I argue that existing views in the political equality debate are inadequate. I propose an alternative approach to equality and argue its superiority to the competing approaches. I apply the approach to some issues in global justice relating to global poverty and to the inability of some countries to develop as they would like. In this connection I discuss institutions of international trade, sovereign debt and global reserves and I focus particularly on the WTO, IMF and World Bank.

Aquesta tesis anal.litza les Clausules d'Acció Col.lectiva i les Clàusules de Precedència quan: 1) el repagament és endogen i depèn d'un esforç de lobbying dels creditors. 2) el litigi és purament redistributiu. Hi ha una externalitat positiva del esforç que interactua amb la distribució dels actius i les clàusules contractuals. Els litigis individuals no són desitjables socialment perquè redueixen l'incentiu al esforç. Les Clàusules d'Acció Col.lectiva bloquegen els litigis i maximitzen el repagament. La introducció de Clàusules de Precedència modifica els incentius al esforç. Aquest efecte pot ser positiu o negatiu.El capítol 2 explora la relació entre les crisis de deute sobirà i el creixement de les industries manufacureres. Les industries amb competició importadora intensa rendeixen relativament millor després del default. Les industries exportadores creixen més lentament al voltant del default. Les industries caracteritzades per alta intensitat del capital i tangibilitat dels actius sofreixen menys els effectes dels defaults. / This thesis analyzes Collective Action Clauses and Seniority Clauses when: 1) repayment is endogenous and depends on creditor lobbying effort; 2) litigation for full repayment is purely redistributive. There is a positive externality of effort that interacts with asset distribution and contractual clauses. Individual litigation is not desirable from a social point of view since it weakens the incentives to exert effort. Collective Action Clauses block litigation and maximize repayment. The adoption of Seniority Clauses modifies the incentives to exert effort and thus repayment. This effect can be positive or negative.Chapter 2 explores the linkage between sovereign debt crises and manufacturing industry growth using a difference-in-difference methodology. Industries facing tough import competition perform relatively better after a sovereign default. Export-oriented sectors grow more slowly around default times. Industries characterized by high physical capital intensity and asset tangibility tend to suffer less from default episodes.

This thesis sheds light on several macroeconomic aspects of international and domestic goods trade during the last three decades. The first chapter investigates the causes of the growth of world trade during this period and shows that it is best understood from a factor-proportions perspective. The second chapter analyses the decline in trade experienced by countries in the wake of sovereign debt crises. Empirical evidence suggests that it is due to a reduction in exporters’ access to foreign credit. The third and final chapter provides an explanation for the procyclicality of input trade among domestic firms. I argue that periods of economic expansion affect vertically integrated producers asymmetrically, providing incentives for intermediate-goods trade between fast-growing and slow-growing firms. / Aquesta tesis posa en relleu varis aspectes macroeconòmics del comerç internacional i domèstic en les últimes tres dècades. El primer capítol investiga les causes del creixement del comerç mundial en aquest període i demostra que s’entén millor des de la perspectiva dels proporcions dels factors. El segon capítol analitza la caiguda del comerç experimentada per països arran de crisis del deute sobirà. L’evidencia empírica suggereix que aquest declivi es deu a la reducció en l’accés dels exportadors al crèdit extern. El tercer i últim capítol ofereix una explicació per la prociclicitat del comerç d’inputs entre empreses domèstiques. En períodes d’expansió econòmica els productors integrats verticalment es veuen afectats d’una forma asimètrica, proporcionant així incentius pel comerç de bens intermedis entre empreses que creixen a diferent ritme.

