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荷蘭的中國政策:關係平衡 / Dutch Foreign Policy towards China胡凱瑞, Koenraad Hulsker Unknown Date (has links)
「關係平衡」運用於荷蘭與中國的關係 / The Balance of Relationship applied to Sino-Dutch relations
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權力平衡輿東南亞中立化之研究牟家榮, Mou, Jia-Rong Unknown Date (has links)
第一章緒論;略敘東南亞人文背景及戰後國際政治概況。第二章東南亞國際政治的幾
個背景;第一節民族主義,第二節共黨革命,第三節種族問題與領土爭執,第四節經
濟因素。第三章國際強權在東南亞的角逐;第一節美國,第二節蘇聯,第三節中共,
第四節日本。探討強權的利益,競爭的模式,以及東南亞各國在強權競爭下的適應。
第四章中立化的構想,問題及定義;說明中立化提出的背景及其實質。第五章各國對
中立化的看法;第一節東協各國的立場,第二節緬甸及共黨印支的態度,第三節強權
的反應。第六章中立化的展望;第一節瑞士,瑞典的先例,第二節區域安全,第三節
經濟合作,第四節權力平衡。尋出各種可能達成的途徑。第七章結論。
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權力抗衡到政治均衡:以近代愛爾蘭經濟與外交策略為例 / From balance of power to political equilibrium: in the case of modern Irish economic and diplomatic strategy陳建豪, Chen, Chien Hao Unknown Date (has links)
本文首先討論權力平衡與政治均衡的差異。以Waltz為代表的新現實主義是力學式、演繹邏輯的國際觀;而Schroeder的政治均衡則是生物學式、整體式、歸納的國際觀。權力平衡與政治均衡構成本文的分析架構。本文採歷史研究法,以愛爾蘭為例,說明愛爾蘭在受到「國家」、「人」、「國際體系」的影響後,放棄抗衡的策略後,均衡的國際觀才為愛爾蘭帶來和平與繁榮。
愛爾蘭自十二世紀起成為英國的殖民地,累積八個世紀的恩怨情仇在二十世紀初爆發。愛爾蘭政治家de Valera採用抗衡式的經濟外交策略,即使愛爾蘭成為歐洲的乞丐也在所不惜。1959年接手主政的Lemass對國家利益則有完全不同的見解。取消閉關自守的經貿政策、大膽與英國簽訂英愛自由貿易協定,促使愛爾蘭在1973年順利加入歐洲共同體,開啟了塞爾特之虎的序幕。
文末則是回到兩岸關係的探討。台灣與愛爾蘭相似點在於,同屬小國且也同樣面對同文同種的強敵威脅。台灣或可以愛爾蘭為鏡,走出成功的小國國際政治。
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冷戰後中美在朝鮮半島的政策比較以權力平衡理論探析 / Sino-US policy on the Korean peninsula after the Cold War balance of power theory exploration林展弘 Unknown Date (has links)
中、美關係一直以來都是國際的焦點問題且持續發展變化。自1972年中、美關係開始正常化以來,兩國的關係經常是在進展與停滯、合作與對抗中來回折衝,中、美之間在許多方面存在著矛盾,又在眾多領域裡有著共同利益。冷戰結束後,美國對中國的政策進行了大幅度的調整,新的矛盾與利益也逐漸凸顯出來。諸如人權問題、貿易不平衡問題和臺灣問題等等,皆是當前中、美鬥爭的焦點,但在安全、經濟貿易與科技文化教育和非傳統安全領域等方面又都有著共同的利益。在這種利益與矛盾交織的狀態下決定了雙邊以合作取代對抗的政策基調,也是中、美間在現今國際趨勢下必須的戰略選擇。
朝鮮半島位處陸權國家的心臟地帶與海權國家的邊緣地帶,對陸權國家而言,是連接海洋建立海權的重要跳板,對海權國家來說,則是向陸地擴張勢力的戰略捷徑,而此區域更是中國、俄羅斯、日本、南韓、北韓等權力競逐的主戰場,再加上美國在此經營布局已久,複雜的國際關係在此合縱連橫,時而欣欣向榮充滿希望,時又戰雲密布一觸即發。自朝鮮半島爆發第一、二次朝核危機後朝鮮半島的局勢更加詭譎多變,而朝核議題便如同一顆未爆彈時刻牽動中、美間最敏感的神經,金正日去世後,更增朝鮮半島的不確定性;在此嚴峻的挑戰下,中、美兩國的態度更是動輒得咎。
本文的主要目的於分析中美兩國自冷戰後迄今對朝鮮半島的政策比較,並針對外交、經貿、戰略佈署等方面作一全面探討,並以權力平衡角度分析在中、美共管亞洲的戰略結構下對南、北韓的影響,期能為未來欲從事相關研究的人提供參考。 / Relationship between the U.S. and China has always been one of the most focused issues internationally and it continues to develop and changes its shape as time goes by. Since 1972 both countries normalize their relationships, the U.S. and China had been going back and forth of deciding whether being collaboration or opposition, fits their benefits in a dynamic field. While the cold war ends, United States had made an adjustment by a wide margin on its policy to China, for instance, the Human Rights, Trade Imbalance, and Taiwan are the causes explain how China and the U.S. are constantly in conflict. However, correlates with Security, Economical trading, Technology, Culture, Education and Non-Traditional Land Security, the U.S. and China are aware of the importance of each other. All of the consequences, contradiction, and benefits led China and the U.S. to work together instead of being in battles which can be described “the strategic choices” 2 giants have made in the current international trend. The Korea peninsula locates in the heart of continental countries and at the edge of sea countries. For continentals, the peninsula can be the elevator of establishing its sea-power; and for the ocean authorities, owning the peninsula is one of the fastest strategic shortcut of expanding its power to the land. For decades, the area had been the battlefield for China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, and adding the glimpse of the U.S, which makes the peninsula one of the most comprehensive international involvements in the world. Since the 1st and the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis occurred, the discussion of nuclear weapons in North Korea tangles the sensitive nerves between the U.S and