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South Africa has been considered a bastion of democracy on the continent of Africa since its first fully democratic election in 1994. Yet, under its second president since apartheid, Thabo Mbeki, the consolidation of South Africas democratic gains tended to slow or even stagnate. This thesis develops a theoretical backdrop by explaining competing theories of leadership and development in Africa. With Thabo Mbekis promotion of the African Renaissance he should be considered to of promoted a good governance model of growth and leadership within South Africa. To determine whether Mbeki actively followed through in implementing good governance practices as leader of South Africa and the ANC this thesis analyzes three aspects of the African National Congress (ANC): centralization, corruption and the 2007 leadership succession. Through this analysis of these three aspects of the ANC under Mbeki the thesis moves to determine whether the former president should be considered to have cultivated a good governance regime while in office or whether his leadership of South Africa embraced more neopatrimonial logic.<p> This study finds that under Mbeki neopatrimonialism expanded significantly, particularly within the ruling ANC, and can to a certain extent be used to explained Mbekis actions while president of South Africa. Despite actively promoting a good governance agenda this thesis argues that Mbeki contributed to the stagnation of democratic gains in South Africa. This legacy will continue to effect future South African leaders including Mbekis arch-rival Jacob Zuma.

South Africa has been considered a bastion of democracy on the continent of Africa since its first fully democratic election in 1994. Yet, under its second president since apartheid, Thabo Mbeki, the consolidation of South Africas democratic gains tended to slow or even stagnate. This thesis develops a theoretical backdrop by explaining competing theories of leadership and development in Africa. With Thabo Mbekis promotion of the African Renaissance he should be considered to of promoted a good governance model of growth and leadership within South Africa. To determine whether Mbeki actively followed through in implementing good governance practices as leader of South Africa and the ANC this thesis analyzes three aspects of the African National Congress (ANC): centralization, corruption and the 2007 leadership succession. Through this analysis of these three aspects of the ANC under Mbeki the thesis moves to determine whether the former president should be considered to have cultivated a good governance regime while in office or whether his leadership of South Africa embraced more neopatrimonial logic.<p> This study finds that under Mbeki neopatrimonialism expanded significantly, particularly within the ruling ANC, and can to a certain extent be used to explained Mbekis actions while president of South Africa. Despite actively promoting a good governance agenda this thesis argues that Mbeki contributed to the stagnation of democratic gains in South Africa. This legacy will continue to effect future South African leaders including Mbekis arch-rival Jacob Zuma.

South African foreign policy is not made in a bubble; as a democracy since 1994, its outward orientation is theoretically subject to lobbying and pressure from outside groups as well as jockeying among bureaucratic entities. This study applies the principles of Foreign Policy Analysis, a theoretical framework that attempts to unpack the processes through which governments’ foreign policies are made, to South Africa to determine whether foreign policy making is in reality open to outside inputs, or whether the foreign policy arena—as in many countries globally—is an elite reserve. The thesis has a specific focus on the 1994-2008 period, during which time Deputy President (1994-99) and later President (1999-2008) Thabo Mbeki dominated government’s foreign policy formulation, to determine whether South Africa’s democratic transition was accompanied by “democratization” of the foreign policy making process compared to the apartheid government. In addition, the thesis sought to disaggregate the various actors involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision making sides of the coin—to analyze their individual roles in influencing foreign policy, both pre- and post-1994. The thesis found that the dominant actor in South African foreign policy, both before and after 1994, was the national leader (Prime Minister before 1984; President thereafter) or, on occasion, his chosen delegate if the leader was disinterested in the external realm. This is in part because South African Constitutions vest most decision-making power in the executive, in line with international norms, but also due to a lack of pressure by non-governmental actors. While South Africa’s post-apartheid dispensation allows for greater inputs by the public and other outside actors, the practice of influencing foreign policy—either through the ballot box or through concerted pressure between elections—changed very little. Public engagement on foreign policy, already weak, did not improve after 1994. Parliament, despite having a dedicated committee on the issue, showed itself largely disinterested, as did the broader ANC. The press, business, the ANC, and most civil society organizations similarly showed little desire to weigh in on foreign policy beyond isolated instances. Only academia consistently attempted to influence policy during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, with mixed results. Ultimately, blame for this lack of change appears to lie mostly with outside actors themselves, who during the first 14 years of democracy failed to take advantage of political space opened to them. In examining Thabo Mbeki specifically, the thesis found that he took advantage of this leeway to dominate the foreign policy debate and rarely went out of his way to open the foreign policy debate any more than he had to. He gave short shrift to the inputs of pressure groups; had no time for the press or business; and dominated the ANC and its parliamentary caucus. Mbeki had a clear and well-defined worldview, and he had little time for people or organizations with decidedly different views. That said, those close to Mbeki, and even outsiders—notably from the academic community—paint a far more nuanced picture of the man, as someone who would listen and engage with others on foreign policy, at least if he believed they had done their homework on the issues in question. Hence, portrayals of Mbeki as a “dictator” in the foreign policy realm appear to be overstated. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (African Politics)