Les crises financières internationales ne se présentent pas comme des événements rares et isolés dans le temps. Des dénominateurs communs classiques à toute crise financière se retrouvent dans chaque cas historique : la détérioration des indicateurs macroéconomiques, la psychologie et les paniques des investisseurs, la spéculation. La problématique des dettes souveraines ne relevait jusqu’à présent principalement que des pays en développement, alors que les récentes perturbations financières ont démontré que les pays développés pouvaient également être gravement affectés. L’objectif de ce travail est d’analyser les évolutions du cadre juridique de la gestion des dettes souveraines pour réunir des éléments qui permettent de comprendre le choix normatif privilégié par chaque opérateur. L’actuel scénario d’endettement des États souverains entraîne nécessairement un bouleversement irréversible des règles et des structures juridiques connues qui visent à assurer le bon fonctionnement de l’économie mondiale. Face à l’actuelle incertitude normative, il est primordial d’étudier les supports du financement souverain, le traitement des crises, les propositions de réformes visant à améliorer le système et le rôle des institutions multilatérales dans la gestion de la dette souveraine. Après avoir déterminé l’existence d’un engagement international de gestion des dettes souveraines, nous plaidons pour la mise en œuvre d’un ensemble normatif d’outils conçus pour intégrer les réglementations nationales sur la base de modèles préexistants. / Historically, international financial crises do not occur in isolation but rather go hand in hand with the deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, investor panic and speculation. Until recently, the sovereign debt issue has principally concerned developing countries. However, the recent financial turmoil has revealed that developed countries can similarly be severely affected. Since the beginning of the 20th century, experts in international law have periodically discussed the possible remedies to the endemic situation of sovereign indebtedness. In 2001, the International Monetary Fund launched a proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism known as the ‘Krueger Plan’; this was quickly abandoned in 2003. Due to the present economic and political cul-de-sac, the legal framework of sovereign debt management strongly preoccupies the international community. The current sovereign debt scenario necessarily involves an irreversible disruption of the legal rules and structures that currently support a proper functioning global economy. This doctoral thesis analyses the evolution of the legal framework and the normative choices favoured by each actor. Identifying which particular legal issues are essential to evaluate such complexity allows us to deepen the theoretical and practical suggestions designed to facilitate the resolution of sovereign debt crises. After establishing the leading international requirements for sovereign debt management, this thesis advocates the implementation of a normative set of tools designed to integrate domestic regulations on the basis of previous models. / Internationale Finanzkrisen erweisen sich als nicht seltene und zeitlich unbegrenzte Ereignisse. Jeder Finanzkrise in der Historie haften die gleichen klassischen Charakteristiken an: die Beschädigung makroökonomischer Indikatoren, der Psychologie sowie die Panik der Investoren, Spekulationen. Darüber hinaus beschränken sich die aktuellen Finanzstörungen nicht mehr nur auf Entwicklungsländer. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht darin, die Entwicklung des Rechtsrahmens der Verwaltung souveräner Schulden zu analysieren, um Elemente zusammenzutragen, die es erlauben die bevorzugten normativen Entscheidungen jedes Akteures zu verstehen, zu bewerten und im Anschluss entsprechend Handlungsanweisungen zu geben. Das gegenwärtige Szenario der Verschuldung souveräner Staaten führt unweigerlich zu einer unumkehrbaren Umwälzung der bekannten Rechtsverordnungen und -strukturen, die auf die Gewährleistung eines reibungslosen Funktionierens der Weltwirtschaft abzielen. Angesichts der gegenwärtigen normativen Unsicherheit, ist es von größter Bedeutung die Auseinandersetzung mit finanziellen Krisen, die entsprechenden Reformvorschläge, die Suche nach Systemverbesserungen hinsichtlich einer Marktregulierung und die Rolle der multilateralen Institutionen bezüglich der Verwaltung souveräner Schulden genauer zu untersuchen. Nach der Feststellung des Vorliegens einer internationalen Verpflichtung zum Staatsschuldenmanagement wird die Einführung einer Reihe normativer Werkzeuge befürwortet, um nationale Vorschriften auf Grundlage bereits bestehender Modelle zu integrieren.

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, titled "Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking", I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-off, liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium. The second chapter, titled "Gambling Traps", analyzes macroeconomic dynamics under this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that self-fulfilling expectations about high bank risk-taking may lead to 'gambling traps' associated with slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent decline in economic activity. I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Bank's longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) may perpetuate gambling traps. The third chapter, titled ''Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks'', is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid · Zochowski. In this chapter, we present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Financial stability is achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits or collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks.

