Sedan attacken på USA 11 september 2001 har åtskilliga rapporter skrivits om Talibanernaför att skapa underlag för styrkorna som bekämpar dem. Syftet med uppsatsen är att försökaåskådliggöra en struktur på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och förklara varför dehade denna struktur på styret med utgångspunkt i den religiösa utbildningen. Och i och meddetta bidra till forskningsläget om talibanerna. Frågeställningen som besvaras i uppsatsen är:Vilken struktur hade styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och varför hade styret dennastruktur? Denna frågeställning löses ut av följande 2 frågor: Fråga 1 - Kan strukturen påstyret av talibanernas organisation 2009 beskrivas med hjälp av en strukturellorganisationsteori? Fråga 2 - Kan den religiösa utbildningen vara en förklaring till dennastruktur på styret?Med hjälp av en strukturell teori om organisationers form och två sociologiska teorier sombehandlar varför människor och grupper handlar som de gör utifrån deras bakgrund ska jagförsöka uppfylla uppsatsens syfte och beskriva hur strukturen på styret av talibanernasorganisation såg ut 2009 och förklara varför den såg ut så.Uppsatsen använder en kvalitativ metod där divisionaliserad organisation, habitus och dendolda läroplanen används som teorier. I den första analysen som svarar på den första frågangörs en fallstudie på ett dokument som beskriver regler och förhållningssätt för talibanernaunder Mullah Omar med hjälp av divisionaliserad organisation. Därefter för att svara påuppsatsens andra fråga analyseras talibanernas habitus utifrån den religiösa utbildningen föratt sedan analyseras med hjälp av Pierre Bourdieus habitusteori och Donald Broadys dendolda läroplanen.Resultatet av analyserna visar att strukturen på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 tillstor del kan beskrivas med teorin om divisionaliserad organisation och att habitusteorin medstöd av den dolda läroplanen kan ge en förklaring till varför deras styre hade denna struktur2009 utifrån de enskilda individernas religiösa utbildning i södra Afghanistan och Pakistan. / Since the attack on The United States of America September 11 2001 numerous reports hasbeen written about the Taleban to provide information to the forces fighting them. Thepurpose of my thesis is to try to illustrate a structure on the rule of the Taliban organisation2009 and explain why they had this structure on their rule based on religious education. Andby this contribute to the current research about the Taliban. To fulfil this purpose I willanswers the following question in the thesis: What structure did the Taliban have on the ruleof their organisation in 2009 and why did the rule have this structure? This main questionwill be answered through two sub questions: Question 1 – Can the structure of the rule of theTaliban organisation 2009 be described by using a structural theory about organisations?Question 2 – Can the religious education be an explanation to this structure of their rule?With the help of one structural theory about organisations and two sociological theory’sthat concerns why people and groups act the way they do based of their background I will tryto fulfil the purpose of the thesis and describe the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 and explain why the rule had this structure.The thesis uses a qualitative method and divisionaliserad organisation, habitus and thehidden curriculum as theories. In the first analyse that answers to the first question I make acase study on a document that describes rules and regulations for the Taliban’s under MullahOmar using Henry Mintzbergs theory of divisionaliserad organisation. Thereafter to answerthe second question I first analyse the Taliban habitus based on their religious education.Then I continue the analysis using Pierre Bourdieus theory of habitus and Donald Broadysthe hidden curriculum.The result of the two analyses shows that the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 can be described fairly well using the theory of divisionaliseradorganisation. It also shows that the theory of habitus with the support of the hiddencurriculum can give an explanation to why their rule had this structure 2009 based on theindividual’s religious education in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This thesis addresses an identified gap in the field of rebel governance and rebel funding, by theorizing and investigating how differences in rebel group funding sources affect a group’s engagement in rebel governance, distinguishing funding through natural resources from funding through non-natural resources. It is highlighted that these sources differ in three fundamental ways: their necessity for civilian labor and cooperation, the extent to which equipment, technology and infrastructure are required, and the expected time of pay-off. It is hypothesized that the degree to which a rebel group depends on natural resources determines the likelihood to which it engages in rebel governance - i.e. intervenes in all security, political, social, health and educational spheres of civilian life. This hypothesis is investigated through a comparative case study of two rebel groups from 2003 to 2018: the Taliban in Afghanistan, which generated its funding primarily through Afghanistan’s opium economy, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, later known as Al-Qaeda in Maghreb, which generated its funding through ‘criminal activities’ such as kidnappings for ransom. The findings suggest some level of support for the hypothesis. Inconsistencies in the findings limiting generalizability and the need for further investigations are discussed.

