2013年11月，時任烏克蘭總統的亞努科維奇，在拒絕簽署歐盟聯繫國協定後，引發一連串國內及國外的危機，導致了領導人被罷黜、國家領土被俄羅斯佔領、外國勢力的影響浮上檯面等後果，造就了冷戰過後最大的東歐戰略板塊變化。 烏克蘭位居東歐亞交匯之處，對區域安全影響頗鉅。為研究烏克蘭危機的影響與未來可能的局勢變化，本文首先簡述事件過程，並以時間軸鋪陳，分析其歷史及地緣關係如何造成烏克蘭人民國家認同差異與影響領導人的外交政策；在地緣政治方面，以美國、歐盟及俄羅斯等三大重要外國勢力為主要面向，研究如何在政治、經濟及軍事方面干擾烏克蘭的走向。進而探討烏克蘭當局之戰略文化形成之肇因、外國勢力角力對其國內政治的衝擊與其未來對外關係的可能的戰略選項。 / In November 2013, when the President of Ukraine, Yanukovych, refused to sign the EU-Ukraine association Agreement, triggered a series of domestic and foreign crises, such as: the president was removed from his power, and the territories was occupied by the Russian, as well as the foreign influence had become an important issue and no longer been ignored and so on. This has been the biggest changes on strategic situation in Eastern European since the Cold War ended. Ukraine is located in the intersection of Eastern Europe and Asia; the impact of regional security is huge. In order to study the influence of the crisis in Ukraine and the possible changes of the situation in the future, at fist this paper summarizes the event process, then according to timeline, analyzing how the historical and geopolitical issues will influence the people in the Ukrainian as well as the leaders’ foreign policies. From the geopolitical perspective, the United States, European Union and Russia are the major foreign forces as the main target, this paper will focus on how the political, economic and military issues interference the direction of the Ukraine's developments. And then exploring the possible strategic options for the formation of the strategic culture of the Ukrainian authority, the impact of foreign forces on its domestic politics and the future strategic choice on the external relations. Keywords: Ukrainian crisis, strategic culture, regional security.

「戰略文化」是戰略研究的文化途徑，主要是認為一國的歷史、文化、意識形態等內在生成的條件會影響該國決策精英的思想、觀念、認知，從而影響、導致該國在一段較長時期內具有基本一致的戰略偏好，進而做出與他們觀念認知相符合的戰略行為，此可為理解中國對外戰略認知與行為，提供一個文化觀點的研究途徑或理論解釋。 本論文借用美國學者江憶恩（Alastair Iain Johnston）對「戰略文化」的分析，實際考究兩漢與隋唐對外來威脅的認知、用武的態度、和戰的立場與偏好，發現古代中國王朝具有對外壓制的戰略偏好，與江憶恩認為中國是強勢現實主義（parabellum）戰略文化的觀點一致；但本論文認為，造成這樣的結果，主要是受到為儒家提倡與擁護的「天下觀」理念之影響所致。 「天下觀」理念是中國周朝思想家們對於爭奪及治理天下領土、政權及民心的思想或觀點，他們以推動及維護「中原王朝主導的天下秩序（中原天子為天下唯一主宰，外邦族皆應臣服）」為核心價值，並透過型塑「禮治等級制度」推動「以夏變夷」，外部勢力若悖於該一文化結構，就視同破壞天下秩序，視同是對中原政權的安全威脅，武力在此情況下就被賦予了「誅暴平亂」的道德化與除罪化的工具意義而被允許使用。在「天下觀」理念影響下的中原君臣，會認為最大的不安全感來自於一個不臣服且實力又大的外部政權，因此對外以壓制、凌駕、征服來袪除他們的不安全感，此即構成封建中國對外用兵、崛起稱霸的戰略文化邏輯。 / The main purpose of this paper is to pursuit the reason of the ancient China’s rising and its triggering a war toward foreign threat. By analyzing the perception of the use of force of the Han, Sui,Tang Dynasties when dealing with the external threat, this paper, using the approach of the strategic culture analysis by the American scholar Alastair Iain Johnston , has found that the strategic culture of ancient China had a coercive preference toward the external threat, which is consistent with the conclusion of Johnston that the strategic culture of China is parabellum(realpolitik). This paper indicates that such preference was affected by the “Tianxia discourse”(a thought toward the world) of the ancient Chinese. “Tianxia discourse” mainly acclaimed by the Confucianism is a paradigm of how the Chinese emperor dominates “the world”. In” Tianxia discourse”, the ideal subject of the national strategy should establish or maintain the unipolar structure of “Li(禮) hierarchy system ”.In other words, the world order must under control by the Chinese emperor, any regimes that try to rebel this structure is regarded as a threat to the Empire. In order to maintain this order, the use of force is allowed and necessary. Through “Tianxia discourse”, we can well understand the strategy and behavior of the empire, knowing the logic of the use of force when it faces an external threat and discovering the reason of the ancient china’s expansion.

