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The thirteen essays in this volume demonstrate the multiplicity of connections between learning and politics in Renaissance Italy. Some engage explicitly with Hans Baron's "civic humanism" thesis illustrating its continuing viability, but also stretching its application to prove the limitations of its original expression. Others move beyond Baron's thesis to examine the actual practice of various individuals and groups engaged in both political and learned activities in a variety of diverse settings. The collective impression of all the contributions is that of a complex, ever-shifting mosaic of learned enterprises in which the well-examined civic paradigm emerges as just one of several modes that explain the interaction between learning and politics in Italy between 1300 and 1650. The model that emerges rejects any single category of explanation in favour of one that emphasizes variety and multiplicity. It suggests that learning was indispensible to all politics in Renaissance Italy and that, in fact, at its heart the Renaissance was a political event as much as a cultural movement. "In moving past the constraints imposed by the so-called Baron thesis, the essays in this volume allow for an innovative focus on Renaissance humanism as a set of 'practices' determined more by social structures and networks than by specific historical events. In so doing, a number of these studies open up new areas of scholarly exploration." - Scott Blanchard, Misericordia University / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1149/thumbnail.jpg

Muitas análises sobre o humanismo florentino dos séculos e XIV e XV, mesmo quando reconhecem a importância da tradição retórica, sobretudo latina, na formação e produção desses autores, a veem como uma ferramenta que encobre as suas verdadeiras e sinceras crenças, e criam um hiato entre suas obras e suas realidades políticas, tornando os escritos desses primeiros humanistas uma fonte histórica bastante delicada e perigosa para o historiador. Este estudo procurará, a partir de uma tendência historiográfica crítica às teses de Hans Baron sobre o Humanismo cívico (1955 e 1966) e das reflexões teóricas de Quentin Skinner (1999a, 2007 e 2007a), bem como de outros autores antigos e contemporâneos sobre as relações entre linguagem, política e história, propor uma leitura de algumas obras de dois humanistas florentinos dos séculos XIV e XV, Leonardo Bruni Aretino e Lino Coluccio Salutati. Uma leitura na qual a tradição retórica clássica neles presente e atuante seja vista não como um elemento que os distancia de suas realidades políticas e esconde suas convicções, mas como um meio pelo qual eles criaram novos conceitos e um novo vocabulário que contribuíram para dar forma não só à realidade cultural e política em que viveram e da qual participaram ativamente, na Itália e na Europa, mas também ao pensamento político ocidental posterior. / Many studies on XIV and XV century Florentine humanism, even when they accept the importance of rhetoric tradition, mainly the Latin rhetoric tradition, in humanists educational background and works from these centuries, see this rhetoric tradition just as a tool which hides humanists true and sincere beliefs, forming a gap between their works and their political realities and making the works of these early humanists a somewhat embarrassing and dangerous historical source for historians.This work seeks to analyze some works of two Florentine humanists from XIV and XV centuries: Leonardo Bruni Aretino e Lino Coluccio Salutati, from a critical historiographical view on Hans Barons thesis on civic Humanism (1955 and 1966) and Quentin Skinners historical and theoretical writings (1999a, 2007 and 2007a), as well as the writings of other ancient and modern authors who have also written about many and important relations between language, politics and history. It aims to identify the classical rhetoric tradition present and active in both humanists production not as an element that keeps them away from their political realities and hides their true and sincere beliefs, but as a mean through which these humanists created new concepts and new vocabulary that contributed not only to shape the cultural and political reality in which Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni lived and actively took part, in Italy and in Europe, but that have also contributed to form the occidental political thought.

