Après le contrat, que reste-t-il ? La réponse la plus spontanée est qu'il ne reste rien, sinon un souvenir évanescent et le retour à la liberté. Pourtant, l’étude du droit des contrats montre le contraire. L’extinction laisse subsister des intérêts économiques qui doivent être protégés. Il n’est d’ailleurs pas anodin de constater une prise de conscience des parties et des rédacteurs d’actes : un regain de prudence a commandé le développement des clauses postcontractuelles. Mais, même en l’absence de telles stipulations, une régulation existe, formant des après-contrats standardisés par le législateur, ou encadrés par le juge. Une véritable optimisation du droit de l’extinction est observable, dont le but est de maximiser les bénéfices apportés par l’exécution ou par l’effet extinctif, mais aussi de minimiser les risques succédant à l’extinction. Le contrat apparaît ainsi sous la forme d’une institution sociale devant prendre en compte le contexte dans lequel l’opération économique se développe, au service de la relation inter partes, laquelle transcende la seule durée de la convention. Soulignant la dimension relationnelle de la convention, l’après-contrat permet de remettre le contrat en perspective dans sa somme existentielle, c’est-à-dire en tant qu’expérience totalisant la période précontractuelle, l’exécution et le temps postcontractuel. Dans la compréhension de cette trilogie, le terme extinctif marque un repère qui tire son utilité d’une double nature : il clôt une durée (critère temporel) et signe un ordre de bouleversement dans le sort des obligations (critère substantiel). / Does anything remain after the end of a contract? Generally, we easily believe that the relationship between economic partners and the duration of their contract stop at the same time. But this belief is built on a simplistic vision of the real economic world. When the contract duration is over, some economic interest must be preserved. That is why wise partners anticipate a follow-up to the extinguished contract, by stipulating postcontractual obligations. But, even if there is no anticipation, a regulation does exist with standard legal rules or judges’ framework. A real optimization of the contract law is expanding, to maximize the benefits arising from the contractual experience and minimize the risks led by the postcontractual freedom. That is how the Contract shows a specific aspect: it becomes a social institution which considers its economic context, serving the relational dimension of the partnership. Definitely, the relationship between the partners can last above the duration of the contractual instrument. By this way, the post-contract put into perspective the contract in an existential addition which is composed of three parts: the precontractual, the execution and the postcontractual time periods. In this configuration, the term is seen as a mark which encloses a duration (temporal criterion) and turns the contractual obligation (substantial criterion). Indeed, the post-contract nature is dual, contractual and extracontractual at the same time. That is why we will treat our subject from both and complementary criterions, saying that the post-contract is a time period out of the contract, whereas it shows concurrently the contract out of its own duration.

OF DISSERTATION IN ENGLISH Doctoral Student: JUDr. Kateřina Juřicová Topic of Dissertation: Limitations on Freedom of Contract in the Civil Law Supervisor of Dissertation: Prof. JUDr. Jan Dvořák, CSc. Doctoral Programme of Study: Theoretical Legal Sciences - Civil Law, Univerzita Karlova, Právnická fakulta, katedra občanského práva Date of Closing of Dissertation: 31.12.2019 The dissertation covers the limitations on freedom of contract in civil law and provides with the summary and following analysis of both general and specific limitations on freedom of contract in civil law. The general limitations consist of mandatory rules and stipulations prohibited by law. As part of the analysis of the general limitations both character and distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory rules are analyzed, as well as the criteria for the provisions to be designated as mandatory such as statutory prohibition, stipulations contrary to good morals, public order or the law concerning the status of persons, including the right to protection of personality rights. Similarly, the list of specific limitations on self-authorship describes legal relationships between landlord and tenant, employer and employee or consumer and entrepreneur, various cases in the community property of spouses or contracts with minors,...

