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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 which operated as the interim constitution of the Republic introduced a new legal order predicated on constitutionalism and constitutional supremacy. Within it was entrenched a justiciable Bill of Rights that guaranteed the enforcement and protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals of the state. Notionally and traditionally bills of rights have been conceived as a mechanism for the protection and enforcement of fundamental human rights against the state, the abuse of state authority and sate power. Such an application has been typified as the vertical application of the bill of rights . During the drafting process of the Interim Constitution, the Technical Committees commissioned by the Multi-Party Negotiating Process for that purpose were preoccupied with the question as to whether the South African Bill of Rights should apply in the private sphere between private persons acting inter se; such an application being typified as the horizontal application. The result was an ambiguous text. The question of whether the Bill of Rights was indeed capable of a horizontal application was intensely debated before the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Du Plessis And Others v De Klerk And Another 1996 (3) SA 850. And in an equally intense judgment the majority of the Court concluded that the Bill of Rights was not in general capable of a direct horizontal application. Although influenced by a strenuous textual analysis, there were other considerations too that influenced the Court's decision. One of the most important of these was that the operation of a bill of rights in the private sphere would be contrary to the notion of a constitutional state and that it would make the law vague and uncertain. However, the very same Constitutional Court a few months later in In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) certified that Section 8 (2) of Chapter 3 unequivocally provided for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. This dissertation examines the paradigms within which the Bill of Rights operates horizontally and analyzes the apprehensions expressed in Du Plessis v De Klerk within the context of these paradigms. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1998.

Malawi reverted to multiparty politics in 1993.1 A new Republican Constitution,2 (the Constitution) with a Bill of Rights was provisionally adopted on 18 May 1994 and it entered into force on 18 May 1995.3 Chapter 3 thereof deals with fundamental principles upon which the Constitution is founded and Principles of National Policy (PNP). Section 13(c) of the Constitution which falls under the PNP deals with health. It is to the effect that ‘the State shall actively promote the welfare and development of the people of Malawi by progressively adopting and implementing policies and legislation aimed at achieving adequate healthcare, commensurate with the health needs of Malawian society and international standards of healthcare’. According to section 14 of the Constitution, PNP are only directory in nature. Courts are obliged to have regard to them in the interpretation and application of the Constitution or any other law or in the determination of the validity of executive decisions. In the light of the foregoing, arguably, the right to health is not justiciable under the Constitution. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2010. / A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Ben K. Twinomugisha of the Faculty of Law, University of Makerere. 2010. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Published Article / The teachers' salary strike, which occurs almost annually in South Africa, is so widespread that it seems to have gained public toleration if not complete acceptance. However, the strike may have a lasting and devastating impact on the teachers' as well as the learners' discipline, motivation and morale, with the learners being the hardest hit. The strike has a negative impact on the learning and teaching culture and on the learners' academic performance. Although the teachers' strike is about salaries and salary-related matters, all too often, debates about it shift from the strike to the tension between the teachers' right to strike and the learners' right to receive education. This study endeavours to fathom the truth about the two rights, to establish whether they can stand side by side without contradicting each other, and to study their implications.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.