China. As Kim Chong Il dies and leaving all the questions left to rest of the world, the uncertainty of the peninsula had increased; under rigorous challenges in the international community, the attitudes of China and the U.S. can entirely influence the globe. The essay mainly focuses on the analysis of the comparative policies to the Korean Peninsula in between China and the U.S after the Cold War, as well as the probing into Diplomacy, Trade, Deployment for a entire scan, in order to understand the angel of power of balance to mutually manage Asia’s strategic structures and how it can be effective to North and South Korea. The article hopes can provide critical information for scholars in future to attempt related research on sphere in such matter.
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潛在的超強:中國崛起的地緣戰略與亞太安全研究 / Potential super power: the study on rising China's geostrategy and its impact on Asia-Pacific security王俊評, Wang, Chun Ping Unknown Date (has links)
本論文的問題意識在於,中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣,在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標,並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序,結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率,與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。
中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時,缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。
在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中,古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強,而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼,壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手,組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼,以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序,和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力,追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼,使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外,但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略,使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域,並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區,只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區,以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍,並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。
本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因,只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用,目的是藉此極大化中國的利益,並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協,並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排,促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力,最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權,但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位,以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外,皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為,難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此,中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型,不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型,故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡,反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。
但是,中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力,目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅,更為了繼續實施經濟建設,必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益,在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下,亦不願意真正與中國敵對,導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係,但其他方面互動熱絡,不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態,無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。
關鍵字:中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.”
Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy.
Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”.
China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm.
The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes.
Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States.
China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region.
Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy
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聯盟的本質:解釋後冷戰時期的北約存續 / Essence of alliance: explaining the NATO's endurance in the Post-Cold War era陳麒安, Chen Chi An Unknown Date (has links)
第二次世界大戰結束以後,以美國為首的西方國家為了嚇阻蘇聯的入侵,遂成立了北大西洋公約組織。這也標誌著冷戰時期美蘇兩強對峙的局面。冷戰結束以後,許多學者因而預言北約即將瓦解。但多年以來,北約卻依然存在,更歷經了三次東擴。本文寫作的目的,便欲透過重新檢視國際關係理論三大主要學派的觀點,對於後冷戰時期的北約存續提出解釋。
在現實主義學者陣營中,摩根索與華爾滋的「權力平衡」論點與北約發展的史實不符;施韋勒的「扈從利益」論點僅部分解釋了國家聯盟行為,對於「扈從」概念的界定又出現前後不一;米爾斯海默的「推卸責任」論點試圖同時涵蓋「制衡」與「不制衡」兩種選項,而純粹的「推卸責任」策略又必須依賴其他國家願意承擔,因此不易成功。瓦特的「威脅平衡」理論雖仍有不足之處,但較適合解釋本文的個案。筆者認為,後冷戰時期的北約便是面臨了大規模毀滅性武器擴散、俄羅斯存在與恐怖主義等威脅,才強化了盟國繼續合作的意願。
從新自由主義學者的觀點而言,國家若欲在無政府狀態的國際體系中維持合作關係,便需要以互惠為基礎而運作的國際制度。當國際制度能隨著成員的需求而調整時,就能獲得更多支持。由於美國的優勢國力受到北約的制度規範與集體決策機制削弱,又具有軟權力的勸服力量,遂吸引了中、東歐國家加入聯盟。此外,民主國家之間較不容易發生戰爭。這些因素都維繫了北約盟國在後冷戰時期的合作關係。
由於後冷戰時期的北約在訴求「內群體」偏袒的同時,卻未激化「外群體」歧視。建構主義學者認為,若隨著聯盟關係的發展,成員之間能培養出休戚與共的集體身份,將個別的國家安全問題視同為集體的安全議題時,彼此便超越了傳統軍事聯盟在攻擊與防禦上合作的功能,而達到安全共同體的境界。北約所具備的規範特性也進一步增強了其對盟國的型塑能力。
聯盟的本質在於合作。但關鍵是國家為何合作、如何促進合作,以及如何決定合作對象或競爭對手。事實上,後冷戰時期的北約並未放棄對付共同威脅的核心目標,卻也逐漸發展出安全管理的功能,不但參與了維和行動,也建立起和俄羅斯與烏克蘭的對話機制,更凝聚了盟國的信念而形成具有集體身份的安全共同體。 / In the aftermath of WWII, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mainly led by the U.S., was formed to deter U.S.S.R.’s aggression. This organization signified the bipolar system of international relations. When the Cold War came to an end, many scholars once predicted NATO would collapse. However, the alliance still endures for decades and enlarges eastward three times. The purpose of the dissertation is to reappraise the perspectives from three major schools of International Relation theory and provide some explanation of NATO’s endurance in the post-Cold War era.
In the camp of realists, the balance-of-power theory raised by Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz is inconsistent with the facts of NATO’s development. The bandwagon-for-profit theory proposed by Randall L. Schweller only gives partial explanation of international alliances and takes a contradictory position on the concept of bandwagon. The buck-passing theory maintained by John J. Mearsheimer tries to include both the options of balance and not-balance on the one hand, while depends heavily on other states’ willingness to take the responsibility of balance on the other hand. As far as we know, the latter seldom results in success. Although the balance-of-threat theory sustained by Stephen M. Walt still has some shortcomings, it can provide a better explanation of the case discussed in the dissertation. This author concludes that NATO faces multiple threats of the spread of WMD, the existence of Russia and transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era. That’s why the allies continue to cooperate.
From the standing points of neo-liberalists, if states want to maintain cooperation under the anarchical international system, they will need international institutions based on reciprocity. When international institutions can be adjusted with the demand of their member states, they will obtain more supports. Because the primacy of the U.S. was reduced by the institutional rules and joint decision making process in NATO and accompanied with persuasive soft power, some Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were drew to join the alliance. Moreover, there are few wars among democracies. For all these reasons, NATO still survives until now.
When NATO seeks to develop in-group favoritism in the post-Cold War era, it does not activate out-group discrimination. Constructivists state that if members of alliances can cultivate their collective identities and transform national security problems into collective ones, they can go beyond traditional military alliances and become security communities. Features of norms in NATO also strengthen their capabilities in shaping the alliance.
The essence of alliance is cooperation. Its key points for states lie in why they cooperate, how to facilitate their cooperation and how to choose their partners or opponents. As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO doesn’t give up its core purpose of fighting against common threats, while it develops the function of security management gradually. Besides, NATO takes part in the peace-keeping operations and builds the mechanisms for communication with Russia and Ukraine. In the end, NATO solidates the belief from its member states and turns into a security community of collective identity.
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由現實主義論國際法律規範 / On International Legal Norms: the Viewpoint of Realism譚偉恩, Tan,Wei-en Unknown Date (has links)
現實主義的理論特色在於偏好以權力的角度理解國際政治(特別是國家的行為)並且認為在一個處處充滿衝突的無政府狀態體系中,國家是最主要的分析單元。惟類此觀點不僅是一般研究者對於現實主義的誤認,更是現實主義對自我認知的不完備。雖然現實主義將法律或規範置於權力的概念之下,認為國際法只是國家可有可無的一項工具,但事實上國際法律規範與權力卻經常彼此相互影響。
本論文之目的並非要否定現實主義,而是欲對之進行修正及反省。由國際秩序此項議題作為起點,作者處理了下列幾個問題:首先,在國家所組成的國際社中,現實主義維持秩序的策略及其效果為何?其次,若此方法不具成效或有所疏漏,吾人是否有其它的選項可供作為維持國間家往來關係穩定與和平的方法?藉由探索國家創建國際法律規範的原因以及國際法的法源等諸問題,吾人發現國際法律規範之創立往往並沒有一套如同國內法那般正式且專責的機制,但被國家承認為規範或被接受為法律者的方式(例如:國家間的共識),卻不可反駁地存在於國際社會,在這些形成法律規範的方式中,國家(或其他行為者)可以清楚的認知到規範內容中所要求的義務與責任。
因此,儘管現實主義認為國際法不具重要性,但吾人仍應探就國家為何有時願意遵守法律規範的原因。並且設法釐清在現實主義是項研究典範中不同流派的現實主義理論,對於客觀存在的國際法律規範之評價與認知。基於現實主義並非單一的理論而是為一研究典範,故本文在內容上分別從古典現實主義、結構現實主義(包括守勢與攻勢兩種現實主義)、新古典現實主義,以及較為一般人忽略的英國學派等現實主義理論的派別中去探討國際法律規範在國際政治中的地位及功能。文中指出,長期以來人們對於現實主義的理解受限於權力政治這樣的標籤,從而視現實主義與國際制度或國際法為水火而不相容!但事實上,採用現實主義理解國際關係,不意謂著就必須對國際法持以否定的態度。毋寧,在現實主義與國際法律規範之間,存在的不是一種絕對的互斥關係。非結構理論型的現實主義,如古典現實主義,對於國際法即是採取正面肯定其功能的態度。
當瞭解現實主義的秩序觀及其維持秩序策略(權力平衡)的疏漏所在之後,本文解釋了國際法律規範形成的原因以及不同流派現實主義理論對於它的評價和觀點。接著,作者就國際政治的變遷情形做了觀察和檢驗,國際政治自冷戰結束後有了鉅幅轉變,雖然體系的本質依舊如昔,即由主權國家所組成的無政府狀態體系;但是體系內部已有了不同以往的發展和變革。舉例來說,全球化現象已經從經濟領域擴展到政治和文化等其它層面,並向傳統的國家主權及其權力提出挑戰。其它諸如民族分離運動、環境生態等問題也對冷戰後的國際政治造成衝擊,這些影響主要體現在:行為體之間高度的互賴性、行為體之間差異性的擴大,以及對國際法律規範的迫切需要。上述事實使得傳統現實主義以國家作為主體的國際政治體系正朝向一個近似中世紀主義的新政治體系在形成。在此體系中,國家將喪失其原本在體系中的優勢主導性地位,而國際法律規範的發展也將相應的有所提升及調整。
事實上,並非所有行為者的行為皆忠實反映現實主義關於國際法無用論的主張。學者布爾即就國際法律規範所具有的三項政治性功能來解釋國際政治與法律規範間的關係:一、幫助國家認同與瞭解在他們彼此間所形成的「社會」事實;二、在國家和其他行為者間定訂一套基本的互動規則;三、裨益國際社會的成員達成進一步的共識與承諾。結論指出,國際法律規範是國際政治中一項不可獲缺的部分,為了克服傳統現實主義及以結構理論為核心的現實主義在解釋上的不足,「國際社會」的概念必須被深入瞭解和應用在現實主義的理論建構中。同時,吾人應投入心力展開對全球性議題的研究,例如:人權與環保,因為在這些領域中,一項現實主義最為核心的思考—國家主權的獨立與完整,將會遭遇到越來越多的挑戰並使國家藉口主權作為脫逸國際法律規範的可能性大為減低。 / The characteristic feature of Realism is its use of the power concept to explain the course of international politics (especially the behavior of state). The primary unit of analysis is the State which is regarded as operating in an anarchical system dominated by conflict. However, both notions above are misunderstood not only by general students, but the partial of Realism itself as well. Although Realism aligns norms or law with power in so far as international law is considered a tool at the disposal of the most powerful. Yet international legal norms and power also frequently do interact actually.
