Thesis (doctoral)--Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften, Speyer, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [520]-564).

The United Arab Emirates' legal system has developed though the continued negotiation between the Shari’a and the Civil Courts over the spheres of criminal law and commercial law. The framework that has emerged, as a result of regime politics and Supreme Court rulings, provides the regime the flexibility to continue their commercial development and integration into the modern global economy, while retaining the domestic authority structures that legitimate their power.

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still holding the centre stage. Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal approach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of appointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected countries. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLM

Le contrôle de l’exécutif dans la création de l’État de droit en Afrique aura été au centre de tous les débats doctrinaux depuis la décennie 1990. L’omnipotence de l’exécutif sur les autres pouvoirs en Afrique, sapant l’existence de l’équilibre des pouvoirs (exécutif, législatif, judiciaire) a donné lieu à toutes sortes de spéculations. C’est ainsi que dés 1990 l’accent était mis sur les mécanismes de limitation des pouvoirs de l’exécutif. Cette question de la séparation et de l’équilibre des pouvoirs dont la paternité revient à John Locke mais dotée de sa résonance actuelle par Montesquieu reste aujourd’hui une question non encore résolue en Afrique afin de permettre une réalisation effective de l’État de droit. Cette étude a pour objet de mettre en lumière les obstacles qu’il faudrait lever , les causes sociologiques concourant à de telles conséquences ainsi que les voies et moyens devant mener à la limitation des pouvoirs de l’exécutif , laissant la voie aux conditions naturelles de préservation des libertés individuelles pour la mise en œuvre de l’Etat de droit en Afrique. Force est de constater que bien des progrès ont été réalisés depuis 1990, notamment avec l’édiction de nouveaux textes constitutionnels et une volonté affichée des uns (pouvoirs politiques) et des autres (société civile et associations de défense des droits de l’homme) de mettre en place des régimes démocratiques. Toutefois, depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, cet espoir des lendemains prometteurs semble céder la place au pessimisme. Il convient ainsi de déterminer les raisons de cette décadence tout en mettant l’accent sur des indices de nature à fleurir l’espoir des lendemains meilleurs. C’est dans cette ligne droite que s’inscrit l’objet de notre projet de thèse. / The control of the executive in the creation of the Rule of law in Africa will have been in the center of all the doctrinal debates since the decade 1990. The omnipotence of the executive on the other powers in Africa, sapping the existence of the balance of power (executive, legislative, legal) caused all kinds of speculations. Thus by 1990 the emphasis was placed on the mechanisms of limitation of the powers of the executive. This question of the separation and the balance of power whose paternity returns to John Locke but equipped with his current resonance by Montesquieu remains today a question not yet solved in Africa in order to allow an effective realization of the Rule of law. This study has the aim of clarifying the obstacles which would have to be raised, sociological causes contributing to such consequences as well as the ways and means having to lead to the limitation of the powers of the executive, leaving the way to the natural conditions of safeguarding of individual freedoms for the implementation of the Rule of law in Africa. Force is to note that many progress were realized since 1990, in particular with the édiction of new constitutional texts and a will displayed of the ones (political powers) and others (civil society and defense associations of the human rights) to set up democratic regimes. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this hope of the promising following days seems to give way to pessimism. It is thus advisable to determine the reasons of this decline while focussing on indices likely to flower the hope of the better following days. It is in this straight line that the object of our project of thesis is registered.

La protection des droits fondamentaux par l’Union européenne et la problématique de la qualification juridique de l’Union ne sont pas isolées. Au contraire, elles sont profondément liées. Sous l’effet de la protection des droits fondamentaux, l’Union peut être classée dans la catégorie des fédéralismes. Cette nature fédérative exerce en retour une influence sur la protection des droits fondamentaux. La protection des droits fondamentaux et la nature de l’Union forment ensemble l’identité de l’Union. Cette identité pourrait-elle se concrétiser par une Fédération de droit ? Cette hypothèse de qualification, qui s’inspire du modèle de l’État de droit et repose sur les exigences du cosmopolitisme, vise une Fédération dont l’un des objectifs fondateurs est la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cette hypothèse offre certaines clés de compréhension sur l’articulation du processus de fédéralisation et de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cependant, à bien des égards, l’articulation entre ce processus et cette protection est conflictuelle. Les obstacles à cette qualification sont nombreux. Les États membres souhaitent en effet préserver leur souveraineté. Les impératifs du fédéralisme économique ou les attentes d’une sécurité fédérative soulèvent également de multiples inquiétudes. Ces obstacles affectent tant le processus de fédéralisation que la protection des droits fondamentaux. En conclusion, ils empêchent de qualifier pleinement l’Union de Fédération de droit. / The protection of fundamental rights by the European Union and the issue of the Union's legal nature are not isolated. On the contrary, they are deeply linked. The Union can be classified in the category of federalism under the effect of the protection of fundamental rights. In return, this federative nature has an influence on the protection of fundamental rights. The protection of fundamental rights and the nature of the Union together form the identity of the Union. This identity could be a federal rule of law (Fédération de droit)? This hypothesis, which is based on the rule of law model and the requirements of cosmopolitanism, aims at a Federation whose founding objectives include the protection of fundamental rights. This hypothesis offers some keys to understanding how the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights are articulated. However, the relationship between this process and the protection of fundamental rights is often conflictual. There are many obstacles to this qualification. Indeed, Member States wish to preserve their sovereignty. The imperatives of economic federalism or the expectations of federal security also raise multiple concerns. These obstacles impact both the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights. In conclusion, they prevent this qualification of european federal rule of law.

The study makes a descriptive and analytical study of the development of the dynamic concept of the rule of law with special reference to the African contribution. First, the study shows that the Diceyan concept of the rule of law was narrow and peculiar to the Western liberal legal culture, and that more specifically, the substantive content of the concept of the rule of law was limited to the first generation of human rights. In its international and African context the concept was expanded to include all three generations of human rights and also identified with the concepts of democracy and the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. The expanded concept came to be known as the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law. Secondly, the study traces the origins and development of the principle of equal rights and self-determination and their extension to all peoples and nations and shows that these rights are universal, not relative, as they derive from the inherent worth and dignity of the individual. Also, the study shows that in the African context the three generations of human rights have been interlinked, made inter-dependent, and then identified with the rule of law, human rights and the right of self-determination (perceived as a right to democratic self-governance). Hence, the worth and dignity of the human personality has been made the fountainhead of human rights and have been elevated to the substantive elements of the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law and the basis of the modern African Constitutional State. Under the Colonial Rule both the Diceyan and the dynamic concept of the rule of law were not recognised. Instead, Colonial and racist regimes tried to create alternative institutions of government which denied the oppressed peoples the right to democratic self-governance and independence. However, Colonial and oppressed peoples relied on the dynamic concept of the rule of law in their freedom struggles and in the elaboration of their policies. Hence, the constitutions of all the former colonies in southern Africa under discussion were to different degrees informed by the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D

Reducing firms’ financial constraints can be an important element for economic growth. Previous scholars have documented various factors that affect firms’ ability to access finance (e.g. Lambert et al., 2007, p. 385). In this study, we investigate the impact of financial reporting credibility in reducing firms’ financial constraints. In addition, we study the role that rule of law at a country level have on the above stated association. We hypothesize that financial reporting credibility decreases firms’ financial constraints. Then, we propose that the ability of financial reporting credibility to reduce financial constraints weakens when rule of law (at a country level) decreases. This is the first study to investigate how the association between financial reporting credibility and financial constraints are affected by rule of law on a country level, to the authors’ knowledge. The study uses 52,381 firms operating in 98 countries that responded to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys between the time period 2006 to 2015. Financial constraints are measured through a variable that takes into consideration the perceived amount of obstacles firms are facing in their current operations and the proxy for financial credibility is whether firms have been audited or not. Our moderating term is the World Bank’s rule of law index. By using both regression and matching analysis, we find a significant negative association between financial credibility and financial constraints. This indicates that increased financial reporting credibility leads to less financial constraints for firms. For the moderating effect of the rule of law, the results are insignificant. However, we observe that when the level of rule of law is high, increased financial credibility leads to minor improvements in access to external finance.

<p>This is a study of whether it is possible for the governmental form of democracy to be ap-plicable in states that have not had democracy as their governmental form earlier in their political history. In this thesis the concept of liberal democracy is the major theory used as well as the concepts of rule of law and civil society. After giving a description of the con-cepts the thesis continues with two chapters that respectively describe and explain the states of Belarus and Cuba. The two states are going to be used in the analysis at the end of this thesis.</p><p>The analysis includes several conditions to asses if democracy exists. These conditions are derived from the chapters on democracy and rule of law. In the analysis the states of Bela-rus and Cuba are analyzed based on the conditions derived from the chapters on democra-cy and rule of law. The results of the concluding discussion are that the probability for de-mocracy to survive in Cuba is higher than in Belarus because Cuba seems to be transition from an authoritarian form of regime to a form o f democracy. In contrast to Belarus, Cu-ba seems to be willing to open up from seclusion and isolation, as well as listen to its people than what the state of Belarus is willing to do.</p>

The judiciary in Kenya has been progressively viewed as subservient to the executive, an upholder of state power and a poor protector of citizens’ rights. The rejection of the judiciary as an independent and impartial arbiter of disputes was a major contributor to the post-election violence experienced in December 2007 which resulted in anarchy and massive loss of lives and property. This thesis contends that there is a contextually symbiotic link between separation of powers, judicial independence and the rule of law. While focusing on the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, the research highlights the dangers of failure to maintain the appropriate balance of power between the executive, judiciary and the legislature, its ramifications to judicial independence and the rule of law. By analysing secondary data and using Kenya as a case study, this relationship is chronologically traced from the pre-colonial, colonial, independence and post-independence periods. An examination of successive constitutions exposes gaps and weaknesses in constitutional provisions guaranteeing judicial independence. Instances of violation are discussed with examples as confirmation that such protection was minimal, weak and not respected in practice. A high degree of executive intrusion, influence and control was evident inter alia in appointments, removal, funding and administration. Cumulatively, these factors contributed to the erosion of personal and institutional independence leading to drastic loss of confidence. Opportunities in terms of implemented reforms, especially the newly promulgated Constitution of Kenya 2010 are scrutinised. The thesis concludes that even though complete independence from the executive cannot be achieved nor is it desirable, more robust constitutional protection of judicial independence, coupled with a high degree of autonomy can be a strong guardian against violation. New threats are discovered. Further research, constitutional amendments and use of non-legal initiatives are proposed as key for future judicial reform.

<p>The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime. </p><p>I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.</p> / Dissertation