This dissertation examines student radicalism in Tennessee between Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) and the national backlash against the Kent State University shootings in Kent, Ohio in May 1970. As the first statewide study of student activism, and one of the few examinations of southern student activism, it broadens the understanding of New Left student radicalism from its traditionally defined hotbeds in the Northeast and the West Coast. It also argues for a consideration of student radicalism that incorporates white and black accounts, assessing issues surrounding civil rights, labour, the renegotiation of student roles on campus, and Vietnam on black and formerly all-white campuses. Three main arguments drive this dissertation. First, the notion of the New Left inhabiting only a brief moment in time, rising and falling in the 1960s—years of hope, days of rage, in Todd Gitlin’s influential telling—is problematic in the context of Tennessee. The location of Highlander Folk School in Tennessee created a strong connection to Old Left labour activism for the state’s New Left. Student movements both developed more slowly in Tennessee and fractured more slowly. My second argument is that forms of radicalism in Tennessee were distinctly southern. The region’s political order was more stifling than its counterpart in the North, and could easily turn more deadly. Students radicals in the South grasped this difference. Any left in the South had to address issues of race, but, in light of the danger, had to do so gingerly. Thirdly, race mattered a great deal to southern leftists, black and white, at first bringing them together and later driving them apart. Both black and white students viewed attempts to establish personal autonomy within campus and community organising as centrally important to their activities. Black and white students understood personal autonomy in a broad sense, conceptualised of as ‘student power’: it covered immediate concerns over universities’ assumption of parental power over students, as well as apparent infringements of civil rights and civil liberties. This dissertation reconstructs this pursuit of student power, both within campuses and beyond, and details the growing rift between black and white student interests.

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In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

No description available.