Submitted by Marcelo Reis Dreyer de Souza (marcelo.dreyer@gmail.com) on 2015-02-22T21:25:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MarceloSouza_final.pdf: 1013317 bytes, checksum: 78632b388bcd25a528ba8a7ef46e71ff (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-02-23T23:00:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MarceloSouza_final.pdf: 1013317 bytes, checksum: 78632b388bcd25a528ba8a7ef46e71ff (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-24T13:41:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MarceloSouza_final.pdf: 1013317 bytes, checksum: 78632b388bcd25a528ba8a7ef46e71ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-27 / Este trabalho analisa, sob a ótica da sustentabilidade da dívida, os efeitos de se manter um elevado nível de reservas internacionais juntamente com um elevado estoque de dívida pública. Busca-se o nível ótimo de reservas para o Brasil através de uma ferramenta de gestão de risco, por simulações de Monte Carlo. Considerando as variáveis estocásticas que afetam a equação de acumulação da dívida, e entendendo a relação entre elas, pode-se estudar as propriedades estocásticas da dinâmica da dívida. Da mesma forma, podemos analisar o impacto fiscal de um determinado nível de reservas ao longo do tempo e verificar quais caminhos se mostram sustentáveis. Sob a ótica da sustentabilidade da dívida, a escolha que gera a melhor relação dívida líquida / PIB para o Brasil é aquela que utiliza o máximo das reservas internacionais para reduzir o endividamento local. No entanto, como há aspectos não capturados nesta análise, tais como os benefícios das reservas em prevenir crises e em funcionar como garantia para investimentos externos, sugere-se que as reservas não excedam os níveis reconhecidos pela literatura internacional que atendam a estes fins. A indicação final deste estudo é que as reservas internacionais funcionam como um instrumento de proteção ao país quando o endividamento e o custo dele não são tão expressivos, como são atualmente no Brasil. / With the perspective of debt sustainability, this paper analyses the effects of maintaining a high level of international reserves with a high stock of public debt. An optimal level of reserves for Brazil is pursued using a risk management tool, through Monte Carlo simulations. Considering the stochastic variables that affect the equation of debt accumulation, and understanding the relation between them, it is possible to study the stochastic properties of the debt. Similarly, we can analyze the fiscal impact of a given level of reserves and verify which paths prove sustainable. From the perspective of the debt sustainability, the choice that generates the best net debt / GDP for Brazil is the one that uses the maximum of international reserves to reduce local debt. However, as there are some aspects that this analysis does not capture, as the benefit of the reserves in preventing crises and serving as collateral for foreign investment, is suggested that reserves should not exceed levels recognized by the international literature that meet these purposes. The final indication of this study is that reserves function as a protective device when the debt and its cost are not so expressive as they are currently in Brazil.

Cette thèse cherche à savoir si la méthode décentralisée, officiellement mise en avant dans la gestion des crises de la dette souveraine depuis leur origine, est non seulement réalisable, mais également efficace en termes de répartition équitable du fardeau de la dette. Nous définissons en effet un processus de restructuration efficace comme une procédure de courte durée (inférieure à un an) et qui respecte les besoins des deux parties prenantes au contrat. Si du côté des créanciers, la décote ne doit pas être abusive, du côté du débiteur, la dette doit redevenir soutenable, au sens à la fois économique et social du terme. Le terrain d'analyse des processus de renégociation de la dette se concentre exclusivement sur les économies d'Amérique Latine, dans la mesure où elles représentent les débiteurs ayant enregistré le plus grand nombre de défauts au cours de l'histoire. À travers une méthode pluridisciplinaire, nous défendons finalement la thèse selon laquelle l'échec des différents processus de restructuration est directement subordonné à l'iniquité du partage du fardeau de la dette, laquelle fait suite à un déséquilibre des pouvoirs de négociation inhérente au cadre de gestion décentralisée. Notre posture macroéconomique et notre démarche inductive induisent un cadre d'analyse socio-économique, lequel fait appel à un approfondissement historique, en termes d'économie politique, mais également à une étude basée sur la psychologie sociale. La thèse est structurée autour de deux parties, elles-mêmes subdivisées en deux chapitres. La première partie s'attache à comprendre les origines et les modalités de prévention et de gestion des crises, ainsi que leurs échecs. Elle conjugue de fait l'observation empirique et les soubassements théoriques de la décentralisation. De fait, le premier chapitre fait état, au vu de la double responsabilité à l'œuvre dans le déclenchement et l'enlisement dans la crise, de l'échec de la méthode décentralisée sur le long terme. En effet, non seulement la décentralisation apparaît inapplicable, puisqu'une tierce partie est systématiquement contrainte d'intervenir, mais elle ne permet pas non de plus de répartir équitablement les coûts de la crise. Le second chapitre cherche consécutivement à comprendre pourquoi ce processus de restructuration est néanmoins maintenu. L'économie politique de la décentralisation montre alors que le choix entre la régulation et le « laissez-faire » ne tient pas tant à des critères d'efficacité économique qu'à des considérations idéologiques et politiques. La deuxième partie de cette thèse propose symétriquement des pistes de réflexion afin de pallier les principaux écueils relevés lors des différents épisodes de défaut et de restructuration. Ainsi, si le troisième chapitre répond au second, le quatrième fait écho au premier. En effet, le troisième chapitre montre que la décentralisation ne peut aboutir en raison non seulement de ses écueils techniques, mais surtout de la nature des deux parties au contrat. L'immunité souveraine ayant été relativisée dans les deux premiers chapitres, il s'agit ici d'analyser le fonctionnement des marchés selon une méthode alternative au concept d'efficience. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous faisons appel aux préceptes de Keynes (1936) et de son analyse en termes psychosociaux, que nous approfondissons au travers du courant de la finance comportementale. Une telle étude révèle ainsi l'incapacité des créanciers à s'organiser de bonne foi, laquelle représente pourtant la condition sine qua non de la réalisation et de l'efficacité de la méthode décentralisée. Par conséquent, le dernier chapitre de ce travail conclue sur la nécessité d'un revirement en faveur d'une approche plus centralisée, laquelle inclut une tierce partie neutre, compétente et institutionnalisée. / The aim of this dissertation is to know whether the decentralized approach, officially put forward in the management of sovereign debt crises since their origin, is not only feasible but also efficient in terms of equity of the debt burden sharing. We define indeed an efficient restructuring process as a procedure of short duration (less than one year) and that meets the needs of both parties. If, in the side of creditors, the discount should not be abusive, towards the debtor, the debt must become sustainable, in both economic and social terms. Field analysis process of renegotiating debt focuses exclusively on Latin American economies, insofar as they represent debtors who historically recorded the highest number of defaults. Through a multidisciplinary approach, we finally defend the thesis that the failure of the various restructuring process is directly subordinate to the iniquity of sharing the debt burden, which is due to an imbalance of bargaining power, as an inherent part of decentralized management. Our macroeconomic and inductive approaches built the framework for socio-economic analysis, which uses history, political economy, but also a study based on social psychology. This dissertation is structured in two parts, themselves divided into two chapters. The first part focuses on understanding the origins of crises, their prevention and crisis management, and then their failures. It combines empirical observation and theoretical underpinnings of the decentralization. Specifically, the first chapter outlines, given the dual responsibility in the onset and sinking into the crisis, the failure of the decentralized approach in the long term. It concludes that not only decentralization is inapplicable, since a third party is always forced to intervene, but nor it does allow an fair sharing of the crisis costs. The second chapter consecutively seeks to understand why such a restructuring process is still maintained. The political economy of decentralization then shows that the choice between regulation and "laissez-faire" is not so much linked to economic efficiency criteria, but rather to ideological and political considerations. The second part of this work symmetrically proposes lines of thought to overcome the main obstacles identified in most cases of defaults and restructurings. Thus, if the third chapter addresses the second, fourth echoes the first. Indeed, the third chapter shows that decentralization can't be efficient, not only because of its technical pitfalls, but also because of the nature of the both contractual parties. Sovereign immunity having been put into perspective in the first two chapters, the point here is to analyze the functioning of financial markets in an alternative way, compared with the efficiency hypothesis. That is why we go into the Keynes psychosocial analysis (1936) in depth with the behavioral finance. Such a study reveals the inability of creditors to organize themselves in good faith, while it is the sine qua non condition of the decentralized approach implementation and efficiency. Therefore, the final chapter concludes on the need for a shift towards a more centralized approach, which includes a neutral, competent and institutionalized third party. Here, if multilateralism must prevail as a model of collaborative thinking, in regard to the management of the current debt crisis in Europe, such a possibility remains unlikely in the short term. This is why debtor countries may have to take some unilateral decisions, including potentially legitimate and transparent debt repudiation in case of sinking into the crisis, in order to compel the international community to make that needed shift. Keywords: Sovereign debt, Restructuration, Decentralized approach, Dependency theories, Political Economy, Behavioral Finance.