Målet med rapporten är att utreda hur samverkansprocessen kan genomföras på ett sådant sätt att nyttan kan maximeras för alla parter inom projektet. Detta görs genom att fokusera på tre delar; samverkan som definition och uppfattning på marknaden, upphandlingsfasen hur skall upplägget inom denna utformas för att anbud med rätt incitament för projektet skall bli antaget, samt hur kontraktet skall utformas för att få samtliga parter att vilja jobba tillsammans mot ett gemensamt mål, vilket ska gagna alla engagerade och därmed projektet. Dessutom skall undersökas hur kontraktsteoretiska risker uppmärksammas och behandlas i dessa situationer. Teorin tydliggör att de faktorer vilka främst är av vikt för en lyckad samverkan är förtroende, uppföljning och kontroller. Dessa styrmedel kan beskrivas som mjuka parametrar varför frågor till stor del har designats för att utreda hur projektet har utformats för att höja kvaliteten på de mjuka parametrarna. Utredningen sker genom att hålla 14 intervjuer, inkluderande beställare, huvudentreprenörer samt underentreprenörer. Vad som kan konstateras är att uppfattningen om vad samverkan är och hur det bör användas är relativt enhetlig på marknaden. Det som uppkommit som en av de största skillnaderna mellan projekt är om de integrerar eller inte integrerar underentreprenörer. Vid upphandling har det diskuterats hur lagen om offentligupphandling kan påverka resultatet samt vikten av ett genomtänkt bedömningssystem av anbudsunderlag. Dessutom tydliggörs vikten av varje individs engagemang under denna typ av samarbete vilket också lyft frågan om hur organisationen skall väljas ut. När det kommer till kontraktet har det konstaterats att incitament inte används eller uppskattas i någon större utsträckning, dock kan bonus vara ett bra medium för att styra kvaliteten på de mjuka parametrarna. Om bonus eller incitament används är det av vikt att dessa har ett tydligt utvärderingsystem vilket håller parterna ständigt uppdaterade om hur de ligger till för att erhålla en utbetalning av eventuell bonus. Vidare kan kontraktet hjälpa till att tydliggöra samarbetet, detta genom att strukturera varje parts ansvarsområde samt tydliggöra respektive parts förväntningar på varandra. Detta kan reducera missförstånd och eventuella konfliketer längre fram. Vilket leder till ett bättre arbetsklimat och förhoppningsvis bättre slutresultat. Vidare är ett riktpris vilket är rimligt för alla parter direkt nödvändigt för ett lyckat projekt. När det kommer till kontraktsteoretiska risker har det uppmärksammats att det inte är något som diskuteras i någon större utsträckning. Det finns en mindre medvetenhet om dess existens men fokus ligger på de ekonomiska- och tidsrelaterade risker vilka kan föreligga. / The goal with the report is to investigate how the partnering process can be performed to maximize the satisfaction of all engaged actors within the project. This will be done by focusing on three main parts; partnering as definition and the markets perception of the concept. The procurement phase, how should it be constructed in order to be able to select the tender which will provide the highest satisfaction for the project in total? The contract, how should it be formed to make all parts engaged and strive together for the same goal, which benefits all actors and the project as a whole? Besides these questions it will also be investigated how risks which stems from contract theory are noticed and dealt with. Theory suggests that the main factors behind a successful partnering project are; trust, monitoring and controls. These instruments could be described as soft parameters, therefore questions has been constructed to investigate how projects are planned in order to increase the quality of the soft parameters. The investigation is performed by holding 14 interviews including clients, contractors and subcontractors. From the interviews it can be concluded that the markets conception of partnering is relatively uniform. What has turned out to be the biggest difference between the projects is if they choose to include the subcontractor within the partnering contract or not. When it comes to the procurement it has been discussed how the law of public procurement could affect the result. The importance of a well-functioning grading system for the tenders has also turned out to be of key importance. Furthermore the individual’s importance within the project has been voiced, which increases the importance of how to select the project organization. When it comes to the contract the conclusion is that incentives is neither being used to any extent, nor is it appreciated when used in partnering. But bonus on the other hand, is said to be a good medium to govern quality when discussing the soft parameters. If bonus or incentives are used it is of importance that the parameters who are connected to them are clear, and that the system which decides if the goals for the bonus is reached is well-functioning and continuously updated. This is important in order for the contractors to know how close they are of reaching the goals. Furthermore the contract could help clarify the cooperation, by structuring every actor’s responsibility and clarify the actor’s expectations of each other, this is important to reduce misunderstandings and eventual conflicts further on in the project. This leads to a better working climate and hopefully a better end result. It is also a direct necessity to reach a target price which is reasonable for all parts in order to achieve a successful project. When it comes to risks within contract theory it has been observed that is it not discussed at any further extent. There is a minor awareness of its existence but focus is on economic and time related risks.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(工学) / 甲第18572号 / 工博第3933号 / 新制||工||1604(附属図書館) / 31472 / 京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻 / (主査)教授 小林 潔司, 教授 大津 宏康, 教授 河野 広隆 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Philosophy (Engineering) / Kyoto University / DFAM

