Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-22T12:50:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Cristina Teixeira.pdf: 1742608 bytes, checksum: f5f3bbf6f0d171f7327ae9b6ba73a866 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T12:50:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Cristina Teixeira.pdf: 1742608 bytes, checksum: f5f3bbf6f0d171f7327ae9b6ba73a866 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-10 / This research focuses on the analysis of important themes in the study of Law, particularly in the development of the Brazilian State: education, citizenship and The Democratic Rule of Law. Education, a fundamental social right, is the pillar of all rights in society and traces a path towards human dignity. Once education as a right is not strongly promoted, an individual’s personal, social and political needs cannot be catered for. Citizenship, viewed as a possible intervention in the State decisions, was outlined in the Constitution of 1988 with active courses of action, namely the plebiscite, the referendum, the popular legislative initiative and popular action. The Democratic Rule of Law is the key principle in Brazil, which sharpens the focus of this research. It is virtually impossible to put citizenship into practice and, subsequently, endeavor The Democratic Rule of Law to take root without quality education, as stated in the constitutional text, which is based on the full development of the individual, citizenship awareness and qualification for the labor market. In order to address the question raised in this investigation, a documentary and bibliographical research was done. In the light of the premises found in the study, as far as education, democracy and The Democratic Rule of Law are concerned, aligned with the citizen’s active participation, it seems non-viable to consider citizenship on the grounds of the aforementioned democratic rule except for education which paves the way for full citizenship / Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar temas importantes para o estudo do Direito e, especialmente, para o desenvolvimento do Estado Brasileiro: a educação, a cidadania e o Estado Democrático de Direito. A educação, direito fundamental social, é requisito para a realização de outros direitos e a obtenção dos bens necessários a uma vida digna. Sem o exercício adequado desse direito não é possível a realização em nível pessoal, social e político da pessoa. A cidadania, aqui considerada como a possibilidade de intervir e participar das decisões do Estado, na Constituição de 1988 foi qualificada com a possibilidade da utilização de instrumentos diretos de atuação, entre os quais destacamos o plebiscito, o referendo, a iniciativa popular legislativa e a ação popular. É princípio fundamental de nosso País o Estado Democrático de Direito e é aqui que se coloca a questão objeto dessa pesquisa: é impossível exercer a cidadania e, em consequência, realizar o Estado Democrático de Direito, sem uma educação adequada, aqui entendida como aquela preconizada no Texto Constitucional, com as finalidades de desenvolvimento integral da pessoa, preparação para o exercício da cidadania e qualificação para o mercado de trabalho. Para responder à questão proposta, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que embasou as análises elaboradas sobre os temas, objetos desta pesquisa. A partir das premissas estabelecidas, a respeito da educação, da democracia e do Estado Democrático de Direito, bem como dos mecanismos de participação direta dos cidadãos, não é possível falar-se em cidadania como fundamento do Estado Democrático de Direito sem uma educação que prepare as pessoas para o exercício da cidadania

O raciocínio jurídico analógico tem sido visto ora como forma de raciocínio essencial ao Direito, ora como mecanismo pernicioso e arbitrário de tomada de decisões, em prejuízo ao Estado de Direito. O presente trabalho parte da hipótese de que o raciocínio analógico é mecanismo que promove segurança jurídica, e, não, indeterminação. Para sustentar tal ideia, a primeira parte desta discussão apresenta o ponto de vista de diferentes teóricos do direito que procuraram expor ou negar a existência de uma estrutura própria dessa forma de raciocínio. A segunda parte, por sua vez, propõe um balanço acerca dessas perspectivas, identificando-se elementos pertinentes à estrutura do raciocínio analógico e passíveis de análise específica e de crítica, com possibilidade de reformulação ou de melhor compreensão dos pontos colocados em evidência. A terceira parte, por fim, estabelece relação entre raciocínio analógico e coerência, entendendo esta como essencial para compreender de que maneira tal espécie de raciocínio pode promover segurança jurídica; para tanto, discute os conceitos de coerência e de integridade do direito, e, então, propõe que é possível verificar, do ponto de vista prático, relação entre a forma de desenvolvimento de raciocínios analógicos e os institutos jurídicos, de maneira a sustentar, por fim, que a analogia pode constituir mecanismo de segurança jurídica e de densificação do direito. O trabalho conclui que o raciocínio analógico desempenha papel relevante no Estado de Direito, nem sempre percebido como tal. / Analogical legal reasoning has been seen both as a form of reasoning essential to the law and as a pernicious and arbitrary mechanism of decision-making, undermining the rule of law. The present work is based on the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is a mechanism that increases legal certainty, not indetermination. To support this idea, the first part of this discussion presents the point of view of different legal theorists who sought to expose or deny the existence of a proper structure of this form of reasoning. The second part, in turn, proposes a balance on these perspectives, identifying pertinent elements to the structure of analogical reasoning, which are subject to specific analysis and criticism, with the possibility of reformulation or better understanding of the highlighted points. The third part, finally, establishes a relation between analogical reasoning and coherence, understanding this as essential to comprehend how this kind of reasoning can promote legal certainty; for this, it discusses the concepts of coherence and integrity of the law, and then it proposes that it is possible to verify, from a practical point of view, the relationship between the development of analogical reasoning and institutions of law, in order to sustain, lastly, that analogy can constitute a mechanism of legal certainty and densification of the law. This work concludes that analogical reasoning plays a relevant role in the rule of law, not always perceived as such.