十八世紀英國的海上霸權幾乎統治全球四分之三個地區的殖民國家，第二次世界大戰希特勒意圖統治歐洲的陸權思想，日本侵略中國大陸的行為與建設大東亞共榮圈的資源掠奪，主要原因是政治領袖受到地緣政治理論的影響，導致發動殘酷的戰爭。隨著航空時代的來臨「制空權」而不是制海權將成為一個國家力量的主要體現。葛雷在1991年波灣戰後曾說：「世界已見證了一場『非常戰爭』（hyper-war）的新型式作戰，空中武力已躍居於支配地位。」 「戰略」乃兵力的威脅或實際運用以獲致戰爭的政治目的。軍事武力與戰爭息息相關，最終的目的是達成政治目標。即便是海島型國家對戰略的本質也難以跳脫這個範疇。李德哈達認為戰略問題乃是手段與目標的問題，戰略效益的觀念提供了一個共同的標準，用以衡量在各種不同的地理環境中作戰的軍種對國家安全所能作出的貢獻。而「戰略思維」是決策者從戰略層面考量客觀事務的思維形式，是思維主體依據戰略諸要素而形成的戰略思想、戰略方針和戰略決策而進行的觀念動態；它強調軍事領域的運用。由於空軍戰略作戰與用兵指導並無「後發制人」的意涵，空軍建軍構想與戰略指導主張「攻防兼備」，與現階段「守勢戰略」構想脫節。戰略思維理念脫離不了地緣因素，台灣應該朝向海島地形國家的地緣特性方向思考，以選擇最佳的戰略與武力發展方向。戰略思維理論分析大致脫離不了決策者對戰爭的認知與預防？是否會造成衝突（衝突發生如何因應）？ 危機將會產生（當衝突無法解決時）！戰爭可能發生（危機無法解決時）！最後決策者下達決策指導（軍事戰略指導）等系列式理論連貫均直接考驗決策者的決心下達。論述「決定性武器」意味該武器的運用對某些戰役或戰爭具有決定性作用，空中武力決定了1991年波灣戰爭及1999年科索沃戰爭的結果乃是不變的史證，但並非意味如果沒有空中武力其結果將令人存疑！根據以上觀點，某一特定「關鍵戰力」在戰略上較為適合用以處理某一衝突，各種事件發生均可能有一種特定力量（最可能為軍事力量）最適宜作為處理該事件的工具。因此，決策者對於海島型國家戰略思維的導向，必須認清聯合作戰概念為先，軍種的戰略效應值得重視，各軍種在某一戰爭中所具有的獨特角色與效能，如此才能獲得中華民國空軍戰略在未來台海戰爭或衝突中戰略發展的定位與目標。 杭亭頓認為防衛式嚇阻（deterrence by defense）的構想具有報復的效能，防衛性嚇阻關鍵在強調報復能力與決心，戰略必須付諸行動（執行），構想才能實現，否則只是空想。現階段「有效嚇阻」與「防衛固守」構想中，嚇阻是預防戰爭發生或維持現狀的理論，防衛是在嚇阻無效後所發生的行為選擇。因此理論上戰略選擇應該以「有效嚇阻」先於「防衛固守」，換句話說國防投資與兵力結構發展應以「嚇阻」為主，「防衛」為輔的戰略指導方針，才能結合構想。發展中、長程巡弋飛彈或彈道飛彈，並建立一支隱匿性高與打擊力強的部隊等作法，增加防衛及打擊縱深，可提高「嚇阻」可信度。在台灣戰略能力不足情況下，採取「防衛」為核心，擴張「嚇阻」效果（攻防兼備）的戰略思維，較能因應台海情勢發展，符合國家安全需求。戰爭發生前選擇建構防衛性嚇阻武力為先，戰爭發生時其決勝關鍵重點在於「聯合制空、聯合制海」，防衛固守以聯合地面作戰為指導，以符合國防報告書所提「重點式發展」的建軍精神。 SWOT分析理論分析程序可從戰略環境評估（包括地緣環境因素） 經敵我能力研析 形成建軍構想及軍事戰略構想 提出戰略指導 完成軍事戰略計量化 最後產出合理戰略資源需求。運用戰略評估模式的主要目的是針對海島型國家台灣，從整體戰略環境及可能的威脅作為評估起點，考量國家科技與資源能力，以及友邦支持可能性等內、外因素，透過風險評估，規劃出合理兵力結構（包括武器裝備獲得，備選、計畫、及可用兵力，資源分配）。 波灣戰空中攻擊所展現出的作戰模式，足以顯示海、空聯合攻擊的戰略行動將成為未來戰爭中的主流，空中攻擊的戰略效果較以往更為驚人，空軍戰略的發展導向聯合作戰型態，地面作戰時間大幅縮短。空中武力在「沙漠風暴」中所代表的是戰略效應，空中武力乃是美國空軍當前的思想主流，認為所有的空中設施均應整合為具有某整戰略涵義的一種軍事工具，手段與結果的關聯性應作為空中武力發展與運用的計畫作業指導。從1997年至2001年空軍軍事投資維持在約10%的配比觀察，空軍依據「宜攻不宜守」的戰略運用原則，確無法實現兵力整建目標，使空軍出現建構防衛性嚇阻戰力的困難窘境。軍事戰略計畫制定的「守勢防衛」構想，是積極的防禦作為，具備「攻守兼備」的戰略意函。對於海島型國家地理特性而言，空軍建立「攻守兼備」的兵力結構（包括建軍構想、兵力整建及備戰計畫）具有先天的合理性條件。 迄2001年時台灣三軍總兵力佔全國總人口比例為1.65%，高於海島型國家的美國（0.85%）、英國（0.54%）、及日本（0.2%），顯示台灣兵員總額比例偏高。如果從空軍佔兵力總數比例言，美國佔27.3%，英國為29.87%，日本是18.47%（2002年日本為18.6%），而台灣空軍卻僅佔總兵力14.53%為最低。英國三軍總員額比例依序約為3：1：1.5，日本為3.5：1：1，台灣2001年三軍兵力計38萬人，陸海空三軍總員額比例約為：4：1：1，空軍員額比例明顯過低。1991年至2001年十年間國防預算三區分比較發現，軍事投資比例降幅50%，作業維持費方面保持約20%穩定比例，人員維持費所佔比例逐年增加，十年間增加約16%的成長率，均已超過先進國家所佔比例，顯示國軍在兵力結構、國防預算支用配比方向有檢討的必要。根據世界先進國家國防支出結構分析，其中軍事投資經費佔40-50%，作業維持費佔20-30%，人員維持費佔20%左右。 塑造、回應、與準備乃是一個國家針對某種作戰場景，因應未來戰場需求，從預防到作戰過程階段所必須面臨的戰略抉擇。「戰略環境」除地理環境受空間限制不易改變，其他因素隨內、外在環境與時間產生相對性之變化。地緣政治因素對決策者的戰略思維導向具有絕對的影響力，決策者可運用地緣政治的外在影響力改變台海的戰略環境。「決戰境外」應該探討國軍擁有那些高科技能力、武器裝備質量的優勢、高素質的兵力、三軍聯合作戰能力、足夠的國防預算與組織結構等優勢條件，始能發揮「精準縱深打擊、提升早期與警、爭取資訊優勢」，以及支持「決戰境外」的構想？台灣面臨政治上無法主動採取攻勢作戰的限制，對於建構反制防衛性嚇阻武力方面，以具備早期偵蒐、遠距、精準、縱深、匿蹤型嚇阻武器為發展目標，如巡弋飛彈、彈道飛彈、反輻射飛彈、彈道飛彈防衛系統、發展電磁脈衝彈及反制核爆電磁脈衝非軍事武力、發展防衛性定向能制空武器等，以具備改變敵我優劣戰略態勢之能力而整備。 有關空軍戰略發展新思維方面筆者認為應從改變戰略態勢、改變戰略環境、調整軍事戰略構想、建立正確的「攻擊與防禦」概念、建構海、空軍嚇阻力量、傳統防衛性嚇阻武力建構、空軍兵力規劃構想與空軍數量化規劃模式等方向著手，如此才能推論出合理的空軍戰略發展導向，以支持軍事戰略並結合國家安全目標。以上相關戰略新思維的觀點可提供決策者對於如何發展空軍戰略？以煥然一新的面貌呈現。 筆者認為美國無意派遣兵力直接介入台海衝突，僅止於採取間接性的防止衝突擴大，保持台海海空航行自由，或提供軍事武器協助台灣，布希對介入台海戰爭的走向傾向於『選擇性軍事介入海外衝突』的可能性較大。國際間介入台海軍事衝突的態度原則採取自衛是手段，不過仍將受到美國若干程度的影響。

本論文旨在探討俄羅斯外交政策之動機與推動因素，文中以新古典現實主義做為研究架構，並結合了體系層次因素（自變項）及個體層次的中介變項（如：領導人形象和戰略文化）。本論文所探討之時間軸橫跨1991至2014年，重點著重於以下兩研究案例：2008年南奧塞提亞戰爭及2014年克里米亞危機。針對此兩研究案例，作者使用「過程追蹤」和「歷史敘事」的研究方法，以驗證體系與個體層次因素對於俄羅斯外交政策的影響。 分析結果印證了新古典現實主義的主要假設：俄羅斯在相對物質權力提升的情況下，會同樣地擴大外交政策行動上的野心與版圖。雖然由第一個研究案例可得知，所謂的體系修正因素（如：地理位置、限制/允許因素、和體系明確性）對於俄羅斯介入喬治亞的決策有著重要的影響。而第二個假設提到，「總統普丁選擇設計、校正、調整策略上的選擇，反映文化上可接受的偏好，以維持國內的政治支持度」這個說法也已經被印證。