Decades after 1602, Taiwan was an unique stage for continual showing of power struggles of various great powers. Three ancient concepts, including strategy, political order and history are precisely the main axles connecting these historical events. Each one of these domains would have significant and profound influence interweaved with others. Geographically, Taiwan is not only the center of the first island chain out of the continent, it is also located at the top of this so call ¡§Asiatic Mediterranean¡¨ triangle. The geographical location of Taiwan thus unpreventable made it revolving in the struggles among international powers. The action of a state definitely will aim at its national interest. The foreign policy of a nation would be set according to a guided rule which included the geopolitical code. To be more precise, the geopolitical code is one of the important criteria to identify national interest as well as adversary and to react against them. This research is based on three geological levels, including local level of Taiwan, regional level of Southeast Asia and the global level to analyze the geopolitics of Taiwan and to examine various powers which had ruled Taiwan in the history. In terms of the geography matters, the maritime power disposition, the geopolitics and the geo-economy are factors to shape up the destiny of Taiwan for some 400 years by different powers from the world. In the final analysis, based on a principle that political order would be changed following the changes of stratagem, it shows that the consideration and planning of foreign strategy would have great impact in the domestic political order and administrative policy. In one word, the geological location of Taiwan put it in the cross road of the ocean while geopolitical and economical factors confine Taiwan to be ruled by invasion powers for the last four hundred years.

本論文的問題意識在於，中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣，在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標，並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序，結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率，與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。 中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時，缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。 在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中，古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強，而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼，壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手，組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼，以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序，和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力，追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼，使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外，但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略，使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域，並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區，只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區，以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍，並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。 本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因，只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用，目的是藉此極大化中國的利益，並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協，並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排，促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力，最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權，但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位，以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外，皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為，難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此，中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型，不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型，故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡，反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。 但是，中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力，目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅，更為了繼續實施經濟建設，必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益，在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下，亦不願意真正與中國敵對，導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係，但其他方面互動熱絡，不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態，無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。 關鍵字：中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.” Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy. Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”. China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm. The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes. Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States. China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region. Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy