Studies of the Supreme Court consistently show that the Office of the Solicitor General enjoys remarkable success before the Supreme Court, both at the certiorari stage and at the merits stage. These studies offer a variety of explanations for Solicitor General success, but fail to portray accurately the Office of the Solicitor General and to account for variations in governmental success. This paper seeks to continue the exploration of governmental success. By looking at the Office of the Solicitor General as a series of individuals with distinct characteristics rather than as a single entity, and by accounting for various situational dynamics, I attempt to explain the variations in executive success.

This study examines the agenda setting and decision-making behavior of the United States Supreme Court from 1888 to 1989.

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Despite well documented evidence that both the level and diversity of amicus participation in state high courts have been growing, we know little about whether or under what conditions amicus briefs have an impact on court outcomes. This dissertation investigates how interest groups attempt to influence state supreme courts through their participation as amicus curiae. Using an original dataset assembled from content analysis of more than 2300 state supreme court decisions handed down between 1995 and 2010 and spanning three distinct areas of law - products liability, environmental law, and free speech/expression - I find that amicus briefs submitted by interest groups have the most influence over judicial outcomes in areas of law where interest groups routinely make large-scale donations to judicial campaigns. These results raise serious concerns about the influence of big money in judicial elections. The second part of this dissertation tests two competing theories of amicus influence to determine how state high court judges utilize amicus brief information in judicial decision making. The informational theory assumes the influence of amicus brief information to be evenly distributed across judges. However, theories of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning suggest that the information in amicus briefs may be received and evaluated differently depending upon the ideological predispositions of individual judges. Using multi-level modeling, I analyze the votes of more than 12,000 individual state high court judges to determine whether judge ideology conditions the influence of amicus briefs such that judges are more receptive to pro-attitudinal information contained in briefs from interest groups that share their predispositions. Results suggest that method of judicial retention and area of case law structures the mechanism of amicus brief influence. Amicus briefs appear to play an informational role in complex areas of case law but the presence of competitive judicial elections appear to alter the mechanism of amicus brief influence such that judicial responsiveness to amicus briefs is more closely tied to the reelection and campaign fundraising considerations of individual judges. The final portion of this dissertation investigates the case-level and court-level factors that attract interest group participation as amicus curiae in state high courts in order to better our understanding of interest group strategies when engaging state judiciaries. This paper tests the hypothesis that groups strategically target cases that will best serve the policy and institutional interests of the group, while focusing group resources on cases and courts where they are most likely to be successful. Results indicate that both liberal and conservative groups target state high courts that are elected through competitive and retention election processes rather than those that are appointed, suggesting that interest groups believe their influence will be greater with judges who are accountable to the public. Results also show that both liberal and conservative groups target courts from states that are ideologically sympathetic, but not necessarily from courts that are ideologically similar. / Political Science

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Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.