This thesis investigates whether players in the National Hockey League overperform during the last year of their contract. This phenomenon is called the contract year phenomenon and suggests that players have financial incentives to perform better during this specific season. Previous research has shown evidence of this phenomenon in the National Basketball Association and some evidence in Major League Baseball. To investigate this we have used data from 6 season in the NHL between 2016 to 2022. A linear regression was conducted to identify the relationship between points per hour and contract year. A negative relationship between the variables were identified, probably due to the fact that worse players tend to sign shorter contracts, getting a contract year more often. When fixed effect regression was conducted to compare individual players with themselves over time, no significant relationship between the variables was observed, indicating that there is no evidence of the contract year phenomenon in the NHL. The non existing effect remains when looking at specific contract statuses and position in combination with the contract year variable.

Trafikverkets drift- och underhållsentreprenader "basunderhåll väg" anses av entreprenörerna ha en obalanserad riskfördel. Huvudfrågan är om totalentreprenad är den bästa lösningen på Trafikverket driftkontrakt på vägsidan. Examensarbetet har utförts tillsammans med NCC. Datainsamlingen har gjorts dels genom litteraturstudier och dels genom intervjuer med Trafikverket, Sveriges Byggindustrier samt de stora entreprenörerna Svevia, NCC, Peab och Skanska. Slutsatsen av arbetet är att kontrakten innehåller för många oklarheter för att upphandlas på totalentreprenad, men får Trafikverket kontroll på mängder som ska utföras framöver är det fullt möjligt att upphandla kontrakten på totalentreprenad. Däremot kommer det inte att hinnas med någon inventering av mängderna inför kommande upphandling. Av den anledningen föreslås att kontrakten 2018 upphandlas som samverkansentreprenad utan incitamentsavtal under de två första åren då entreprenören tillsammans med Trafikverket inventerar och planerar vad som ska utföras under den fyraåriga kontraktstiden. Inför tredje och fjärde året görs ett incitamentsavtal 50/50 när omfattningen är mera känd. / Trafikverket:s Road maintenance contracts, "Basunderhåll väg", is considered by the contractors to have an uneven distribution of risk between the partners. The main question is if Design-build contract is the best solution for Trafikverket:s Road maintenance contracts on the roadside. The essay has been written on behave of NCC account. The study is based upon literature studies, but also by interviewing staff from big companies, whom are affected by these contracts (Trafikverket, Sveriges Byggindustrier, NCC, Svevia, Peab, Skanska). The main conclusion with the essay is that the contracts maintain too many uncertainties to be procured at a Design-build contract. However, if Trafikverket manages to control the amount mass data, it is highly possible to procure contracts with Design-build contract contracts in the near future. Although, it will not be obtainable to have some sort of inventory of these amounts for the upcoming procurements. By this reason, the proposal is Partnering contract procured by 2018 without any incentives during the first two years. Both the contractors and Trafikverket plan the inventory of what shall be done during the four-year contract period. For the third and the final year they shall make an agreement on a target price for the incentive 50/50 when the extent is better known. Key

