Hip-Hop music is bigger than ever, a development that some states watch with Argus eyes. The latter is especially the case when the content that hip-hop artists produce is critical towards the circumstances in their country. In various cases, regimes subsequently attempt to repress and silence these critical hip-hop performances and artists. It is that phenomenon that this study explores, trying to find an answer to the conundrum of why some regimes employ hard repressive measures to silence critical hip-hop whereas other states use soft repression. The lens of questioning what regime type a country has, will be used in order to try to uncover the answer. Due to regime type specific characteristics, it is expected that autocratic and democratic regimes use soft repressive measures, while hybrid regimes employ hard repression. This hypothesis is tested by using the method of Structured Focused Comparison and scrutinising the cases of Spain, Russia and China. Repression of critical hip-hop seems to vary a lot between cases and is rather haphazard. Hence, regime type does not seem to be the catalyst behind a certain form of repressive behaviour towards hip-hop. Instead, a variety of country specific factors seems to determine the course of repression.

The study investigates the relationship between state repression and mass mobilization in resilient autocratic regimes. Using qualitative methods, I examine the question: How can state repression lead to mass participation of society in the nonviolent resistance movement? Developing Brian Martin’s (2012) theory, I hypothesize that framing of state repression by the regime and the opposition influence public perception and, in turn, participation levels. Four contemporary cases are analyzed: The Belarus Election Fraud Resistance 2020-2021, the Belarus Antiwar Resistance 2022, the Russia Navalny Resistance 2021, and the Russia Antiwar Resistance 2022. The findings acquired through the Structured Focused Comparison generally support the theory, demonstrating that well-organized and present opposition can effectively counter state strategies and encourage people with divided and negative perceptions of repression to take risks and join the nonviolent movement. Yet, the negative perception of repression alone is not enough to mobilize the masses in the face of high levels of repression. The magnitude of repression might affect people's motivations to join the nonviolent movement. The study emphasizes the importance of supporting opposition figures and organizations in repressive regimes to strengthen their capacity to mobilize the masses and suggests further research on the deterrent effect of repression.

This study is an attempt to contribute to the emerging theoretical literature on state repression. A time-series model was developed to test the hypothesis that state violence in Argentina and Chile is largely a function of four internal political factors and their interactions: 1) the inertial influence of past restrictive policies on the formulation of current policies, 2) the annual incidence of political protest demonstrations, 3) the perceived effectiveness of repressive measures on unrest, 4) and the institutionalization of military rule.

In a quantitative study in 2007, Davenport found that autocratic military regimes statistically face a higher risk of electoral violence than authoritarian party-backed regimes. This thesis has attempted to link Davenports findings with theories on military belligerence presented by Lai and Slater (2006) as well as Geddes et al. (2014), and thereby contribute to our understanding of the matter by investigating the potential causal mechanisms connecting regime type and electoral violence. The analysis specifically focuses on differences in pre-election violence by comparing the 2008 election in Pakistan and the 2007 election in Uzbekistan. Evidence from the cases suggest that there is some support for a covariation between regime type and levels of pre-election violence, although there are alternative explanations worth considering before one can determine whether or not a causal relationship can be observed. Finally, the findings indicate that military regime belligerence or lack of knowledge on how to use nonviolent political repressive tools in order to sway the elections do not explain the observed variation. Rather, the thesis suggests that levels of pre-election violence is more likely to be affected by other conflicts in the region, the design of the election campaign and whether there are established influential opposition parties present in the country.

Digital Repression: Backlash or Deterrence of Dissent? is a quantitative analysis of the MENA region between the years 2000 and 2020. By distinguishing, theoretically as well as empirically, between nonphysical and physical aspects of state repression, this study aims to fill an identified research gap and contribute to the literature on the repression-dissent puzzle. To answer the research question; how does digital repression affect dissent?, this study uses digital repression as the independent variable and looks into whether this nonphysical form of state repression has a positive or negative effect on dissent, aggregating between violent and nonviolent forms of the dependent variable. In connection to logistic regression, the main finding is that digital repression seems to have a positive (backlash) effect on dissent, no matter the type of dissident tactic.