本論文探討芬蘭中立政策。首先說明中立意涵以界定芬蘭中立政策的特質。芬蘭中立政策一直是安定與經濟並重，一面與蘇聯/俄羅斯維持良好關係，一面爭取進入西方市場，確保經濟利益。因此，芬蘭所採取的政策為平衡策略。二次大戰後以中立政策為優先，實為考慮到國家利益與國家生存。後冷戰時期，蘇聯瓦解，限制芬蘭與西歐整合的因素不再，芬蘭因經濟需要，選擇加入歐洲聯盟。成為歐盟會員後，芬蘭必須重新調整中立政策，以因應歐盟的共同外交暨安全政策。共同外交暨安全政策要求歐盟會員國必須接受歐盟制定的共同外交政策，甚而共同防衛。這是測試芬蘭等中立國對歐盟承諾的最大極限。芬蘭的外交政策因而逐漸不談中立，但仍維持中立的核心-軍事不結盟與可信的防衛。芬蘭採行不結盟政策，避免參與集體防衛的行動，嚴格區分防衛與危機處理任務，不參與軍事層面的活動。芬蘭利用北約組織架構進行國際合作，參與非軍事行動，增加本身危機處理能力。此外，在西歐聯盟的機制下，也提倡危機處理與維持和平任務，謹慎選擇參與的行動。本論文的結論為芬蘭的中立政策保有其彈性與靈活性，以符合東西集團的要求，隨著國際情勢的轉變與國內的要求，調整中立政策。冷戰時期芬蘭在安全需要與經濟需要間取得平衡；後冷戰時期，因國內經濟考量加入歐盟，不再採取中立政策，外交政策調整為不結盟政策，不參與軍事聯盟，因此沒有加入西歐聯盟與北約組織。但並不意謂芬蘭將來不會放棄不結盟政策，仍舊保有政策的彈性，若情勢變遷，芬蘭可能會選擇加入軍事聯盟，捍衛本身的安全需求。

90年代起，德國再統一後躍上全球政治舞臺，從過去歐洲安全的顧慮之國，轉型成為今日歐洲政治、經濟與軍事穩定力量。但是在後冷戰時期，過去許多次級威脅因子失去了壓抑力量後，成為後冷戰時期新形態的安全議題，威脅全球政治與經濟的穩定與安全。面對這些紛踵沓至的威脅，德國一方面必須鞏固與維護自身冷戰期間所累積的經貿成就，另一方面則積極配合聯合國、北大西洋公約組織與歐洲聯盟的決策，派遣聯邦國防軍遠赴海外，從事維和、軍事、人道與救援等國際性任務，追求自身外交正常化的目標。 本文研究發現，1991年至2009年為止，聯邦國防軍在過去19年來的71項海外維和、軍事、人道與救援等國際性任務，都嚴格限定在聯合國、北約與歐盟憲章的框架下，恪遵既有的國際秩序與國內憲法規範，實踐身為聯合國、北約與歐盟成員國的義務，成為上述三大國際組織最倚賴的軍事力量。 雖然歷年來德國政府已透過具體的立法與釋憲過程，排除《基本法》限制德國海外派兵政策的規範，但是行政部門的決策過程中仍須面臨國內外輿論對於德國海外派兵政策的反對與疑慮；加上德國政府每年投入國防建軍的經費有限，聯邦國防軍的軟硬體設備未必能夠負擔高頻率與海外派兵任務，眾多因素都使聯邦國防軍多年來的派兵成效有限。 德國再統一後雖於積極參與三大國際組織框架行動，配合自身的外交折衝談判與軍事影響力，欲積極重塑其國家的地位。面對諸多主客觀的限制與未臻成熟的條件，德國重返正常化國家的過程仍將艱辛無比。 / Since the re-unification in 90’s, Germany has leaped upon the stage of the global politics. With much effort, Germany has successfully rendered itself from “a nation of grave concern to European security” into “a stable political, economic and military power in modern Europe.” However, during the post-Cold War era, those probable and minor threats, which were suppressed by the huge atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, will appear to became the new forms of security issues in the 21st century, and further to jeopardize the global political and economic security and stability. Dealing with these countless and non-stopping new forms of threat, Germany, on the one hand, must secure its existent accomplishment in trade and the miracle of economic development, and also, on the other hand, actively accommodate the decisions and charters of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union, to pursue Germany’s “normalized diplomacy ”by deploying its Federal Defense Army, Bundeswehr, into the overseas hostile spots, to implement the peacekeeping, military, humanitarian and rescue operations. From 1991 to 2009, Bundeswehr has participated in 71 international peacekeeping, military, humanitarian and rescue operations, which were all implemented strictly under the framework and the charters of the UN, NATO and EU. Over the past 19 years, Germany has obediently complied with the existent regulations of the international laws and the German constitution, Grundgestez, and fulfilled the compulsory obligations as the member of the 3 institutions stated above. For this matter of fact, Bundeswehr has become the reliable military force in these institutions. This thesis has drawn the humble conclusions that although the German executive branches has overruled the legal obstacles and set new paths of deploying Bundeswehr overseas by the legislative move and the explication of the Grundgestez, the executive branches will always tackle the domestic criticism and the international skepticism; meanwhile, the executive branches have never allocated even more sufficient annual budget for the military branches to maintain its readiness-rate, therefore the training of personnel, software, equipment and facilities may not genuinely satisfy the needs for actual battles and afford the frequent and distant operations. The combination of these problem has compromised the actual consequence and the efficiency of Germany’s overseas military deployments in the past two decades. Having endeavored so hard to comply with the operations under the framework of the three major institutions, accompanying its maneuvering of diplomacy and military significance, Germany will still have to give much toil and labor to re-shape its international status. Nevertheless, being obstructed by the immature subjective and objective conditions, Germany’ road returning to its Normalcy of the state will still be long and difficult.

