本論文研究了累積投票對中國上市公司業績的影響。我們主要研究三個問題。第一個問題是研究哪类所有权机构的公司更易于采取累积投票，第二是通過累積投票產生董事會成員和通過直接投票產生的董事會成員可能存在的差異。第三個問題是研究累積投票選出成員對公司治理和公司業績產生的影響。通過控制公司的特點，我們發現，控股股东占很大比例的公司（即便是在30%规定采取累积投票线下）更易于采用累积投票，其二，累積投票選舉產生的董事會和監事會更可能是專業人士，而且平均而言，累積投票選出的董事和監事會成員，比那些由直接投票選舉產生的董事會和監事會成員，擁有更多的公司股票. 此外，有證據表明他們更有可能代表股東利益而非管理層或大股東利益，這些證據不僅表明他們更有能力履行其職責，並且表明他們的個人利益與公司利益之間更為一致。本文延伸了現存的研究，並且證明了累積投票選舉產生的董事會對公司績效有積極的影響。但是，證據表明累計投票監事的比例增加並不會顯著改善公司績效。這些證據表明，累積投票在某種程度上改進了中國上市公司的公司治理狀況。 / This paper investigates the impact of cumulative voting on the performance of listed corporations in China. We focus on three main issues: investigating effects of corporations’ ownership structure on cumulative voting adoption, exploring differences (if any) in personal attributes between the board members elected by cumulative voting and those elected by straight voting, and identifying the influence of cumulative voting members on corporate governance and firm performance. Controlling firm characteristics, we find that corporations with controlling shareholder who owns a larger proportion (even under the 30% regulatory cumulative voting cut-off) of the shares are more likely to adopt accumulative voting but the ownership concentration of other block shareholders tend to be uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with cumulative voting. In addition, both directors and supervisors elected by cumulative voting are (a) more likely to have professional titles, (b) own more stocks on average than those elected by straight voting, and (c) are more likely to be shareholder- rather than management-affiliated or controlling shareholder (typically the largest shareholder-affiliated). Such evidence indicates that they are more capable of fulfilling their duties and suggests that their personal interests may be more compatible with those of the listed corporations. In addition, we extend the existing literature by showing a positive correlation between the percentage of cumulative voting-elected directors sitting in the board of directors and firm performance. However, we did not find a significant relationship between the increase of proportion of CV supervisors and firm performance. In summary, these results demonstrate that cumulative voting, to some extent, improves corporate governance in China’s listed corporations. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Qian, Jinghui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-69). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT(ENGLISH) --- p.i / ABSTRACT(CHINESE) --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- The notion of cumulative voting --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- The situations in China --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Issues to be investigated in the paper --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Theoretical effects of cumulative voting --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Empirical findings --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Cumulative voting in China --- p.14 / Chapter 3 --- Theory and Hypothesis --- p.16 / Chapter 4 --- Data and Methodology --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Data --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Methodology --- p.25 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Propensity score matching --- p.26 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Barber and Lyon matching --- p.32 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Comparison between directory and supervisory members --- p.34 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- OLS and difference-in-differences regressions --- p.35 / Chapter 5 --- Empirical Results --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample characteristics of cumulative voting elections (CVEs) --- p.38 / Chapter 5.2 --- Comparison between cumulative voting and non-cumulative voting --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- PSM statistical description and regression results --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Barber and Lyon matching --- p.49 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Differences between CV members and NCV members --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3 --- Effects of Proportion of CV directors and CV supervisors on firm performance --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4 --- Robutness analysis --- p.59 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusions and Discussions --- p.61 / Chapter 6.1 --- Summary of findings --- p.61 / Chapter 6.2 --- Theoretical contributions and limitations --- p.63 / REFERENCES --- p.65 / Chapter Appendix I --- Variables and Descriptions --- p.70 / Chapter Appendix II --- Supplementary PSM Regression --- p.73 / Chapter Appendix III --- Supplementary Comparison CV members vs. NCV members --- p.75 / Chapter Appendix IV --- Robustness of the Regression --- p.79 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.82

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt (Main), 2005. / Literaturverz. S. [309] - 341.

