The primary aim of this thesis is to analyze the consideration of suicide by modernity which imposes life as the most essential and unconditional affirmation and death as the absolute opposite of life. Herein, the mutual exclusiveness of life and death is considered under the guidance of Foucault&rsquo / s critique on modernity. Thus, the potential of suicide as a resistance to the primacy of life in modern times is discussed in a Foucauldian framework. From this point forth, with inspiration from existentialist thought, a hypothetical category of philosophical suicide is defined to emphasize a peculiar form which has a more radical potential to resist the pre-given and unconditional affirmation of life than any other form of suicide. Within this framework, the peculiarity of this hypothetical category of philosophical suicide is discussed by focusing on its radical potential to resist the mode of existence dictated by modernity.

In this thesis I characterize, through an analysis of some of the key themes and central insights of both Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, what Bernstein (2011) has called a “sea change” in contemporary philosophy. I illustrate how their main insights are profoundly educational and how they offer us an effective means of reconceptualising what education means within the context of our world today. I will particularly stress two important elements of this ‘sea change’ that figure prominently in both Peirce and Gadamer’s work. First, the central importance of situated agency, and second, the affirmation of a relational process ontology. When taken together, these insights entail a conception of education that radically affirms the transformative potential of human agency based on the fecundity of educational experience. This ‘sea change’ will be presented in juxtaposition to the problematic modern/Cartesian framework that is current in educational thought today.

In this thesis I characterize, through an analysis of some of the key themes and central insights of both Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, what Bernstein (2011) has called a “sea change” in contemporary philosophy. I illustrate how their main insights are profoundly educational and how they offer us an effective means of reconceptualising what education means within the context of our world today. I will particularly stress two important elements of this ‘sea change’ that figure prominently in both Peirce and Gadamer’s work. First, the central importance of situated agency, and second, the affirmation of a relational process ontology. When taken together, these insights entail a conception of education that radically affirms the transformative potential of human agency based on the fecundity of educational experience. This ‘sea change’ will be presented in juxtaposition to the problematic modern/Cartesian framework that is current in educational thought today.

The purpose of this study is to examine philosophical hermeneutics as a referent for student understanding of Nature-of-Science (NOS) concepts. Rather than focus on a prescriptive set of canons used in addressing NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools, this study seeks to explicate a descriptive set of principles based on Hans Georg-Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that has the potential for developing dispositions necessary for understanding. Central among these are the concepts of fore-structure, prejudice, temporal distance, and history of effect, all of which constitute part of the whole of the hermeneutic circle as envisaged by Gadamer. As such, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is contrasted with Cartesian epistemology and its primacy of method, the Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice, the modernist/progressive tendency to consider all situations as problems to be solved by relegating all forms of knowledge to techné, and the subjective nature of interpretation inherent in a hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication of such a conceptual analysis for NOS pedagogy is that student understanding is considered not so much as a cognitive outcome dependent on a series of mental functions but rather as an ontological characteristic of Dasein (being-human) that situates learning in the interchange between interpreter and text. In addition, the philosophical foundations implicit in addressing student understanding of NOS found in many curricular reform efforts and pedagogical practices in science education are questioned. Gadamer’s hermeneutics affords science education a viable philosophical framework within which to consider student understanding of the development of scientific knowledge and the scientific enterprise.

While naturalistic theories have come to dominate the philosophical landscape, there is still little consensus on what “naturalism” means. I trace the origins of contemporary naturalism to a view, called the “fundamental naturalistic impulse,” that originates in Quine’s turn against Carnap and which I take to be necessary for naturalism. In light of this impulse, some “substantively naturalistic” theories are examined: a weak version of non-supernaturalism, Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms, and “Canberra plan” conceptual analyses of moral property terms. I suggest that if we take the fundamental naturalistic impulse seriously, then there is no need to differentiate substantive versions of naturalism over and above methodological versions. Substantive thesis in ontology or semantics can be had on account of one’s methodological commitments. This not only cuts against the distinction between methodological and substantive naturalisms, but also demonstrates just how far method can reach.

