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Many people assume that when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates a federal statute as unconstitutional, the Court's decision establishes binding precedent that narrows the U.S. Congress's available options. This thesis examines whether Congress has in practice been able to effectively circumvent Supreme Court precedents while still acting consistently with such precedents in a narrow sense by not repassing an identical statute. More specifically, this work explores whether the U.S. Congress was able to repass new statutes similar to those previously invalidated by the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005). To more fully probe this issue, this study examines how often Congress has responded in such a manner, how successful Congress was in replicating the initial invalidated statute's breadth and potency, the success of the amended statute's subsequent implementation or whether the new statutes survived judicial scrutiny, and lastly, whether legislative policy goals or Court precedents prevailed. The research focused on the Rehnquist Court because it invalidated an unprecedented 34 federal statutes. This analysis found that Congress offered 11 proposals, but only repassed four statutes attempting to replicate the initial invalidated statutes. Nevertheless, in the four instances of successful reenactment, Congress was able to achieve, in practice, indistinguishable potency and breadth in two statutes and identical potency with significantly narrower breadth in one statute. This work is significant because it demonstrates that occasionally Congress has utilized available tools—in this case repassing analogous statutes—to effectively counter Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court is not always the exclusive or irrevocable arbitrator of constitutional controversies. / Master of Arts

The author has tried to show in this study the broad applications laid down by the Supreme Court in its decisions dealing with Jehovah's Witnesses. The tolerance used by the Supreme Court in working out the immense problems created by this sect at such a critical period, shows how tolerance builds strength rather than lessens it.

Since the acknowledgement of the entrapment defense by the Supreme Court in the case of Sorrells v. United States 287 U.S. 435 (1932) there have been discussions on how it should be applied. There are two schools of thought for the application of the entrapment defense. One is the objective test and the other is the subjective test for entrapment. The subjective test focuses on the defendant's predisposition while the objective test focuses on the activity of the government. The federal courts and thirty eight states use the subjective test for entrapment. Florida is one of the states that use the subjective test for entrapment. The majority of this study is focused on the history and application of the entrapment defense, with a focus on the state of Florida. The study will aim to examine the ramifications of applying a subjective test for entrapment. Furthermore, this study will shed some light on problems with the way the entrapment defense is applied in Florida. This study has led to new ideas about how and why a new test for entrapment should be embraced by the courts in Florida.

This study will remain with the role of the Supreme Court, and then only with its role in the character of interpretation as far as the necessitation of a new type of police power is concerned.

Submitted by Deidre Raquel Whitfield (deidre.whitfield2015@fgvmail.br) on 2015-01-26T14:28:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2015-01-28T14:08:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-02-05T16:21:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-05T16:26:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-29 / Discrimination, in its best form, is a hard concept to fathom as an employee or ordinary citizen. In the workplace, there are times when discrimination is necessary due to extenuating circumstances that revolve around the form or act of discrimination. It could be conveyed to save a life or avoid future conflict. However, it must be clearly stated as a written law that the act is lawful. When unlawful discrimination occurs, it stages an entirely different tone, as it is mainly conducted out of malice, hatred, greed, control, or ignorance. Over the last few decades, discrimination has existed in the workplace, although Federal laws mandate that it does not occur. It does not exist in just one geographical area or is country specific, but covers a wide spectrum, linking countries together from their points of view to creating rifts amongst those who are affected and those who are not, not only from a business perspective, but social humanistic relationships as well. This thesis will use quantitative and qualitative data to support discrimination of sexual harassment, race or color, and gender issues, as well as personal experiences, and how it has and will continue to impact businesses if the acts do not cease, permanently. Leadership, from the Presidents and Heads of Countries, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), managers, lowest-ranking supervisor, and employees should make it their personal goal to ensure these issues do not continue or arise in their perspective areas of responsibilities. When employees understand that they are valued, will be taken seriously when reporting acts of discrimination, and that some form of action will be taken, performance and productivity will escalate, and morale will increase in the workplace, resulting in higher productivity and subsequently higher profit margins for the company.

No description available.

This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.

This thesis assesses three United States Supreme Court opinions, engaging in an inductive approach to generic criticism, in an attempt to discover whether or not there are similarities and/or differences in these decisions. This study focuses on draft card, flag, and cross burning cases argued before the Court in order to discover the potential genre's characteristics.

The diploma thesis focuses on the approximation of law of compensation for bodily harm and death, and evaluation of its development especially in connection with the recodification of private law. The main objective of the thesis is to provide a comprehensive overview with emphasis on the most significant changes that occurred in connection with the recodification, and its evaluation. The first chapter deals with theoretical basis of the duty to provide compensation for harm, since the formation of such a duty is a prerequisite for granting compensation. Besides the reasons that lead to the formation of the duty, individual pre-conditions of the duty are discussed as well. These pre-conditions are unlawful act, formation of the damage, causality and fault. The second chapter deals with the concept of harm which replaced the previously more often used term damage. In addition, the second chapter also includes a general introduction to the compensation for bodily harm and death, which is related to the following chapters. The third chapter is a key point of the whole thesis, as the recodification of private law influenced the most compensation of non-pecuniary damage for bodily harm and death. The principle of full compensation for suffered harm, hence the expiation of such harm according to the...