In the spring and summer of 1655, Oliver Cromwell, as Lord Protector of England and with the authority of the Council of State, dispatched an English fleet under the command of Sea General William Penn and General Robert Venables to conquer and settle the target of their choosing among Spain's colonies in the Caribbean. A Spanish defending force of perhaps 400-600 men, mostly militia, repulsed a landing force of 9,000 men. Demoralized and defeated, the much-reduced force boarded their ships and sailed to the more weakly held island of Jamaica, where the Spanish who chose not to surrender faded into the interior to join their runaway slaves in a guerrilla campaign that would last five years before the English completed their conquest of the island. When Oliver Cromwell heard the news of the defeat at Hispaniola, observers in London reported that he shut himself in his room for an afternoon, before placing Penn and Venables in the Tower of London; but later recovered to call for godly Englishmen to settle the new colony of Jamaica. Few chose to answer, while most followed the example of the New England colonists, who felt they had enough trouble fulfilling God's mission in the North American wilderness, without sailing through a war zone to an uncertain future in disease and hunger-ridden Jamaica. Meanwhile, the war Cromwell felt he could avoid in Europe broke out with Spain, gaining him Dunkirk but costing money and men. This ambitious and spectacularly unsuccessful project to colonize the Spanish Caribbean has come to be known as the Western Design. The Western Design represents a key turning point in the history of the Caribbean and development of England's American colonial empire. Through an unprecedented use of state-commissioned force, England struck against a continental enemy across the Atlantic, and added what would become a valuable sugar island and buccaneering base to a growing American empire. The event has long been looked at by historians of Commonwealth England, both in exploring Cromwell's religious psychology, and in debating its foreign policy. However, with the growth of an Atlantic approach to history, new fields have opened within which the Western Design should be considered. One development has been the blurring of the formerly rigid historiographical distinctions of what constituted English, colonial American, and Caribbean history. A growing Atlantic empire including all three areas has begun to be explored, and events in one place have been examined as to how they affected events in the others. One example has been an analysis of the early seventeenth-century Caribbean as a target for Puritan colonization, much as New England has been viewed for decades and even centuries. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Summer Semester, 2004. / May 26, 2004. / History England Colonies Spain Western Design Nava / Includes bibliographical references. / Matt D. Childs, Professor Directing Thesis; Rodney D. Anderson, Committee Member; Paul Strait, Committee Member.

Cadences are call and response marching songs sung by military personnel during drill and ceremony. This music originated in the United States in 1943 and has spread to militaries across the world. It is typically heard at basic training installations where it is used to help resocialize trainees into soldiers and during unit physical training. The lyrics of cadences often engage with facts of military culture: exploring the reality of combat and military life, instilling motivation, and developing unit cohesion. Scholarship in this field displays significant gaps when it comes to the development of the military cadence, which my thesis intends to address. Army historians, who have written extensively about cadences, discuss drill and ceremony practices from the Revolution and Civil War, but then they immediately jump to the Duckworth Chant (the modern origins of cadence in 1943). Any discussion of African American musical idioms, which I argue provide the foundation of the cadence, is curiously absent. The purpose of this thesis is introduce the historical context of the origins of cadence, understand the musical parameters of its performance, and attempt to understand its impact on military culture.

Parents’ perspectives on their children’s outdoor risky play (ORP) can influence their engagement in it and the risk-navigation strategies they adopt. Until now, the perspectives of parents who regularly navigate threats to their safety, such as military members in combat arms occupations (CAOs) in the Canadian Armed Forces, and who have second-hand information on war and combat, such as female partners of members in CAOs, have been excluded from research. Conducting research with members in CAOs and their female partners can provide important understanding for experiences with risk, danger, injury, traditional gender roles, and ORP perspectives. I thus recruited and conducted semi-structured interviews with military members in CAOs (female = 1, male = 6) in the Canadian Armed Forces and 16 female partners of members actively serving in CAOs. Individuals could participate if they had a child in the 4-12 age range. I selected this age range for the study due to it being important for children’s adoption of safety strategies. I addressed three questions in stand-alone papers in my thesis: 1) “Do experiences in the military influence members’ in CAOs perspectives on their children’s ORP?”; 2) “What are military mothers’ perspectives on their children’s outdoor risky play and how may these perspectives be shaped by their military experiences?”; and 3) “How do gender expectations for female partners of members in CAOs influence their perspectives on children’s ORP?” I used risk and sociocultural theory to inform my approach to research questions 1 and 2 and conducted a reflexive thematic analysis. The results of my study addressing research question 1 were twofold: 1) Members in CAOs believe ORP provides children with opportunities that challenge excessive safety restrictions promoted in Canadian society; and (2) the work experiences of members in CAOs in the Canadian Armed Forces influenced their distinction between children’s ORP and dangerous play-related injuries. In response to research question 2, I found that female partners believed (1) ORP in close physical proximity to strangers and cars is dangerous for children; (2) ORP should not result in children experiencing serious injuries; and (3) outdoor risky play can teach children to assess and manage risks. I employed poststructural feminist theory, feminist methodologies, and critical discourse analysis to address question 3. My results were twofold: (1) Military mothers resist discursively produced pressures to subscribe to overprotective parenting during their children’s ORP; and (2) traditional gender discourses in Canadian society shape military mothers’ feelings of responsibility for their children’s ORP safety. The results from my research suggest that exposure to information on war and combat can influence parents’ perspectives on their children’s ORP. Further, they suggest that societal values, such as gender role expectations and pressure on mothers to engage in overprotective parenting, can influence parents’ fears for their children’s safety and the ORP they encourage and restrict.

Committee Chair - Michael Creswell Committee Member - Edward D. Wynot Committee Member - Jonathan Grant / A Thesis Submitted to the Department of History in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. / Fall Semester, 2004. / July 27, 2004. / MI5, Tomas Harris, Juan Pujol, ARABEL, GARBO, MI6, Abwehr, Double-Cross, Double Agent, Twenty Committee, XX, Wilhelm Canaris / Includes bibliographical references. / Michael Creswell, Professor Directing Thesis; Jonathan Grant, Committee Member; Edward D. Wynot, Committee Member.

This thesis covers two critical time periods of the history of Pensacola, Florida. The first examines the Civil War and the second covers Reconstruction. The study begins with the Union's occupation of Fort Pickens located on Santa Rosa Island and evaluate's the North's strategy in occupying the position. To illustrate the fort's strengths, the thesis provides accounts of the battle of Santa Rosa Island and the subsequent artillery duels. Because of its limited importance during the war, neither side placed much emphasis on Pensacola. As a result, the city was not the site of a major engagement. In 1862, the Confederates abandoned the city and the Union quickly took over, but limited manpower prevented an adequate occupation forcing the federals to remain within the safety of their installations until the end of the war. Pensacola had an easier transition to the post war nation, because of two factors, the military and the timber industry. The federal government kept enough personnel to properly man the forts and Navy Yard, and as a result the soldiers' presence prevented lawlessness and ensured the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts. While other areas of the South endured poverty due to the failure of cotton crops, Pensacola's economy grew as the demand for lumber increased. West Florida's vast longleaf pine forests provided an almost unlimited supply of timber, and the region's sawmills flourished. This provided a large number of wage paying jobs that kept Pensacola's residents out of poverty. Along with providing employment, the timber industry boosted the shipping traffic entering and leaving the city's port. The city also faced other issues that affected its events between 1861 and 1877 such as yellow fever, railroads, and the possibility of annexation to Alabama. Each of these aspects influenced the development of Pensacola and its residents. Yellow fever prevented the city from becoming a haven for tourists seeking a healthier climate, and the lack of a railroad connection with Tallahassee prompted Alabama to propose annexation. The combination of these factors along with the military and timber industry gave Pensacola a unique situation during the Civil War and Reconstruction. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Spring Semester, 2005. / March 3, 2005. / Fort Pickens, Florida, Reconstruction, Civil War, Pensacola / Includes bibliographical references. / Joe M. Richardson, Professor Directing Thesis; James P. Jones, Jr., Committee Member; Paul W. Strait, Committee Member.

The French Revolution had a tremendous impact on the social, political, and cultural development of the western world. Similarly, it had a revolutionary impact on warfare in both Europe and the United States. Although the U.S. had a distinctly British military tradition through the War of 1812, in the span of a single year, the U.S. Army adopted the French system of warfare or French Combat Method as the intellectual framework for the American way of warfare. This French Combat Method informed and guided the way in which American officers conceptualized the battlefield, how they organized their formations and their regulations, how they equipped them, and how they learned lessons from their experiences on the battlefield. This French influence dominated the American way of warfare from 1814 through the Civil War and World War I, and into the 1930's. It was not until the catastrophic fall of France in 1940 that caused the U.S. Army to fundamentally change their intellectual framework. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Fall Semester 2008. / August 6, 2008. / United States Army, French Military Thought / Includes bibliographical references. / Frederick R. Davis, Professor Directing Dissertation; J. Anthony Stallins, Outside Committee Member; James P. Jones, Committee Member; Jonathan Grant, Committee Member; Darrin M. McMahon, Committee Member.

The way in which Napoleon used cavalry to shape the battlefield and to support his infantry attacks made cavalry operations play a unique role in Napoleonic warfare. Studying the cavalry operations during the decline of the Empire from 1813 through 1815 enabled an analysis not only of the capabilities of the soldiers and leadership of the French cavalry, but also a better understanding of the changes that occurred in Napoleon's operational and strategic art of warfare. This study required an analysis of cavalry operations in all of the major campaigns in the period. The operations of General François-Ètienne Kellermann from 1813 through 1815 provided an excellent case study of cavalry operations to analyze the changes in Napoleonic warfare. This detailed analysis presented different conclusions than many historians and questions much of the traditional interpretation of the capabilities and operations of Napoleon and his armies. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Spring Semester, 2006. / April 7, 2006. / French History, Napoleon, Kellermann / Includes bibliographical references. / Donald D. Horward, Professor Directing Thesis; Jim Jones, Committee Member; Jonathan Grant, Committee Member.

"How the Common Grunt and Prostitute Changed Military Policy" argues that the promiscuity of the American servicemen and the women they encountered, forced the military to abandon its policy of endorsing abstinence during the Second World War. Out of fear of weakening the combat strength of the military, the government initially used punishments as a deterrent to contracting venereal disease. Since the men in arms actively sought venues for pre-marital sex regardless of the consequences, such penalties proved unsuccessful. As the war progressed, the War Department and Surgeon General's Office reacted and began to implement methods of venereal disease education, prevention, and treatment. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Spring Semester, 2004. / April 1, 2004. / Prostitution, Sexual Behavoir, American Servicemen, World War II / Includes bibliographical references. / Jonathan Grant, Professor Directing Thesis; Peter Garretson, Committee Member; William O. Oldson, Committee Member.

The expansionist agenda of the Polk administration culminated in the War with Mexico. The capture of Mexico City in September 1847 left the United States Army with the unprecedented task of occupying an enemy capital for an extended period. After the initial theaters of operation proved unable to secure a peace, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott commenced a campaign to take central Mexico including the capital city. In March 1847, an army of 11,000 soldiers under Scott landed at Vera Cruz. In six months, Scott's army marched over 250 miles and won five major battles. In mid-September, Scott took Mexico City. Throughout the campaign, Scott attempted to implement a pacification plan in an effort to prompt Mexico to open peace negotiations. Concern for his army weighed heavily on him as he faced unprecedented challenges in occupying Mexico City after its capture. The United States simply had almost no experience in the ramifications of fighting a foreign war, other than a few brief small-scale incursions onto foreign soil at Tripoli in 1805 and in British Canada. The difficulties that arose for Scott from the situation in Mexico were frustrating. Scott pacification plan used conciliation, coercion, and force on Mexico's army and people in an effort to win the acceptance of the Mexican people. The success of his campaign depended on his army's ability to win battles while keeping Mexican civilian losses as low as possible. Scott devised a sophisticated pacification plan that was ahead of its time. This effort, together with his willingness to suspend operations after major battles to provide an opportunity for peace talks, reflected Scott's strategy. His goal was to end the war, not subjugate the Mexican people.

Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) is the method the United States (US) Army and Navy use to discharge cargo from large seafaring vessels onto a bare beach when an enemy force has denied access to a deep-water port or the ports have been damaged by natural disasters, terrorist actions, sabotaged by military forces, etc. The last large scale, published analytic study on JLOTS was conducted in 1993 during the Ocean Venture 93 exercise at Camp Lejeune, NC; since that time, nearly the entire US Army inventory of wheeled vehicles have been replaced and tracked systems have increased in size and weight with the additions of reactive armor tiles and urban survival kits. The current estimation method for determining how long a JLOTS operation will take relies on the median duration values in order to determine total operational length. This research shows that the JLOTS activity duration medians published in current military doctrine are no longer representative of the current inventory of US Army vehicles. New planning factors are defined based on JLOTS subject matter expert opinions as well as a new method of JLOTS duration estimation is described through the use of discrete-event simulation. The results of the proposed duration estimation method were compared to both the existing methodology using both the published planning factors and the new planning factors defined through subject matter expert opinion. In both comparisons the current estimation method was found to consistently overestimate operational throughput while underestimating duration since it fails to capture the queuing actions that occur in a resource constrained environment such as JLOTS. It is the recommendation of this research that a time and motion study be conducted on JLOTS operations in order to more accurately define the probability distributions associated with JLOTS activities. These distributions would replace the triangular distributions defined by subject matter experts in this research in order to generate a more accurate estimate of JLOTS duration and throughput. More accurate estimates for JLOTS operations will enable cost savings by providing maritime transportation providers with greater fidelity on scheduling while reducing the time these ships are vulnerable to enemy actions.