A teoria tradicional sobre o poder identifica a violência do Estado como sendo a manifestação última do poder político, chegando mesmo a encontrar na demonstração de força física a essência do poder. Esta relação repercute na teoria do Estado definindo-o, não sem bases históricas, como monopólio dos instrumentos de violência. Já para o direito, a identificação entre poder e violência leva a uma sobrevaloração da sanção na atribuição de juridicidade à norma. Ainda que não de modo pioneiro, Hannah Arendt e Niklas Luhmann definiram o poder em oposição à violência, ainda que a ela relacionado. Esta similaritude na descrição do poder como oposto à violência leva a indagações acerca da compatibilidade entre as reflexões políticas de Arendt e as observações sociológicas de Luhmann. Este trabalho realiza uma comparação entre as obras dos dois autores no que diz respeito à relação entre poder e violência dentro do Estado de Direito. Para tanto, o estudo parte da premissa de que é possível a uma teoria do Estado aplicar tanto Arendt, quanto Luhmann a seus próprios conceitos. A distinção de posições, se interna ou externa à política, permite que uma assimetria entre as obras seja estabelecida e, deste modo, viabiliza a comparação. O trabalho conclui pela compatibilidade dos autores devido à semelhança entre os conceitos de ação e comunicação, entretanto, reconhece que o conceito de poder de Arendt é muito mais amplo do que aquele de Luhmann. Por fim, este trabalho propõe possíveis pontos de partida para novas abordagens da política e do direito que reúnam características dos dois autores analisados. / The traditional theory of power identifies State violence as the ultimate expression of political power, to the point of perceiving in the demonstration of physical strength the essence of power. The liaison between political commands and violent attitudes reaches the definition of State itself, establishing it, not without any Historical grounds, as the monopoly of instruments of force. In Law the relation between power and violence leads to overestimating the role of sanction in define a norm as lawful. Even though not as pioneers, Hannah Arendt and Niklas Luhmann defined power as opposite to violence, yet connected. Such similarities induce the question of the possibility of combining both theoretical approaches. This essay compares the works of the authors regarding the bearing of power and violence under the rule of law. As premise, this essay adopts the assumption that it is indeed possible for a theory of State to develop both Arendts and Luhmanns concepts as its own. Different theoretical positions inside and outside polity allow the creation of an asymmetry, which enables the comparison. This essay reaches the conclusion favorable to the compatibility of the authors, due to the similarity of both the concept of action and that of communication. Nonetheless, it recognizes that Arendts concept of power is much broader than Luhmanns. Finally, this essay suggests new approaches to political and legal theories that may pursuit the theoretical path of any or both the authors in comparison.

This thesis examines the institutional design and the procedures regulating the decree-making in the poleis of the Classical and Hellenistic periods. The main contention of this thesis is that Greek decree-making is to be conceived as the result of a multi-layered system of interaction and delegation of deliberative authority among different institutions: councils, officials, assemblies and lawcourts. My thesis argues, therefore, that decree-making procedures were specifically designed to implement the concept of 'divided power', a value shared by both democracies and non-democratic regimes, and to shape the collective behaviour of the citizens when acting as decision-makers within the institutions. By adopting models from the political sciences, my thesis bridges the gap between institutional approaches to political decision-making and more recent approaches that have stressed the role of values and ideology as key factors to understand ancient Greek politics. Chapter 1 lays out the methodology of the thesis informed by the New Historical Institutionalism. Chapter 2 analyses the practice of delegation of power from the Athenian Assembly to the Athenian Council in order to enact additional measures. The careful study of the delegation-clauses sheds light on the administrative power of the Council by demonstrating that the Council played a proper policy-making role through the enactment of a decree, which was the product of Council's expertise in defined matters, such as religious affairs, foreign policy and the navy. Chapter 3 builds on the findings of the previous chapter, and shows the workings and development of delegation-clauses to the Council in two examples from outside Athens, Mytilene and Megalopolis over the longue durée. Chapter 4 deals with the deliberative procedures of Hellenistic Sparta. The Spartan 'divided power' envisaged that the Gerousia shared the probouleutic power with the ephors who could independently submit the bill to the Assembly. The Gerousia, however, held the power of nomophylakia and could veto the final decree. This chapter shows that divided power and the need of legal stability were addressed by Spartan institutions, but with different results because of the wider powers of officials in the decree-making. This chapter introduces the important issue of the balance between people's deliberation and stability of the legal order, which form an important focus of chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 discusses the role played by legal procedure of the adeia in fifth-century deliberative decision-making in the Assembly. This chapter provides a new comprehensive account of this legal institution. Adeia instituted a pre-nomothetic procedure, according to which the Assembly could change an entrenched piece of legislation or decree without clashing with the nomothetic ideology. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between deliberation and judicial review in the Greek poleis. The first section discusses the Athenian graphe paranomon, the public charge against an illegal decree. A thorough analysis of the legal procedure and of the institutional design shows that deliberative decisions were made within the framework of the rule of law and the graphe paranomon enforced this principle. This did not imply an institutional prominence of the lawcourts in the Athenian decision-making. The lawcourts performed an important role in the deliberative process through providing a safeguard of legal consistency by adding the legal expertise of the judges to the general rationale of the decree-making. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the discussion of evidence of judicial review from outside Athens and the multifaceted role of the Hellenistic practice of appointing foreign judges in adjudicating public lawsuits, and especially in the judicial review of decrees.