Submitted by Renato José Rodrigues Fernandes (renatojrf87@gmail.com) on 2013-05-01T19:50:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado - Renato José Rodrigues Fernandes.pdf: 706316 bytes, checksum: c3ec791ac990f327104c8e50900f5641 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-05-02T13:17:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado - Renato José Rodrigues Fernandes.pdf: 706316 bytes, checksum: c3ec791ac990f327104c8e50900f5641 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-02T13:36:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado - Renato José Rodrigues Fernandes.pdf: 706316 bytes, checksum: c3ec791ac990f327104c8e50900f5641 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-04-09 / This work aims to investigate the quantitative implications of a fiscal policy rigidity model developed by Gonçalves e Guimaraes (2012) and to answer if it is able to generate more defaults in equilibrium without using a strong ad hoc assumption about the costs in terms of product of a default on sovereign debt in order to be able to generate the desired results according to what is observed in economic data, i.e., that defaults tend to occur in bad times. The main hypothesis of this model is that the government cannot commit to a fiscal adjustment to repay the debt that is coming due because it chooses the tax rate in the previous period. Thus, when facing a low product in a given period, the sovereign cannot adjust its revenue to meet his obligations and has to decide either to increase the level of debt or to repudiate its debt and not repay. In the results, we have that the fiscal rigidity increases the occurrence of defaults in at least one order of magnitude in comparison to other quantitative models of sovereign debt and helps to explain the occurrence of defaults in periods of low product in the Economy. / Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar as implicações quantitativas do modelo de rigidez de política fiscal desenvolvido por Gonçalves e Guimaraes (2012) e responder se ele é capaz de gerar mais defaults em equilíbrio sem se utilizar de uma forte hipótese ad hoc acerca dos custos em termos do produto de um calote na dívida soberana, a fim de conseguir gerar os resultados desejados de acordo com o que se observa nos dados econômicos, isto é, que os calotes tendem a ocorrer em tempos ruins. A principal hipótese deste modelo é que o Governo não pode se comprometer com um ajuste fiscal para repagar a dívida que está vencendo porque ele escolhe a alíquota de imposto no período anterior. Logo, ao se deparar com um produto baixo em determinado período, o soberano não pode ajustar a arrecadação a fim de fazer frente às suas obrigações e se vê diante da decisão de aumentar o nível do endividamento ou de repudiar sua dívida e não pagá-la. Nos resultados, tem-se que a rigidez fiscal aumenta a ocorrência de defaults em pelo menos uma ordem de magnitude comparado a outros modelos quantitativos de dívida soberana e ajuda a explicar a ocorrência de calotes em períodos de baixo produto na Economia.

La thèse examine le cadre juridique de la restructuration de la dette souveraine vis-à-vis des créanciers privés et le rôle joué par le droit international public. La problématique est la suivante : Quel est le rôle actuel et potentiel du droit international public dans la restructuration de dettes souveraines ? Le cadre juridique actuel est fragmenté, avec une multitude d'acteurs et de pratiques. Le contexte politique influence le processus plus que des coutumes ou des principes généraux. La jurisprudence révèle les défis pour les cours nationales et les tribunaux internationaux. L'approche contractuelle incite les créanciers à un contentieux créatif, qui perturbe les négociations. L'arbitrage relatif aux investissements s'est révélé inadéquat. Les incohérences entre les différents fora entraînent des résultats insatisfaisants pour les créanciers et les débiteurs, au détriment de la sécurité juridique. Pour les perspectives d'avenir, les concepts de dette odieuse et d'état de nécessité ne peuvent offrir que des améliorations limitées. Leur contenu apparaît trop peu défini pour protéger une restructuration. La réforme du cadre juridique de la restructuration de la dette souveraine a mis en concurrence les approches fondées sur le droit international public et sur le droit privé. Cela a été le plus évident avec le processus à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et la modification concomitante des clauses contractuelles. Un cadre futur pourrait inclure une réduction de l'accès au contentieux, un rôle plus important reconnu aux droits de l'homme de la population débitrice et une action de l'Union européenne à mi-chemin entre les deux approches. / This thesis considers the legal framework of sovereign debt restructuring in relation to private creditors and the relevant rules of public international law. The research question is : What is the actual and potential role of public international law in sovereign debt restructurings ? The current legal framework is fragmented, and a multitude of actors and practices coexist. Political expediency governs the process and the outcomes, with little room for customary rules or general principles of law. The case law reveals the challenges for both domestic courts and international tribunals in dealing with sovereign debt restructurings. The contractual approach provides incentives for creditors to attempt creative litigation, which disrupts negotiations. Investment arbitration has proved an inadequate response. The inconsistencies among the different fora bring about unsatisfactory results for creditors and debtors alike, let alone the implications for legal certainty. For the future prospects, the concepts of odious debt and state of necessity can provide limited improvements, at best. Their content and contours appear too ill-defined to be relied upon by States wishing to shield a restructuring. The reform of the legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring has set a competition between approaches based on public international law and on private law. This has been most evident with the process at the United Nations General Assembly and the concomitant modification of contractual clauses. A future framework could potentially feature less avenues for litigation, a focus on the human rights of the debtor population, and a middle ground shaped by the European Union.