Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 585-679).

Univ., Diss.--Hamburg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. 585 - 679.

The recent upsurge in the number of take-over bids in British Columbia and in England has revealed several problems of control. These resulted in legislation in British Columbia and a system of voluntary self-control by the institutions involved in England. The object of this paper is to examine the adequacy of control in some important aspects of take-over bids. As a background to discussion, two bids which disturbed the financial and legal communities in England are described. Some of the problems which were illustrated during the course of these bids are isolated and examined. These include the directors' powers when reacting to a take-over offer, disclosure of information, equality of treatment for shareholders, the role of financial advisers, and the position of minority shareholders after the completion of a bid. It will be seen that two different methods of control operate in British Columbia and in England. In British Columbia, the Securities Act 1967 contains provisions relevant to take-overs, and is administered by the Securities Commission. In England the situation is more complex. Legislative provisions are contained in the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, but more significant control is exercised by the Take-over Panel who administer the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, 1969, a voluntary system of self-control. In both jurisdictions the common law plays an important role. The strengths and weaknesses of the two systems and their effect on the problems under discussion are noted. The Securities Commission has wide investigatory and legal powers, but the rules are somewhat inflexible and as the Commission is understaffed it cannot give the attention necessary to problems which may arise. The Take-over Code contains excellent rules, which may be easily adjusted to take account of changes in commercial circumstances, but the Panel suffers from a lack of legal powers. It is discovered that shareholders in each jurisdiction have common problems of access to information and enforcement of the rules. In those areas in which the common law is the controlling influence, there is uncertainty as to the rights of shareholders and the extent to which they may be affected by a resolution of the company in general meeting. It is suggested that the problems which are revealed by an examination of recent bids can best be approached through a procedure which combines the best and eliminates the worst facets of the present systems in British Columbia and in England. It is therefore recommended that a Take-over Commission be established in each jurisdiction under the Securities Act and the Companies Act respectively, having supervisory, investigatory and legal powers. Flexibility is maintained by enabling a committee of experts to draw up and continually revise the rules pertaining to take-overs. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effect a target's operating characteristics can have on the takeover-decision of a potential bidder. Consequently, the general socioeconomic changes within the takeover market and their consequences for companies acting within this hostile environment are described and the most common economic and non-economic motives of bidders as well as several distinctive target characteristics discussed. In particular, this study identifies and subsequently analyses 28 variables viewed to be potentially relevant for a bidder's takeover-decision. In order to obtain the best possible insights into the behavior of the identified variables and their particular influence on the likelihood of getting taken over, the specific variables are empirically tested on an individual level through the application of different nonparametric techniques as well as on a combined level through the performance of a binary logistic regression analysis. The empirical examination is based on a total of 804 observations gathered by Bloomberg L.P. for the pharmaceutical and the related health care sector and covers the period from 1996 to 2002. The results of the different testing methods, although subject to certain limitations, give reason to believe that there are indeed certain factors that can make companies more interesting for potential bidders. Therefore, a regular performance of 'target-self-tests' as suggested by the author is viewed to be paramount for an early anticipation of hostile takeover attempts and a timely establishment of adequate measures of defense, which as a consequence could contribute considerably to a decrease of a company's likelihood of getting taken over. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie fokus op die effek wat 'n potensiele teiken se bedryfseienskappe op die oorname besluit van die organisasie wat die oorname oorweeg, kan hê. Gevolglik word die algemene sosio-ekonomiese veranderinge in die oorname mark en hulle gevolge vir maatskappy wat daarbinne opereer, bespreek. Verder word die mees algemene ekonomiese en nie-ekonomiese beweegredes van maatskappye wat oornames oorweeg asook verskeie onderskeidende eienskappe van teikenmaatskappye, ook bespreek. In besonder identifiseer en analiseer hierdie studie 28 veranderlikes wat potensieel relevant mag wees tydens 'n oorname besluit. Ten einde die bes moontlik insig te verkry oor die gedrag van die ge-identifiseerde veranderlikes en hulle spesifieke invloed op die waarskynlikheid van 'n oorname, word nie-parametriese tegnieke toegepas om op individuele en saamgestelde vlak die veranderlikes empiries te toets. Hierdie empiriese ondersoek is gebaseer op 'n totaal van 804 observasies soos versamel deur Blomberg L.P. vir die farmaseutiese en verwante gesondheidsorgsektore en strek oor die tydperk 1996 tot 2002. Die resultate van die onderskeie toetsmetodes - gegewe sekere beperkings - dui daarop dat daar inderdaad sekere faktore is wat maatskappye meer aantreklike teikens vir 'n potensiele oorname kan maak. Gevolglik beskou die navorser dit as belangrik dat sekere 'selftoetse' gereeld gedoen behoort te word. Dit kan dien as vroee waarskuwingsein met betrekking tot die waarskynlikheid van 'n vyandige oorname; en kan die geteikende maatskappy help om tydige verdedigingsmeganismes in plek te kry ten einde die waarskynlikheid van oorname beduidend te verminder.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1985.

A company is susceptible to the risk incurred by stochastic prices, measured in the domestic currency unit. The random characteristic stems from a stochastic domestic price or from a stochastic foreign exchange rate possibly combined with a locally stochastic price. The risk may be reduced by initiating hedging activities. Nowadays, there is no enveloping method on the market to guide the actors in the choice among the abundance of hedging methods and in the decision of hedging level. This dissertation aims at trying to provide a support method for such a decision. The fundamental idea of the method developed is to provide the actor with the probability distribution of the outcome of the total position (contractual position, anticipatory position, or tender offer plus hedging activity), conditional on any combination of hedging vehicles chosen. Thus, by analyzing and by possibly altering the hedging mix, the actor may create a risk profile of the total position that suites his or her disposition. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1985. / Also available in print.

Thesis (doctoral)--Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [238]-263) and index.

This paper examines the minority discount due to lack of control by looking at tender offer premiums on Swedish publicly traded firms from 2007 to 2018. We analyze how ownership structure, the acquired stake and distribution of shares affect the minority discount. Variables focusing on control of shares are tested individually but also included in models addressing additional impacts. Our findings suggest that a bidder’s ownership of the target firm prior to the announcement lowers the bidder’s valuation of the remaining shares. However, the relation between premium and ownership seem to depend on a threshold of having a toehold which justifies the argument of toeholds attaining control and influence of the target firm. Correspondingly, the premium per share increases with the partial interest acquired, suggesting a non pro-rata valuation. We find no evidence of additional premium for minority shareholders in squeeze out events. However, equally powerful blockholders in target firms tend to increase bid premiums, arguably due to increased competition which aligns bid premium valuation to the valuation of control between dual class shares.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration