The subject of this thesis is the relationship of the psychology and epistemology of the philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135 A.D.) to the Stoic tradition to which he belonged. Epictetus' psychology is characterised by the subsuming of psychological functions and development under the single term prohairesis, and his epistemology under a corresponding term 'use of impressions' (chrêsis phantasiôn); the two terms being used largely interchangeably. The status of the prohairesis as a faculty is investigated and it is concluded that it is the principal over-arching faculty of the governing-principle of the soul (hêgemonikon), and thus occupies a similar position to that occupied by Reason (logos) in the Stoic tradition. Prohairesis is used to define the 'end' and 'good' for man in Epictetus' teaching, displacing 'wisdom' and 'virtue' with 'prohairesis as it ought to be'. Epictetus thus seeks to reflect the concerns of the 'person making progress' by making the end an extreme point on a continuum of mental and moral states on which he already occupies a place. The self-contemplating ability of prohairesis allows it to be used to define the human self as a single unified consciousness, and also distinguish it from 'external' things outwith our power. The redefining of all things external to the mind as outwith our power is Epictetus' most significant innovation. Epistemology is closely linked to psychology. The 'use of impressions' involves using 'preconceptions' (prolêpseis) and 'rules' (kanones) to test incoming impressions. The aim is not to allow any false judgement to be installed permanently in the prohairesis and thus hinder moral progress. The substitution of the term judgement (dogma) for 'cognition' (katalêpsis) allows Epictetus to draw attention to the need to replace poor judgements with better ones. The thesis concludes that Epictetus introduces a number of innovations to Stoicism and also develops established doctrines to reflect his emphasis on the 'inner life' and on the moral development of ordinary people.

Inaug.-diss.--Munich. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. 5-6.

Inaug.-diss.--Munich. / Lebenslauf. "Literaturverreichnis": p. 7-9.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen, 1937.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 299-307).

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen, 1937.

Orientador: Isabella Tardin Cardoso / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T06:15:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DePietro_MatheusClemente_M.pdf: 1727096 bytes, checksum: a9c1e6897f0ff21f7f1c822203d3380f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Ao percorrer as Epistulae morales de Sêneca (4 a.C.- 65 d.C), notamos que uma parte considerável de seus ensinamentos se fundamenta em um conceito pouco trabalhado academicamente: a ¿harmonia¿. O filósofo, ao exortar Lucílio à busca da sabedoria, utiliza diversas imagens e exemplos, e neles observamos a presença, ora de modo evidente, ora sutil, de referências à harmonia entre o discurso e as ações, entre a vida e o discurso, entre o estilo e o caráter, entre as ações e a natureza, entre a vontade e o destino, entre a corpo e a alma, entre as ações e elas mesmas, e assim por diante. Em estudo anterior, verificamos que tal harmonia não costuma ser expressa por um único termo, mas é designada por vocábulos com sentidos semelhantes: partindo do estudo do conceito de conuenientia, que é a tradução direta do termo técnico homología (o qual, no estoicismo de Zenão designava a harmonia enquanto objetivo da prática filosófica), constatamos que Sêneca também emprega outros vocábulos mais comuns na língua latina, em especial: concordia, consonans, consentire, constare e congruere. Como objetivo central da nossa pesquisa, foram traduzidos para o português e comentados trechos das cartas em que tais vocabulos se mostram relevantes ao estudo da ¿harmonia¿ nas cartas filosóficas de Sêneca. O estudo introdutório discorre acerca do modo específico com que o filósofo, no corpus por nós selecionado, concebe e apresenta conceito tão importante ao estoicismo em geral. A consideração da polissemia e das imagens no texto senequeano se mostra fundamental para a compreensão da noção filosófica investigada / Abstract: By reading through Seneca¿s Epistulae morales one notes that a considerable part of his doctrine is based on harmony, a concept that has not received the deserved attention in Senecan researches. While urging Lucilius in the search for wisdom, Seneca uses a great variety of images and examples that refers explicitly or implicitly to many kinds of harmony, e.g.: harmony between speech and deeds, life and speech, style and character, actions and nature, will and fate, body and soul, between actions among themselves. It was verified that such a ¿harmony¿ usually is not named by a single term or expression, but is indicated by words with similar acceptances. The study of the idea of conuenientia ¿ the straight Latin translation of the technical term homología (¿harmony¿ in Zeno¿s Stoicism) ¿ confirmed that Seneca also makes use of other words, that are more familiar to the current Latin language, among which there are concordia, consonans, consentire, constare and congruere. Excerpts of Seneca's philosophical letters that have been proved to hold valuable arguments to the study of the ¿harmony¿ were translated into Portuguese and annotated. The introductory study concerns about the particular way by which Seneca presents such an important Stoic concept in the selected corpus. The polissemy and images in the investigated texts play a central role in the understanding of the philosophical notion here considered. / Mestrado / Mestre em Linguística

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The main aim of this thesis is to present and compare the approaches of the two important Hellenistic philosophical schools - the Old Stoics and Epicurus - to the phenomenon of death in relationship to the concept of the soul. First, the problem is viewed through the perspective of physics. Epicurus and the Stoics adhere to the belief in the substantial (and not individual) immortality of the soul, resembling in some aspects the view of presocratic philosophers. The soul is uderstood by both schools as basis of life functions connected with heat and breath. Second, the ethical approaches to death by Epicurus and the Stoics and their different proposals for disposing of the fear of death are shortly introduced.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1973. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-222). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.