"The end of the Cold War marked for Europe the entrance into an era of instability and violence caused by the collapse of the old communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. How the European security organizations reacted to those changes and new threats and transformed themselves for dealing with a new security environment is the focus of this thesis. In particular, it gives an overview of the transformations that occurred within NATO and OSCE in the post-Cold War period, which have created and developed new security mechanisms and policies for dealing with crises. The thesis further examines the consolidation of a new European security actor, the European Union, and the development of the military dimension through the ESDP, which is linked directly to transformations that occurred in Europe, being merely a consequence of those changes. All three organizations proved their importance as stability factors of the European security system by launching crisis management operations, acting in ceasefire and post-conflict mediation, conducting preventive diplomacy, and spreading democracy and principles of human rights."-- p. i. / Republic of Moldova Army author.

This dissertation critically examines how U.S. print media sought to represent the realities of decolonizing and newly independent countries in West Africa by focusing on pivotal events and charismatic leaders from the “non” vote in Guinea in 1958 to the radical appeal of Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau in 1973. The framing and agenda setting of mainstream media coverage turned leaders and events into metonyms not only for peoples and nations but also for Africa and Africans as a whole. However, the complexities of West Africa, such as political rivalry in the Congo or civil war in Nigeria, troubled such representations. Thus this dissertation tracks the widening of coverage and opening up of representations in African American and New Left print media in a time of global unrest as well as Cold War.

This thesis will examine the response of educators to the use of the American public school system for ideological management during the early Cold War period. Through an assessment of instructional films, this work will show that the objectives of educational propaganda fell into three main categories: to promote Americanism as the national ideology, to deter students from communism or communist sympathy, and to link the potential for nuclear warfare to ideological lassitude. It will be argued that although the majority of educators accepted these goals, as films became increasingly extreme in their presentations, a critical minority revealed discontent with the use of the school for the purposes of indoctrination. By the mid-1960s, a number of factors would result in the dismantling of the Cold War consensus and a reinvigoration of the critical perspective in education.

The success of Chinese foreign policy since 1949 can be demonstrated empirically in terms of core national interests defined by the realist international relations perspective: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socioeconomic development. Influential realist writers, however, fail to consistently identify or explain the success of Chinese foreign policy, despite the work of area specialists who suggest that Chinese foreign policy displays consistent and effective, strategic patterns of force. Strategic thought arises from culturally differing ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions, as modified within specific historical conditions. Using the theoretical approach of comparative strategic culture, an abstract conceptual framework is developed for philosophical analysis of western and Chinese strategic culture. Classical and contemporary western realist-strategic paradigms coexist in theoretical and practical tension, resulting in a western strategic ethnocentrism which explains realist failure to recognize Chinese strategic patterns in foreign policy. Chinese philosophical assumptions, reinforced in linguistic structure, create a culturally paradigmatic approach to strategic thought, modified by the modern historical context of civil/national wars and state-building. The modern Chinese strategic paradigm of protracted war is characterized by the mutually constitutive relationship between the military and political dimensions of force, and by a cumulative, discontinuous pattern of foreign policy and state-building, in which force is created, stored, and applied over space and time. / Graduate

The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a variety of significant repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. This doctoral project examines the evolution of Chinese intellectual perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, before and after the collapse. Relying on a larger body of updated Chinese sources, this thesis will offer re-evaluations of many key issues in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. The following topics will be explored or re-examined: Chinese views of Soviet policies in the early 1980s prior to Mikhail Gorbachev’s assumption of power; Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s political reform from the mid-1980s onward, before the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; Chinese scholars’ evolving views on Gorbachev from the 1980s to 1990s; the Chinese use of Vladimir Lenin and his policies in the early 1980s and early 1990s for bolstering and legitimizing the CCP regime after the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Incident, respectively; and the re-evaluations of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin since the mid-1990s. First, the thesis argues that the changing Chinese views on the USSR were not only shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. Even more importantly, views changed in response to the earth-shaking event of the rise and fall of world communism in the last two decades of the 20th century. Second, by researching the country of the Soviet Union, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the Chinese state policies of reform and open door in both decades. By examining the Soviet past, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that doomed the USSR. In short, Chinese research on Soviet socialism has primarily served to trace the current problems of Chinese socialism, in order to legitimize their solutions – rather than a truth-seeking process devoted to knowledge of the Soviet Union.

This is a study of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East cognisant of the relationships between the three in one's thinking as well as practices. This is achieved through the threefold structure of the thesis, which looks at Cold War pasts (Part I), post-Cold War presents (Part II) and possible futures (Part III). The thesis also has a set of more specific aims. First, it aims to present a critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security. And finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think differently about the futures of regional security in the Middle East. The overall thesis is that the Critical Security Studies perspective presents a fuller account of regional security in the Middle East; it offers a comprehensive framework recognising the dynamic relationships between various dimensions and levels of security, as voiced by multiple referents.

This thesis deals with Britain's attitude towards European security under the Callaghan government from 1976 to 1979. That period saw Cold War tensions grow and détente lose its momentum as Britain struggled with economic weakness while trying to maintain its international influence. Concentrating on Cold War Europe, this thesis asks two questions: what policy did the Callaghan government adopt towards European security, and what role did Britain play in the Atlantic Alliance? It draws three conclusions. First, under Callaghan, Britain sought to maintain a traditionally influential role in Europe. To achieve that goal, it attempted to sustain a major military contribution to NATO and to foster good US-UK relations. Nevertheless, this policy was complicated by acute economic crisis and defence expenditure cuts. Britain's credibility in the Alliance was seriously diminished and policymakers had to offset reductions in British hardware contributions with diplomatic contributions. Secondly, Britain's role as a mediator in the Alliance contributed to its stability during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter's inconsistent foreign policy and lack of consultation with allies caused confusion and tensions soon after his inauguration. This gave the British room to work for the maintenance of Alliance unity and, as a result, the US-UK special relationship was strengthened. Thirdly, regardless of Britain's response to its economic trails, and its collaboration with the US, Callaghan's preference for status quo, and his lack of strategy towards European security other than the maintenance of the stability of the Alliance under American leadership, hampered Britain's attempts to retain influence. As Britain's power waned, West Germany's rose as German leaders gained status in the defence policy making process of the Alliance by arguing for a new response to the changing East-West military balance and the decline of détente.