Latiniste disciple d’Érasme et docteur en droit civil, Barthélemy Latomus est une figure emblématique d’une époque marquée par les mouvements transversaux de l’Humanisme et de la Réforme. Sa carrière connut deux périodes asymétriques, comme professeur de rhétorique latine et conseiller juridique d’un archevêque électeur de l’empire. Il enseigna à Trèves, Cologne, Louvain et Paris, où il fut choisi le premier comme lecteur en rhétorique latine au Collège fondé par François Ier. Ses recherches sur les fondamentaux de l’art oratoire, conjuguées à celles de Melanchthon dans le sillage de Rodolphe Agricola et de Georges de Trébizonde, aboutirent à l’avènement d’une rhétorique de type humaniste alliant étroitement logique et éloquence. L’objectif premier est de répondre aux besoins concrets des enseignants et des orateurs responsables. Dans ce but, il mit au point une méthode originale en analysant les discours classiques, surtout de Cicéron, non par intérêt archéologique ni en vue d’une vaine imitation, mais pour acquérir les outils d’un savoir-faire personnel. Dans un grand discours sur les « studia humanitatis » il expose le fond de sa pensée : un humanisme civique, reflet d’une anthropologie qui envisage l’homme en tant que membre actif de la société, où la rhétorique tient une place capitale. À Paris, il est l’un des représentants très prisés de l’humanisme du nord qui avait tant contribué à la réforme des programmes d’études universitaires. Devenu conseiller à Trèves après un voyage en Italie, il est amené à approfondir la théologie en vue du dialogue interreligieux. Dans ses controverses, il relaye la doctrine officielle en la fondant sur l’étude des sources bibliques et patristiques; il prône le débat d’idées face aux disputes stériles. À Paris, Latomus était proche du mouvement évangélique français; il maintint des contacts avec des amis luthériens, tels Jean Sturm et Jean Sleidan, et leur fit des ouvertures hardies concernant la structure hiérarchique de l’Église en vue d’un Concile libre. / A pupil of Erasmus, a Latin scholar, and a doctor of civil law, B. Latomus was an emblematic figure of a period marked by the cross-currents of humanism and reformation. His career spanned two asymmetrical periods: starting out as a professor of Latin literature, he ended up as a legal adviser to the Archbishop-Elector of Trier. He taught at Trier, Cologne, Louvain and Paris, where he was the first appointed lecturer of Latin eloquence at the College founded by François Ier. His research into the foundations underlying the art of oratory, together with those of Melanchthon and following upon those of Agricola and George of Trebizond, led to the development of a specifically humanist rhetoric, combining dialectics with eloquence, whose main goal was to cater to the practical needs of teachers and orators holding a post of responsibility. His analysis of classical speeches, above all by Cicero, was more than a mere archeological interest or an empty striving after imitation: Latomus developed an original method allowing him to forge for himself the tools of a highly personal savoir-faire. The essentials of his thoughts are developed in a great speech devoted to the ‘studia humanitatis’: a civic humanism, which is the reflection of an anthropology seeing man as an active member of society, in which rhetoric played a central role. During his Paris years, Latomus was seen as one of the foremost representatives of that brand of Northern humanism that had contributed so much to the shaping of university curricula. After becoming a counselor in Trier on his return from an iter Italicum, he delved into theology. In his controversies, he sided with the official doctrine by firmly basing it on biblical and patristic sources; he preferred the clash of ideas over sterile disputations. Latomus was close to the French evangelical movement; he kept contact with Lutheran friends such as Sturm and Sleidan, to whom he submitted courageous proposals regarding the hierarchical structures of the church, in the hope of having them discussed at a free council.