Smart contracts are software systems that monitor and control the execution of legal contracts to ensure compliance with the contracts' terms and conditions. They often exploit Internet-of-Things technologies to support their monitoring functions, and blockchain technology to ensure the integrity of their data. Ethereum and business blockchain platforms, such as Hyperledger Fabric, are among the most popular choices for smart contract development. However, there is a substantial gap in the knowledge of smart contracts between developers and legal experts. Symboleo is a formal specification language for legal contracts that was introduced to address this issue. Symboleo specifications directly encode legal concepts such as parties, obligations, and powers. This thesis proposes a tool-supported method for translating Symboleo specifications into smart contracts. Its contributions include extensions to the existing Symboleo IDE, the implementation of the ontology and semantics of Symboleo into a reusable library, and the Symboleo2SC tool that generates Hyperledger Fabric code exploiting this library. Symboleo2SC was evaluated with three sample contracts. Experimentation with Symboleo2SC shows that legal contract specifications in Symboleo can be fully converted to smart contracts for monitoring purposes. Moreover, Symboleo2SC helps simplify the smart contract development process, saves development effort, and helps reduce risks of coding errors.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23671号 / 経博第654号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)准教授 菊谷 達弥, 教授 関口 格, 准教授 安達 貴教 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

Especially during times of intense change, managers may negatively impact the quality of employee-manager relationships by breaching or violating psychological contract terms and exhibiting unfair treatment (i.e., interactional injustice) in the workplace. A psychological contract is conceptualized as an exmployee's perception or individualistic belief about the reciprocal and promissory nature of the employment relationship (Argyris, 1960; Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl, & Solley, 1966; Rousseau, 1989, 1990, 1995; Schein, 1965, 1994). Misperceptions surrounding contractual changes and perceived misalignments between managers' words and deeds have contributed to employee perceptions of contract breach and violation, which are linked to negative employee attitudes and behaviors (Andersson, 1996; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Pate, Martin, & Staines, 2000; Rousseau, 1995). Employees may simultaneously experience interactional injustice when managers act in disparaging ways and fail to provide adequate explanations (Bies, 1989; Bies & Moag, 1986). Leadership literature has provided evidence that high-quality leadership can positively influence employees' behaviors and attitudes and increase perceptions of workplace fairness (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kickul, Gundry, & Posig, 2005; Kouzes & Posner, 2003). However, the relational role of leadership credibility, within the context of psychological contract breach and violation and interactional justice, has not been examined in leadership, psychological contract, and organizational justice literatures. This study was designed to explore the relationships between leadership credibility, interactional justice, and psychological contract breach and violation. The results of the study confirmed that employees' perceptions about leaders' credibility does strongly relate to managerial violation, interpersonal justice, and informational justice. / Ph. D.

The use of third-party components is helpful while writing complex software systems, but it can be difficult to debug software that interacts with third-party components. To address this problem, a mechanism for determining if one is using the component correctly would be beneficial. Reading component documentation may or may not help, depending on its clarity and precision. A formally specified contract for that component would be better, and would also allow run-time contract verification via assertions. The client of the component could enable these assertions during development and debugging, and then disable them for the final production release to increase performance. This thesis presents nContract, a tool that provides configurable run-time contract verification without requiring component recompilation or source code access. nContract allows component developers to formally specify .NET components using attributes. This contract information is retrieved from the compiled component's metadata and a subclass is generated for each formally specified type. All members of the component's interface are overridden and contract assertions are wrapped around calls to the base class. As long as the component client uses a factory to create instances of the component's types, the decision of whether or not to create assertion-checked or unchecked objects can be deferred until run-time. / Master of Science