Malgré la fréquence des périodes de crises financières, les États ne bénéficient pas d’un mécanisme d’insolvabilité. Prenant acte de cette absence de régulation institutionnelle, notre recherche poursuit un double objectif : identifier les outils existants pour traiter l’insolvabilité de l’État et évaluer leur efficacité. L’insolvabilité de l’État présente plusieurs spécificités. La première découle de l’absence de régulation en la matière : à défaut de mécanisme d’insolvabilité applicable, c’est le juge qui est susceptible d’être saisi. La seconde relève de la personne du débiteur. La qualité souveraine de la partie débitrice influe sur les modalités de concrétisation de l’insolvabilité. Dans une telle situation, l’État est tenté d’intervenir unilatéralement sur sa dette, soit pour annuler les contrats de prêt, soit pour les suspendre ou les modifier. Enfin, la troisième spécificité réside dans la personne des créanciers. Ceux-ci ne forment pas un tout uniforme. Ils sont issus d’ordres juridiques divers et poursuivent des objectifs variés. Pour répondre à chacune de ces difficultés, le droit international privé constitue un outil privilégié, du moins à l’égard des créanciers privés. Face aux difficultés soulevées par l’insolvabilité de l’État, le résultat est cependant contrasté. Lors de la question de l’accès au juge, le droit international privé se révèle décevant. Il n’est pas apte à satisfaire un traitement unitaire de l’insolvabilité. En revanche, les mécanismes substantiels de droit international privé apportent des progrès significatifs. S’ils sont adaptés, ils sont susceptibles d’assurer une certaine régulation de l’insolvabilité étatique. / Despite the large number of sovereign debt crises around the world over the centuries, international law on the matte is still very much underdeveloped. There exists no bankruptcy regime applicable to sovereign states. With this lack of institutional regulation in mind, our research aims at identifying a set of tools that can be used in order to provide a satisfactory treatment of state insolvency. State insolvency has specific characteristics. Firstly, due to the lack of regulation, the judge is the only authority that can be seized in case of insolvency. Secondly, being a sovereign powers in order to repudiate or modify sovereign debt. It can also declare a moratorium. Thirdly, the insolvency involves various creditors who each have different goals. They come from different legal orders. Private international law is a primary tool to tackle these issues, at least when creditors are private persons. However, the results of this research are contrasted. Private international law is unable to address the difficulties related to the access to the courts. Before judges, the treatment of State insolvency can only be fragmentary. By contrast, at a substantial level, some private international law mechanisms can sustain progress. If they are adjusted, they ensure a certain amount of state insolvency regulation.

This thesis consists of three chapters on macroeconomics and international economics. The first studies the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with financial frictions. Profit-maximizing banks with endogenous leverage ratio expand credit lending during economic booms and become increasingly vulnerable to unanticipated economic shocks. Countercyclical macroprudential instruments are found to be effective in dampening economic fluctuations and stabilizing the credit cycle. However, a policy regulating the loan-to-value ratio of the residential households causes a credit shift towards the business sector. Optimal simple rules are selected using welfare analysis to provide practical implications for the evaluation, estimation and future implementation of macroprudential policies in alleviating economic risk of financial intermediaries. The second chapter examines the impact of political risk on sovereign default. An economic model with endogenous default decisions shows that political instability increases the likelihood of sovereign default. A quantitative analysis using data from 68 countries in the period from 1970 to 2010 finds that both short and long-run aspects of the political environment have significant effects. The findings suggest that a country is more likely to experience default when i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and iii) it has a less democratic political system. The third chapter investigates the bidirectional relationship between banking and sovereign debt crisis. An economic model with financial intermediaries and a government sector shows that sovereign default may cause a banking crisis as banks hold a large amount of government bonds. Nevertheless, a significant amount of bailouts or bank guarantees may constrain the short-term liquidity of the government sector and trigger a sovereign debt crisis. Empirical studies using the credit default swap spreads of the Eurozone support the two-way linkage. Quantitative results also show increasing spillover effects across borders as globalization leads to greater integration of financial markets.

This Master's thesis focuses on the analysis of the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. It studies how to measure and express competitiveness. It also describes the path of Spain to economic growth through periods of recession and looks into the different Spanish economic sectors and thoroughly examines the economic situation of the various autonomous communities. This thesis also includes a case study of the Catalan separatist movement. The last chapter tries to make an economic outlook.