Muitas análises sobre o humanismo florentino dos séculos e XIV e XV, mesmo quando reconhecem a importância da tradição retórica, sobretudo latina, na formação e produção desses autores, a veem como uma ferramenta que encobre as suas verdadeiras e sinceras crenças, e criam um hiato entre suas obras e suas realidades políticas, tornando os escritos desses primeiros humanistas uma fonte histórica bastante delicada e perigosa para o historiador. Este estudo procurará, a partir de uma tendência historiográfica crítica às teses de Hans Baron sobre o Humanismo cívico (1955 e 1966) e das reflexões teóricas de Quentin Skinner (1999a, 2007 e 2007a), bem como de outros autores antigos e contemporâneos sobre as relações entre linguagem, política e história, propor uma leitura de algumas obras de dois humanistas florentinos dos séculos XIV e XV, Leonardo Bruni Aretino e Lino Coluccio Salutati. Uma leitura na qual a tradição retórica clássica neles presente e atuante seja vista não como um elemento que os distancia de suas realidades políticas e esconde suas convicções, mas como um meio pelo qual eles criaram novos conceitos e um novo vocabulário que contribuíram para dar forma não só à realidade cultural e política em que viveram e da qual participaram ativamente, na Itália e na Europa, mas também ao pensamento político ocidental posterior. / Many studies on XIV and XV century Florentine humanism, even when they accept the importance of rhetoric tradition, mainly the Latin rhetoric tradition, in humanists educational background and works from these centuries, see this rhetoric tradition just as a tool which hides humanists true and sincere beliefs, forming a gap between their works and their political realities and making the works of these early humanists a somewhat embarrassing and dangerous historical source for historians.This work seeks to analyze some works of two Florentine humanists from XIV and XV centuries: Leonardo Bruni Aretino e Lino Coluccio Salutati, from a critical historiographical view on Hans Barons thesis on civic Humanism (1955 and 1966) and Quentin Skinners historical and theoretical writings (1999a, 2007 and 2007a), as well as the writings of other ancient and modern authors who have also written about many and important relations between language, politics and history. It aims to identify the classical rhetoric tradition present and active in both humanists production not as an element that keeps them away from their political realities and hides their true and sincere beliefs, but as a mean through which these humanists created new concepts and new vocabulary that contributed not only to shape the cultural and political reality in which Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni lived and actively took part, in Italy and in Europe, but that have also contributed to form the occidental political thought.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the often-ignored inherent philosophical connection between Charles Taylor¡¦s ontological argument (philosophical anthropology) and his political scheme. Taylor articulates a moral realist understanding of the plurality of values and an ontological statement of human agency, and tries to demostrate a possibility of reconciliation between essentially conflicting values and cultures. In Taylor¡¦s view, ¡§the many¡¨ does not necessarily entail tragical choices among values, as Isaiah Berlin famously asserted, but can be possibly mediated through the common human agency with the hope that we can eventually reach one true consensus. Based on this uniquely Taylorian understanding of human condition, Taylor¡¦s political scheme can be seen as an effort to ameliorate the deep-rooted malaise within Western modernity, and find a common ontological ground among community members and citizens by which deliberations can be facilitated. The thesis will go on to examine Taylor¡¦s two most inspiring political assertions, namely, the polilics of recognition and civic humanism, in detail. I will argue that although Taylor optimistically believes that a common moral and cultural understanding can help forming and be transformed into a common political common good within a given community, the connection between these two levels of commonality is fairly weak. Moreover, what liberals object is precisely Taylor¡¦s attempt to equate cultural common understanding with a form of political common good.

Réfléchir sur le « bon régime », c’est s’interroger sur l’organisation politique qui convienne à la nature imparfaite de l’homme. Cette nature, combinée avec la contingence dans laquelle l’action humaine se déploie, rend illusoires les tentatives de constructions théoriques et absolument parfaites. Le « bon régime », c’est un régime juste, modéré, orienté vers le bien commun. Mais c’est surtout un régime adapté à la communauté qu’il a pour vocation d’organiser. Le pragmatisme et la « prudence » sont nécessaires pour dégager la constitution qui convient à la communauté politique. La composition sociologique de celle-ci, son histoire, ses moeurs et ses traditions déterminent pour une large part les solutions constitutionnelles qui peuvent être mises en oeuvre. Le « régime » s’insère