Spelling suggestions: "subject:"4he eritique off pure deason"" "subject:"4he eritique off pure feason""
1 |
A Creature Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: Therapeia in the Philosophies of Plato and Immanuel KantIngram, Caleb 01 August 2018 (has links)
Using the scholarship of Robert Cushman to navigate Plato’s dialogues, Chapter 1 of this thesis establishes their multifaceted model of philosophy as therapeia. Said model includes Plato’s practical diagnosis of the human condition, his many notions formulated as a cure, and this first chapter ends by briefly responding to some of Martha Nussbaum’ recent criticisms of "Platonism," within The Therapy of Desire, and expounding upon the dialogue Phaedrus as Plato's therapeutic treatment of eros. Chapter 2 looks to the works of Dieter Henrich and T.K Seung in order to explore their proposed links between the philosophies of Plato and Kant, carving out a space for a new connection of therapeia. Chapter 3 discusses The Critique of Pure Reason in light of Plato’s own therapeutic philosophy, analyzing Kant’s unique diagnosis of a further, intellectual aspect of the human condition, his basic means of treating it, and the ideal form of human activity toward which he intends to direct our abortive intellectual desires.
|
2 |
The Demand for the Unconditioned in the Antinomies: A Defense of KantBowman, Caroline 01 January 2016 (has links)
I interpret and defend Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics and his indirect proof of transcendental idealism in the first Critique's Antinomy of Pure Reason. Throughout my thesis, I focus on the role of the principle "P2" in the Antinomy ("If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is given"). I first defend Kant's use of the principle to motivate the proofs of the Thesis and Antithesis arguments in the second antinomy, which concerns composition, and the third antinomy, which concerns causality. I then explain how the role of P2 in the proofs exposes Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism to a significant challenge, to which I develop a response. Finally, I pose the question of whether Kant ultimately argues that the unconditioned exists, or whether he argues that it is merely possible that the unconditioned exists. I explore both options and outline avenues for further consideration of this question, which I argue is crucial to understanding Kant's critical project.
|
3 |
Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel's Phenomenology of SpiritLeBlanc, Richard 28 September 2011 (has links)
Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.
|
4 |
Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel's Phenomenology of SpiritLeBlanc, Richard 28 September 2011 (has links)
Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.
|
5 |
Science and Faith in Kant's First CritiqueFulmer, Everett C 10 August 2012 (has links)
This thesis engages in an interpretative debate over Kant’s general aims in the first Critique. I argue that a defense of the rational legitimacy of religious faith is at the very center of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s defense of faith is inextricably bound up with his views on the legitimacy of science. On my account, Kant’s Critique not only demonstrates that science is fully consistent with religious faith, but also that science, when properly understood, actually favors religious belief over non-belief.
|
6 |
Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel's Phenomenology of SpiritLeBlanc, Richard 28 September 2011 (has links)
Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.
|
7 |
A representação do incondicionado na crítica da razão pura / The representation of the unconditioned in the critique of pure reasonCoriolano, Ericsson Venâncio January 2016 (has links)
CORIOLANO, Ericsson Venâncio. A representação do incondicionado na crítica da razão pura . 2016. 177f. – Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2016. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-19T11:47:46Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
2016_tese_evcoriolano.pdf: 1115617 bytes, checksum: 3f39ccadbb31fc5903fdeaf264bef73e (MD5) / Rejected by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br), reason: on 2017-04-20T13:32:56Z (GMT) / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-20T13:54:30Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
2016_tese_evcoriolano.pdf: 1474417 bytes, checksum: b67dfe5961cb7a703aff6061343fee71 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-05-02T17:39:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1
2016_tese_evcoriolano.pdf: 1474417 bytes, checksum: b67dfe5961cb7a703aff6061343fee71 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-02T17:39:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