<p>På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat.</p><p>Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.</p>

På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat. Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.

This paper deals with the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan after the NATO-invasion at the end of 2001 and its success. To ensure the stability of the country, the NATO-led coalition had not only to overthrow the Taliban regime, but also to create basic government structures and help them perform. Reconstruction is of course very common and necessary after conflict, it is however usually operated by strictly civilian measures, e. g. government institutions and humanitarian organisations. In this case, however, such approach was not possible due to volatile security situation, which in some areas grew to such intensity, it essentially became a war-conflict again. This paper focuses on the Herat province and NATO units, especially under ISAF command. It seeks to define the process of post-conflict reconstruction and using the process-tracing method, it then ascertains the extent to which ISAF units dedicated themselves to post-conflict reconstruction and made a positive progress in this area. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This research paper investigates the current turmoil in Pakistan and how much of it has been caused by the joint American-Pakistani War on Terror. The United States' portion of the War on Terror is in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that began after the September 11th attacks in 2001, as well as in Pakistan with unmanned drone attacks. Pakistan's portion of this war includes the support to the U.S. in Afghanistan and military campaigns within it's own borders against Taliban forces. Taliban forces have fought back against Pakistan with terrorist attacks and bombings that continue to ravage the nation. There have been a number of consequences from this war upon Pakistani society, one of particular importance to the U.S. is the increased anti-American sentiment. The war has also resulted in weak and widely unpopular leaders. The final major consequence this study examines is the increased conflict amongst the many ethnicities within Pakistan. The consequences of this war have had an effect on local, regional, American, and international politics.

No description available.

This dissertation explores the ways in which Americans constructed a public understanding about gender relations in Muslim countries from the Iranian Revolution through the post-9/11 period that cast Muslims as oppressors of women. It argues that such understandings significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy in recent decades. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the degree to which women had or lacked rights became one barometer by which Americans judged Muslim societies. Journalists, scholars, women's rights activists, novelists, filmmakers, politicians, and others in the U.S. contributed to public debates since 1979 that cast Muslims as particularly oppressive of women. The pervasiveness of such views and lobbying efforts by women's rights activists pushed policymakers to situate the attainment of rights for women within the constellation of legitimate areas of policy concern regarding the Muslim world. As a consequence, by the 1990s concern for Muslim women's rights sometimes drove U.S. policy, as when President Clinton chose not to recognize the Taliban regime in 1998; at other times, rhetoric about the oppression of Muslim women became a political tool which policymakers could use to provide legitimacy and moral force for their interventions in the Islamic world. This story is both national and transnational and involves both state and non-state actors. / History

This thesis investigates global fight against terrorism in North West Pakistan and Afghanistan from a 21st century perspective in 2018. It focuses on local attitudes towards the War on Terror and their interplay with geo-strategic, regional, international and Pakistan’s domestic landscapes. In doing so, it questions the efficacy of existing academic and policy approaches towards achieving sustainable peace in North West Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. It also evaluates the impact of regional rivalries especially in between Pakistan and India on the achievement of US foreign policy interests. Part-1 reviews existing literature on terrorism especially in post 9/11 setting. It examines the international discord of agreeing on a single definition of terrorism and its ramifications. It sequentially focuses on character of security in North West Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan since colonial times. It also identifies various traditional, religious and societal angles of Pashtun tribes; which always inspired them to fight against external powers. Part-2 combines academic investigations with empirical evidence. The results are correlated with current discussions on modern terrorism, geopolitical pulls and regional rivalries to create a holistic picture. It identifies local attitudes and regional rivalries as major impediments towards achievement of sustainable peace. Research findings indicated that predominant Western academic debates on the conflict were foreign policy inspired with little local and veteran input. By adapting a pragmatic approach the terrorism challenge can be addressed and the region can contribute towards the continuation of ‘Rules Based Order’ within the current phase of Great Power Rivalry.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim's duty 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - ... in any country in which it is possible to do it'. Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that 'nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food' has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, 'dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;' the continued bombing of Iraq 'even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;' and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group's true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda's real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan's Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious - or, as I came to think of myself, a secular - person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden's arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden's words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the 'war on terror' - which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to 'rethink secular and sacred' - both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word 'tolerance' itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs. Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting.