<p>This dissertation consists of three major chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to testing a novel gravity model of international trade, while the last two chapters explore cross-country commitment and implementation behavior within the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement. </p> <p><strong>Chapter 1:</strong> I test a novel theoretical gravity model of international trade on firm-level export data from Colombia in 2018. The model assumes a power law relationship between trade flows and distance, with the distance elasticity resulting from two dynamic processes: firm-export growth captured in a Pareto distribution; and the growth of the distance over which those exports are sold. Although the model has been shown to work well in French data, its usefulness for interpreting data from other countries remains unexplored. I find evidence that the model fails in Colombia because some large firms contradict its assumptions by exhibiting shorter export distances compared to smaller firms in the sample. I hypothesize that these large firms are branches of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs’ headquarters constraint the export growth of its affiliates as well as the markets they reach. While I cannot prove firms’ MNC affiliation, I use export sophistication as an imperfect metric to reflect MNC presence. When MNC affiliates are excluded from the sample, firm export distance rises faster with firm size, leading to improved predictions of the distance elasticity of trade in Colombia by the model. These findings have implications not only for the tested model but also for other theories that explain gravity in international trade through firm-level behavior.</p> <p><strong>Chapter 2:</strong> We use a new database of commitments made during the process of ratifying the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to study variation in countries’ commitment behavior. The TFA is a novel World Trade Organization agreement because it allows developing countries to select commitments from a menu of best practices in trade facilitation, rather than to consent, or not, to a comprehensive package of negotiated commitments. The operation of this <em>à la carte</em> approach to concluding trade agreements is worthy of study in its own right, but the commitment data also offer a high-level description of progress in an international effort to improve border management procedures around the globe. Our study uses data on TFA commitments to describe progress across subcomponents of the agreement. A regression model shows that the number of Type A trade facilitation commitments that a country made in the TFA ratification process depends on its level of development, population size, ability to control corruption, and foreign aid received to support trade facilitation. We use multidimensional scaling techniques to study differences in the content of national commitment bundles. This approach demonstrates that variation in the content of countries’ commitments is closely tied to the number of commitments made.</p> <p><strong>Chapter 3:</strong> This chapter examines the implementation progress of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) from 2019 to 2023. The TFA, which is the latest World Trade Organization agreement, came into force in 2017. In its novelty, it allows developing countries to set their own implementation schedule and adjust it if needed. This flexibility aligns implementation requirements with the capabilities of signatory countries, but introduces uncertainties in achieving complete global implementation and fully realizing the potential benefits of the agreement. Using data on the notified implementation dates for each measure of the TFA, this study describes the progress made in implementing different subcomponents of the agreement over a period of five years. A regression analysis suggests that the annual rate of progress towards achieving full TFA implementation does not vary based on country characteristics such as GDP per capita, population size, or landlocked status. Assuming that the tendency at which countries implement measures remains unchanged, I project that 95% of developing countries will achieve 95% TFA implementation between the years 2036 and 2047.</p>

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

L’adoption par l’OMC de mesures de TSD utiles pour promouvoir l’agriculture des PED par le commerce agricole a favorisé l’accès des PED au marché rémunérateur de l’UE par des schémas multiples qui ne sont pas encore répartis équitablement entre les PED. Les préférences tarifaires de l’UE accordées aux PED figurent parmi les plus importants instruments de développement commercial utilisés par les pays développés. Cependant, l’effectivité des mesures de TSD reste relative à cause des limites inhérentes à leur contenu influencé par le statut particulier de l’agriculture à l’OMC. L’UE continue de bénéficier d’arrangements spéciaux et pratique un protectionnisme agricole très complexe et très décrié sur le plan externe. Les politiques commerciales, agricoles, sociales, environnementales et sécuritaires en vigueur dans le marché agricole européen neutralisent les efforts consentis par les PED, plus particulièrement les PMA et les pays ACP, pour exploiter les préférences. L’avenir de l’accès des PED au marché agricole de l’UE est actuellement lié à l’aboutissement incertain des négociations du Cycle Doha sur le TSD et l’agriculture. Les Conférences ministérielles de Bali (décembre 2013) et de Nairobi (décembre 2015) ont permis de mettre sur pied des accords partiels et a minima qui semblent maintenir le déséquilibre subtil entre un TSD peu contraignant et un statut particulier de l’agriculture toujours résistant à l’OMC, sans apporter une solution définitive au statu quo de l’accès des PED aux marchés agricoles des pays développés. Les enjeux et les perspectives de l’accès des PED au marché agricole de l’UE dépendent de la direction que prendront les travaux en cours pour répondre aux questions de développement et de libéralisation agricole dans le cadre d’un vrai cycle de développement. / The adoption by the WTO of special and differential treatment (SDT) measures that are useful for promoting the agriculture of developing countries through agricultural trade has favored the access of developing countries to the remunerative market of the EU through multiple schemes that are not yet evenly distributed between developing countries. EU tariff preferences for developing countries (DCs) are among the most important trade development instruments used by developed countries. However, the effectiveness of SDT measures remains relative because of the limitations inherent in their content influenced by the special status of agriculture in the WTO. The EU continues to benefit from special arrangements and practices agricultural protectionism that is very complex and highly criticized externally. The commercial, agricultural, social, environmental and security policies in force in the European agricultural market neutralize the efforts made by developing countries, in particular least developed countries (LDCs) and ACP countries, to exploit preferences.The future access of developing countries to the agricultural market of the EU is currently linked to the uncertain outcome of the Doha Round negotiations on SDT and agriculture. The Ministerial Conferences in Bali (December 2013) and Nairobi (December 2015) have led to the establishment of partial and minimum agreements that seem to maintain the subtle imbalance between a non-constraining SDT and a particular status of agriculture that is still resistant to The WTO without providing a definitive solution to the status quo of DCs access to agricultural markets in developed countries. The challenges and prospects of developing countries' access to the EU agricultural market depend on the direction of work in progress to address agricultural development and liberalization issues within a real development cycle.