This thesis doesn’t mean to deny the value of Realism, instead, tries to modify and introspect its viewpoints. Starting at the issue of international order, there are several tasks having been done: what is the strategy for Realism to keep order in the society of states and how does it work? Then, if the way for keeping order in Realism wasn’t constructive or in vain, do we have other choices to retain the relationship among the states stable and peaceful? By way of finding out why the states created international law and what the sources of international law are, we can think that the making process of international legal norms and norms itself don’t possess one formal mechanism responsible for law creation like the domestic law, but there are recognized and accepted methods by which legal norms or rules came into existence, for example, the consent of states. In those methods the precise content of legal norms can be identified by states (or other actors).
Despite, therefore, the realist perspective deems international law to have no significance in its own right but we still have to seek to ascertain why do the States obey international law sometimes, if not always, but at least. And make it clear to know what the appraisal and perception in different schools under the Realism Paradigm. As we have known the Realism is not a single theory but a research paradigm, the author investigated respectively the different schools of Realism; they are Classical Realism, Structural Realism (including Offensive and Defensive Realism), Neoclassical Realism and Realism in English School. As the content points out, people whose stereotype of Realism has been limited to power politics are used to thinking that international institutions (and regimes) or international law is incompatible with the Realism, usually. However, it’s not absolute for us to consider that Realism turns down international law necessarily. For one instance, Realism without using structural concept, like Classical Realism, takes the positive attitude toward the role and the functions of international legal norms.
After realizing the Realism’s conception of order and what the flaw of its strategy (Balance of Power) to maintain order is, this thesis then mentioned about the reasons why international law is created, and how different school under the Realism Paradigm evaluates international law. Following up, the author inspected the change in international politics. In the post Cold War era, though the nature of international system is still like what it used to be, a Anarchical system, the different and new phenomena do really happen. Globalization, for instance, is one momentous challenge to the sovereignty of States and their political power. The rest like separatist movements, environmental problems are also influential to international politics. The central issues of those influences are the interdependence among actors, the dissimilarities among actors and the yearning for international legal norms. Under the perceptions like this, the traditional state-centric international system of Realism has been being toward a Neo-Medieval system. In that system, state actors will lose their predominant and leading stand. On the other hand, the development of international legal norms will adjust itself to the new world and become more important.
In fact, the behavior of international actors does not seem to bear out the realist assumption of the impotence of international law. Bull, for example, explains the international law-international politics relationship in terms of three political functions fulfilled by international law: to identify the idea of a society of sovereign States, to state the interactive basic rules of coexistence among States and international actors, and to help mobilize compliance with the rules of international society. As the conclusion in this thesis pointed out, international legal norms is one part of international politics. In order to overcome the inadequacies of the traditional and structural realist interpretation, the concept of ‘International Society’ must be dealt and applied explicitly and deeply in constructing theory of Realism. Meanwhile, people should spend more time researching the global issues, such as human rights and environmental protection, because in these sectors, the most core of realist thinking, independence and integrity of sovereignty, will get into plight and encounter more and more challenges, and the possibility for the States to get rid of international legal norms in the name of sovereignty becomes less and less.
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