The imbalances within the Euro-zone were the main reasons of the crisis that had led to the growing budget deficits in the Southern Europe resulting in the accumulation of unsustainable debt. The imbalances were caused by the declining competitiveness of the South vis-s-vis the North. The main causes of the declining competitiveness are the differences in unit labor costs invoked by different regulations concerning the labor markets in the Euro-zone countries and the diverging levels of productivity, which is liked with the different levels of technological advancement. The contributing factor is the institutional imperfections of the EMU, that did not allow the countries in Southern Europe to restore their competitiveness by traditional means without providing them with alternatives.

In my first chapter I follow the methodology put forth by Bohn(1998), the market-based sustainability method to measure whether the sovereign debt is sustainable or not. I work with a panel of 125 countries for 26 years and along with incorporate different institutions ratings by ICRG’s political risk ratings. In my analysis I find out that the debt on average is sustainable for countries up to certain extent and thus giving us an inverted U shape debt-exports curve. I use country exports to find out if the debt is sustainable or not. I also find that better institutions do give an edge to countries when it comes to borrowing as it lowers the risk expectations on the lenders part. The findings do vary based on the country’s income level and based on its geographical location.

Critics have alleged that the process of negotiating sovereign debt relief is unduly politicized and favors a global capitalist elite over national and democratic interests. This study evaluates the legitimacy of these criticisms by analyzing the cases of Russia and Poland in the six year period after the end of state communism in the 1990s. An alternate hypothesis, that the words of state leaders both in public and in meetings with influential global capitalist agencies determine the outcomes of key negotiations, is advanced through a careful analysis of video recordings of key speeches as well as other sources. A comparison of these cases is used to develop insights into the political role of transnational financial institutions and global capitalism. / Master of Arts

This study offers a reinterpretation of the so-called Eurozone crisis, arguing that its crisis character is overstated and that it is rather a normal stage in the process of European banking sector integration. Particularly, I maintain that it is neither a sovereign debt crisis caused by profligate peripheral governments, nor a crisis of the Eurozone's common monetary policy. Nor, however, are the Eurozone's low growth, high unemployment, and economic and political instability deliberate policies, whether by German or Greek governments, European institutions, or the European banking circuitry. Rather, I trace the Eurozone's low growth and high unemployment back to what I call transpositions. Transpositions change the possible boundaries of perceiving political and economic situations by altering the syntagmatic structure governing their intelligibility. The shift from 2003-2007 'boom times' to post-2007 'times of crisis' is one such transposition, which occurs behind the backs of human actors and thus forms the horizon of possible behavior of market and political actors. The Eurozone's 'crisis' transposition, results in differentiations within the asset class of Euro-denominated sovereign debt between a 'core,' comprising Germany, Austria, Latvia, and Finland, among others, and a 'periphery,' encompassing Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus. It follows that the solvency of Eurozone member states is a derivative function of banking sector liquidity, reversing the conventional 'sovereign debt crisis' explanation to what I call the country-fundamental transposition. The second transposition I explore is the austerity transposition. I maintain that the Eurozone's real economy is more interconnected than conventional narratives of European economic unification allow, and that supposedly national European economies – including particularly that of Germany – are integrated subcircuits of Europe's real economy. Constituting them as supposedly national economies is itself a transposition, necessary for the preservation of the European banking circuitry's interconnected balance sheets. Yet, the austerity transposition goes further, beyond a form of political economy oriented towards growth and sustainability, and into a moral economy of condemnation differentiating between morally virtuous and morally pernicious economies in the Eurozone. Its destructive effects are therefore neither irrational nor the result of a German hegemonic agenda, but that of the Eurozone's post-2007 syntagmatic structure. / Ph. D.

The global economic and financial crisis resulted in worldwide rising government debt levels, especially from 2008 to 2011. This thesis focuses on the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union and illustrates its member countries' debt levels in the period from 2001 to 2011. Two main indicators are considered: accumulated sovereign debt and its share in GDP. The following part outlines main measures taken in order to decrease general debt level in the European Union. Furthermore a selection of various presented proposals is introduced. The last part of the thesis speculatively evaluates all of these instruments and indicates possible imperfections.