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to a large increase in the government debt of all advanced economies. In the United States, the debt burden reached levels not seen since the Second World War. In Europe, high fiscal stress evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. My thesis focuses on debt dynamics in advanced economies and the design of policies that can stabilize their fiscal burden. In the first chapter, I provide new evidence and theory on US debt dynamics and their relation with long-term growth forecasts. In the second chapter, I document a novel dataset on the maturity structure of sovereign debt of Euro Area (EA) countries and study the effect of the maturity composition on debt dynamics. Finally, in the third chapter, I analyze empirically the role of debt management in stabilizing the fiscal burden of countries in the EA.<p><p>Chapter 1: Sovereign Debt in the US and Growth Expectations<p><p>This chapter studies the effect of changes in expectations of long-term GDP growth on US government debt and deficits. Long-term growth expectations are an essential determinant of expected future revenue growth and fiscal solvency. I present evidence that US government debt and deficits are positively correlated with long-term GDP (and revenue) growth forecasts from the Congressional Budget Office between 1984 and 2012. This is robust to controlling for current growth and to using à-la-Kalman estimated forecasts for a longer time span. This stylized fact is novel in the macroeconomics literature and I develop a new model of government behavior that explains it.<p>My model features endogenous (forward-looking) purchasing behavior for the government. This distinguishes my model from standard macro theories that assume exogenous government purchases, or ad-hoc backward looking policy rules for government purchases. It builds on the recent ‘long-run risks’ literature by assuming shocks to the trend growth rate of total factor productivity. The model matches the observed positive correlation between fiscal deficits and the trend growth rate, based on the government’s desire to smooth public consumption over periods of higher (or lower) long-run productivity growth. <p><p>Chapter 2: Government Debt Maturity and Debt Dynamics in EA Countries<p><p>This chapter presents a new comprehensive database on sovereign debt stocks and yields, at all maturities, for six EA countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain between 1991 and 2013. I constructed this database by combining information from different sources (treasuries, national central banks and statistical offices), on a security-by-security basis. A recent literature has shown the importance of debt maturity management in the US - e.g. Hall and Sargent (2011) - however, due to lack of data, this key issue remained unstudied for the EA. Thus, I use my database to study the effect of debt maturity management on the evolution of government debt in EA countries. <p>My main finding is that debt maturity also had an important effect in debt dynamics of the EA. The debt maturity structure affects debt dynamics because longer maturity shields the government budget from changes in interest rates. In general, interest rates in the EA have fallen since 1991 while treasuries in the region extended debt maturity. Thus, an increasing number of long-term bondholders experienced large capital gains. Counterfactual simulations show the impact of a different maturity structure on the evolution of debt and suggest that extending debt maturity in 2014 and 2015 would result in lower debt ratios by 2022. I also estimate the debt-to-GDP erosion induced by higher current and future inflation and find that inflation would lower the fiscal burden in EA countries much more than in the US.<p><p>Chapter 3: Quantifying the Role of Debt Management for Fiscal Self-Insurance in the EA<p><p>The last chapter provides evidence of debt management being an effective tool for protecting the government budget from fiscal spending shocks in the EA. In particular, I document that sovereign bonds of EA countries had a significantly lower real return in response to government spending shocks between 1991 and 2013. Importantly, longer bond maturity generally implied a larger drop in returns. This is in line with theories claiming that long-term debt provides fiscal self-insurance. However, my finding suggests that medium-term debt is more effective in hedging against spending shocks. <p>I identify government spending shocks in a Structural VAR model estimated with both aggregated quarterly fiscal data for the EA and stacked data from individual countries. I also use a simple FAVAR model to distinguish between common and idiosyncratic (country-specific) shocks and document that the former risk was hedged more effectively. The introduction of the Euro reduced the absorption of idiosyncratic shocks (relative to common shocks) by bond returns. However, the European debt crisis brought the degree of fiscal self-insurance against country-specific shocks back to pre-Euro levels. Finally, debt maturity seems to play a minor role in the absorption of country-specific shocks by the return on sovereign bonds. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished