Thesis (M. A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kadhim, Abbas ; Shore, Zachary. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Islam, Muslim, radicalization, Germany, France, United Kingdom, terrorist, home-grown, immigration, integration. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-85). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009. / Prepared for: L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs. Title from title-page of electronic thesis. Bibliography: leaves 217-225.

From 1939 to 1947 two Jewish terrorist organizations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Lohamei Herut Israel (known to Jews by its Hebrew acronym, Lehi, and to the British as "The Stern Gang") challenged Britain's rule over Palestine. Those eight years began with the publication of the White Paper in May 1939 and ended in September 1947 with the decision taken by the British Government to surrender its League of Nations Mandate and withdraw from Palestine. This thesis examines the influence that Jewish terrorist activities had on Britain's policy for Palestine and seeks to ascertain the role played by terrorism in that decision. Through an examination of British policy and the strategies employed by the British Army to defeat the terrorists, this study demonstrates why the British failed to reach either a military or a political settlement in Palestine. This failure can.be attributed both to the irreconcilable nature of Arab and Jewish claims to the country and the lack of a clear and consistent policy for Palestine on Britain's part. The situation was further aggravated by the weaknesses of the Palestine Police Force, the futile efforts of the Palestine Government to obtain the cooperation of the Jewish public against the terrorists and the debilitating effect of Jewish terrorist activities on the morale of the British soldier in Palestine. The search for a solution to the Palestine problem after World War II took place amid increasing terrorist violence in the country. As British authority in Palestine deteriorated, Britain's will to remain there dissolved. This thesis concludes that no single factor itself can be considered responsible for the decision to surrender the mandate and leave Palestine. At the same time, however, Jewish terrorist activities played an important--and even a decisive--role in the events that led to the termination of British rule over Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel.

Thesis (M.(Security Studies))-University of Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M. (Security Studies) -- University of Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.) -- National Defense University, 2007. / AD-A468 858. Includes bibliographical references.

Title: Terrorism and cyberterrorism as threats for the present Objectives: Describe the principle, history and typology of terrorism. Approach and describe the problematics of cyberterrorism. Analyze and compare available terrorist attacks which happened from 11th September 2001 to 19th February 2020. Methods: The theoretical part was developed on the basis of study, analysis and research from Czech and foreign literature about problematics of terrorism and cyberterrorism. The practical pard included the collection of electronic and printed information about terrorists attacks which were further analysed and compared using five factors, which were: the year of terrorist attack, method of execution, country that tooked place of the attack, number of injured and number of victims. Results: The result of this diplama thesis is the description of the principle, history and typology of terrorism, description of problematics of cyberterrorism and analysis of terrorist attacks which happened from 11th September 2001 fo 19th February 2020. Keywords: Terrorism, terrorists, attack, cyberterrorism, threat.

Masters of Commerce / Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, because it is a key ingredient in making a nuclear bomb. If a terrorist organisation can get HEU, it would be close to making a nuclear bomb. After South Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, it kept HEU that was extracted from the nuclear bombs. The US tried to persuade South Africa to blend down its HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) or give it up for safekeeping. However, South Africa refused to give it up. After a breach at Pelindaba, a national key point facility where South Africa stores its HEU, the US intensified its efforts to pressure South Africa to give its HEU up. It even promised incentives to South Africa should they agree to give it up, but South Africa refused. The US used the nuclear terrorism narrative to justify its initiative to eliminate vulnerable materials in the world. However, South Africa is yet to be swayed. This is odd since South Africa's refusal can negatively affect its credentials as a nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament champion and its image as a norm entrepreneur. The objective of the study was to understand the role played by HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. It was to explore HEU as a factor in the state's nuclear diplomacy and to understand the power of having HEU in nuclear negotiations, as well as what SA intends to do with its HEU. The study is framed theoretically by drawing on foreign policy theory, namely middle-power theory, and revisionism. It juxtaposed middle power, reformist, and revisionist positions with status quo foreign policy to analyse the role of HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. As a middle power with a moral high ground, South Africa hoped that it can affect change in the nuclear regime. However, when this did not occur its foreign policy shifted to a revisionist character that is discontent with the status quo in the nuclear regime. SA is dissatisfied with the current nuclear order and wants it revised towards liberal values such as equality and nondiscrimination. It views the current nuclear order as nuclear apartheid.

The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost. To achieve US objectives in Iraq it is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadist elements as well. This thesis uses a social mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) describing the group's political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames and repertoires of action. The result of this analysis shows an internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-specific political or social strengths. This thesis applies this knowledge to established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort. This relational analysis views the conflict through a six dimensional framework to examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions. We then examine the current status of the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq. Trend-analysis tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern and areas of positive movement. Based on the nature of AQI and the current trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model's relevance for strategic use in other regions.