本研究分析顯示，體系因素和個體層次中介變項對於2008年介入喬治亞及2014年併吞克里米亞的決策皆有影響。整體而言，當分析一個國家的外交政策時，新古典現實主義確實是個強而有力的架構，但作者也深知仍有進一步研究的必要。 / This thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the motives and drivers of Russian foreign policy. It uses neoclassical realism as an enhanced research framework which combines systemic stimuli (independent variable) and unit-level intervening variables such as leader images and strategic culture. The work investigates the period from 1991 to 2014 with focus on two case studies, namely the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. This two case studies use process-tracing method and historiography to test the effect of systemic and unit level factors on the Russian foreign policy. The analysis has confirmed the main neoclassical realist expectation that an increase in the relative material power of the Russian Federation will lead to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of Russian foreign policy activity. Although, especially the first case study showed, that the so called systemic modifiers, such as geography, restrictiveness/permissiveness and systemic clarity had significant effect on the decision to intervene in Georgia. The second hypothesis stating that, “President Putin chooses to frame, adjust, and modify strategic choices to reflect culturally acceptable preferences to maintain domestic political support” was also confirmed. The analysis has shown that both systemic stimuli and unit level intervening variables influenced the final decision to intervene in Georgia in 2008, and to annex Crimea in 2014. Overall, neoclassical realism proved to be enhanced and a useful framework for analyzing foreign policy of a state. But the author is fully aware that a further research is needed.