dans un « système » qui le détermine en partie. Le régime mixte est pendant longtemps apparu comme la forme institutionnelle adaptée à la réalisation du bon régime puisqu’il permet la juste représentation des divers intérêts en présence et l’adhésion du plus grand nombre. Son apparente disparition à l’époque moderne et contemporaine est trompeuse, car ses caractéristiques principales, notamment la modération et l’équilibre, évoluent et se transforment pour s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités. Le constitutionnalisme moderne, par son attachement aux mécanismes de distribution des pouvoirs censés garantir l’équilibre et la modération du pouvoir en est l’illustration parfaite. Mais c’est surtout la persistance paradoxale de diverses formes d’hétéronomies – sociologique, morale, naturelle – qui montre que les modernes et les contemporains n’ont pas rompu de manière définitive avec le « bon régime », si cher aux anciens. / Reflecting on the concept of « good political regime » means reflecting on the best suited political organisation for the imperfect nature of man. This nature, combined with the contingency in which human action occurs, makes all tentative of perfect theoretical constructions illusionary. The « good political regime » is a fair regime and a moderate one oriented towards common good. But it is above all a government adapted to the community it intends to organise. Pragmatism and prudence are necessary in order to organise the most suitable constitution for the political community. Its sociological composition, its history, its customs and traditions are for a large part responsible in determining the constitutional solutions that can be implemented. The political regime occurs in fact in a political system which determines it in return. A “mixed” constitution has appeared for a long time as the most adequate institutional form, as it enables the fairest representation of the diversity of its interest, and the adhesion of the majority to the constitution. Its apparent disappearance in modern times is deceiving since its most distinctive features, among which moderation and equilibrium, have evolved and been transformed to adapt to new realities. Modern constitutionalism, by its attachment to the mechanisms of power distribution constitutes a perfect illustration of this phenomenon of adaptation. But it is above all the paradoxical persistence of different forms of heteronomy – sociological, moral, natural – that best exposes how the modern man has not definitively broken with the « good political regime » so dear to the Ancients.

[pt] É importante diferenciar o Maquiavelismo do Maquiavelianismo. O primeiro está baseado na crença de que todos os meios disponíveis são justificáveis para ascender e manter o poder, ainda que imorais; enquanto o outro consiste na verdadeira essência do pensamento de Nicolau Maquiavel, trazer as lições deixadas pelos antigos para os tempos moderno, principalmente no que consiste a chamada liberdade republicana. Isto faz total sentido se enxergarmos a renascença como o período de substituição da vida passiva, marcada pela pura reflexão espiritual e contemplação divina, pela vida ativa em que o homem assume uma atividade criadora perante o mundo, não apenas nas artes como nas instituições políticas. Essa é a pratica do viver civiles, em que toda forma de organização social é moldada pela própria comunidade com o objetivo de aprimorar o convívio social. Esta noção está na própria essência do movimento do humanismo cívico que marcou todo o período da Renascença. É sob esta perspectiva que devemos interpretas a obra de Nicolau Maquiavel. O príncipe novo nada mais é que a forma alegórica desta engenharia institucional que posteriormente ganharia a alcunha de Poder Constituinte, mas já estava presente na dinâmica renascentista. Ainda segundo Maquiavel, o príncipe novo necessariamente assumiria a forma de um Oxímoro, figura alegórica em que duas partes de natureza opostas se unem contraditoriamente em um todo harmônico. Aqui, ele se refere aos pequenos e aos grandes que em uma eterna disputa, sempre dentro de um determinado arcabouço institucional, colaboram para aprovar leis uteis para o beneficio mutuo de toda a sociedade. Este processo consiste na fundação continua que deve ser encarado como a próprio essência do poder constituinte que possuía uma natureza invariavelmente aberta. É assim que devemos ler as referencias ao governo misto ao longo de toda a obra maquiaveliana. A figura do Oxímoro exclui qualquer associação do pensamento do secretário florentino com o fenômeno populista, ao menos se levarmos em consideração a definição dada por Laclau em a Razão Populista. O populismo é marcado pela ascensão de uma particularidade (plebe) e sua consolidação como totalidade (populus), enquanto Maquiavel propôs com a cooperação ainda que forçada entre os dois polos antagônicos da sociedade com a manutenção de suas respectivas funções sociais. Entretanto, podemos identificar no conceito de virtù, a vagueza conceitual necessária para caracterizar o conceito de significante flutuante. Isto explica a facilidade das mais diversas correntes ideológicas em se apoderar do legado do secretário