考量社會之發展與型態變遷，以及面對國內人口結構急遽老化，政府應建立一套完善的退休基金監理制度，以保障老年退休生活經濟安全。本研究借鏡國外政府基金監理組織之運作經驗，並由行政、法律、政治等面向，分析我國退休基金監理機制長期發展之情形，並進行統整性的規劃與周延性之探討，以找尋其最適合的監理模式，達到退休基金健全及永續發展之目的，進而滿足社會各界對其發展的價值期待。 本研究透過深度訪談之方式，共訪談政府機關代表2名、退休基金協會1名及專家學者4名。據本研究發現，我國退休基金監理組織型態、運作以及退休金制度上存在些許問題，如：獨立性缺乏、專業性不足、風險性過度集中…等。因此，本研究綜合文獻資料與訪談結果，歸納結論，且針對現有退休基金監理機制之問題，提出退休基金監理機制及其後續研究之相關建議，希冀改善我國退休基金監理機制所面臨之困境，並就我國退休基金監理機制之缺失或不足之處，提出建議及改善，以確保退休基金監理有效運作，保障退休人員權益。 / With the development of Taiwanese society, the pattern of social change, and the rapidly aging population in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government will need to create a comprehensive supervision mechanism for retirement funds to ensure citizen’s financial safety during retirement. The purpose of this research is to find the most suitable governmental supervision mechanism that can ensure retirement funds remain healthy and sustainable in the long-term, and can demonstrate to the public that this is a worthwhile endeavour. This research organises, analyses and discusses the operational experience of foreign governments with retirement funds and the long-term development of a supervision mechanism of such funds in Taiwan from an administrative, legal and political standpoint. For this research, in-depth interviews with two government representatives, a person from the Pension Fund Association and four specialists were conducted. It was identified that there are still some problems with the structure and operation of the supervision mechanism and of the Taiwanese pension system itself. Some example issues are the lack of independence and expertise, and excessive concentration of risk. By bringing together the learnings from the literature and interviews, this study offers suggestions on how to overcome the challenges that the current supervision mechanism of retirement funds faces and how to progress with future investigation. In addition, this research suggests methods to improve the aspects of the supervision mechanism that have been lacking or insufficient, hoping to ensure that it operates effectively to protect the rights of retired citizens.

我國政府預算採基金制，所有收入支出都透過基金處理，而基金依預算法規定又分為普通基金和特種基金兩類，前者為一般用途，後者為特殊用途。依預算法第四條的定義，特種基金依性質又分為營業基金、債務基金、信託基金、作業基金、特別收入基金、資本計畫基金六種，一般定義將營業基金及信託基金以外的四類基金統稱為「非營業基金」。非營業特種基金在設置之初都有其目的與必要性，但因種種原因，逐漸產生了基金設置浮濫、疊床架屋、功能不彰、作業效能欠佳、破壞財政統收統支之運作體制、影響國庫財務靈活調度等批評。 預算審議是立法權和行政權互動的結果，有時行政權對預算還具有更高的主導力，而政府總預算裡被視為管理效率最低、使用最混亂、淪為政府隱藏預算工具，同時資訊最不透明、最難以窺見財務全貌的就是非營業特種基金預算。由於非營業特種基金審議具有不同於一般預算的特殊性，本文即計劃透過對特種基金發展及編列過程、立法院預算審議程序及盲點的研究，了解立法院對特種基金監督機制的全貌，進而完成下列研究目的： （一）從分權監督、預算原理、政府財務管理、基金制度的發展與演變等，了解存在於政府預算編列與監督之間的總體問題。 （二）從特種基金的設置理論、特種基金與總預算的關係、政府對特種基金的需求與運用等，檢視特種基金運作的問題。 （三）研究非營業特種基金設置浮濫、疊床架屋、管理困難、規模不當、經營效率不彰、淪為隱藏預算之所、不符成本效益原則等的原因出在哪理？能否透過監督機制的強化而予以妥善解決？ （四）透過預算審議過程的解構，分析立法院特種基金監督機制的困境與難題，從而提出研究建議。 　　研究結果發現，就被監督者的行政部門而言，或出於有意的逃避監督，常發生財務資訊提供不足、或不提供財務以外的經營與績效資訊以供立法院審議的現象；有時則是出於無心的如使用過於專業複雜、過於本位的會計語言來編列特種基金預算的情況，無論何者，都已對監督構成了障礙。就身為主要監督單位的立法院而言，一方面要面對千方百計保障完整行政權的行政單位，一方面也受到自我能力不足、權力不完備的制約。就能力而言，立法委員少有會計專業能力，在責司龐雜、利益團體壓力遠大於專業預算審查使命、審查時間有限、調查權不完備等限制情況下，立法院對非營業特種基金的監督成果尚不能令人滿意。 為了改善立法院在監督品質低落，除了加強立法院預算中心之功能、增加國會專業助理、政黨內培育資深專業人才外，在預算審議流程之制度設計上應從取消多餘而無實益的審議程序、強化立法院在監督預算執行過程中的參與權。管理法規的層級應該提升為立法層次，透過特種基金管理法制化以制衡行政部門，同時應建立特種基金績效評估制度、立法促使財務資訊揭露透明化、適時修訂特種基金管理辦法及預算編列，如此才能真正落實特種基金監督與管理。 / The budget of Taiwan’s government uses a fund system, where all incomes and expenditures must be processed through funds. The Budget Act distinguishes two categories of funds, general funds for general purpose use and special funds for special purpose use. According to Article 4 of the Budget Act, special funds are further divided into six categories: enterprise funds, debt service funds, trust funds, operation funds, special revenue funds, and capital revenue funds. With the exception of enterprise funds and trust funds, all other funds a generally defined as non-profit funds. There are always specific goals and necessities at the origin of the creation of non-profit special funds. However, due to various reasons, these funds have been criticized for extravagant expenditures, unclear functions, and ineffectiveness, as well as for disrupting the income and expenditure mechanism of finances and having a negative influence on the financial management of the National Treasury. Budget approval results from the interaction between the legislative and executive powers, where the executive power sometimes yields greater influence. The budget for non-profit special funds is often criticized as yielding the lowest results, being badly use, being the government as a secret budget tool, and lacking transparency. Because the approval process of non-profit special funds is different from regular budgets, this paper will examine how special funds are created and what is the process for the approval of budget by the Legislative Yuan, as well as identify possible blind spots in order to gain a complete picture of the Legislative Yuan’s supervision mechanism for special funds. This research will achieve the following goals: 1. From the perspective of control through the separation of powers, budget principles, government financial management, and the evolution of the fund system, understand the problems that exist between the government’s budget planning and budget control mechanisms. 