Many researchers and political experts have commented on the disenfranchisement of the citizenry caused by irresponsible use of power by the government that potentially violates the 4th Amendment rights of millions of people through secret mass surveillance programs. Disclosures of this abuse of power are presumably protected by the 1st Amendment, though when constitutional protections are not followed by the government, the result can be prosecution and imprisonment of whistleblowers. Using a critical autoethnographic approach, the purpose of this study was to examine the devolution of democratic governance and constitutional rights in the United States since 9/11. Using the phenomena of my signature indictment (the first whistleblower since Daniel Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act) and prosecution by the U.S. government, data were collected through interviews with experts associated with this unique circumstance. These data, including my own recollections of the event, were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. The findings revealed that the use of national security as the primary grounds to suppress democracy and the voices of whistleblowers speaking truth to, and about, power increased authoritarian tendencies in government. These tendencies gave rise to extra-legal autocratic behavior and sovereign state control over the institutions of democratic governance. Positive social change can only take place in a society that has robust governance and social structures that strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and do not inhibit or suppress them.

What is the relationship between networks and unit-level outcomes, such as the international trade network among states and domestic rule of law or repression? Do these effects hold after accounting for actors' strategic selection of network ties? I explore these questions by building a multi-player game, in which players make two simultaneous decisions: (1) whether to form trade links and with who, and (2) whether to increase their trade benefits by improving their type, associated with the level of domestic economic risk factors. The model predicts an endogenous relationship between the number of direct trade partners and the probability of playing High Type: High Type states have more direct trade partners, and the number of trade partners has a positive effect on the probability of choosing High Type. A state's type is also affected by indirect trade connections--counter-intuitively, indirect trade has a negative effect on the probability of choosing High Type. In Chapters 3 and 4, I test the general predictions of the theoretical model, by applying them to two distinct areas of international research. In Chapter 3, I conceptualize a state's type as the level of domestic rule of law enforcement. States with strong rule of law enforcement are regarded as High Type states, because they guarantee lower cost of operations within their borders, by enforcing property rights and contractual law. Weak rule of law states, on the other hand, can be thought of as Low Type states, as business operations within such states are constantly threatened by a risk of expropriations, inefficiencies associated with corruption within the judicial system, and other manifestations of poor business practices. In Chapter 4, I recast the theoretical model by showing how a state's type can be conceptualized as a state's domestic respect for human rights. Highlighting the economic costs of repression, such as higher economic risk, negative publicity, and decreased quality of human capital, I argue that these costs are suffered by both the domestic economic elites and their international business partners. These business elites can, however, alleviate their losses resulting from such costs by either pressuring their government to embrace stronger human rights protections or, when this option is unavailable, by setting up channels for indirect economic transactions through states with more favorable political environments. To test each Chapter's empirical predictions, model the simultaneity between network formation and effect, using a statistical estimator developed by Ripley, Snijders, and Preciado (2012). This statistical estimator, referred to as a continuous Markov Chain exponential random graph model (MC ERGM), allows for a close mimicking of the theoretical model by simultaneously modeling two dependent variables: network formation and its effect on actors' behavior. The results of the statistical tests provide some support the theoretical predictions.