florentino em prol de uma causa própria. Ironicamente, Maquiavel parece ter aberto a caixa de pandora do populismo, ainda que contra a própria vontade. / [en] It is important to distinguish the Machiavellianism from the Machiavellian commonwealth. The first is based on the believe that all available means are justifiable to ascend and preserve power, yet imoral; while the other consistes on the true essence of Nicolà Machiavelli s thought: apply the leassons let by the ancient to modern times, specially about the so called republicana liberty. It makes all sense if we analyse the renaissance as the moment of substituition of the passive life, marked by purê spiritual reflexion and divine contemplation, for the active life that the man adopts a creative active before the world, not just in the arts as the political instituitions as well. This is the practice of the viver civiles in which all the forms of social organization are shaped by the own community. in order to improve the social life. This concept is in the own essence of the civic humanism that forged all the period of the Renaissance. It is under this perspective that we should interpret all the Machiavellian work. The príncipe novo is just the alegorical form of the popular statecraft that would later be named constituitional power, but it was already present in the renascence dynamic. Accorduing to the florentina secretary, this príncipe novo would necessarily assume the shape of an Oxymoron, figure of speech in which two parts of opposite nature contradictorily unite in a harmonious whole. Here, he refers to the eternal dispute among the small and the big when operete inside a framework tend tocooperate aproving useful laws for the whole civil society. This process consists in the continuos foundation and caracterizes the own essence of the constitucional power which always have an opened nature. That is the way we should read the references to the mixed government all along the machiavellian works. The Oxymoron figure exculpes any association of the machiavellian Thoughr to the populista phenomenom, at least if we consider the definition given by Ernesto Laclau in his Razão Populista. The populism is caracterized by the ascention of a particularity (plebe) and it s consolidation as totality (populus), while Machiavelli proposed the cooperation yet forced between two antagonical Poles with the preservativos of their respectiva social functions. Nevetheless, we might identify in the concept of virtù, enough conceptual vaporousness to classify it as a flowing significant. It explains the easiness with the most diverse ideologia corrents apropriated from the Machiavellian Legacy. ironically, Machiavelli seemed to have opened the populism pandora box, yet unwittingly.

Die Arbeit untersucht den Diskurs um das Boxen in der englischen Gesellschaft zwischen circa 1780 und 1820. Sie zeigt, dass er ein wichtiger Schauplatz für die Austragung sozialer, politischer und kultureller Konflikte war. Im Diskurs um das Boxen spiegeln sich in besonderem Maße die Konflikte zwischen civic humanism und politeness wieder, des Konfliktes zwischen zwei einander entgegengesetzten Männlichkeitsidealen: das Ideal vom starken Mann, das von den Boxern verkörpert wird und dem gegenüber das Ideal des verweichlichten und einfühlsamen ‚polite man‘. Boxen nimmt auch eine zentrale Funktion in den Debatten über die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse im ‚body politic‘ ein: von Konservativen wurde es eingesetzt als gegenrevolutionäre Maßnahme, um die Masse zu mobilisieren ohne Ihnen eine politische Teilhabe zu geben. Radikale sahen es als ein Instrument, um die Arbeiter zu ermächtigen, sie über Ihre Rechte zu informieren und deren Ansprüche auf Emanzipation zu legitimieren. Boxen war zudem ein Schlachtfeld, um verschiedene Verständnisse von Rasse und nationaler Identität auszutragen: einem Verständnis, dass das nationale Ganze als ethnisch homogen konstruierte und einem inklusiveren Verständnis der englischen Nation, das Minoritäten nicht ausschließen musste. / The study examines the discourse on boxing in English society circa 1780 to 1820. It shows that it was a site of struggle between diverse notions of gender, class, race, and nation. Boxing was a central arena for the opposition between civic humanism and politeness. It was an arena for the struggle between two diametrically opposed manly ideals, the strong and corporeal ideal epitomized by the boxers versus the feminine and sensitive polite ideal. Boxing took on an important role in the debates on the place of the working class in the body politic; conservatives perceived boxing as a counter-revolutionary measure and way to mobilise the masses in defence of their country without granting them political rights. Radicals viewed it as a tool to empowering the workers, educating them on their rights and legitimizing their claims for emancipation. Boxing was also a site of struggle between conflicting notions of race and differing ideas of national identity, specifically between one which saw the nation as ethnically homogenous and another, more cultural understanding of national identity, which was more inclusive to minorities.