South African foreign policy is not made in a bubble; as a democracy since 1994, its outward orientation is theoretically subject to lobbying and pressure from outside groups as well as jockeying among bureaucratic entities. This study applies the principles of Foreign Policy Analysis, a theoretical framework that attempts to unpack the processes through which governments’ foreign policies are made, to South Africa to determine whether foreign policy making is in reality open to outside inputs, or whether the foreign policy arena—as in many countries globally—is an elite reserve. The thesis has a specific focus on the 1994-2008 period, during which time Deputy President (1994-99) and later President (1999-2008) Thabo Mbeki dominated government’s foreign policy formulation, to determine whether South Africa’s democratic transition was accompanied by “democratization” of the foreign policy making process compared to the apartheid government. In addition, the thesis sought to disaggregate the various actors involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision making sides of the coin—to analyze their individual roles in influencing foreign policy, both pre- and post-1994. The thesis found that the dominant actor in South African foreign policy, both before and after 1994, was the national leader (Prime Minister before 1984; President thereafter) or, on occasion, his chosen delegate if the leader was disinterested in the external realm. This is in part because South African Constitutions vest most decision-making power in the executive, in line with international norms, but also due to a lack of pressure by non-governmental actors. While South Africa’s post-apartheid dispensation allows for greater inputs by the public and other outside actors, the practice of influencing foreign policy—either through the ballot box or through concerted pressure between elections—changed very little. Public engagement on foreign policy, already weak, did not improve after 1994. Parliament, despite having a dedicated committee on the issue, showed itself largely disinterested, as did the broader ANC. The press, business, the ANC, and most civil society organizations similarly showed little desire to weigh in on foreign policy beyond isolated instances. Only academia consistently attempted to influence policy during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, with mixed results. Ultimately, blame for this lack of change appears to lie mostly with outside actors themselves, who during the first 14 years of democracy failed to take advantage of political space opened to them. In examining Thabo Mbeki specifically, the thesis found that he took advantage of this leeway to dominate the foreign policy debate and rarely went out of his way to open the foreign policy debate any more than he had to. He gave short shrift to the inputs of pressure groups; had no time for the press or business; and dominated the ANC and its parliamentary caucus. Mbeki had a clear and well-defined worldview, and he had little time for people or organizations with decidedly different views. That said, those close to Mbeki, and even outsiders—notably from the academic community—paint a far more nuanced picture of the man, as someone who would listen and engage with others on foreign policy, at least if he believed they had done their homework on the issues in question. Hence, portrayals of Mbeki as a “dictator” in the foreign policy realm appear to be overstated. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (African Politics)

This thesis reflects on how to develop an African leadership that can contribute to the effective transformation of the African continent. After analysing the concept of leadership and categorising it for better understanding, the mission of the church as a developer of leaders par excellence has been examined and its potentials and limits assessed. Then, the thesis studied the specific extent of poor African leadership and its dire socio-political consequences in a sub-Saharan African country; so, the context of DR Congo was analysed. After that the contribution of the notion of African Renaissance to the whole debate of leadership development in Africa was assessed and the social, economic and political climate of the continent analysed. The poor and deficient African leadership has been identified as the main cause of rampant conflicts and wars, a slow economic development and lack of transformation in the continent. Given that church leadership seemed so poor and inefficient, the thesis has recommended that the African church needed primarily to transform its own leadership to be able to effectively develop transformational political leadership. The analysis of African institutions already involved in the development of an African leadership for socio-political transformation has shown that Christianising African leadership and socio-political institutions alone was not enough. So, the thesis has proposed a comprehensive socio-political discipleship for the transformation of both individuals and their communities. In a nutshell, the discipleship includes a socio-political intercession1, a four-dimensional discipleship, a socio-political psychotherapy and a church involvement project for socio-political transformation. / Christian Spirituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Missiology, with specialisation in Urban Ministry)

