The much-debated topic of the pension system together with the currently elevated levels of inflation give rise to the question of how well the pension system is equipped to deal with a prolonged period of inflation. The current system was introduced in the 1990s and since then it has been operating in a period of low and stable inflation. The purpose of this project is therefore to study the inflation sensitivity of the Swedish pension system and the purchasing power of Swedish pensioners. Since the Swedish pension system consists of different parts and each part has a different inflation sensitivity, this allows me to study the inflation sensitivity of some typical cases of pensioners who has their own unique mix of pension income. I measure inflation sensitivity through the concept of equality of consumption, where utility from consumption is derived primarily from the discretionary spending that exceeds necessary expenses for survival such as food and shelter. Through this, I analyse economic inequality as measured by the amount of discretionary spending and evaluate how inflation affects these amounts for different typical cases of pensioners. The data in this study is gathered from official sources such as Pensionsmyndigheten and Statistiska Centralbyrån. I find that the nominal inflation protection provided by the Swedish pension system is high for most theoretical cases. However, inflation erodes real purchasing power for Swedish pensioners, especially for those not eligible for the housing supplement and for those who lack an occupational pension. The basic protection adds inflation protection for pensioners with a relatively low income, while occupational pensions add inflation protection for pensioners with a relatively high income. The findings suggest that the median pensioner is more adversely affected by inflation when compared to other income levels, as measured through discretionary spending.

I och med pensionsreformen vid sekelskiftet lades ett större ansvar på den individuelle pensionsspararen då man nu själv ska besluta hur en del av den allmänna pensionen ska placeras. Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera huruvida det hade varit möjligt för en pensionssparare att uppnå en högre riskjusterad avkastning för sin premiepension genom att göra ett aktivt val i form av en egen sammansatt portfölj, än att låta staten förvalta pensionen i förvalsalternativet AP7 Såfa. Analysen är baserad på Harry Markowitz etablerade moderna portföljteori där han uppmärksammade hur sparare genom diversifiering kan reducera risken i sin placering genom att välja tillgångar som inte fullt samvarierar. Genom användning av tillgänglig data för tidsperioden 2000 – 2014 över de fonder som finns valbara i PPM-systemet har vi beräknat de optimala portföljer med samma risknivå som förvalsalternativet. Därefter har dessa jämförts med försvarsalternativet med avseende på risk och avkastning. Dessutom har tre teoretiska portföljer satts samman över en period på tio år, som placerats som dessa optimala portföljer och omallokerats efter Markowitz rekommendation att se över sitt sparande en gång om året. Analysen visar att det har gått att uppnå en högre riskjusterad avkastning genom att själv göra ett aktivt val av portfölj i sitt sparande. Problemet ligger i att det är svårt att identifiera dessa portföljer i förtid. De tre teoretiska portföljerna har samtliga presterat väsentligt mycket sämre än vad förvalsalternativet har gjort under samma tidsperiod. Resultatet visar att förvalsalternativet inte är fullt riskjusterat, man har alltså inte fullt fått betalt för den risk man tagit i sitt sparande. Vi drar ändå slutsatsen att förvalsalternativet är ett fullgott alternativ. / The Swedish premium pension reform at the turn of the century resulted in a greater responsibility for the individual saver. The decision concerning how the premium pension should be invested now lies with the investor. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether it had been profitable for a saver to achieve a higher risk-adjusted return for its premium pension money contributions by making an active choice by a self-composed portfolio, rather than to allow the State to invest the capital in the Seventh AP Fund (AP7 Såfa) which is the default option. The analysis is based on Harry Markowitz’s established Modern Portfolio Theory by which he drew attention to how investors through diversification can reduce risk in its investment by choosing assets that are not fully correlated. By using the available data of the funds that were selectable in the Swedish Premium Pension system by the time period 2000 – 2014, we have calculated the optimized portfolios with the same risk level as the default option. Subsequently, a comparison of these optimized portfolios and the default option are made in terms of risk and return. Furthermore, three theoretical portfolios are put together over a period of ten years and are invested as these optimized portfolios and reallocated after Markowitz's recommendation to review their savings once a year. The analysis shows that it has been possible to achieve higher risk-adjusted returns by making an active choice of portfolio. The problem though is that it is difficult to identify these portfolios in advance. The three theoretical portfolios have all generated a lower return than the default option did during the same period. The result shows that the default option is not fully risk-adjusted. Nonetheless, we conclude that the default fund is a good alternative.

There are ongoing discussions about a new reform of the mandatory fully funded individual accounts in the Swedish public pension system. Since the initial round in 2000, several funds have been excluded from the platform due to deceptive, and sometimes criminal, behavior towards the consumers. This paper analyzes which individuals that have invested in these funds, examines possible explanations for this, and sheds light on the current structure of the Premium Pension Scheme. By using a rich dataset on 650,000 individuals that consist of both those who have been in six particular dubious funds and a random sample of the rest of the Swedish pension savers, the variables of interest are evaluated in a logistic setting. The results show that individuals who are men, unmarried, divorced, in their older-middle age, have lower-incomes, live in rural areas, and the North of Sweden are more likely to have invested in one of the dubious funds. The results also reveal that some funds have clearer target-groups, while others have targeted more randomly. The study emphasizes the need for improving people’s financial decision-making through improved information.

We investigate the activity and performance of 64 Swedish registered mutual equity funds available in the Swedish Premium Pension System from October 2002 to December 2011. Fund activity is measured by applying the holdings based analysis Active Share combined with Tracking Error Volatility (TEV). Active Share is a relatively new measure that compares a fund’s holdings with its benchmark index constituents (Cremers & Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013). This is used as a proxy for the fund’s stock selection strategy. As a complement, TEV is used as a proxy for the factor timing strategy. Performance are measured by using Jensen’s (1968) model, Fama and French’s (1993) model and Carhart’s (1997) model. We document that Swedish funds in the Premium Pension System are relatively passive in term of Active Share compared to US funds. We attribute this finding to the relative number of stocks held by a fund compared to the market. Swedish equity funds hold a relatively larger share of the number of stocks in the Swedish market while US funds hold a relatively smaller share of the stocks in the US market. We run a panel regression analysis to test the relation between Active Share and various variables. We find that funds with higher TER fees and fewer stocks on average have higher Active Share. There are also indications that TEV is positively related to Active Share. However, the overall explanatory power of the variables is low. We attribute this as evidence that Active Share is an independent measure of fund activity. Overall, we find neutral performance for an equally weighted portfolio of all funds in the PPS. To examine the performance differences between different levels of activity, we sort funds into five portfolios based on Active Share and TEV. The results show that, given a medium-to-low TEV, funds with high Active Share significantly outperform funds with low Active Share. Furthermore, it appears that the fee rebate in the Premium Pension System is important especially for the passive funds. Without the rebate, the passive funds underperform significantly. We run a panel regression analysis on the future fund performance to test the predictive abilities of Active Share and TEV. The results indicate that Active Share does not explain future performance differences. Conversely, TEV is negatively related to future performance which can be explained by fund managers being overconfident