Spelling suggestions: "subject:"4he dynamic interpretation"" "subject:"ehe dynamic interpretation""
1 |
What is “meta-” for? : a Peircean critique of the cognitive theory of metaphorJIANG, Yicun 08 August 2017 (has links)
My thesis aims to anatomize the cognitive theory of metaphor and suggests a Peircean semiotic perspective on metaphor study. As metaphorical essentialists, Lakoff/Johnson tend to universalize a limited number of conceptual metaphors and, by doing this, they overlook the dynamic relation between metaphorical tenor and vehicle. Such notion of metaphor is not compatible with the polysemous nature of the sign. The diversity and multivalency of metaphorical vehicle, in particular, cast serious doubts on the hypothesis of “conceptual metaphors” which, being meta-metaphorical constructs, can tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula “A is B”. Consequently, Lakoff/Johnson’s notion of conceptual metaphor is very much a Chomskyan postulation. Also problematic is the expedient experientialism or embodied philosophy they have put forward as a middle course between objectivism and subjectivism. What is missing from their framework is a structural space for dynamic interpretation on the part of metaphor users. In contrast, cognitive linguists may find in Peirce’s theory of the sign a sound solution to their theoretical impasse. As a logician, Peirce sees metaphor as the realization of iconic reasoning at the language level. His exposition on iconicity and iconic reasoning has laid a solid foundation upon which may be erected a fresh epistemology of metaphor fit for the contemporary study of language and mind. Broadly speaking, metaphor in Peirce can be examined from roughly two perspectives. Macroscopically, metaphor is an icon in general as opposed to index and symbol, whereas, microscopically, it is a subdivided hypoicon on the third level as opposed to image and diagram. Besides, Peirce also emphasized the subjective nature of metaphor. Semioticians after Peirce have further developed his theory on metaphor. For example, through his concept of “arbitrary iconicity”, Ersu Ding stresses the arbitrary nature of metaphorization and tries to shift our attention away from Lakoff/Johnson’s abstract epistemological Gestalt to the specific cultural contexts in which metaphors occur. Umberto Eco, on the other hand, sees interpretation of signs as an open-ended process that involves knowledge of all kinds. Encyclopedic knowledge thus serves as unlimited source for metaphorical association. For Eco, the meaning of a metaphor should be interpreted in the cultural framework based on a specific cultural community. Both Ding’s and Eco’s ideas are in line with Peirce’s theoretical framework where the meaning of a metaphor depends on an interpreter in a particular socio-historical context. They all realize that we should go beyond the ontology of metaphorical expressions to acquire a dynamic perspective on metaphor interpretation. To overcome the need for presupposing an omnipotent subject capable of knowing the metaphor-in-itself, we turn to Habermas’s theory of communicative action in which the meaning of metaphor is intersubjectively established through negotiation and communication. Moreover, we should not overlook the dynamic tension between metaphor and ideology. Aphoristically, we can say that nothing is a metaphor unless it is interpreted as a metaphor, and we need to reconnect metaphors with the specific cultural and ideological contexts in which they appear.
