Zygmunt Bauman and other postmodernists have argued that postmodernity is characterized by the disintegration of the legitimacy and authority of what has been referred to as grand narratives or "illusions." These theorists often highlight the manipulative and obfuscating effects of illusion. As such, scholars like Bauman contend that postmodernity sets the stage for sincere, moral responsibility. However, they fail to acknowledge that these illusions provide a cultural and social function through their satisfaction of human needs. Failing to fully acknowledge the importance of this function and human needs in general leads many postmodern theorists to be unable to adequately theorize about the contemporary epoch. In addition to the weakening authority of grand illusions, the advent of technologically advanced society coincided with the process of desublimation (a process by which instant gratification occurs). Desublimation worked to undermine what Sigmund Freud has referred to as the life instincts by promulgating false needs (i.e., wants or desires perceived as needs). As such, contemporary society may be depicted as constituting anomic, atomistic individuals seeking self-preservation. This process may be delineated as the death instincts, or Thanatos, as coming to triumph over the life instincts, Eros. A Thanatos society has significant implications for moral responsibility. The diminution of sincere emotional integration facilitates the unbridled spread of postemotionalism into more and more spheres of social life. As postemotional scripts become the prevailing moral guidelines, Thanatos manifests itself as a compulsion to repeat destructive behavior at the societal and individual level. Society and its members struggle in their attempts to choose the "right" course of action. Confusion and fear become affixed features of personal and social life and morality becomes an arbitrary endeavor.

<p>Uppsatsen behandlar "Gösta Berlings Saga" och framförallt Gösta Berling som en föränderling karaktär samt en tolkning av hur han förändras genom bokens gång. Uppsatsen handlar om hur olika händelser och andra karaktärer i boken påverkar Gösta Berling och hur han lever i en illusion som han inte är förmögen att ta sig ur med egna krafter. Uppsatsen visar en teori om hur kvinnorna mognar före Gösta Berling och hur han får hjälp med att ta sig ur den illusion han lever i.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 122 p. : col. ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

The simultaneous application of interlaced innocuous warm and cool stimuli can elicit sensations of burning heat (the Thermal Grill Illusion, TGI). The TGI is thought to reflect changes in the central interactions between somatosensory sub-modalities (i.e. cold-inhibition of pain). Previous studies used multiple alternating warm and cool bars to elicit a TGI. The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the effects of altering the placements of warm and cool grill elements on the intensities of perceived pain and unpleasantness in 26 male subjects. Arranging the thermal grill elements in a warm flanking cool (WCW) pattern evoked significantly higher intensities of pain and unpleasantness than a cool flanking warm (CWC) pattern and a uniform warm stimulus. Conversely, CWC did not elicit significantly different intensities of perceived pain and unpleasantness than a uniform cool stimulus. This finding may reflect differences in the level of activation of central neurons.

The simultaneous application of interlaced innocuous warm and cool stimuli can elicit sensations of burning heat (the Thermal Grill Illusion, TGI). The TGI is thought to reflect changes in the central interactions between somatosensory sub-modalities (i.e. cold-inhibition of pain). Previous studies used multiple alternating warm and cool bars to elicit a TGI. The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the effects of altering the placements of warm and cool grill elements on the intensities of perceived pain and unpleasantness in 26 male subjects. Arranging the thermal grill elements in a warm flanking cool (WCW) pattern evoked significantly higher intensities of pain and unpleasantness than a cool flanking warm (CWC) pattern and a uniform warm stimulus. Conversely, CWC did not elicit significantly different intensities of perceived pain and unpleasantness than a uniform cool stimulus. This finding may reflect differences in the level of activation of central neurons.

Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2006 / Text teilw. dt., teilw. engl.

Mémoire de maîtrise--Arts plastiques--Paris I, 1993. / 1993 d'après la déclaration de dépôt légal. Bibliogr. f. 84-87.

Doct. diss.--Stanford university. / Bibliogr. p. 147-157. Notes bibliogr.