This thesis reflects on how to develop an African leadership that can contribute to the effective transformation of the African continent. After analysing the concept of leadership and categorising it for better understanding, the mission of the church as a developer of leaders par excellence has been examined and its potentials and limits assessed. Then, the thesis studied the specific extent of poor African leadership and its dire socio-political consequences in a sub-Saharan African country; so, the context of DR Congo was analysed. After that the contribution of the notion of African Renaissance to the whole debate of leadership development in Africa was assessed and the social, economic and political climate of the continent analysed. The poor and deficient African leadership has been identified as the main cause of rampant conflicts and wars, a slow economic development and lack of transformation in the continent. Given that church leadership seemed so poor and inefficient, the thesis has recommended that the African church needed primarily to transform its own leadership to be able to effectively develop transformational political leadership. The analysis of African institutions already involved in the development of an African leadership for socio-political transformation has shown that Christianising African leadership and socio-political institutions alone was not enough. So, the thesis has proposed a comprehensive socio-political discipleship for the transformation of both individuals and their communities. In a nutshell, the discipleship includes a socio-political intercession1, a four-dimensional discipleship, a socio-political psychotherapy and a church involvement project for socio-political transformation. / Christian Spirituality, Church History and Missiology / D. Th. (Missiology, with specialisation in Urban Ministry)

The recent political conflict in Zimbabwe has attracted the attention of policymakers, academics and the media alike in the neighbouring countries of the region, across the African continent and internationally. While the story of an ageing African liberation hero turned dictator who, through autocratic rule, has governed his country and his people to the ground in order to maintain power is captivating, a key element of the fascination is the critical diplomatic role played by South Africa from 2000 onward. Foreign policy in post-apartheid South Africa on paper is driven by human rights and democracy, conflict prevention and conflict resolution through peaceful means, and the promotion of African interests in world affairs. However, after observing South Africa’s involvement in the Zimbabwe conflict between 2000 and 2009, South Africa’s foreign policy appears to be propelled more by African solidarity and sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and a softer interpretation of preventive diplomacy than its international counterparts. Thabo Mbeki’s preventive diplomacy toward Zimbabwe during his presidency was slow to produce results, lacked transparency and frustrated many, yet, when examined under a preventive diplomacy theoretical lens, Mbeki’s policy did eventually garner success through the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of an inclusive government in Zimbabwe. This dissertation examines the role of preventive diplomacy in South Africa’s foreign policy toward Zimbabwe under Mbeki’s leadership and determines the point at which South Africa switched from an approach of preventive diplomacy to one of conflict resolution and conflict management. The concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’ is often focused on government-to-government relations or the high level diplomacy of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Multi-track diplomacy expands on this traditional interpretation and considers the preventive diplomacy contributions of a variety of non-state actors to the practice of conflict prevention. This dissertation uniquely moulds the preventive diplomacy theoretical framework of Michael Lund with Kumar Rupesinghe’s concept of multi-track diplomacy to form a more comprehensive illustration of the role of preventive diplomacy in the approach of multiple actors towards the Zimbabwe conflict. The more inclusive preventive diplomacy theoretical framework is then applied to the conflict in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2009. Through the application of a preventive diplomacy framework which incorporates the concept of multi-track diplomacy it is then possible to observe the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach toward Zimbabwe first between 2000 and 2007 and then as mandated by SADC between 2007 and 2009 and finally compare it with the diplomacy of multi-track actors such as the UN, Zimbabwe-based and South African-based civil society organizations, the Zimbabwean Diaspora, religious groups, and financial institutions. The examination of the larger role of preventive diplomacy in the Zimbabwe conflict situation leads to the understanding that each diplomatic effort is interlinked. Therefore the culminating event of the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach in the Global Political Agreement could not have been achieved without the preventive diplomacy efforts of a multitude of actors who were also committed to preventing violence and finding a lasting solution to the conflict in Zimbabwe. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted