本論文探討芬蘭中立政策。首先說明中立意涵以界定芬蘭中立政策的特質。芬蘭中立政策一直是安定與經濟並重，一面與蘇聯/俄羅斯維持良好關係，一面爭取進入西方市場，確保經濟利益。因此，芬蘭所採取的政策為平衡策略。二次大戰後以中立政策為優先，實為考慮到國家利益與國家生存。後冷戰時期，蘇聯瓦解，限制芬蘭與西歐整合的因素不再，芬蘭因經濟需要，選擇加入歐洲聯盟。成為歐盟會員後，芬蘭必須重新調整中立政策，以因應歐盟的共同外交暨安全政策。共同外交暨安全政策要求歐盟會員國必須接受歐盟制定的共同外交政策，甚而共同防衛。這是測試芬蘭等中立國對歐盟承諾的最大極限。芬蘭的外交政策因而逐漸不談中立，但仍維持中立的核心-軍事不結盟與可信的防衛。芬蘭採行不結盟政策，避免參與集體防衛的行動，嚴格區分防衛與危機處理任務，不參與軍事層面的活動。芬蘭利用北約組織架構進行國際合作，參與非軍事行動，增加本身危機處理能力。此外，在西歐聯盟的機制下，也提倡危機處理與維持和平任務，謹慎選擇參與的行動。本論文的結論為芬蘭的中立政策保有其彈性與靈活性，以符合東西集團的要求，隨著國際情勢的轉變與國內的要求，調整中立政策。冷戰時期芬蘭在安全需要與經濟需要間取得平衡；後冷戰時期，因國內經濟考量加入歐盟，不再採取中立政策，外交政策調整為不結盟政策，不參與軍事聯盟，因此沒有加入西歐聯盟與北約組織。但並不意謂芬蘭將來不會放棄不結盟政策，仍舊保有政策的彈性，若情勢變遷，芬蘭可能會選擇加入軍事聯盟，捍衛本身的安全需求。

在全球化時代下，勞動力的跨國流動成為一個顯著現象。 2005年起，芬蘭食品加工公司開始引進外籍野莓採集工，其中以泰國東北方的農民占最多數。他們持3個月的旅遊簽證，並引用芬蘭 everyman’s right 這個傳統權利在芬蘭的森林裡採集野莓。 這些泰國野莓採集工被視為自僱自營者/企業家而非受雇者，因此他們必需支付其到芬蘭的所有開銷，這些開銷基本上遠超過一個農民家庭的一年所得。農民先行支付了這些高額開銷並不意味著其享有任何收入保證，相反的，其收入完全取決於他們採收了多少野莓。如果他們碰到了乾旱的夏季或野莓作物收成物不佳，此意味者他們在極辛苦的工作之後，不僅沒賺到任何錢，反而背負更多的債務，換句話說，泰籍野莓採集工自行承擔芬蘭採莓之行的所有風險。 泰籍野莓採集工在芬蘭填補了當地人不願從事的次級勞動市場職缺。他們既不享有芬蘭政府的相關勞動法令保障，也不適用芬蘭工會的團體協約。其處於芬蘭勞動市場的灰色地帶。 外籍野莓採集工在芬蘭屬於新的社會現象，目前僅見極少數的文獻聚焦探討此議題。此研究的目的主要是為了瞭解泰籍野莓採集工在芬蘭的勞動處境，並解釋造成其處於不利處境的結構性因素。 / The flow of labour force between countries has become a significant phenomenon in globalization age. Since 2005, the Finnish food processing companies started to introduce migrant wild-berries pickers with a tourist visa up to 3 months in order to harvest wild berries in Finnish forest, and the majority is from the northeastern area of Thailand. They went to Finland with tourist visa and pick up wild berries in the forest according to ‘Everyman’s Right’. They do not be regarded as employees but self-employment or entrepreneurs, and therefore they and their income totally depend on how much berries they pick up. Thai berry pickers paid every cost that far more then one year income of normal farm-family in Thailand by themselves. However, those high costs do not engage any income guarantee. If they meet dry summer or corps is not good enough, they would not get any compensation from Finnish companies. In other words, they will simply work for free and get even deeper debts after extremely hard working. Thai berry pickers in Finland fill in the vacancies in Finnish secondary labour market. They neither entitle to enjoy the protection from Finnish labour regulations nor collective agreements. They are in gray areas in Finnish labour market. Migrant berry picker is a new appearance in Finland, and hence there are only a few literatures focus on the issue. The aim of this research is to understand the situation and explore the structure determinates of Thai berry pickers.

