Training structures have been defined as the order and arrangement of baseline conditional discriminations within stimulus equivalence training. The three training structures most often used are, linear (trains A:B and B:C discrimination), many-to-one (trains B:A and C:A discriminations) , and one-to-many (trains A:B and A:C discriminations). Each training structure trains a different set of simultaneous and successive discriminations that are then needed in the test for derived relations (symmetry, reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetrical transitivity). The present experiment seeks to extend the research on stimulus equivalence training structures by using a within-subject design and adult human subjects. Three sets of 9 arbitrary stimuli were trained concurrently each with a different training structure. From the beginning, training and testing trials were intermixed. The likelihood of producing stimulus equivalence formation was equal across structures.

Despite the central importance of conditional discriminations to the derivation of equivalence relations, there is little research relating the dynamics of conditional discrimination learning to the derivation of equivalence relations. Prior research has shown that conditional discriminations with simple sample and comparison stimuli are acquired faster than conditional discriminations with complex sample and comparison stimuli. This study attempted to replicate these earlier results and extend them by attempting to relate conditional discrimination learning to equivalence relations. Each of four adult humans learned four, four-choice conditional discriminations (simple-simple, simple-complex, complex-simple, and complex-complex) and were tested to see if equivalence relations had developed. The results confirm earlier findings showing acquisition to be facilitated with simple stimuli and retarded with complex stimuli. There was no difference in outcomes on equivalence tests, however. The results are in implicit agreement with Sidman's theory of stimulus equivalence.

Sidman's (2000) theory of stimulus equivalence predicts an interaction between the development of analytic units and the development of equivalence relations. Previous research has documented these interactions (stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2002; Vaidya & Brackney, 2014), therefore the current study attempted to replicate the effects seen in Vaidya & Brackney, 2014 (Experiment 2). Baseline conditional discriminations were trained for two sets of three, three-member classes, while participants simply observed stimuli in the third set which was arranged identical to those of Sets 1 and 2. Following equivalence tests where performance met the accuracy criterion of 85% for Sets 1 and 2, participants then entered a simple successive discrimination training phase where common responses were then trained with an equivalence class (pressing the Q key in the presence of A1, B1, or C1), cross equivalence classes (pressing the R key in the presence of A4, A5, or A6), or for stimuli where the participants had experience with them, but the contingencies were never arranged to facilitate equivalence class formation. Results showed a facilitative effect for common responses drawn from within equivalence classes (Set 1), and a retardation effect for common responses drawn from across equivalence classes (Set 2), for three of the five participants. Results for Set 3 showed an acquisition that fell intermediate to that of Sets 1 and 2, respectively, suggesting an interaction occurring between existing equivalence relations and the development of analytic units.

For many decades there has been an ongoing feud between the fields of behaviorism and cognitive science. This feud is not about specific scientific findings, it is about deep philosophical convictions, and about what terms and methods it makes sense to use when studying psychology. In the late 1950’s, behaviorism was declared dead when it was convincingly argued that behaviorism could not explain the nature of language, a centerpiece of human psychology. But since then behaviorism has slowly risen from its grave, as a new behaviorist theory of language emerged. The new behaviorist theory of language is called Relational Frame Theory (RFT), and it is part of a new behaviorist paradigm called Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS). This paradigm also includes a behaviorist psychotherapy called Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), which in the last decade has become popular across the world. Thus, the feud has once again become active, and the question about which philosophical principles are most suitable for the science of psychology is yet again something that needs an answer. But things have changed since the mid-1900’s when the discussion was last active. The philosophy of CBS is not exactly like that of earlier versions of behaviorism, having developed into a more explicit and coherent set of philosophical principles, summarized under the name functional contextualism. Old arguments against behaviorism do not apply to the same degree. So it is time for a new look at this debate, taking into consideration what functional contextualism and RFT has to offer. According to Contextual behavioral science, cognitive science generally entails a commitment to the correspondence theory of truth, the idea that something is true if it corresponds with reality, or a worldly fact. CBS, on the other hand, makes an explicit commitment to a pragmatic theory of truth, which focuses on the consequences (i.e. usefulness) of a statement or theory, instead of its correspondence with reality. Because of the supposed centrality of these theories of truth for the divide between cognitive science and behaviorism, I will focus on what exactly this divide is about, and whether there is any way that the differences can be reconciled. I will argue that the divide isn’t as big as it may seem when we take a closer look at the philosophical principles and empirical theories of CBS, and that it may in fact be possible to bridge this divide by formulating a version of the correspondence theory that is compatible with CBS. In part 1 I present a quick sketch of behaviorism as contrasted with cognitive science, and the connection between behaviorism and the pragmatic theory of truth, as well as the connection between cognitive science and the correspondence theory of truth. In part 2 I give a more detailed description of the philosophy and science of Contextual behavioral science, including the tools for understanding language in CBS terms. In part 3 I present a more detailed description of the correspondence theory of truth, giving an overview of the different versions of this theory that have been proposed throughout the history of philosophy. In part 4 I make a careful evaluation of the CBS objections towards the correspondence theory of truth, and arrive at a version of the correspondence theory that can be expressed in CBS terms. I will conclude that this version is compatible with the underlying philosophy of CBS, even though the CBS pragmatic theory of truth claims otherwise. I call it a behaviorist correspondence theory of truth.