|
2 |
Le juge face aux principes directeurs du procès civil / The judge facing the guiding principles of civil trialKa, Ibrahima 11 December 2015 (has links)
Le procès civil est le cadre traditionnel de réalisation de la justice des particuliers, et les règles qui le gouvernent se trouvent synthétisées dans les 24 premiers articles du CPC qui en énoncent les principes directeurs. Ces derniers organisent la répartition des charges processuelles entre les différents acteurs du procès, et déterminent ainsi l’essentiel de l’office du juge qui est construit autour du modèle contentieux du procès civil, taillé pour le juge du fond. Cependant, ce modèle subit des atténuations pour des raisons principalement d’équité ou de diligence, alors même que l’affaire qui est soumise au juge relève de la matière contentieuse. Dans la procédure gracieuse et dans celle de cassation, c’est la nature de la mission confiée au juge qui justifie parfois les atténuations apportées à ces principes, et parfois même leur effacement. Par ailleurs, l’action du juge à l’égard de ces principes directeurs va aussi dans le sens de leur adaptation aux évolutions juridiques et socio-économiques. Elle se traduit essentiellement d’une part, par une recherche d’effectivité de ces principes que le juge civil français n’hésite plus à rattacher à des normes supérieures, et d’autre part, par une recherche de leur efficience par le biais des techniques d’interprétation. Si dans le premier cas les phénomènes d’internationalisation et de constitutionnalisation du droit permettent d’expliquer une telle action, dans le second, se pose la question de la légitimité de la démarche. Notre pensée est que le juge d’aujourd’hui est aussi un juge gestionnaire dans un contexte d’accroissement de la demande de justice et de raréfaction des ressources allouées à la justice / Civil trial is the traditional framework where justice of individuals is usually delivered, and the rules which govern it are synthesized in the first 24 articles of the code of civil procedure which set out the guiding principles. The latter organize the sharing of procedural responsibilities between the different actors of the lawsuit, and determine the main part of the office of the judge built around the contentious model of the civil proceedings, cut for the ruling on the judges of the affairs. This model undergoes legal mitigations, mainly for reasons of equity or diligence, even though the case which is submitted to the judge is a matter of the contentious material. In the submission for an out-of-court settlement and that of the appeal to the supreme court, it is the nature of the mission entrusted to the judge who sometimes justifies the mitigations brought to these guiding principles, and sometimes even their disappearance. The action of the judge towards these principles also goes to the direction of their adaptation to evolutions so legal as Socio-Economic. It is essentially translated on the one hand, by a research for effectiveness of these principles which the judge does not hesitate to connect with superior standards, and on the other hand, by a research for their efficiency by means of the technique of interpretation. If in the first case the internationalization and constitutionnalisation explain such an action, the second case raises itself the question of the legitimacy of such an approach. Today’s judge is also a manager, especially in an increasing context of justice request and rarefaction of the resources assigned to the judicial administration
|
3 |
L'influence européenne sur l'interprétation des actes juridiques privés / European influence on the interpretation of private contractsFaintrenie, Nicolas 02 November 2015 (has links)
Par l’arrêt Pla et Puncernau contre Andorre du 13 juillet 2004, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a fait une entrée remarquée dans le contrôle de l’interprétation des actes juridiques privés. Tenante d’une conception réaliste du droit, elle a élaboré des Principes européens d’interprétation qui sont autant d’obligations qui pèsent sur le juge national. La CJUE partage en grande partie ces principes, mais possède ses particularités et hésite encore à s’aligner sur le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Le juge français est quant à lui confronté à des directives d’interprétation qui sont de simples conseils, tandis que la Cour de cassation se refuse à opérer un autre contrôle que celui de la dénaturation. Dès lors, elle n’est pas en mesure de redresser les fautes commises par les juges du fond notamment, et encourt le risque d’engager la responsabilité de l’Etat français devant la Cour EDH. Si la Cour de cassation a entamé une réflexion sur la façon de rendre la justice en coordination avec les cours européennes, la modification du système herméneutique français se heurte à de nombreux obstacles révélateurs de la conception traditionnelle du droit français des obligations. / With the case of Pla and Puncernau versus Andorra on 13 July 2004, the European Court of Human Rights has made a dramatic entrance in the supervision of the interpretation of private contracts. Defending a realist conception of law, it developed European Principles of interpretation, which are obligations for national courts. The CJEU largely shares these principles, but has its particularities and it is still reluctant to align with the Strasbourg Court’s supervision. The French judge is itself faced with interpretive guidelines that are simple advice, while the Court of Cassation refused to operate another supervision than the denaturation. Therefore, it is not able to correct the errors committed by the trial judges in particular, and takes the risk to commit a violation of the European law. If the Supreme Court considers by now how to deliver justice in coordination with the European courts, changing the French hermeneutic system faces many obstacles revealing the traditional conception of French law of obligations.
|
Page generated in 0.1728 seconds