監察制度（control system）是民主體制中重要的監督機制，主要的功能是監督行政和保障人權，隨著第三波民主化的發展，從一九八０年代開始，監察使制度（ombudsman system）快速擴散至全世界，形成一股「監察風潮」（Ombudsmania）。在民主國家中，我國與芬蘭都是實施監察制度較悠久的國家，僅次於瑞典。無獨有偶，兩國都在一九九０年至二０００年進行一連串的憲政改革，修憲後我國政府體制從修正式的內閣制（Parliamentarism）轉變為半總統制（Semi-Presidentialism），而芬蘭則從典型的半總統制傾向議會內閣制。同時在憲政改革的過程中，兩國的監察制度也都有許多的變革。 本文是從權力分立原則（Doctrine of Separation of Powers）、有限政府（Limited Government）和第四權（The Fourth Branch of Power）概念等監察理論作為法理基礎，並以法制研究途徑（Legal-Institutional Approach）和新制度主義（New Institutionalism）作為分析架構，從靜態的法制層面和動態的運作層面，探討我國的監察制度和芬蘭的國會監察使制度，以及兩國在二０００年憲政改革之後的運作情況，以瞭解兩國制度之特色及優劣，並且針對中、芬兩國基本國情、監察制度的基本差異、制度與制度變遷、實務運作與案件、實施成效等幾個面向來作分析比較，剖析其間之異同及其原因。 再者，本文也根據國際性比較與芬蘭國會監察使制度之優點和成功經驗，歸納出監察制度實施成功之條件，包括：（一）監察使「權威」（authority）的建立。（二）具備獨立性、中立性和專業性的特性。（三）健全的國家廉政體系。（四）國會的支持與配合。（五）政治人物對監察使和監察制度的尊重。（六）監察使與外界建立良好的互動關係。並進一步評估我國現行監察制度之問題，主要有下列幾項：（一）形式獨立但實質獨立性不足。（二）監察院的權威未建立。（三）部分監委人選不適任。（四）監察院的功能有待提升。（五）缺乏行銷以及與外界互動不足。 最後，筆者針對以上缺失，分別從監察院的定位、組織規模、監委選任、特殊監察使的設立、監察院的職權、監察院的預算、人權保障、與外界互動、對監委的監督等幾個面向，提出具體改革之建議。 / The control system is an important mechanism in democracy to supervise administration and to protect human rights. Since 1980, with the development of the third wave democratization, the ombudsman system rapidly disseminate to all parts of world, forming the phenomenon of “Ombudsmania”. Among the democratic countries, the control system has been carried out for long in both ROC and Finland, only shorter than Sweden Coincidently, both countries underwent a series of constitutional reform during 1990 to 2000. Thereafter, ROC transformed from the revised Parliamentarism to the Semi-Presidentialism, while Finland turned from the classical Semi-Presidentialism to the parliamentarism. The control systems of both countries have also changed a lot during the constitutional reform. Based on the control theories including concepts of Doctrine of Separation of Powers, Limited Government, and The Fourth Branch of Power as the legal basis, this article utilized the Legal-Institutional Approach and the analysis constructs of New Institutionalism to explore the ROC’s control system and parliamentary ombudsman system of Finland, as well as their operation after the post-constitutional reform in 2000, from the static legislative level and the dynamic operational level. This provided understanding of the characteristics and evaluations of the systems in both countries. Moreover, we focused on the aspects of the essential differences in cultures and in the control systems, the evolution of the systems, the functioning, the cases, and their outcomes to analyze the reasons for the differences between the two systems. Furthermore, based on the international comparison and the success experience in parliamentary ombudsman of Finland, the conditions required for successful practice of the control system was involved: (1) establishment of the authority of the ombudsman, (2) the independent, neutral, and professional characteristics, (3) The national integrity system, (4) the support and cooperation of the parliament, (5) The respect of the politicians to the ombudsman and to the control system, and (6) The well-established interaction between the ombudsman and the outside. Further evaluation found the major problems in the present control system in ROC, including (1) lack of the substantial independence, (2) not established authority, (3) the incapability of some Control Yuan members, (4) the necessity to improve the functions of the Control Yuan, (5) the deficiency of marketing and of interaction with the outside. Finally, for the weakness mentioned above, I proposed the concrete recommendation for reformation, from the aspects of the position of the Control Yuan, the dimension of the organization, the election of the committee members, the establishment of specific Ombudsman, the powers and the budgets for the Control Yuan, the protection of human rights, the interactions with the outside, and the administrations of the committee members.

品牌國家是近年來新興的議題。荷蘭籍學者彼得．范．海姆（Peter van Ham ）於2001年在《外交事務》上發表文章提出：「隨著全球化和媒體革命的發展，已使得每一個國家更明白自身的形象、聲譽及態度，簡言之，即為其品牌。過去的傳統性外交重要性已逐漸消失，在未來政治家必須訓練自己有更好的國家品牌資產經營能力。品牌國家將不僅與他們自己競爭，更需與世界性的超級品牌媲美。」如今許多國家政府對此已相當重視。 本文試圖經由非傳統外交、軟權力、公眾外交、國家行銷等學術探討，對品牌國家的定義及內涵作一個更全面性的研究及瞭解；並藉由芬蘭與諾基亞相互之間關係的案例分析，對品牌國家做更多闡述，期藉此為我國政府運行帶來一些新的想法。 / Brand State is an emerging issue in recent years. In the year of 2001, the Dutch scholar Peter van Ham talked about this concept in Foreign Affairs that “Globalization and the media revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image, its reputation, and its attitude -- in short, its brand. The traditional diplomacy of yesteryear is disappearing. To do their jobs well in the future, politicians will have to train themselves in brand asset management. Brand states will compete not only among themselves but also with superbrands.” Nowadays, many countries have paid a lot of attention to it. This thesis attempts to illustrate the definition and content of Brand State more comprehensively by researching non-traditional diplomacy, soft power, public diplomacy, national marketing and other academic theories. Also, it examines the case of the relevance between Finland and Nokia to elaborate Brand State more and tries to bring new ideas to our government.