This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of conflict intervention in protracted violent conflicts by studying the activities of civil society actors in regard to the conflicts in what was Yugoslavia until 1991. A very broad understanding of ‘intervention’ is used for this purpose that includes all kinds of activities that relate to the conflicts. Based on a survey of activities in the period between 1990 and 2002, a framework for categorising and describing these interventions is applied according to basic functions in four ‘grand strategies’ of ‘peace-making’, ‘peace-keeping’, ‘peacebuilding’, and ‘information, support, protest and advocacy’, with a total list of about 230 instruments of conflict intervention identified. The study concludes that civil society actors played three different basic roles: They complemented the work of state actors, they were the avant-garde for approaches, strategies and methods that later became ‘mainstream’ in conflict intervention, and in some cases, they were able to control or correct actions by governments through advocacy or direct action. The development of instruments of civil conflict transformation received a massive boost through this engagement in the 1990s. The study supports the position taken recently by some researchers making comparative studies of cases of conflict intervention regarding the limited role played by dialogue and reconciliation work in regard to dealing with the overall conflicts: In spite of ‘reconciliation’ and inter-ethnic cooperation being at the core of the vast majority of all projects and programmes undertaken in the area, indicators of real impact regarding an overall positive change in society and prevention of future violence seem to be rather weak. The study further observes that there was a social movement developed relating to former Yugoslavia in many Western countries that in a hitherto unknown way combined traditional methods of protest and advocacy with concrete work in the field.

A wide number of contributions to the peacebuilding literature have decried the limitations and constraints of liberal peacebuilding, to such an extent that the very term has begun to assume vaguely pejorative overtones. Concerns for the health and well-being of liberal peacebuilding have accumulated to the extent that Roland Paris has issued a plaintive call for liberal peacebuilding to be ‘saved’ (2010). In this thesis, I critically engage with the comprehensive approach, one of the central mechanisms that has enabled liberal peacebuilding to redefine and rearticulate its terms of reference. I begin from the assumption that the comprehensive approach does not anticipate the post-liberal peace that has been heralded by some observers (see Richmond, 2011); quite the contrary, it instead provides the basis for reformulation or adaptation within the terms that have been established by liberal peacebuilding. In continuing to hold out this tantalising possibility, the comprehensive approach continues, more than 20 years after its first articulation, to cast a seductive spell over its adherents. In this thesis, I critically assess how the comprehensive approach framework has been engaged and developed by one of its leading proponents (the British Government). I break the approach down into three dimensions of comprehensiveness (deepening, contextuality and complementarity), with a view to illustrating how the textual reproduction of each dimension has been accompanied by a set of contradictions and tensions. In doing so, I propose to explore how discursive ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ has been accompanied by a range of contradictions and tensions. In unravelling these contradictions, I then draw upon Foucauldian concepts and themes to argue that each and every advancement of freedom (whether through the form of empowerment, participation or contextual engagement) has been considerably more ambiguous than the standard narrative of the comprehensive approach – which reproduces the impression of an incremental progression – would have us believe. In questioning and probing the proposition that the comprehensive approach overcomes or reconciles the contradictions and tensions of liberal peacebuilding, I instead suggest a disconcerting reversion to prior points of reference.

The hypothesis underlying this research is that Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct extra-continental intervention. This begs two questions. Is Africa right — politically and morally – to assume this task? And should the rest of the world, particularly the traditional intervening powers, accept and/or promote and/or assist African self-pacification? A trend toward subsidiarity and the regionalisation of conflict management in the African context followed reversals for United Nations and Western policy in the early 1990s, notably in Somalia and Rwanda. In the wake of these setbacks the universal impulse to intervene wherever necessary was overshadowed by a particularist/relativist position that distinguished Africa and African conflicts as cases apart. This translated in theoretical terms to a switch away from a cosmopolitan position allowing of international intervention to a communitarian position that promotes the African 'community' or African sub-regional 'communities' as the primary loci for addressing conflict. The continental organisation, the Organisation of African Union (0AU), has been hampered in assuming this task by its strict Charter adherence to state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states. As a result the logic of subsidiarity devolved on Africa's sub-regional organisations, in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). However, these organisations have found development of a security framework problematic, suffered from internal rivalries and have been hindered by paucity of funds and logistics. Interventions undertaken under the auspices of these bodies have often been of dubious legitimacy under international law. Viewed from the perspective of the 'just war' tradition these interventions also invariably seem morally suspect. Unwilling to intervene directly, the United States, France and Britain have established a joint initiative to enhance peacekeeping capacity in Africa. This project, under funded and ill considered, has proven inadequate from the perspective of both African participants and its sponsors. The research examines two case studies — intervention by the OAU in Chad in 1980-1982 and the peacekeeping operation undertaken by ECO WAS in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. These cases confirm that existing mechanisms are ineffective for addressing African intra-state conflict. Moreover, they show that extra-African involvement remains an enduring feature of conflict on the continent. A return to the universal/cosmopolitan impulse in terms of international intervention in African conflicts seems unlikely in the short to medium term. In view of this neglect Africa must continue the project of self-pacification. The West is under a moral duty to set aside narrow national interests and expand and improve its existing peacekeeping capacity enhancement programme.

