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This thesis explores the relationship between international war crimes tribunals and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. The aim of the present study was to examine how the role and function of international tribunals has changed since the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal in the early years after World War II. Due to the evolving nature of international law and the international criminal legal system, international tribunals have become increasingly recognized as an integral component of peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of conflict. As the first international tribunal mandated to restore international peace and security, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set a new precedent for international tribunals. Beginning with its establishment, there appeared to be a new trend of using international judicial mechanisms to promote peace and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. One important element of change was the increased tendency of international tribunals to engage in public outreach and help build the capacity of national justice sector institutions. As the first international tribunal to succeed the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the first UN tribunal of its kind, the ICTY has shown the extent to which international tribunals facilitate societal reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the legacies they leave behind. Institutions such as the ICTY will not be judged solely on the merits of the ideals on which they were established, but instead on their concrete successes in the domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic judicial capacity.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

Public health law is in the midst of a crisis of public confidence, which, this paper contends, has resulted from the lack of a thorough normative framework to ground public health law. This paper attempts to fill this gap by articulating a normative framework for public health law, situating it within a rule of law tradition in a limited, democratic state. This paper proceeds in three parts: it begins with a descriptive analysis of public health law; it examines the normative theories of rule of law and liberty; and, it examines public health law in light of the normative theories. This paper concludes that public health law, conceived as government interference, is consistent with rule of law and liberty and that rule of law and liberty help provide public health law with a normative framework.

Thesis--Münster. / Vita. Bibliography: p. ix-xlix.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed 14 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Law. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [286]-321).

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Economía / Uno de los factores que se ha destacado como importante en el desarrollo económico es el mejoramiento institucional de los países. Por ejemplo, el Consenso de Washington de la década de 1990 sugería implementar reformas institucionales con el fin de mejorar la seguridad jurídica para los derechos de propiedad en Latinoamérica. En efecto, la literatura existente resalta la importancia de la seguridad jurídica en el patrón de ventajas comparativas: a mayor seguridad jurídica local, mayor especialización en industrias altamente intensivas en contratos a nivel de insumos. Dos ejemplos lo constituyen Nunn (2007) y Levchenko (2007), resaltando en el primero que la seguridad jurídica influye mucho más en la ventaja comparativa que otros factores, como capital humano y físico, acceso al financiamiento y valor añadido, por citar algunos. Es decir existe un amplio consenso que la seguridad jurídica ayuda enormemente a aumentar las exportaciones en industrias donde los insumos se transan a través de negociaciones contractuales (por ejemplo, metalmecánica, semiconductores y una serie de manufacturas sofisticadas). Sin embargo, al revisar casos particulares de algunos países, es claro que si bien los países actualmente desarrollados se caracterizan entre otras cosas por una alta seguridad jurídica1, existen muchos países que, habiendo mejorado o teniendo un alto nivel de seguridad jurídica, siguen teniendo un patrón de ventajas comparativas acorde a países con baja seguridad jurídica. Un ejemplo es Chile, que a pesar de tener niveles de seguridad jurídica1 altos exporta bajas cantidades en industrias intensivas en contratos a nivel de insumos2, como por ejemplo en la industria metalmecánica. Similar situación ocurre con países con buena seguridad jurídica, como Costa Rica, Uruguay y los países de Europa del Este. Esto lleva a pensar que la seguridad jurídica local por sí sola no es suficiente, pero ¿qué ocurre en particular con estos países, que no se especializan en industrias contrato-intensivas, a pesar de tener buenas instituciones de cumplimiento de contratos?

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of some parts of Europe and the North American colonies were confronted with proto-state institutional arrangements. In certain cases, they responded ambivalently. That ambivalence is at the heart of what I will call the 'limited government tradition'. The tradition's adherents thought that long historical experience, not to mention the events of their own times, provided ample evidence of the corrupting effects of power on those who wield it. Power-holders, left to their own devices, are likely to succumb to the temptations of power by exercising it arbitrarily. Where they are able to do so comprehensively and systematically, the upshot is tyranny. How, then, to ensure that state power is constituted in a manner that is inhospitable to tyranny? The tradition envisaged a range of measures, including a distinctive vision of 'the Rule of Law'. The Rule of Law would both define and enforce certain limits on state power. This study argues that the tradition's hostility to political absolutism is based on moral foundations which apply with equal force to economic power. The tradition ought to examine the modern constitution of economic power to determine whether it is hospitable to arbitrariness and tyranny. If such an examination is undertaken, we learn that modern economic power poses the kind of moral dangers that the tradition's Rule of Law project is designed to combat. However, the tradition assumes that it need not treat economic power as even a potential target of the Rule of Law. I will call that assumption the 'Consensus'. This study's first major aim is to explain the origins and stubbornness of the Consensus. Its second major aim is to persuade readers that the Consensus is mistaken: the tradition must regard economic power as, at least, a potential target of the Rule of Law.