A Research Report presented to the Graduate School of Business of the University of Stelienbosch in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration / Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Certain companies in South Africa have dual classes of shares listed on the JSE Securities Exchange i.e. ordinary shares and N shares. Ordinary listed shares, nonmally holds one vote per share, are referred to as superior voting shares. Restricted voting shares have restricted voting benefits to the shareholders, in some cases one vote casting for thousand shares held. Some companies have listed N shares on the JSE Securities Exchange; these are the South African shares with restricted voting powers. A total of 34 companies have issued low voting shares in South Africa, 2 companies started as far back as 1990. Naspers Limited is the only company that has listed only low voting shares. This study investigates the justification for companies issuing low voting shares by comparing the price performance of these shares and also investigates the justification for shares with restricted voting rights. Tests are conducted to detenmine whether a premium is paid for South African superior voting shares by comparing the share prices of superior voting shares and restricted voting shares on the same day of trading on the JSE Securities Exchange. Various parties in the South African business community have opinions and arguments against and in favour of low voting shares; the reasons for the issuing of low voting shares are under scrutiny. In addition to the above mentioned tests the factors influencing the voting premium have also been investigated. The benefits of restricted shares are also investigated. The results of tests conducted on dual share classes trading in South Africa are compared with the results of similar studies on share price information of dual share classes trading on international stock exchanges. The findings of the study are: Ordinary listed shares are trading at a premium comparing to restricted voting shares, in South Africa the premium is calculated at 9.83%; The payment of dividends to shareholders does not influence the share premium; The ratio of ordinary shares in relation to total shares issued does not influence the VRP of a company; The capitalisation of company, in other words the outstanding number of ordinary shares valued at the market price, does not influence the voting premium; and Companies being controlled by families or major shareholding groups are more likely to issue shares with restricted voting rights; The conclusion of the study is that the limited benefits are offered to the owners of the companies that have issued the dual classes of shares and not to the investors' public. These owners of superior voting shares have utilised restricted voting shares to remain in control of the companies and get access to relative cheap investors funding. Restricted voting shares' popularity declined to the end of 1992, the phenomenon is consistent with demise of restricted voting shares in France / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sommige Suid Afrikaanse genoteerde maatskappye het verskillende klasse aandele genoteer op JSE Securities Exchange. Daar word tel kens na gewone genoteerde aandele verwys as aandele met superieure stem reg, die aandele sal sonder uitsondering een stem hou vir elke uitgereikte gewone aandeel. In Suid-Afrika staan aandele met beperkte stem reg bekend as N-aandele. Die betrokke aandele het nie dieselfde stem reg voordele as gewone aandele nie en kan tot een stem per duisend uitgereikte aandele dra. 'n Totaal van 34 maatskappye het beide klasse aandele genoteer, Naspers Beperk is die enigste maatskappy wat slegs aandele met beperkte stemreg genoteer het. Die verhandeling ondersoek of daar enige geldige rede is vir die uitreiking van aandele met beperkte stem reg. 'n Ondersoek word geloods deur te kyk na die prysgedrag van die twee verskillende tipes aandele naamlik gewone en Naandele. Die redes vir enige prysafwykings word ook ondersoek. 'n Vergelykings tussen die aandelepryse van aandele met superieure stemreg en aandele met beperke stemreg (soos genoteer op die JSE Securities Exchange) word gedoen om te bepaal of aandele met superieure stem reg teen 'n premie verhandel. Verskeie partye het argumente en opinies teen en ten gunste van die gebruik van aandele met beperkte stemreg. die redes vir die uitreiking van aandele met beperkte stem reg word onder die vergrootglas geplaas. In Verdere ondersoek na die faktore wat verantwoordelik kon wees vir die premieverskil tussen aandeelpryse van aandele met superior stemregte en aandele met beperkte stemregte word ook gedoen. Daar word ook ondersoek of daar enige voardele is vir die uitreik van aandele met beperkte stemreg. Die studie sluit af met 'n vergelyking van die resultate in 'n Suid-Afrikaanse beleggingingomgewing met die resultate van soorgelyke studies wat gedoen is op aandeleinligting van verskeie intemasionale aandelebeurse waar aandele met beide superieure en beperkte stem reg genoteer is. Die bevindinge van die studie is as volg: Gewone genoteerde aandele (aandele met superieure stemreg) soos genoteer op die JSE Securities Exchange verhandel teen 'n premie van 9.83% oor die tydperk onder oorskou in vergelyking met aandele met beperkte stemreg. Die beta ling van dividende aan aandeelhouers speel geen rol op die grootte van die pryspremie in die verhandeling van gewone genoteerde aandele en aandele met beperkte stem reg. Die verhouding tussen gewone aandele in verhouding to totale aandele uitgereik speel nie 'n rol in die grote van die pryspremie nie; Die kapitalisasie van die maatskappye, met ander word die uitstaande gewone genoteerde aandele teen markprys, speel geen rol in die graolle van die pryspremie nie; en Die aandeelhouersstruktuur speel 'n ral in die uitreiking van aandele met beperkte stemreg. Maatskappye wat beheer word deur families of graot houermaatskappye is geneig om aandele met beperkte stemreg uit te reik. Die gevolgtrekking van die studie is dat aandele met beperkte stemreg wei voordele het, in die geval nie vir die breer beleggingspubliek nie maar wei vir persone of instansies in beheer van die spesifieke maatskappye met beide klasse aandele. Aandele met beperkte stemreg is gebruik am toegang te verkry tot goedkoop befondsing sander am beheer van die maatskappye te verloor. Aandele met beperkte stemreg se gewildheid het begin afneem, nie net in Suid-Afrika nie maar oak in Frankryk waar baie maatskappye besluil hel om weg Ie doen mel die soort aandele.

