dit dan ook nodig gevind om kritiek uit te spreek oor die regering se klaarblyklike onvermoë om daadwerklike inhoud aan positiewe apartheid te gee. Die grootste persoonlike teleurstelling wat Geyer egter beleef het, was sy ontnugtering dat sy mentor en vriend, dr. D.F. Malan, nie sy rol as partypolitikus kon ontgroei en ontwikkel in 'n bekwame minister van Buitelandse Sake en 'n Eerste Minister wat 'n staatsman van internasionale statuur is nie.

The clash between South Africa's dual need of a new political identity and economic viability reflects not only the difficulty in conducting a traditional foreign policy with a strong ideological overlay but also has spurred the debate over whether her foreign policy is to be conducted on the basis of expediency or principle. This study argues that although the shift to a post-apartheid society has created the context for South African foreign policy to be shaped by a new culture of human rights, it remains an interest-based pragmatic activity rather than an exercise in the projection of ethical values or ideological principles. It seems that the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has not yet resolved the basic contradictions that have bedevilled its international thinking since it came into power. Faced with this dilemma, South Africa is often reduced to straddling the fence by half-heartedly supporting principles on one occasion (as in its relationship with the Republic of China), and on another pursuing its economic interests (as her intention to sell arms to the People's Republic of China attests). The government's basic goal of developing fruitful political and economic linkages without sacrificing the principles which underpin wider policy has proved elusive. The central proposition of this study is that the defining parameters of South African foreign policy have remained largely indeterminate because of the realities of the conflicting interests posed by its domestic and external concerns. In essence, the inability to reconcile primary foreign policy goals (preservation of national economic interest) with new foreign policy aspirations (promotion of human rights and peace through the pursuit of justice and fair-play) reflects a tense ambivalence in the founding principles of post apartheid South African foreign policy. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2001.

This is the first study of official relations between South Africa and Australia as conducted through resident High Commissions or Embassies. It reaches the conclusion that, though neither country loomed large on the other's scale of priorities, the relationship was at the outset perceived to be of greater value to Australia than to South Africa. It was initiated by the Australian government in 1945 as was the airlink which connected the two countries in 1952. Then flown by propeller-driven aircraft, the air route led to the expansion of Australian territory when the United Kingdom transferred to Australia sovereignty over the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, eight hours flying time from Perth and an essential refuelling stop en route to Southern Afnca. The first Australian High Commissioner, Sir George Knowles, arrived in South Africa in August 1946. The Smuts government did not attach much value to the relationship. Pleading shortage of staff, and to the embarrassment of the Australian government, it had not reciprocated with its own appointment by the time of its fall in May 1948. On assuming office the following month the new Prime Minister, Dr Malan responded positively to an Australian reminder about the lack of a South African High Commissioner. Dr P.R. Viljoen was appointed to the position and arrived in Canberra in June 1949. The relationship lacked substance and for relatively lengthy periods in the 1950s the High Commissioner's post was left vacant on both sides. The Australian government had proposed the establishment of relations on grounds inter alia that members of the British Commonwealth should be informed about each other's attitudes, policies and problems in the work of the United Nations. Yet it was the United Nations, particularly its composition, which subjected the relationship to its greatest strains. In focusing on the role and functions of individual diplomats the study throws light on what the profession or occupation of diplomacy encompassed at the time. Also canvassed is the development of the South African and Australian Departments of External Affairs from their beginnings to the early 1960s. / D. Litt et Phil. (History)

This study attempts to make a contribution to the debate on the role of South Africa within Southern African Development Community. An attempt is made to analyse this role within the context of regional integration debate. This role has been conceptualised within the dichotomies of hegemon versus partner. The study argues that South Africa is a hegemon in the region of SADC, and that given its overarching economic dominance and it has the potential of establishing its hegemony in the region. It maintains that there are several factors, which could facilitate South Africa's hegemonic dominance such as in military, technology and manufacturing sector. It concludes by arguing that given the changing geopolitical factors both within the region and the globe impedes South Africa from firmly expressing this hegemonic dominance. Furthermore, South Africa's pioneering role in the struggle to change the status quo globally in favour of the Southern states is another crucial factor, which imposes limitations on its hegemonic intentions regionally.