The argument that I present in this thesis is that while the idea of the Self is an illusion, a myth which our brains create, it is one that is necessary for our survival. However, by understanding its neurological origins we are able to take advantage of it without being victims of egocentricity. My first chapter, Neurology of the Self, lays down the neurological foundations for our concept of the Self and goes on to argue that, while biology and neurology must remain the basis of our understanding, we need to transcend our purely scientific concepts in order to integrate them with art and spirituality. Our transcendental view, I argue, seeks to establish values that make life worth living for and are essential to our survival. I consider some possible implications, both real and imagined, of neurological impairment. The second chapter, Consciousness and the Self, considers the neurological and chemical basis for consciousness and develops the ways in which the imagined Self can be used to create a balanced life that is not highjacked by ego. In the third chapter, Human Nature and the Self, I continue to argue for a liberated view of the Self bearing in mind its neurological origin which itself is the creator of our received reality. Compassion, which Schopenhauer's philosophy argued for as the basis of morality, is shown to be facilitated by the concept of a centred Self which I apply to the subject of morality in the fourth chapter, Morality and the Self. .with the fifth chapter, Illusion and the Imagined Self. I come to the very heart of the argument to which tny considered research findings and previous chapters have lead, namely, that the illusion of the Self is neurologically created by our brains and that we do not have an unchanging Self which is other than the experiences and ideas from which our whole Being derives meaning. Nonetheless, this Self and other values we create are essential for our well being and should be cherished in themselves as being crucial for our healthy individual and collective survival. Furthermore, since we are now aware of the origin of our idea of the Self we can gain our freedom from a manipulating ego and become centred Selves able to creatively transcend and transform the limits of our neurologically given reality by being actively involved in the ongoing process of change. This is the subject of my sixth chapter, Spirituality and the Creative Self, and is endorsed in my concluding chapter which, neglecting a view which carefully avoids accepting absolutes that just might be falsified tomorrow, argues that the best values that we create today should be used as absolutes from which to derive principles for living and continuing to live which could, at least, lessen the threat to our survival.

The first chapter explores an anachronistic Kantian critique of Plotinus wherein Plotinus' notion of the One and the soul's ascent to the One is discussed. In the second part of the chapter it will be argued that despite Plotinus' via negativa approach to the One, he commits what Kant calls a transcendental illusion. At this time, Kant's conditions of experience and knowledge are discussed, to show what constitutes as experience. Then, Kant's notion of transcendental illusion is discussed, specifically in its paralogistic and ideal forms. From this discussion, it is evident that Plotinus' idea of the soul is a paralogistic error and his idea of the One becomes the Ideal of pure reason, thereby mistaking the Ideal of the One as constituting ultimate existence. Following this Kantian critique, the second chapter discusses Úankara's view of Âtman. The exposition demonstrates that Úankara's approach is essentially via negativa, that while it is the most humble approach to Brahman, yet it is unable to account for the absolute reality that is essentially ineffable. This discussion focuses on Úankara's belief that people falsely attribute or superimpose qualities to the true Self, because of Avidyâ and that only true knowledge transforms Avidyâ into vidyâ or discriminating knowledge. After this discussion, some criticisms are discussed to show some apparent problems with Úankara's view. At which time, it will be argued that despite Úankara's use of via negativa he commits what Kant calls a "transcendental illusion." We do not have an empirical intuition of the concept of Brahman; therefore, we have neither access to the mystical reality of Brahman as a thing in itself, nor to true knowledge about ultimate reality. Thus, Úankara's view engenders transcendental illusion. The final chapter addresses Schelling's idealism and in particular the view of the potencies at work in God, before God was God. Due to creation, an inversion of the potencies occurs and the outer gains control over the inner. Next, elements of Habermas' view are discussed, wherein he holds a materialistic-interactive-idealist position, as indicated in his ideal speech situation. At this time, it will be argued that Habermas' "ideal speech situation" is idealistic like Schelling's position. Consequently, both Schelling and Habermas' reaction respectively make the Primordial Will and the Ideal Speech Situation into an Ideal and in so doing commits a transcendental illusion.