This project is both a wartime biography and an examination of the American effort in France during the First World War. At its core, the narrative follows the military career of Major General James G. Harbord. His time in France saw Harbord serve in the three main areas of the American Expeditionary Forces: administration, combat, and logistics. As chief of staff to AEF commander General John J. Pershing, Harbord was at the center of the formation of the AEF and the development of its administrative policies. He organized and managed the AEF General Staff and served as Pershing's most trusted subordinate. In May of 1918, Harbord transferred to the fighting line, taking over command of the 4th "Marine" Brigade. During his time with the 4th Brigade, and later as commander of the 2nd Division, Harbord played a significant part in the battles of Belleau Wood and Soissons. A dedicated supporter of Pershing's tactics of "open" warfare, Harbord's failings as a combat commander showed the limits of American tactical experience. For the final four months of the war, Harbord took over control of the AEF's logistical system, the Services of Supply. Though he proved an able administrator, the American supply system approached total collapse in the fall of 1918, and was prevented only by the signing of the Armistice. In all three of these roles, Harbord embodied the emergence of the military manager in the American army. The First World War illustrates that war had grown so large and complex that it required officers whose primary talents lay not in leading men in combat, but in the areas of administration and management of large bureaucratic organizations. James Harbord was one of the first, and best, examples of this new type of officer.

Three important Irish texts use revelations about Irish involvement in the First World War as a lens through which to examine contemporary Ireland: Jennifer Johnston’s novel How Many Miles To Babylon (1974), Frank McGuinness’s play Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching Towards the Somme (1985), and Sebastian Barry’s A Long, Long Way (2005). Because significant critical attention has been paid to the texts of Johnston and McGuinness, and because access to Barry’s archive in the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas further illuminates the process by which Barry represents this crucial moment in Irish history, his novel is the focus of this paper. Unlike Johnston and McGuinness, whose projects use the First World War to interrogate the Ireland in which they are writing and force the reader to grapple with their own historically (or mythically) constructed identities, Barry’s A Long, Long Way denies personal culpability and allows for a view of history in which the individual stands forever as a tragic or pathetic victim. Barry’s novel details the experiences of one Irish soldier, Willie Dunne, on the Western Front and plots his changing attitude towards Irish soldiers’ involvement in the War following the Easter 1916 Rising. Exposed to both nationalist and loyalist perspectives, and to the horrors of war, Willie increasingly develops sympathy with the nationalist position, though he never abandons his principal loyalty to his father. While Willie’s narrative presents a more complicated vision of the Dunne family—Barry’s ancestors who have figured prominently in his oeuvre—it fails to escape the tragic impulse in much of Barry’s fiction, in which history is an immovable and oftentimes malevolent force. Such a vision of history allows individuals like Willie Dunne to disavow responsibility for their personal fate and for their roles within a larger Irish history. / text

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The First World War left few untouched on Canada’s Native reserves: many councils donated money to war funds, thousands of men enlisted and their families sought support from the Military and war-specific charities, and most became involved in the debate over whether Native men could be conscripted and the implications that decision could have for broader Native-government relations. Much of the extant literature on Native participation in the war has paired enthusiastic Native engagement with the Canadian government’s shabby treatment. However, in many different ways and with many different goals, Native peoples achieved significant success in determining the parameters of their participation in the war. Yet, the resolution of these debates between Native peoples and the Canadian government, specifically the Department of Indian Affairs, inadvertently (from the Native perspective) cemented the Indian Act’s key role in Native peoples’ lives, displacing other foundational agreements and traditional organizational principles of reserve life. Native peoples’ varied participation in the First World War paradoxically saw Natives temporarily take control of their relationship with the Canadian government, but in the end brought them more completely under the authority of the Department of Indian Affairs.