<p>"What Can Philosophical Literature Do? The Contribution of Simone de Beauvoir" examines Simone de Beauvoir's existentialist aesthetic theory of the philosophical novel alongside two fictional works, L'invitée (1943) and Le sang des autres (1945), which constitute Beauvoir's first experiments in writing works of this hybrid genre. Throughout this dissertation, I mobilize Beauvoir's theoretical and literary writing to challenge implied notions that literature somehow acts as a supplement to philosophy and that philosophical literature does not offer distinct advantages to the philosophical system.</p><p>In her theoretical writings on philosophical literature - including "Littérature et métaphysique" (1945), her auto-analysis of her novels in La Force de l'âge (1960), her contribution to the forum, Que peut la littérature? (1965), and her lecture, "Mon expérience d'écrivain" (1966) - Beauvoir confronts a potential impasse in the conception of the philosophical novel, which risks devolving into being either a roman à thèse or a concrete example of a pre-existing philosophical system. This aesthetic impasse becomes particularly acute when Beauvoir begins to write ethical fiction after WWII. This dissertation catalogs Beauvoir's unique philosophical solutions to this aesthetic problem, and in turning to L'invitée and Le sang des autres, demonstrates that Beauvoir's aesthetic innovations open up readings of her novels to new insights about her contributions to twentieth-century literary and philosophical thought, including her thought on separation from the other - solipsism and skepticism - and on connection to the other - love, Mitsein, and reciprocal recognition. </p><p>In chapter one, I point to Beauvoir's formulation of the philosophical-literary impasse in "Littérature et métaphysique" and enumerate how this impasse has worked its way into the critical reception of L'invitée. Beauvoir resolves this aesthetic problem through her concept of the philosophical-literary work as a particularly strong appeal to the reader's freedom. In chapter two, I read L'invitée with Beauvoir's aesthetic insights in mind, which has the effect of freeing Beauvoir's novel from the philosophical binds of Sartre's theory of the Look in L'être et le néant. In L'invitée, Beauvoir accounts for and also goes beyond conflict and domination by building a multiplicity of looks through her theme of spectacle in her novel (dance, theater). In chapter three, I show how Beauvoir's turn to ethics and engaged literature after WWII once again raises the specter of the roman à thèse. I thus delineate the differences between engaged literature and the roman à thèse, differences which rely upon the existentialist notion of engaged literature as a dévoilement or unveiling of ethical issues. Finally, in chapter four I show the ways in which Le sang des autres both falls into the traps of the roman à thèse on the one hand and on the other resists that trap through its unveiling of her characters' world as Mitsein and the ambiguous ethical problem of empathy within Mitsein.</p> / Dissertation

The purpose of this study is to discuss the appropriateness of a cognitive approach to Donald Davidson&#039 / s meaning theory. Davidson makes the bold proposal that a truth theory, modified for a natural language, may be treated as a meaning theory for that language. According to Davidson, a meaning theory is an empirical theory. Radical Interpretation is at the center of such an empirical inquiry which places restrictions on the truth theory to make it suitable as a meaning theory without appeal to semantic notions. Davidson&lsquo / s aim in presenting this bold proposal and radical interpretation is to shed light on the concept of meaning, not to define the actual semantic competence of language users. But what Davidson&lsquo / s project does not aim to define is the main thing that a cognitive approach must account for. Whether a truth theory can represent the semantic competence of language users is discussed in this work. It is concluded that, although there is no a priori reason for such a representation claim, the cognitive approach&mdash / with the right assumptions to make the claim testable&mdash / can lead to an empirical research programme.

What is the meaning of life? This has been one of the major questions of philosophy for centuries / from Socrates to Nietzsche and from Tolstoy to the famous comedy writers&rsquo / group Monty Python. People from diverse intellectual backgrounds asked what the meaning of life is. Although there are doubts that this question is now outdated, meaning of life seems to me still an intriguing subject. In this thesis I argue that life&rsquo / s meaning must be discussed according to two different notions. One of these notions is the content of life where life&rsquo / s meaning can be analyzed according to its coherence with a value system, its achievements or its influence on others. The other is the notion of life&rsquo / s meaning as a mental concept, as an experience. I provide reasons to think life&rsquo / s meaning as a composite mental state and propose its components. My point of view carries subjectivist implications, however by introducing necessary conditions of the formation of the composite mental state that provides a life with meaning I argue that such a mental state attains objectivity.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the often-ignored inherent philosophical connection between Charles Taylor¡¦s ontological argument (philosophical anthropology) and his political scheme. Taylor articulates a moral realist understanding of the plurality of values and an ontological statement of human agency, and tries to demostrate a possibility of reconciliation between essentially conflicting values and cultures. In Taylor¡¦s view, ¡§the many¡¨ does not necessarily entail tragical choices among values, as Isaiah Berlin famously asserted, but can be possibly mediated through the common human agency with the hope that we can eventually reach one true consensus. Based on this uniquely Taylorian understanding of human condition, Taylor¡¦s political scheme can be seen as an effort to ameliorate the deep-rooted malaise within Western modernity, and find a common ontological ground among community members and citizens by which deliberations can be facilitated. The thesis will go on to examine Taylor¡¦s two most inspiring political assertions, namely, the polilics of recognition and civic humanism, in detail. I will argue that although Taylor optimistically believes that a common moral and cultural understanding can help forming and be transformed into a common political common good within a given community, the connection between these two levels of commonality is fairly weak. Moreover, what liberals object is precisely Taylor¡¦s attempt to equate cultural common understanding with a form of political common good.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2002. / Title from title screen (viewed November 19, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the School of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts. Degree awarded 2002; thesis submitted 2001. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.