Proceduralists about practical rationality and reasons for action argue that practical rationality is only capable of criticizing our reasons for action when, through deliberation, they are reachable through our current beliefs and desires. Using this model of practical rationality, proceduralists also typically argue that the only reasons for action we have are instrumentally valuable ones. Substantivists disagree, however, and argue that practical rationality is capable of criticizing our actions despite our desires, preferences and interests. Substantivists argue that although we have instrumental reasons for action, there are also other reasons for action we have, specific non-instrumental ones, which we are required to act for on pain of irrationality. In this thesis I argue that a substantivist model of practical rationality and reasons for action is correct, and that understanding practical rationality and reasons for action in this way has surprising consequences for moral theory.

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Contemporary sentiments both African and Western indicate the inadequacy of modern approaches to ethics and the failure of an individualistic ethics as a basis for public and private morality. Modern ethics is inadequate as a moral framework within which communities live their lives. As a result there is a need for a paradigm shift form this mainly individualistic and universalistic modern ways of doings ethics to a more communally oriented and contextual approach reminiscent of traditional African ethics. If we hope to have a more satisfactory moral framework than the current one we need to have a moral outlook that encompasses both the ethical code governing the individual i.e. personal ethics and the ethical code governing social groups and their conduct. And that framework will be something similar to the communal model that we see in traditional African communities such as the Basotho's. Such a moral framework made it possible for communities not only to be contextual in the way they approached personal conduct, but also communal. The current moral uncertainty accompanied by vicious moral individualism in places like Lesotho, seems to me to be the result of the introduction of an individualistic ethic to the Basotho way of life. Ethics as found among traditional Basotho communities was not just a matter of the individual alone, but also of the community within which the individual found his or her true identity. This co-responsibility and mutual inter-dependency for the moral life, something which modernism and the influence of liberal ideas is increasingly eroding from the contemporary life of Basotho, ensured that there was a moral centre through which people found their moral reference point. It ensured there was a moral thought and practice that was coherent enough to give both the individual and the community a moral base, an approved way of conduct with an implicit, but nevertheless clearly understandable rationale and justification. Such a communal approach to ethics made it possible for communities to have a recognizable moral character and it is only when communities are themselves moral that we can hope to have a moral society. So in order to help contemporary Basotho and indeed most Africans, from the pervasive self imposed moral bankruptcy and inconsistencies there is a need to revisit and rediscover that traditional ethos to see what lessons can be learned from it for the present. We need to look back to where we come from as Africans and only then are we going to be able to navigate our future correctly and authentically, and see what lessons of life and proper ways of conduct can we learn from our past, lessons which will be more in line with who we are as Africans in the context of contemporary modern way of living. / Thesis (M.Th.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1997.

This thesis explores the relative strengths of particularism and generalism in the area of meta-ethics in philosophy, utilising justice as a case study. More specifically, this thesis examines the claims of Jonathan Dancy in his book on moral particularism, Ethics Without Principles (2004), that one can construct a moral philosophy without reference to any general principles, or invariant reasons. His book is primarily a study of reasons, and this thesis also presents a study of reasons through the eyes f both the particularists and the generalists. At its core, the particularism holds holism to be true in the theory of reasons, whereas generalism, at its core, holds atomism to be true in the theory of reasons. In my thesis I find that the strongest form of atomism and the strongest form of generalism is Rossean generalism. I conclude that these two pictures combined provide a superior account of what reasons are and how they work than Dancy's particularism. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

One thing that ethics attempts to determine is the right way to live in order to attain human flourishing. Both Aristotelian and African ethics give us communitarian accounts of how flourishing is attained by individuals who are brought up to have the right sorts of character. I argue that there are significant similarities between the accounts of the formation of ethical character in Aristotelian and African ethics. I aim to show that through a critical comparison of these two accounts, an account of the kind of society required from human flourishing can be developed. This can then be used to critique a dominant view of human flourishing: that of contemporary individualism. First I set out the Aristotelian account showing how it depends on a certain conception of the nature of persons. Second, I explore the African account of ethics and ethical character and show how this account is based on a similar communitarian conception of the nature of persons. In both Aristotelian and African ethics, society and upbringing play a crucial role in the attainment of human flourishing. Thus, third, I examine in detail the kind of society required for the formation of ethical character according to Aristotelian and African ethics respectively. I argue that there are many fruitful structural similarities between the two accounts. Lastly, I use the work done in the third chapter, as well as the work of certain prominent communitarian theorists, to critique a contemporary individualist view of human flourishing. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

<p> The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) is the ethical principle that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm. The objective of this thesis is to show that the DDA is not a viable principle without supplementation. Deontological and consequentialist approaches to the DDA are explored in this thesis. Both approaches are rejected due to the limitations of the binary approach to harms&mdash;the binary approach to harms is the assumption that the badness of harms is best captured by two strict categories of doing and allowing. This thesis develops a sliding-scale approach to harms. This approach is developed by using axiology&ndash;value theory. Value theory is used by consequentialism to determine what goods should be maximized by action and how those goods are ranked. This thesis uses the axiological methodology of Fred Feldman to create a more complex account of the badness of harms. The final chapter of this thesis applies the sliding-scale approach to harms to three end-of-life, medical cases.</p>

My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

This review discusses the relationship between the Christian faith and business ethics, the academic work that had been done to enhance the understanding of this relationship and the opportunity for future research. The objective is to provide a research base for an empirical study on Malaysian Christians in business, their religiousness and ethical attitudes. / Religion is the most important source of a person's moral norms. Western business ethics is known to have Judeo-Christian roots and started off as an extension of religious ethics (De George 1986). As such the ethics of Christians in business is generally assumed to be consistent with the teachings of the Christian faith. Yet a couple of recent high profile criminal cases involving prominent self-declared Christians in business meant that a possible dichotomy between religious faith and business conduct surfaced. Therefore the question arises: can the relationship between the teachings of Christianity and the business ethics of its adherents be assumed? / This relationship had been of increasing interest since Christians in business are more up front and open about their faith in relation to the running of their businesses. There are ample inspirational writings based on Biblical precepts and principles intended to help Christians in business apply their faith to their business. However, theoretical and empirical research had been lacking. The volume of empirical studies had been very thin and the number of significant findings sparse. The findings were often inconclusive and sometimes contradictory. / Previous research on the relationship between Christianity religiosity and business ethics approached the concept of religion from the following angles: intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity after Allport's religiosity scale, religious intensity and frequency of religious practices, religious beliefs, Christian upbringing, and religious education. The review found the Love of Money Scale developed by Professor Thomas Li-Ping Tang which was founded on Biblical precepts. Since unethical business practices may be motivated by the love of money, the Love of Money Scale may provide new insights into the relationship between religion, love of money and ethical attitudes. / The review shows that important empirical research had been initiated in the study of the relationship between religion and business ethics. Although previous findings had been relatively weak and inconclusive, more recent studies had more positive findings. Further research would be helpful to establish the relationship on a more solid footing. / Thesis (DBA(DoctorateofBusinessAdministration))--University of South Australia, 2006

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