第二次世界大戰結束以後，以美國為首的西方國家為了嚇阻蘇聯的入侵，遂成立了北大西洋公約組織。這也標誌著冷戰時期美蘇兩強對峙的局面。冷戰結束以後，許多學者因而預言北約即將瓦解。但多年以來，北約卻依然存在，更歷經了三次東擴。本文寫作的目的，便欲透過重新檢視國際關係理論三大主要學派的觀點，對於後冷戰時期的北約存續提出解釋。 在現實主義學者陣營中，摩根索與華爾滋的「權力平衡」論點與北約發展的史實不符；施韋勒的「扈從利益」論點僅部分解釋了國家聯盟行為，對於「扈從」概念的界定又出現前後不一；米爾斯海默的「推卸責任」論點試圖同時涵蓋「制衡」與「不制衡」兩種選項，而純粹的「推卸責任」策略又必須依賴其他國家願意承擔，因此不易成功。瓦特的「威脅平衡」理論雖仍有不足之處，但較適合解釋本文的個案。筆者認為，後冷戰時期的北約便是面臨了大規模毀滅性武器擴散、俄羅斯存在與恐怖主義等威脅，才強化了盟國繼續合作的意願。 從新自由主義學者的觀點而言，國家若欲在無政府狀態的國際體系中維持合作關係，便需要以互惠為基礎而運作的國際制度。當國際制度能隨著成員的需求而調整時，就能獲得更多支持。由於美國的優勢國力受到北約的制度規範與集體決策機制削弱，又具有軟權力的勸服力量，遂吸引了中、東歐國家加入聯盟。此外，民主國家之間較不容易發生戰爭。這些因素都維繫了北約盟國在後冷戰時期的合作關係。 由於後冷戰時期的北約在訴求「內群體」偏袒的同時，卻未激化「外群體」歧視。建構主義學者認為，若隨著聯盟關係的發展，成員之間能培養出休戚與共的集體身份，將個別的國家安全問題視同為集體的安全議題時，彼此便超越了傳統軍事聯盟在攻擊與防禦上合作的功能，而達到安全共同體的境界。北約所具備的規範特性也進一步增強了其對盟國的型塑能力。 聯盟的本質在於合作。但關鍵是國家為何合作、如何促進合作，以及如何決定合作對象或競爭對手。事實上，後冷戰時期的北約並未放棄對付共同威脅的核心目標，卻也逐漸發展出安全管理的功能，不但參與了維和行動，也建立起和俄羅斯與烏克蘭的對話機制，更凝聚了盟國的信念而形成具有集體身份的安全共同體。 / In the aftermath of WWII, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mainly led by the U.S., was formed to deter U.S.S.R.’s aggression. This organization signified the bipolar system of international relations. When the Cold War came to an end, many scholars once predicted NATO would collapse. However, the alliance still endures for decades and enlarges eastward three times. The purpose of the dissertation is to reappraise the perspectives from three major schools of International Relation theory and provide some explanation of NATO’s endurance in the post-Cold War era. In the camp of realists, the balance-of-power theory raised by Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz is inconsistent with the facts of NATO’s development. The bandwagon-for-profit theory proposed by Randall L. Schweller only gives partial explanation of international alliances and takes a contradictory position on the concept of bandwagon. The buck-passing theory maintained by John J. Mearsheimer tries to include both the options of balance and not-balance on the one hand, while depends heavily on other states’ willingness to take the responsibility of balance on the other hand. As far as we know, the latter seldom results in success. Although the balance-of-threat theory sustained by Stephen M. Walt still has some shortcomings, it can provide a better explanation of the case discussed in the dissertation. This author concludes that NATO faces multiple threats of the spread of WMD, the existence of Russia and transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era. That’s why the allies continue to cooperate. From the standing points of neo-liberalists, if states want to maintain cooperation under the anarchical international system, they will need international institutions based on reciprocity. When international institutions can be adjusted with the demand of their member states, they will obtain more supports. Because the primacy of the U.S. was reduced by the institutional rules and joint decision making process in NATO and accompanied with persuasive soft power, some Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were drew to join the alliance. Moreover, there are few wars among democracies. For all these reasons, NATO still survives until now. When NATO seeks to develop in-group favoritism in the post-Cold War era, it does not activate out-group discrimination. Constructivists state that if members of alliances can cultivate their collective identities and transform national security problems into collective ones, they can go beyond traditional military alliances and become security communities. Features of norms in NATO also strengthen their capabilities in shaping the alliance. The essence of alliance is cooperation. Its key points for states lie in why they cooperate, how to facilitate their cooperation and how to choose their partners or opponents. As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO doesn’t give up its core purpose of fighting against common threats, while it develops the function of security management gradually. Besides, NATO takes part in the peace-keeping operations and builds the mechanisms for communication with Russia and Ukraine. In the end, NATO solidates the belief from its member states and turns into a security community of collective identity.