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Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, March 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106) Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1992. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [156]-159).

M.Comm. (International Accounting) / The study investigates the potential effect of applying a fair value model after the grant date to employee share options. The research assesses the appropriateness of the requirements of IFRS2 Share-Based Payment transactions with a specific focus on equity-settled Employee Share Options. The researcher has calculated the percentage movements or changes of fair value between each financial year including the overall percentage change. The study was mainly triggered by the IFRS2 Share-Based Payment rules and various arguments from different authors challenging the appropriateness of IFRS2 Share-Based Payment on employee share options (ESOs) transactions in capturing the full economic value transferred to the option holder at exercise date when applying a grant date accounting model. The study provides insights into whether a grant date accounting model is appropriate in measuring ESOs and capturing the full economic value transferred to the option holder. The application of a static fair value model in measuring the value of ESOs has the potential for both positive and negative effects on the compensation cost recognised in the financial statements over the vesting period. After analysing the descriptive financial data on fair value per option over the six year period included in the sample selection, a conclusion was reached that, IASB should consider to true-up or make a restatement of the opening balance of the fair value reserves account in order to minimise the potential permanent error in equity accounts and to minimise the potential effect of understating or overstating the compensation cost. The IASB should further consider the proper classification of equity instruments issued to employee ESOs which comply with other financial instrument accounting standards such as the IAS32 – Financial Instruments: Presentation, and IFRS9 Financial Instruments. This will ensure that transactions viewed as economic equivalents of each other are treated in the same way from an accounting perspective, and the correct measurement basis of ESOs may be achieved.

The joint hypotheses of informationally efficient markets, transparent financial statements, and adequate accounting disclosure suggest that announcements of changes in the accounting treatment of employee stock options from footnote disclosure to expense recognition should not trigger stock price reactions because free-cash-flows will not change. Event study results from a sample of 241 firms that announce such changes reveal statistically significant negative price changes followed by positive price changes about equal in magnitude. We propose the learning, sophisticated investor, neglected firm, and firm size hypotheses to explain the observed announcement-period stock price reaction.

Cette thèse comprend trois chapitres. Le Chapitre 1 présente des généralités sur les stock-options et synthétise la littérature existante sur les attributions et les exercices de stock-options. Le Chapitre 2 examine le comportement d’exercice des dirigeants dans les plus grandes entreprises françaises. Les résultats fournissent des preuves de l’utilisation d’informations privées pour exercer les options loin de l’expiration. Le Chapitre 3 examine l'annonce des résultats annuels et sa relation avec la décision d’exercice des stock-options des dirigeants. Les résultats de ce chapitre indiquent que les résultats annuels sont plus susceptibles de dépasser les prévisions des analystes quand les dirigeants exercent leurs options proches de l'expiration peu de temps après les annonces. La probabilité d'annonces de résultats positifs est également plus élevée lorsque les dirigeants exercent leurs options et revendent les actions obtenues. Les résultats montrent également la capacité de synchronisation des dirigeants. Ils accélèrent les annonces de résultats quand ils doivent exercer leurs options à proximité de l'expiration, en particulier lorsqu’ils vendent les actions obtenues. Le Chapitre 3 montre que les dirigeants utilisent un niveau plus élevé d’Accruals discrétionnaires lorsqu’ils doivent exercer des options à expiration. / This dissertation contains three chapters. Chapter 1 presents a description of stock option compensation and discusses the existing literature on stock option awards and exercises. Chapter 2 investigates CEO exercise behavior in the most important French companies. The results provide evidence of information timing of option exercises. Chapter 3 examines annual earnings announcement and its relation with CEO exercise decisions. The results of this chapter indicate that earnings are more likely to exceed analyst forecasts when CEOs exercise their options close to expiry shortly after the announcements. The likelihood of positive surprise increases when option exercises are followed by stock sales. The results also show CEO timing ability. CEOs accelerate earnings announcements when they have to exercise their stock options close to expiry, especially when they sell the obtained shares. Chapter 3 shows that CEOs use a higher level of discretionary accruals when they have to exercise options that are about to expire.