This thesis is concerned with the origins and developments of a British-initiated force, known as "The Iraq Levies", which was raised during the Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War. This is a subject which had previously received very little rigorous historical study. The Force began with some forty mounted Arab scouts, recruited from Zubair in southern Mesopotamia by the Field Intelligence unit of the Imperial Expeditionary Force (I.E.F. 'D') in July 1915. By May 1922, the Force had expanded to approximately 6,000 officers and men, as against a planned 7,500 at the Cairo Conference. A survey of the performance and military background of several British officers who served with the Levies, was considered worthy of study. Mostly they came from the Indian Army, and thus were experienced in what may be described as "political soldiering" - an invaluable qualification for their service in Iraq. It was felt important that the different ethnic backgrounds and political aspirations, as well as religious loyalties represented in the ranks of the Levies required investigation to assist in an understanding of their motivation and service. Without a detailed review of these factors, it would be difficult to comprehend how a force which could be considered to owe its allegiance to its pay-masters, could undertake the task of internal security in so volatile a region as that of Iraq, especially during and after the First World War. When its political problems, both internal and external, had to be resolved by the British government which became the mandatory power. This thesis ends with the achievement of Iraq's independence in 1932. The Levies, however, were not finally disbanded until May 1955. That final section of their history was not to be without drama and incident; but it awaits the attention of another student who is interested in the nature and evolution of British Imperial Forces in the Middle East. Their day has now ended, but this thesis hopes to illuminate a little of their history and significance.

As a modernist, Virginia Woolf aimed at the modernisation of existing forms of artistic expression. However, she was also a very historically aware author. Thus the main issues and questions that this dissertation aims at investigating are Woolf’s views on, approach to and use of history and the past in three major novels: Mrs Dalloway (1925), To the Lighthouse (1927) and Between the Acts (1941). After a brief exposition of some of Woolf’s general views on history and inherited cultural constructions and how these contrast with traditional nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches to history, the argument progresses to explore history and the past in each of the three novels respectively. The choice of novels aims at reflecting something of the scope and range of her concerns with history and the past. The chapter on Mrs Dalloway is mainly concerned with the manner in which Woolf deals with a profound historical event like the First World War and her dual vision of history as both a source of tragedy and as a form of assurance for the continuation of life. In the chapter dealing with To the Lighthouse as its main focus, Woolf’s response to her personal past and the preceding cultural era will be explored, as well as her attempt to achieve a form of balance between the present and the past through artistic portrayal. In the discussion of the last novel Woolf wrote, Between the Acts, her response to history in the making and her views on how the course of history can be altered will be dealt with. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of this study in the contexts of Woolf as a modernist and an experimental novelist and in the light of the critical views that perceive Woolf as inadequately responsive to history and social issues.</p / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2008. / English / MA / unrestricted

Julia Kristeva's 1979 essay, 'Le temps des femmes', translated as 'Women's Time' in 1981, most explicitly articulates her approach to feminist thought, addressing women's troubled relationship to patriarchy in terms of time and space. In the essay, Kristeva identifies three distinct positions in the history of feminism: 'equality' feminism, 'difference' feminism; and finally, an anticipated 'third-generation' feminism that will integrate the previous two attitudes, representing what she defines as a new 'signifying space'. The value of the 'third space' is that is offers a method for proceeding beyond the either/or status offered by previous stages of feminist thought and analysis, challenging gender identity per se, and bringing out of the singularity of each individual subject. Women's literature of the interwar period provides a rich source of material in terms of the construction of the gendered subject, as political and military pressures transformed masculine and feminine roles. While literary giants such as Sassoon and Faulkner have committed the experience of the trenches to print, women's writing of this era often explores the effects of the First World War on the community at home, away from the front and its visceral nightmares. This thesis therefore examines the destabilising effect of war on both combatants and civilians as evident in this writing, and each chapter identifies a space in the text where identity is challenged and thrown into debate by the hardships of the War. The resulting signifying space is configured in varying ways, often bringing happiness and personal satisfaction to the protagonist, but it may also represent the darker aspects of Kristevan thought, resulting in negativity and even death.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.