欲瞭解一個國家的行為，就必須要瞭解這個國家的整體行為，而這整體的行為所表現者，即是「文化」。從戰略文化的研究途徑做一切入點，正可深入瞭解一個國家戰爭的行為，甚而可以預測未來戰爭的發生。而維繫國防安全的軍人自當對中共戰略與戰爭模式，應有相當的了解與認知；也希望藉著對戰略文化的瞭解，探照中共對外戰爭實例，探尋中共對外戰爭的模式，進而提供國防戰略因應對策，才不愧於自己的職責所在。 就中華民國的生存發展而言，海峽對岸的中共無疑是我生存發展的最大威脅，而兩岸在軍事武力的不對稱下，中共時時以「不放棄武力」，極盡挑釁之威脅，而台灣除了默默軍事備戰外，在政治，外交生存上，也只能低調回應，這也可看出中共武力對台已具有足夠的軍事力量解決統一台灣問題。目前兩岸之間最大的障礙是由領土主權爭議所衍生的問題，而領土主權問題又很容易引起戰爭，在這種壓力下，台灣將如何去面對，這是一門重要的課題。國內學術界對於兩岸關係的研究，多偏向政策方面而較少理論方面的探討，其實，藉由理論層面的研究而詮釋海峽兩岸互動過程與未來發展，有助於強化政策建議的內涵與深度，觀諸台海兩岸未來的安全發展，若能以戰略文化研究途徑，作為觀察的理論基礎，對於台海武力衝突的可能性，及中共對於使用武力的政治目的、手段與效用或許能提供新的詮釋與政策建議，由於潛在的戰略文化，會使決策者的戰略偏好及使用兵力解決爭議的傾向產生影響，因此，武力在未來台海安全的發展中，仍會是一個關鍵的重要角色，所以透過對中共戰略文化內涵的分析與掌握的研究途徑，進而對其軍事戰略與對外戰爭模式加以研究，期能深入瞭解中共在何種情況下，會不惜一切的以戰爭來解決問題，進而思考台海雙方在既有戰略思維下審慎避免誤判或誤認，讓動武甚至檫槍走火的意外情勢均不會發生；以提供吾人從事國家安全政策及國防戰略規劃相關人員參考研究與運用。 / In order to understand the behavior of a country, it is necessary to learn its behavior in a macro scale, and the representation of such behaviors is known as the “Culture”. From the strategic culture perspective, it provides an in-depth understanding of a country’s use of military forces, as well as the prediction of future wars. Especially for the military personnel who are the key to the national security, they shall have the understanding and knowledge to the People’s Republic of China’s initiation on wars; through the study of strategic culture, examples of PRC’s use of military power, research of PRC’s initiation on wars, I shall fulfill my duty by providing recommendation towards the national security strategies in order to protect the country. To the Republic of China, the PRC from the cross strait is the biggest threat to our country’s survival and development, under the unbalance of military power, PRC constantly provokes and threatens by stating “not giving up the use of force”. In contrast, Taiwan is much more low-profile in the military preparation, politics, and diplomacy. This is a strong indicator that the PRC’s military force has the capability and could to use its power to unify Taiwan. Currently the biggest obstacle between the two sides is the territorial dispute from sovereignty, and it is a subject that can easily trigger wars. It is an important subject for Taiwan to deal with under pressure. Many of the existing academic researches focus on the policy aspect and less on the theoretical perspective. In fact, through the theoretical interpretation of cross-strait interaction and future development can strengthen the content and depth of policy recommendations, and the future safety development. Through the use of strategic culture as the research methodology, it will identify the probability of cross-strait conflict, the PRC’s political execution of military power, tactics, and effectiveness. This strategic cultural perspective may provide new definition and policy recommendation, as it studies the decision maker’s strategic preferences and their tactics. Therefore, the military power plays a significant role in the development of the cross-strait safety, and by analyzing the PRC’s strategic culture and research of its military strategy and war mode, will provide in-depth understanding of the circumstances under which the PRC will stop at nothing to solve the problem with war, and to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation through the strategic culture from both sides. This will further prevent wars from occurred by accidents: hence, this national security policy and defense strategic referencing may provide values to be researched and utilized by the associated members.

本論文的問題意識在於，中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣，在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標，並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序，結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率，與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。 中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時，缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。 在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中，古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強，而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼，壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手，組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼，以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序，和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力，追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼，使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外，但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略，使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域，並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區，只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區，以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍，並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。 本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因，只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用，目的是藉此極大化中國的利益，並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協，並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排，促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力，最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權，但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位，以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外，皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為，難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此，中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型，不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型，故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡，反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。 但是，中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力，目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅，更為了繼續實施經濟建設，必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益，在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下，亦不願意真正與中國敵對，導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係，但其他方面互動熱絡，不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態，無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。 關鍵字：中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.” Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy. Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”. China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm. The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes. Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States. China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region. Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy