<p>The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime. </p><p>I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.</p> / Dissertation

Réfléchir sur le « bon régime », c’est s’interroger sur l’organisation politique qui convienne à la nature imparfaite de l’homme. Cette nature, combinée avec la contingence dans laquelle l’action humaine se déploie, rend illusoires les tentatives de constructions théoriques et absolument parfaites. Le « bon régime », c’est un régime juste, modéré, orienté vers le bien commun. Mais c’est surtout un régime adapté à la communauté qu’il a pour vocation d’organiser. Le pragmatisme et la « prudence » sont nécessaires pour dégager la constitution qui convient à la communauté politique. La composition sociologique de celle-ci, son histoire, ses moeurs et ses traditions déterminent pour une large part les solutions constitutionnelles qui peuvent être mises en oeuvre. Le « régime » s’insère dans un « système » qui le détermine en partie. Le régime mixte est pendant longtemps apparu comme la forme institutionnelle adaptée à la réalisation du bon régime puisqu’il permet la juste représentation des divers intérêts en présence et l’adhésion du plus grand nombre. Son apparente disparition à l’époque moderne et contemporaine est trompeuse, car ses caractéristiques principales, notamment la modération et l’équilibre, évoluent et se transforment pour s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités. Le constitutionnalisme moderne, par son attachement aux mécanismes de distribution des pouvoirs censés garantir l’équilibre et la modération du pouvoir en est l’illustration parfaite. Mais c’est surtout la persistance paradoxale de diverses formes d’hétéronomies – sociologique, morale, naturelle – qui montre que les modernes et les contemporains n’ont pas rompu de manière définitive avec le « bon régime », si cher aux anciens. / Reflecting on the concept of « good political regime » means reflecting on the best suited political organisation for the imperfect nature of man. This nature, combined with the contingency in which human action occurs, makes all tentative of perfect theoretical constructions illusionary. The « good political regime » is a fair regime and a moderate one oriented towards common good. But it is above all a government adapted to the community it intends to organise. Pragmatism and prudence are necessary in order to organise the most suitable constitution for the political community. Its sociological composition, its history, its customs and traditions are for a large part responsible in determining the constitutional solutions that can be implemented. The political regime occurs in fact in a political system which determines it in return. A “mixed” constitution has appeared for a long time as the most adequate institutional form, as it enables the fairest representation of the diversity of its interest, and the adhesion of the majority to the constitution. Its apparent disappearance in modern times is deceiving since its most distinctive features, among which moderation and equilibrium, have evolved and been transformed to adapt to new realities. Modern constitutionalism, by its attachment to the mechanisms of power distribution constitutes a perfect illustration of this phenomenon of adaptation. But it is above all the paradoxical persistence of different forms of heteronomy – sociological, moral, natural – that best exposes how the modern man has not definitively broken with the « good political regime » so dear to the Ancients.