O presente trabalho se estrutura em torno da resposta a duas questões: O que é uma decisão motivada? e Quais as consequências de uma decisão imotivada?. Nesta perspectiva, partese da definição da motivação como um discurso cuja função é a de justificar racionalmente a decisão judicial. Esta justificativa racional tem funções endoprocessuais e extraprocessuais. Dentre as funções extraprocessuais, destaca-se a de conferir legitimidade à atuação jurisdicional no Estado Democrático de Direito. Ainda no âmbito da norma constitucional que impõe ao juiz o dever de fundamentar suas decisões, demonstra-se que ela se estrutura sob a forma de regra, nos termos da teoria dos princípios de ALEXY, com a consequência de que os limites para a caracterização de uma decisão como motivada são rígidos. Passa-se, então, à construção de um modelo teórico de estrutura da motivação sob a ótica funcional. Na construção desse modelo, demonstra-se que a estrutura e conteúdo da motivação no caso concreto dependem da interação de um modelo mínimo de justificação adequada, um modelo intermediário delimitado pelo contraditório e um limite máximo delimitado pela linguagem. A partir desse modelo interativo exploram-se as consequências dos vícios de motivação segundo uma teoria das nulidades dos atos processuais e, assim, conclui-se que a motivação só será considerada inexistente em caso de omissão gráfica e que qualquer vício de fundamentação é uma atipicidade relevante que deve ser nulificada. / The present work is structured around answering two questions: \"What is a motivated decision?\" and \"What are the consequences of an unjustified decision?. In this perspective, we start from the definition of motivation as a speech whose function is to rationally justify the decision. This rational justification has legal and constitutional functions. Among the constitutional functions one that stands out is to legitimate the courts role under in the rule of law. Also as part of the constitutional rule determining courts to motivate their decisions, it is shown that it is structured in the form of a rule in accordance with the principles theory of ALEXY, resulting that the limits for the characterization of a motivated decision are rigid. Then it is possible to create a theoretical model of the structure of motivation from a functional perspective. When building this model, we demonstrate that the structure and content of motivation depends on the interaction of a minimal model of proper justification, an intermediate model bounded by the adversarial principle, and another model, bigger than the others, defined by the language. From this interactive model it becomes possible to explore he consequences of the defects of motivation according to a nullity of procedural acts theory and thus it is concluded that motivation wont be considered existent only in case of graphical omission and that any defective reasoning must be nullified.

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

Résumé : La thèse s’intéresse aux sanctions prises par des exécutifs internationaux et qui ont pour cibles des personnes physiques ou morales : gels et confiscations d’avoirs, interdictions de voyager, amendes et même inscriptions sur des listes à caractère infâmant. La licéité de ces sanctions est examinée à l’aune des règles du droit international qui leur sont applicables : d’une part, les règles de procédure et, de l’autre, le droit international des droits de l’homme. L’analyse permet d’identifier deux types de sanctions illicites : 1°) Le premier type comprend les sanctions qui sont pénales et qui, par ailleurs, répriment de graves infractions. Ces sanctions devraient être imposées par des juges et non par des organes politiques ce que sont les exécutifs internationaux qui les infligent. 2°) Le second type de sanctions illicites regroupent les sanctions dépourvues de recours au sens du droit international des droits de l’homme. Les personnes affectées par ces sanctions devraient pouvoir en contester le bien-fondé devant un organe indépendant et impartial. Il n’existe, par ailleurs, aucune circonstance de nature à exclure l’illicéité de l’un ou l’autre de ces deux types de sanctions. Ces sanctions, dès lors, n’ont aucun caractère contraignant. Qui plus est, les Etats se trouvent mis dans l’obligation de ne pas y donner suite. Les sanctions qui n’appartiennent à aucun de ces deux types sont, en principe, licites. Abstract : The thesis concerns the sanctions taken by international executives and which targets individuals and legal entities: freeze and confiscation of assets, ban on travels, fine and even inscription on dishonourable lists. The legality of the sanctions is checked in relation to the international rules which are applicable to the sanctions: firstly, rules of procedure and, secondly, human rights. This work concludes to the existence of two types of wrongful sanctions: 1°) the first type groups together the sanctions which are penal and, moreover, punish serious offenses. These sanctions should be decided by judges and not by political organs like international executives. 2°) the second type of wrongful sanctions contains those without recourse complying with human rights. The persons targeted by these sanctions should be able to contest them before an independent and impartial organ. In addition, there are no circumstances precluding wrongfulness of these two types of sanctions. So, these sanctions are not binding and the States are under obligation not to apply them. The other sanctions which do not belong to one of these two types of sanctions are, in theory, legal.

<p>The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Commission) began its work in October 2004 and provided its final report only three months later on 25 January 2005.2 There, it concluded, inter alia, &ldquo / that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide&rdquo / and that at least the central Government authorities did not act with genocidal intent.3 However, these findings would not exclude the possibility that the atrocities committed by individuals against victims were carried out with the specific intent to destroy and therefore could possibly fulfil all necessary requirements of the crime of genocide.</p>