2016_tese_evcoriolano.pdf: 1474417 bytes, checksum: b67dfe5961cb7a703aff6061343fee71 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2016 / The main theme of this PhD thesis is the representation of the unconditioned in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued an essential function of the unconditioned for the preparation of logical and transcendental activities of speculative reason. There is in this work, in a new light, the defense of exposition of some theses about the following sub-themes: 1) the origin of transcendent concepts necessary mode in consciousness; 2) the definition of transcendental appearance; 3) the development and solution of the antinomy of pure reason; 4) the definition of transcendental freedom; 5) the exposition of the function of speculative reason in the establishment of scientific knowledge. Themes (1) and (2) are covered in the first chapter through the exposition of the function of representation of the unconditioned in the development of subjective derivation of transcendental ideas carried out by Kant, of A293/B349 to A338/B396, in the Critique of Pure Reason. Themes (3) and (4) are treated in the second chapter, specifically in the presentation of the results of the research about The Antinomy of Pure Reason, in the second chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A405/B432 to A568/B596. The theme (5) is found in the third chapter and it is presented by the defense of the thesis that the speculative reason has a vital role to scientific knowledge, it is obtained from the study about Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A642 / B670 to A705 / B733. It is defended here, ultimately, that all these issues are based on a fundamental thesis that permeates all Transcendental Dialectic, namely that the unconditioned can be determined as a transcendental element with a regulative empirical use of all experience to establish a systematic unity of all objective knowledge. / O tema central desta Tese é a representação do incondicionado dentro da Crítica da Razão Pura. Defende-se uma função imprescindível do incondicionado para elaboração das atividades lógica e transcendental da razão especulativa. Encontra-se aqui, sob uma nova ótica, a apresentação da defesa de algumas teses acerca dos seguintes temas secundários: 1) a origem de conceitos transcendentes de modo necessário no pensamento; 2) a definição de aparência transcendental; 3) a elaboração e solução da antinomia da razão pura; 4) a definição de liberdade transcendental; 5) a exposição da função da razão especulativa no estabelecimento do conhecimento científico. Os temas (1) e (2) são abordados no primeiro capítulo através da exposição da função da representação do incondicionado no desenvolvimento da derivação subjetiva das ideias transcendentais realizada por Kant na Crítica da Razão Pura de A293/B349 a A338/B396. Os temas (3) e (4) são tratados no segundo capítulo, mais precisamente na apresentação dos resultados da investigação do A Antinomia da Razão Pura, segundo capítulo do segundo livro da Dialética Transcendental, de A405/B432 a A568/B596. O tema (5) é encontrado no terceiro capítulo e será apresentado através da defesa da tese, obtida a partir do estudo do Apêndice da Dialética Transcendental, de A642/B670 a A705/B733, que a razão especulativa tem uma função imprescindível para o conhecimento científico. Defender-se-á, em última análise, que todos esses temas são fundamentados em uma tese de fundo que perpassa toda Dialética Transcendental, a saber, que o incondicionado pode ser determinado como elemento transcendental com um uso empírico regulativo de toda experiência para o estabelecimento de uma unidade sistemática de todo conhecimento objetivo.
|
8 |
¿Dónde está la deducción objetiva de Kant?Osborne, Gregg 09 April 2018 (has links)
Where Is Kant’s Objective Deduction?”. The preface to the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is marked by a distinction between objective and subjective sides of the transcendental deduction. The objective side alone is said to be essential to Kant’s main purpose and is also said to retain its full strength even if the subjective side is not found to be convincing. The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, that the most prominent accounts of this distinction in the literature are all subject to insuperable objections. Second, that the meat of the objective side is not to be found in the chapter explicitly devoted to the transcendental deduction but rather in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles. What this implies is that a portion of the text frequently held to be the very heart of the Critique is said in the preface to the first edition to be inessential. We must therefore ask whether it is and be prepared to justify any divergence from the position espoused by Kant himself in 1781. / El prefacio de la primera edición de la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant está signado por la distinción entre los aspectos objetivo y subjetivo de la deducción trascendental. El aspecto objetivo es considerado esencial para el propósito principal de Kant, y se suele considerar que mantiene toda su fuerza incluso si el aspecto subjetivo no resulta convincente. La tesis de este artículo es doble. Primero, las interpretaciones más prominentes de esta distinción, en la literatura filosófica sobre Kant, no se sostienen. Segundo, lo central del aspecto objetivo no debe ser encontrado en el capítulo explícitamente dedicado a la deducción trascendental, sino más bien en el segundo capítulo de la Analítica de los principios. Esto implica que una parte del texto, frecuentemente considerada como el corazón mismo de la Crítica, es descrito en el prefacio a la primera edición como no esencial. Debemos, por tanto, preguntar si lo es, y estar dispuestos a justificar alguna divergencia respecto de la posición expuesta por Kant mismo en 1781.
|
9 |
Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel's Phenomenology of SpiritLeBlanc, Richard January 2011 (has links)
Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.
|
10 |
Kant's Idealism: On the Character and Limits of Spatial RepresentationHeide, David C. 01 November 2010 (has links)
No description available.
|
Page generated in 4.8389 seconds