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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Moral Disillusion: Shattering Moral Illusions for the Sake of Taking Responsibility

January 2012 (has links)
abstract: I present in this dissertation a theory of moral disillusion. In chapter 1 I explain moral innocence and its loss. I show that becoming morally responsible requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that she can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. I show that moral disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question them. In chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an acquaintance with evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals can be evildoers. Morally good people can also bring about evil. I conclude that evil is the exploitation of the extremely vulnerable. In chapters 4 and 5, I analyze more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are characterized by an understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that one might bring about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, and that one can be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand unchosen evil and the tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual sees that moral responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what we believe. In chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a philosophy of moral disillusion. I argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is congruent with Harry Frankfurt's prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others. From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction between moral disillusion and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the morally disillusioned are morally accountable for more than those still harboring moral illusions. Although moral disillusion does not entail becoming morally good, by acquiring the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to affect the content of one's cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, and potentially minimize, evil. To have and understand these abilities, but not to care about them, increases one's moral accountability. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2012
2

The Role Of Call In Promoting Learner Autonomy

Mutlu, Arzu 01 December 2008 (has links) (PDF)
In this study, four aspects of learner autonomy within the context of CALL were investigated so as to find out whether CALL environments contribute to the development of learner autonomy. Two groups of students, in total 48 preparatory school students, at intermediate level in the Department of Foreign Languages at a private university in Ankara were chosen to take part in the study. First&rsquo / the students&rsquo / language learning strategy use was explored. Then, only one group of students was given a five-week language learning strategy training through CALL. During the training, their motivation levels, willingness to take responsibility for learning and involvement in out-of-class studies were scrutinized. In order to reach the aforementioned goals, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected by the help of questionnaires, semi-structured face-to-face interviews, observations, e-learning diaries kept by the strategy training group and a five-week language learning strategy training through CALL. In order to reach the aim of the study, the data were collected in the form of pre-test and post-test for the language learning strategies of the learners from both groups to be analyzed and evaluated. Besides, both groups were observed by the instructors in order to address motivation, taking responsibility for learning and engaging in out-of-class study. However, only the students in one group were given a five-week language learning strategy training through CALL, and they were interviewed before and after the training and they kept e-learning diaries. The findings indicated that the five-week language learning strategy training helped the students in the strategy training group to improve their use of language learning strategies as well as increasing their motivation, encouraging them to take responsibility for their learning and engage in out-of-class activities. However, when compared to the students in the strategy training group, the students who did not get the five-week language learning strategy training through CALL did not show many uses of language learning strategies, high motivation levels, willingness to take responsibility and engage in out-of-class activities. Since the main aim of this study was to foster learner autonomy by the help of CALL, this study attempted to suggest ways to help learners to use language learning strategies, increase their motivation, take responsibility for learning and engage in out-of-class. Keywords: CALL, learner autonomy, learning strategies, motivation, taking responsibility, out-of-class study, language learning
3

Particularly Responsible: Everyday Ethical Navigation, Concrete Relationships, and Systemic Oppression

Chapman, Christopher Stephen 20 August 2012 (has links)
In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy). I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.
4

Particularly Responsible: Everyday Ethical Navigation, Concrete Relationships, and Systemic Oppression

Chapman, Christopher Stephen 20 August 2012 (has links)
In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy). I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.

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