There is a divide between the fields of Conflict Resolution (CR) and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) that impacts on the transfer of knowledge and skills. This is the central hypothesis investigated and confirmed through analysis of the literatures of the two fields, the responses to a questionnaire to practitioners, and autoethnographic interrogation. A generational analysis of authors is combined with the results of a (N=28) questionnaire with practitioners from both fields. This delineates the divide in the theory and literature as well as how those operating in each field identify, conceptualise mediation and what they read. The autoethnography explores the fundamental impact of on conflict role definitions generally and the mediator specifically. It then looks at the impact of crossing the ADR/CR divide on mediation practice, highlighting the necessity for practitioners of a ‘both and’ approach to skills/ knowledge and attitude/qualities. This leads to the consideration of a framework for mediator competence across the ADR/CR divide. The interaction of the mediators’ normative project and the ability of parties to self-determine is explored practically and ethically. This highlights a range of issues with expectations mediation and mediators and foregrounds the impact on the mediator of the mediator role. It ends with a call for further research using innovative methodologies, such as autoethnography, that illuminate mediation as a relational process.

abstract: In countries of conflict, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often resort to humanitarian relief. A small number of peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs) engage more directly, through grassroots mediation, elite negotiation and advocacy. This thesis observes the potential for implementing such direct conflict interventions in traditional relief and development organizations. To understand current NGO activities, I examine ten case study organizations in two countries of conflict, Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia. I analyze organizations' rhetorical presentation, their society-level engagement, strategies for intervention, and responses to persistent challenges, such as security, impartiality, collaboration and evaluation. Based on conflict study literature, I make tentative recommendations for NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia specifically. I also propose a more general system for classifying NGO peace work: five generations of conflict intervention, each more integrated, direct, and political. Rhetorical, structural and operational changes will help organizations move toward higher generation work. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Social Justice and Human Rights 2011

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The recent political conflict in Zimbabwe has attracted the attention of policymakers, academics and the media alike in the neighbouring countries of the region, across the African continent and internationally. While the story of an ageing African liberation hero turned dictator who, through autocratic rule, has governed his country and his people to the ground in order to maintain power is captivating, a key element of the fascination is the critical diplomatic role played by South Africa from 2000 onward. Foreign policy in post-apartheid South Africa on paper is driven by human rights and democracy, conflict prevention and conflict resolution through peaceful means, and the promotion of African interests in world affairs. However, after observing South Africa’s involvement in the Zimbabwe conflict between 2000 and 2009, South Africa’s foreign policy appears to be propelled more by African solidarity and sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and a softer interpretation of preventive diplomacy than its international counterparts. Thabo Mbeki’s preventive diplomacy toward Zimbabwe during his presidency was slow to produce results, lacked transparency and frustrated many, yet, when examined under a preventive diplomacy theoretical lens, Mbeki’s policy did eventually garner success through the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of an inclusive government in Zimbabwe. This dissertation examines the role of preventive diplomacy in South Africa’s foreign policy toward Zimbabwe under Mbeki’s leadership and determines the point at which South Africa switched from an approach of preventive diplomacy to one of conflict resolution and conflict management. The concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’ is often focused on government-to-government relations or the high level diplomacy of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Multi-track diplomacy expands on this traditional interpretation and considers the preventive diplomacy contributions of a variety of non-state actors to the practice of conflict prevention. This dissertation uniquely moulds the preventive diplomacy theoretical framework of Michael Lund with Kumar Rupesinghe’s concept of multi-track diplomacy to form a more comprehensive illustration of the role of preventive diplomacy in the approach of multiple actors towards the Zimbabwe conflict. The more inclusive preventive diplomacy theoretical framework is then applied to the conflict in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2009. Through the application of a preventive diplomacy framework which incorporates the concept of multi-track diplomacy it is then possible to observe the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach toward Zimbabwe first between 2000 and 2007 and then as mandated by SADC between 2007 and 2009 and finally compare it with the diplomacy of multi-track actors such as the UN, Zimbabwe-based and South African-based civil society organizations, the Zimbabwean Diaspora, religious groups, and financial institutions. The examination of the larger role of preventive diplomacy in the Zimbabwe conflict situation leads to the understanding that each diplomatic effort is interlinked. Therefore the culminating event of the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach in the Global Political Agreement could not have been achieved without the preventive diplomacy efforts of a multitude of actors who were also committed to preventing violence and finding a lasting solution to the conflict in Zimbabwe. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted