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The concept of outsiders has been argued to be one of the main themes in childhood fairy tales in general and in J.K. Rowling's Harry Potter novels in particular. Severus Snape is one of the most evident outsider characters in the novels, described as an unpleasant, ugly man presented as a double agent with uncertain allegiances. When the truth is revealed, in the very last pages of the series, he is discovered to have been an undercover spy for the good side all along. This essay examines Snape as an outsider, and analyzes his effect on the novel, especially his relation to the three characters with whom he interacts most: Dumbledore, Voldemort and Harry. All three of these characters are main characters and are also outsiders themselves in different ways. Examining the relations between good and evil and showing that these concepts are closely tied to choices and reactions towards being an outsider, the essay argues that the analysis of Snape as an outsider helps distinguish between aspects of good and evil in the novel. By focusing on Snape and the concept of the outsider, different dimensions of the novels become visible. Snape is here an instrumental character on his own, and may well be seen as the main character. Although the series in some aspects has been described as a fairy tale, the complex character of Severus Snape gives the novels a further depth appealing not only to children, but to adults as well.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este trabalho realiza um estudo comparativo com as narrativas O Cabeleira, do escritor brasileiro Franklin TÃvora, e O Malhadinhas, do portuguÃs Aquilino Ribeiro, visando, principalmente, à compreensÃo do modo como se manifesta a figura do herÃi em ambas as obras. TraÃa um paralelo entre ambos os protagonistas, observando analogias e contrastes em sua construÃÃo e as relaÃÃes com o contexto sociocultural e a tradiÃÃo popular. Para tanto, considera os seguintes aspectos: a proposta literÃria dos dois autores; a presenÃa de substratos medievais na construÃÃo dos herÃis em anÃlise, denunciando, em ambas as narrativas, a heranÃa de uma tradiÃÃo popular que dà Ãnfase a atitudes de coragem, destemor, valentia; a presenÃa da ambiguidade ou ambivalÃncia nos dois protagonistas. Torna-se evidente em Cabeleira a tese rousseauniana do homem naturalmente bom corrompido pelo meio, mas que pode recuperar os bons sentimentos perdidos atravÃs do amor e da religiÃo. Malhadinhas, por sua vez, mostra-se um sujeito briguento e astucioso, valendo-se de mentiras e enganos para escapar de situaÃÃes embaraÃosas ou perigosas, mas, ao final, dà sinal de mudanÃas, passando mesmo a adotar um comportamento religioso, frequentando a Igreja e atribuindo à sociedade a culpa de seus erros. Podemos observar que, apesar de guardarem semelhanÃas em relaÃÃo a alguns aspectos, os herÃis diferenciam-se em outros. Dessa forma, o estudo, dividido em trÃs capÃtulos, primeiramente introduz consideraÃÃes acerca da atuaÃÃo dos escritores, da recepÃÃo crÃtica de suas obras, de suas respectivas propostas literÃrias, focalizando o regionalismo. O capÃtulo seguinte verifica a heranÃa medieval perceptÃvel nas personagens em estudo e, por fim, o Ãltimo examina a questÃo da ambivalÃncia, observando o problema do embate entre bem e mal apresentado pelos protagonistas. O trabalho visa, assim, a uma melhor compreensÃo das ideias e da produÃÃo dos autores e da sua importÃncia no quadro cultural e literÃrio em que atuaram.

Esta dissertação trata da constituição da noção de Psicologia em Para Além de Bem e Mal. O conceito de psicologia constitui um elemento chave para compreendermos os escritos de maturidade de Nietzsche porque está diretamente associado à hipótese da vontade de poder. Defendemos que a psicologia nietzscheana se apresenta como uma crítica à concepção moderna de sujeito. No lugar da noção moderna de subjetividade o filósofo destaca a relevância das instâncias infraconscientes na determinação da dinâmica e estruturação dos corpos. Ao enfatizar esse "mundo interior" Nietzsche nos conduz a uma nova interpretação acerca da moral._________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT: This is a dissertation on the constitution of the notion of Psychology in Beyond Good and Evil. The concept of psychology is a key element to the understanding of Nietzsche?s mature writings for it is directly associated to the hypothesis of will to power. We reclaim that the nietzschean psychology presents itself as a critique to the modern conception of subject. Instead of the modern notion of subjectivity Nietzsche highlights the importance of infra-conscient instances in the determination of the dynamics and structures of bodies. On emphasizing this "inner world" Nietsche drives us to a new interpretation concerning morals.

L’ambition de ce travail est d’expliquer le rôle du bien dans la philosophie platonicienne. Omniprésente dans les dialogues de jeunesse, la recherche d’une science du bien (agathologie) culmine dans la République, où le rôle de l’Idée du bien par rapport à l’intelligible est comparé à celui du soleil par rapport au sensible. La thèse défendue est que cette analogie entre des fonctions ne devient compréhensible que si on la lit à la lumière du Philèbe, dialogue qui examine la nature du bien. Grâce à un commentaire interne et détaillé de ce dialogue, fondé sur les principes de l’herméneutique de Schleiermacher, il est montré comment s’y opère progressivement et de manière rigoureuse le passage d’un examen de la vie bonne à la mise au jour du contenu de l’Idée du bien. Au cours de cette recherche, sont également abordés des problèmes aussi divers que les rapports entre l’un et le multiple, la division de tous les contenus de l’univers en quatre genres, la présence d’une intelligence démiurgique dans le monde, la division du plaisir en ses espèces, la distinction des différents pouvoirs de l’âme, la nature de la perception, les rapports entre la beauté et le type d’émotion qu’elle suscite, la classification des sciences, etc. Au terme de ce parcours, on découvre que le contenu de l’Idée du bien consiste en l’unité de la mesure, de la beauté et de la vérité. Cette unité permet d’unifier au sein d’une discipline unique trois champs de la philosophie qui sont aujourd’hui généralement considérés comme radicalement distincts :la morale, l’esthétique et la science. Cette discipline unique, en tant qu’elle se consacre à l’étude du bien, peut être nommée « agathologie ». Il s’agit d’une science, et même de la science suprême selon Platon, mais cette science ne doit pas être comprise comme un savoir figé qui s’immobiliserait dans la contemplation de ses résultats, mais comme dialectique, c’est-à-dire comme s’identifiant au mouvement de recherche qui mène à ces résultats et qui met en œuvre de manière décisive la mesure, la beauté et la vérité. Cette compréhension de la philosophie platonicienne comme agathologie permet de saisir l’unité profonde de la démarche qui se manifeste dans tous les Dialogues, depuis les premiers jusqu’aux derniers, puisqu’elle montre que tous ne traitent jamais que du bien sous l’une ou l’autre de ses formes. D’où l’importance du Philèbe, dialogue qui donne sens à tous les autres en les organisant relativement à une recherche unique :la recherche du bien. / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Magister Theologiae - MTh / Classic Christian theology regards evil as the product of sin, the emphasis in traditional African religion and culture is on human sin as the result of evil forces. This thesis investigated the way in which African Christian theologians understand the relationship between sin and evil. The question, which was addressed was, does sin lead to evil or evil lead to sin. / South Africa

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Despite Hannah Arendt's prediction in the wake of World War II that "the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life," the majority of postwar philosophers have preferred to stay away from the idea of evil. But at the same time that philosophical reflection on the notion of evil has dissipated, there is no denying the fact that referring to "evil" has remained very common among the public at large, among political leaders, and in popular culture. To better understand what meaning the concept of evil might have for us today, in this paper I will address two main questions. First, recognizing the problems recent philosophers have raised against the idea of "evil," we should ask if we should simply take our leave of the concept of evil, admitting that it has been exhausted by overuse, shifting intellectual paradigms, and a triumphant secular age. In other words, does it make any sense for us today to go beyond calling something wrong or unjust or harmful or unspeakable and to speak in terms of "evil?" Is talk about evil simply a relic of a way of speaking and thinking about the world that we have long left behind? Is "evil" in fact one of those terms that have always drawn people into error and sometimes even into committing horrific acts? Second, if we believe we can begin to address this first set of questions about the notion of evil, it remains to be seen what exactly we might mean by evil. What are we pointing to when we call something "evil?" What makes something evil rather than merely wrong or unjust? What kinds of things do we reserve the judgment of evil for? This set of questions leads us to come up with a substantive account of evil, an account of what evil is and what distinguishes evil from other wrongdoing. To address these questions, our argument will proceed as follows. We will begin with an overview of the recent return to discussing evil after a turn away from evil by the majority working in philosophy. After giving a brief historical overview of these shifts we will then begin to argue for the need for philosophers to think about evil and the concept of evil. In short, as I will argue, because we continue to turn to the notion of evil in response to extreme forms of wrongdoing, philosophical reflection is warranted in trying to clarify what we might reasonably mean when we call an agent or action evil. Moving to a discussion of the idea of radical evil, we will begin with a close reading and interpretation of Kant's account of radical evil, pausing to discuss what he gets right and where he may err. We will then move to recent discussions of evil in contemporary philosophy, much of which can be understood as revolving around Kant's account of radical evil. In these contemporary accounts, evil is no longer used in an inclusive, wide sense, but almost exclusively to refer to the kinds of extreme, unforgivable wrongdoing we might classify under the notion of radical evil. In these recent accounts, there is an attempt to distinguish degrees of evil, between the "normal" or "ordinary" evils of serious wrongdoing that we nevertheless can understand, punish, and cope with, versus the "radical" or extreme evils that we cannot really understand, punish, or fit into our intellectual and moral frameworks. After discussing these recent accounts and appreciating the progress they make, we will nevertheless ask whether they can really help us grasp the kinds of horrendous evil they were developed in response to. In particular, we will argue that these recent accounts still fail to appreciate the notion of radical evil to its full extent, preferring to focus on the harm caused and on notions like the banality of evil and ordinary evildoers, projects which may end up distorting the nature of evil. Looking to some recent reflections on radical evil, we will argue that the Kantian notion of a perversion of the will and an evil heart help us to understand that radical evil is something that is usually anything but banal, but is a fundamental breach of our normal standards of wrongness and that this quality of excess and the inversion of the moral is what lies at the core of the acts and agents we deem evil. We will conclude by looking at the necessary limits of any abstract discussion of evil in general and how particular evils such as those experienced at Auschwitz cannot even begin to be explained by such accounts, arguing that our discomfort and horror in the face of evil nevertheless remains but that such attempts at reflection and understanding evil remain necessary and urgent.

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