2. By examining the theory of special funds, the relationship between special funds and the general budget, as well as the need and use by the government of special funds, identify the problems inherent to the use of special funds. 3. Inquire into the causes behind the problems inherent to non-profit special funds, such as wasteful use, management difficulties, inappropriate size, lack of efficiency, insufficient transparency and poor cost-efficiency, and explore the possibility of improving the situation by strengthening supervision mechanisms. 4. Explore the structure of the budget approval process to analyze the difficulties faced by the Legislative Yuan in supervising special funds and provide recommendations. 　　This research found that the executive departments either deliberately avoid supervision by not providing sufficient financial information, or do not provide the Legislative Yuan with other information relevant to the administration and use of special funds. Sometimes, the involuntary use of too much accounting jargon by budget makers hampers the ability of legislators to understand and supervise budgets. No matter which circumstance, this creates many hurdles for supervision. As the most important supervising department, the Legislative Yuan must on one hand face numerous executive departments all intent in protecting their executive powers, and on the other hand must deal with restrictions such as limited capacity and limited powers. In terms of capacity, few legislators have professional accounting skills, they must also deal with limitations such as pressure from interest groups, limited time for budget review, and incomplete powers for investigation. As such, the result of supervision by legislators of non-profit special funds leaves to be desired. In order to improve the quality of supervision by the Legislative Yuan, apart from strengthening the central role of the Legislative Yuan in budgeting, increasing the number of professional staff, and cultivating professional staff within political parties, it is also necessary to reduce unnecessary procedures in the budget approval process, as well as strengthen the participative power of the Legislative Yuan in supervising the budget during its execution. The management of special funds should be regulated by law (and not by executive orders as is the present case) in order to balance the power of executive departments, and at the same time establish a system to evaluate the performance of special funds. The law will encourage greater financial transparency and allow the modification of the management process of special funds as well as the planning of budgets. This will facilitate the implementation of the supervision and management of special funds.

The goal of my thesis on Supervision over the banking industry in the EU member states is to describe critically and to define newly engendering concept of the banking union. It is a very actual topic because the effective mechanism creation, which should solve problems of the European banking sector, is currently one of the primary goals of the European Union. The study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is the theoretical one. The definition and differentiation of the essential terms such as supervision and surveillance can be found there. Further the basic theoretical modules can be found there, from which it is possible to stem during the banking supervision implementation in practice. The second and the third chapters are the analytical parts. The introduction of the second chapter glances at the backgrounds of the legislative proposals acceptance in this area. Afterwards the chapter is already focused on four pillars of the proposed Banking union. The first pillar is formed with so called "single rule book", thus the uniform regulatory rules that are the implementation of the requirements expressed in so called Basel III. In this part of the study there is outlined why it is not quite happy at present to burden the credit institutions in the European Union even more through...