This dissertation examines how Latin American diplomacy helped shape U.S. officials’ response to revolutionary movements at the height of the Cold War. It explains the striking contrast between U.S. patronage of the Bolivian revolution and the profound antagonism with similar leftist nationalist movements in Cuba and Guatemala. Although U.S. policymakers worried that “Communists” were infiltrating the Bolivian Government, Bolivian diplomats convinced the Eisenhower administration to support their revolution. The dissertation demonstrates that even during the peak of McCarthyism, U.S. policymakers' vision extended far beyond Cold War dogmatism. This vision incorporated a subtle, if ultimately contradictory, appreciation of the power of nationalism, a wish to promote developmental liberalism, and a desire for hemispheric hegemony regardless of strategic and ideological competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials were eager to exploit the emerging force of third world nationalism and employ it to strengthen the “inter-American system.” The Bolivian revolutionaries presented their political project as copacetic to Washington’s wider regional goals, and thus managed to secure considerable freedom of movement to continue to pursue a radical revolutionary agenda and statist program of development, financed and enabled by hundreds of millions in U.S. aid dollars.

This study focuses on the significant investment in oceanography that typified Cold War Britain. Thanks to the analysis of untapped archival records, it documents the remarkable growth of marine research in the UK, and its underlying ambitions, from the end of Second World War naval exercises to the deployment of nuclear submarines in the Atomic Age. In particular, it looks at the significance of sea studies in the context of British naval operations, the surveillance of enemy vessels at sea, and the gathering of intelligence on the capabilities of enemy forces. In so doing, it depicts the trajectory of what was at the time dubbed "military oceanography" from its ascendancy in the post-war years to the creation of an national organization (the National Institute of Oceanography, NIO), devoted to pursue novel research, to its re-configuration during the 1970s marking an important transition from military to civilian (environmentally-driven) studies. The thesis discusses the complexities of the Cold War British State. It reveals the connections between leading scientists, government administrators, and military officers, and their interplay in the establishment and development of oceanographic studies. The thesis contends that at the core of the political-scientific interface there are policy networks and that we can gain a better understanding of this interaction by looking at some of the key figures, or "nodes" in these networks. It thus uses the career of the NIO director, the marine scientist George Deacon, as a source to gain entrance into the historical path of British oceanography, and argues that by looking at Deacon as a mediator (or "go-between") one can gain a better understanding of the dynamics and historical evolution of the policy networks he participated in.

Oil is one of the most widespread high-density energy sources in the world: its importance for the military-industrial complex became even more evident in the postwar context. In this framework, establishing the conditions for accessing the world's oil-rich areas became essential for states, not only to provide for their own energy needs, but also to buttress national economic and geostrategic interests, and protect energy security. In addition, regulating the oil flow between countries afforded the ability to influence their operational capabilities. Exploiting oil as a geopolitical weapon was not distinctive of the two global hegemonic powers, but was also employed by less powerful countries, such as France and Italy. My thesis shows how, from the second half of the 1940s, successive Italian and French administrations established agencies for hydrocarbon management, and devised strategies of oil exploration according to their political agendas. Achieving energy autonomy was the main objective of both countries. However, the predominance of Anglo-American interests in both French and Italian oil scenarios led to continuous bilateral diplomatic tensions, especially over issues of exploration rights. Anglo-American governments and companies sought to shape the French and Italian oil scenes to their benefit, also by looking for allies in the political classes of the two countries. It was the outcome of these 'oily deals' that eventually shaped the history of Italian and French oil industries. Conflicting interests were revealed at their fullest during the Algerian war of 1954-62: following the discovery of large oil and gas fields in Algeria, US and Italian companies started to negotiate, first with the French and then the Algerians, their access to, and prospecting rights for Algerian territories. My work shows that negotiation processes involved secret surveillance activities, the establishment of parallel diplomacies, and serious confrontation between Cold War allies. A fundamental role in these deals was played by technocrats and geoscientists, who facilitated the communication of secret data on oilfields to their national authorities. Significant global oil discoveries occurred worldwide in the 1950s, eventually leading to overproduction: an outcome assisted by major progress in geophysical prospecting techniques. France's new role as an oil producer thanks to discoveries in Africa provoked a shift of national interest from exploration to transport. At the same time Italy, after the signing of massive oil-for-technology barter agreements with the Soviet Union, could now dispose of a surplus that needed channelling to potential outlets. For both countries, building pipelines became an essential aspect: however, as both were targeting the West European market, Europe became an arena of bitter competition for pipeline dominance. Italian-Soviet contracts, together with the current level of West European trade with the Soviet Union, prompted an examination of Western security by international organisations. The issue of limiting Soviet oil exports into West European countries was widely debated at the European Community and Nato, as was European technological aid to the Soviet project of constructing a colossal pipeline system. My analysis of the terms of the debates, their development and outcome, reveals the ambiguity of the concepts of security and 'strategic technology' as a ground for decision-making, indicating how these were construed as co-products of negotiations.