Section 71(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has introduced into South African company law a provision which for the first time permits the board of directors to remove another director from office in certain specific instances. A further significant innovation in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is contained in section 162, which empowers a court to make an order declaring a director delinquent or placing him under probation in specific instances. The effect of section 162 is that a court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors. The focus of this thesis is the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and by the judiciary. The thesis explores the underpinning philosophy of the statutory provisions relating to the removal of directors from office. It also examines the impact of the power given to the board of directors and to the courts to remove a director from office. The grounds and the procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary are examined. The fiduciary duties applicable to directors in removing a director from the board of directors are also explored. In addition, this thesis examines the removal of directors holding multiple positions or capacities in relation to a company, such as an employee or a shareholder with loaded voting rights. The remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors are examined. Recommendations are made to strengthen and improve the provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 relating to the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and the judiciary. Amendments to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are suggested to remove ambiguities; to guard against the abuse of sections 71(3) and 162; to improve the grounds and procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary, and to enhance the remedies that may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors. / Artikel 71(3) van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 het ’n bepaling tot Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyreg toegevoeg wat die direksie vir die eerste keer in staat stel om ’n ander direkteur in sekere spesifieke gevalle uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. ’n Verdere belangrike vernuwing in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word in artikel 162 vervat, wat ’n hof magtig om ’n bevel uit te vaardig wat ’n direkteur misdadig verklaar of hom of haar in spesifieke gevalle aan ’n proeftydperk onderwerp. Die effek van artikel 162 is dat ’n hof by magte is om ’n direkteur uit die direksie te verwyder. Die fokus van hierdie tesis is die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en die regbank. Die tesis verken die onderliggende filosofie van die statutêre bepalings wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte verband hou. Dit ondersoek ook die impak van die bevoegdheid wat aan die direksie en die howe verleen word om ’n direkteur uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. Die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank word ondersoek. Die fidusiêre pligte van toepassing op direkteure by die verwydering van ’n direkteur uit die direksie word ook verken. Daarbenewens ondersoek hierdie tesis die verwydering van direkteure wat veelvuldige posisies of hoedanighede met betrekking tot ’n maatskappy beklee, soos ʼn werknemer of aandeelhouer met gelaaide stemregte. Die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur, wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is, kan steun, word ondersoek. Aanbevelings word gemaak om die bepalings in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008, wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en regbank verband hou, te versterk en te verbeter. Wysigings aan die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word voorgestel om dubbelsinnighede uit te skakel; om teen die misbruik van artikels 71(3) en 162 te waak; om die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank te verbeter, en om die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is kan steun, te versterk. / ISigaba 71(3) Somthetho weZinkampani 71 ka 2008 sewuze wangenisa emithethweni yezinkampani zaseNingizimu Afrika, umthetho ongowokuqala ovumela ibhodi labaqondisi ukuthi libe namandla wokugudluza omunye umqondisi esikhundleni sakhe ngaphansi kwezimo ezithile. Olunye ushintsho olusha kuMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 uqukethwe yiSigaba 162, wona ugunyaza inkantolo ukuthi ikhiphe umyalelo owazisa umqondisi ngokuthi unecala noma obeka umqondisi ngaphansi kophenyo, phecelezi “probation” ngesinye isikhathi. Inhloso yeSigaba 162 wukunikeza inkantolo igunya lokugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi. Impokophelo yale thisisi wukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi, bagudluzwe yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho/nobulungisa. Ithisisi ihlola ifilosofi yemithetho ekhishiwe emayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni zabo, Kanti futhi ihlola umthelela wamandla anikezwe ibhodi labaqondisi kanye nezinkantolo ukuthi zigudluze umqondisi esikhundleni. Izizathu kanye nengqubo elandelwayo mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho nazo ziyahlolwa. Imisebenzi emayelana nokuthembeka eyenziwa ngabaqondisi ukugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi nayo iyacwaningwa Ngaphezu kwalokhu, le thisisi .iphenya ukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi abaqokwe ezikhundleni eziningi noma abanegunya elithize ngokwengqubo yenkampani, enjengesisebenzi, phecelezi “employee” noma umabelwa-mashezi onamalungelo amaningi okuvota, phecelezi, “loaded with voting rights”. Izeluleko ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi ogudluzwe esikhundleni sakhe yibhodi labaqondisi nazo ziyahlolwa. Izincomo nazo ziyenziwa ngenhloso yokuqinisa kanye nokuthuthukiswa kwamandla oMthetho we-71 weZinkampani ka 2008, mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho. Izinguquko zoMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 ziqonde ukususa izixakaxaka, ukulwa nokudlelezelwa kweSigaba 71(3) kanye no 162, ukuthuthukisa izizathu kanye nezingqubo zokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho, ukuqinisa izindlela zokulungisa ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi osegudluziwe esikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.