This thesis consists of three essays concerned with endogenous fiscal policy and its interaction with political economy constraints. The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the cyclical behavior of endogenous government consumption over the business cycle absent a commitment mechanism in a neoclassical economy with Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shocks and investment shocks. Tax rates that finance public consumption are chosen in a time consistent way in a dynamic game between the government and a representative agent that values public goods in his utility. It is found that government consumption set without commitment behaves procyclical in response to the mentioned shocks. The government-consumption-output ratio is mildly procyclical or countercyclical depending on the selected calibration. Particularly, the elasticity of substitution between private and public goods plays an important role. The second essay showed in Chapter 3 extends the model studied in Chapter 2 adding agent heterogeneity in wealth and labor productivity. The aim of this study is to identify how policy outcomes are affected by inequality of households, particularly the median voter's choice of tax rates that finance public goods. For a standard RBC calibration to the U.S. economy the result is a strong procyclical comovement of public consumption with output, and a relatively weak procyclical comovement of the output share of public consumption with output, that becomes stronger with rising inequality. The politico-economic channel induces causality from output to lagged tax rates, therefore after a Hicks neutral productivity shock the median voter tries to delay the increase in the tax rate, such that the increment will take place just after the accumulation of more capital. In the case of equal agents the response is to decrease the tax rate in the first year after the shock. Additionally, the model predicts that the size of government consumption decreases with inequality. The last essay in Chapter 4 presents a stylized model of external sovereign debt that incorporates corruption in the form of rent-seeking groups by which the choice to cooperate or non-cooperate in providing public goods, in extracting rents and in issuing debt, is endogenized. More than one rent-seeking group originates a "tragedy of the commons" over fiscal resources that make the borrower economy to show collective fiscal impatience. External creditors envision that impatience and require higher interest rates for buying bonds, exacerbating the problem of high debt. The high level of interest rates decreases the wealth of the country and endangers its ability to repay the debt. We show that bailout plans, defined as temporary loans with lower than market level interest rates, are not effective in such economies.

Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. With one fiscal authority, private information results in a deterministic outcome. When a public signal is available, the model behaves in a similar manner to a sunspot model. In line with much of the global games literature, improving public information has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Finally, the model is extended to include a second fiscal authority, which captures a similar sunspot result and illustrates the potential for externalities in fiscal policy. Lower debt in the less indebted authority can push a more indebted authority into crisis. Lower debt makes the healthier authority relatively more attractive, which causes the investors to treat the heavily indebted authority more conservatively. In certain circumstances, this is sufficient to cause a coordination failure. Chapter 4: A debt game with correlated information This chapter models of debt roll-over where a continuum of investors receives correlated signals on whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent. The investors face a collective action problem: a sufficient proportion of investors must agree to participate in the debt roll-over for it to be a success. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates in the deal, the debtor will default. The game has a unique switching strategy, which results in global uncertainty being preserved. The ex ante distribution of play (conditional on the true solvency of the debtor) follows a Vasicek credit distribution. The ex ante probability of a debt crisis is affected by the exogenous model parameters. Of particular interest is the observation that increasing private noise unambiguously reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Unsurprisingly, increasing the fiscal space or return on debt also decreases the probability of a crisis. Chapter 5: Bailouts and politics The final chapter examines the political-economic equilibrium in a two-period model with overlapping generations and a financial sector, which is inspired by the model in Tabellini (1989). The public policy is chosen under majority rule by the agents currently alive. It demonstrates that the bailout policy adopted in the second period has important effects on the bank's financing decisions in the first period. By adopting a riskier financing regime (i.e. higher leverage) in the first period, the older generation can extract consumption from the younger generation in the second period. Sovereign backstops of the financial sector are state-contingent: they can appear costless for long periods of time but eventually result in a socialization of private-sector debt. It is this mechanism that makes implementing capital requirements costly to investors yet beneficial to the younger generation. The model also highlights two important issues: (i) bank capital is endogenous and (ii) proposed resolution mechanisms must be politically credible. It suggests that a major benefit of increasing and narrowing equity-capital requirements or increasing liquidity ratios is that they are implemented ex ante and therefore available either to absorb losses in the event of a crisis or to reduce the possibility of large drops in asset values. Finally, this chapter also provides a structure by which to interpret the stylized facts of Calomiris et al. (2014): that more populist political institutions are associated with more fragile financial systems.