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between stimulus equivalence (briefly, networks of relations among stimuli) and the extension of stimulus function (briefly, spread of effect across network) more closely than has been possible before. The traditional view of this relation suggests that equivalence classes mediate the extension of stimulus function and are, therefore, necessary for any extension to occur. This study used a preparation in which the conditional discriminations required for the development of equivalence classes and the simple discriminations required for the extension of function were trained or tested simultaneously. Results suggest that equivalence are not necessary for the extension of stimulus function though they may be sufficient.

Participants demonstrate the Stroop effect when, in naming the color in which a word appears, reaction times are longer when the color and word are incongruent (e.g., "yellow" printed in blue) compared to when they are congruent (e.g., "yellow" printed in yellow). The literature commonly refers to the difference in reaction times as a measure of the interference of word stimuli upon color stimuli, and is taken as support for the theory of automaticity. This study asks whether the Stroop effect can be analyzed as interactions within and across stimulus classes. Adult participants learned three 3-member classes (color, word, and pattern) in a serialized order of training. In the testing phase, participants were presented with compound stimuli formed from combinations of members within and across classes (e.g., word and color), and reaction times were recorded in similar fashion to the Stroop task. Results show that averaged participants' reaction times are faster to compound stimuli comprised of members within the same class, compared to compound stimuli formed with members from different classes. These group-level data are consistent with the Stroop literature in that congruent compounds produce faster reaction times relative to incongruent compounds. However, individual participant data do not consistently reflect the Stroop effect. Further considerations for future research in this area are discussed.

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Educators and practicing professionals in many fields emphasize the importance of critical thinking for effective decision-making. However, critical thinking skills are not usually directly taught in traditional educational settings. A subset of these skills, identifying logical fallacies, could be amenable to direct instruction using procedures that establish conditional discriminations, such as equivalence-based instruction (EBI). EBI procedures have been shown to be effective and efficient when teaching a variety of skills, including the identification of logical fallacies, when compared with no-instruction and self-instruction control groups. The purpose of this study is to compare the effectiveness of web-based EBI procedures to a more traditional lecture-based instruction format, with and without requiring participants to actively respond to the material, for teaching undergraduate students to identify logical fallacies. Participants were assigned to one of three groups: equivalence-based instruction, lecture-based instruction or lecture-based instruction with active responding. Using a pretest-train-posttest design, performance on multiple-choice tests that target relations among logical fallacy names, descriptions, and examples were compared. The results of this study suggest that EBI is an effective instruction method for teaching college students to identify logical fallacies. When compared to both lecture-based instruction teaching methods, EBI resulted in consistently higher posttest scores following instruction and more consistent acquisition of the nonprogrammed relations (i.e., BA, CA, CB, BC).

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