The relationship between South Africa and the United States was, historically, quite mutually profitable. The South African government regarded the United States as an ally in the world and sought continued friendship with them. The United States was mildly critical of the South African system of apartheid, but they, however, viewed South Africa as an ally. During the 1980's the relationship between the two countries became strained as the anti-apartheid voices in the United States grew louder and louder. The movement sought to end the atrocities of apartheid and change American foreign policy toward South Africa. The strongest diplomatic means available to them was imposing economic sanctions on South Africa in an attempt to force political change in the country. The anti-apartheid movement lobbied extensively gaining support among the American pub1ic and eventually the U.S. Congress. The sanctions campaign culminated in the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. Prior to the enactment of the CAAA the South African government and its allies launched their own campaign in an attempt to combat the imposition of sanctions. Lobbying played a key role in the process for those on both sides of the issue. For the anti- apartheid movement, lobbying was effective on the American public and the U.S Congress. For the South African government lobbying was effective on the conservative right wing and President Reagan and his administration.

This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the role and involvement of foreign donor entities in the processes of transforming and creating viable and sustainable municipal entities in South Africa. The discussion particularly focuses on the relationship between the donor community and the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and how this relationship has been nurtured, coordinated and managed. The study acknowledges the challenges pertaining to local government transformation and the role and mandate assigned to the DPLG by the South African Constitution and the Presidential Coordinating Council (PCC) for it to facilitate the creation of developmental local government. In discussing this, consideration is given to capacity and resource constraints within the Department, which necessitate that it collaborates closely with other stakeholders, particularly donors, in seeking to augment its resource base and capacity. The Department's lack of capacity is further complicated by the various pieces of legislation, which have a serious bearing on how municipalities have to work - irrespective of their capacity and resources limitations. The research also focuses on how this relationship, between the DPLG and foreign aid donors working in the local government sector, is coordinated and managed. From evidence gathered and interviews conducted, the conclusion is drawn that there is much room for the DPLG to improve and strategically focus its interaction with donors as informed by its mandate and strategic priorities. Proposals, which entail development of donor management guidelines, setting up of a donor coordination unit within DPLG, the improvement of the understanding of donor work politics and modalities among DPLG officials, etc., are made.

This study is a contribution to the literature on South Africa's foreign policy since 2000-2004. It provides a theoretical framework within which South Africa's foreign policy should be understood. It attempts to explain the contradictions that have been apparent in South Africa's foreign policy by looking at the constraints inherent in South Africa's position as an emerging middle power. It argues that South Africa's pluralist inclinations are constrained by Africa's evolving multilateral forums and that South Africa's preference for such undermines the realization and achievement of her foreign policy principles and goals. It also argues that as a realist middle power, South Africa is constrained the ambivalence shown by the region towards her exercising leadership in the region. This is due to South Africa's history of destruction in Southern Africa in the 1980's. South Africa's quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe provides the focal point for the study. The study argues that it is not the case that South Africa is not concerned with human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Instead, this concern has been expressed in ways that do not tarnish South Africa's own image in Africa. This has been done by engaging Zimbabweans through multilateral forums. This study concludes that this strategy failed to bring about resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis.

M.A. (History) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

On 10 May 1994 the European Union offeredSouth Africa a package of measures to ... send a strong political signal to the incoming govemment and to the South African population, thus proving its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South Africa after the elections. This package consisted of two parts: 1. A series of short term implementations to take place with immediate effect to help South Africa's development and transition, and 2. An offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should the new government so request. South Africa accepted the European Union's offer to negotiate a long-term relationship, and in response requested membership of the structure governing the Union's relations with the rest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, namely the Lomé Convention. Due to various incompatibilities South Africa was not allowed to join this organisation. In its place the European Union offered to negotiate an agreement with South Africa that would lead to a Free Trade Area. This agreement was in keeping with the rules as laid down by the World Trade Organisation. It envisaged the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers between the Union and South Africa over a period not exceeding 12 years, allowing for asymmetry in terms of time constraints in implementation only. South Africa saw this type of agreement as inconsistent with the desire expressed by the European Union to support the countries development and the integration of the Southern African region. In its place South Africa proposed a new concept in trade agreement, this concept, known as the Trade and Development Agreement, embodied both trade liberalisation and support for development. This agreement would introduce a new paradigm of thought to govern trade between developed countries and developing countries within the World Trade Organisation's rules. This paper explores the events that unfolded in these negotiations. It attempts to discover whether, in the current global environment, it is possible, or beneficial, for the developed world to act in an altruistic manner towards another state in order to assist its development.