War and war-fighters have become immortalized through performance; generations of service-men and women are defined by actions on the battlefield artfully altered on stage and screen. This reciprocal relationship, whether war-fighters intentionally participate or not, has imbued the entertainment industry with the power to characterize war-fighters in lasting ways. Performance enters the military in other ways as well: war-fighters reenact moments from war films; combat training takes on theatrical tactics and rhetoric; war-fighters of the War on Terror record and stage their own war performances. We accept that current war performances will inevitably affect the perception and reputation of war-fighters, not only for the duration of the war but for decades afterward, but do we fully understand the cost of the relationship between today's war-fighters and performance's role in the military? In this MA thesis, based on ethnographic fieldwork with veterans of the War on Terror, I explore the intersection between war-fighters, war, and performance. By examining how veterans relate to cinematic and stage performances of war, I will discuss how war-fighters of the War on Terror use performance to surrogate their warrior identities, to train for and defer the war experience, and to produce their own war performances. Combining my ethnographic fieldwork with archival film and play research, I illuminate how performance constitutes and challenges the war-fighter?s identities in the War on Terror.

This is an integrative paper aiming to encapsulate the themes of my previously published work upon which this PhD is being assessed. This work; encompassing several papers and various chapters of my book are attached behind this essay. The research question, examines the effect of Western support to warlords on political legitimacy in the post 9/11 Afghan war. I contextualise the research question in terms of my critical engagement with the literature of strategists in Afghanistan during this time. Subsequently, I draw out themes in relation to the available literature on warlords, politics and security in Afghanistan. I highlight the value of thinking about these questions conceptually in terms of legitimacy. I then introduce the published work, summarising the focus of each paper or book chapter. Later, a ‘findings’ section addresses how the policy of supporting warlords has affected legitimacy through its impact on security and stability, the political settlement and ultimately whether Afghans choose to accept the Western-backed project in Afghanistan, or not. I argue that this issue is important as it has security implications not just in the immediate region, but increasingly, throughout the Middle East and possibly further.

The Obama Administration in the United States has announced and started implementing foreign policy that is distinctly different from that of its predecessor, the Bush Administration. A new foreign policy doctrine, based on the concept of ‘smart power’, is now emerging and acknowledges that a combination of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ is required for the US to build an appropriate framework within which to tackle unconventional threats such as terrorism. In essence, the prioritisation of soft power indicates a return to intangible power resources, such as culture, ideology and institutions, and most importantly, prioritises diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. This study will determine why this dramatic shift has occurred, and will investigate the diplomatic fallout of the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terror’ during which ‘hard power’ tools were favoured and diplomacy was marginalised or, at best, combined with unilateral and even coercive tools of foreign policy. The study will also interrogate the preliminary assumption that the foregoing has convinced policy-makers in the US that the country, despite its superpower status, will not be able to achieve its long-term goals on its own and, if it acts unilaterally, will undermine those political alliances and institutions that are vital to its foreign-policy goals. This has arguably prompted the Obama Administration’s recent embrace of global diplomatic norms, inter alia, transparency, inclusiveness, multilateralism, respect for international law, and basic civility in international relations. / Mini Dissertation (MDIPS)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / Unrestricted

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The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) was published in 2006 and used by the military to consolidate counterinsurgency strategies and tactics and correct the growing military problems in Iraq. However, rather unusually, this military doctrinal publication was also heavily publicized through a wide array of media to the American public giving it an important role in political discourse and the rhetorical history of the U.S. ‘war on terror’. Beyond its military application, the FM 3-24 can be understood as a rhetorical device used by the Bush Administration to repair a collapsing ‘war on terror’ narrative and shore up plummeting public support for the war in Iraq, which had reached its lowest levels at the time of the manual’s publication. Still more important is the language in the text itself, which bears a conspicuous tone of benevolence, historically uncharacteristic to military doctrine. Despite this ‘spirit of goodwill,’ the FM 3-24, in fact, functions as a segment of the ‘war on terror’ narrative and an ideological vehicle for American global hegemony directed primarily toward American audiences. This view is justified by three main trends in the text: One, the manual omits mention of, or minimizes, the moral and political impact of military invasions on foreign countries that necessarily precede counterinsurgency operations; two, it relies fundamentally on legal arrangements with occupied countries that favor American prerogatives; and three, it reduces counterinsurgencies to a simple dichotomy between good and evil, the latter role being assigned to anyone who opposes the United States, which therefore denies the political complexities of that opposition. The FM 3-24 is a prescriptive document that has been 1) designed to militarily extend or reinforce American global power through counterinsurgency operations and 2) used politically to reproduce or justify particular attitudes in the American public that will foster support for those operations.

In the 1990s, three Mexican-born filmmakers, Alfonso Cuarón, Guillermo del Toro, and Alejandro G. Iñárritu, began careers that would see them directing films in Mexico, the US, and Europe. The three filmmakers are known for incorporating a broad spectrum of genres and aesthetic traditions from world cinema into their own films. Despite their internationalism, scholars and critics have tended to emphasize their national identity, viewing their films as either intrinsically Mexican or not Mexican enough. I argue that their films reflect multiple national identities and address what it means to live in a global community constituted by a plurality of cultural perspectives. This dissertation reads these auteurs as constructing their films as sites of dialogue between different identities, enabling their work to appeal to global audiences. I also understand these filmmakers as being in conversation with each other through shared themes that articulate specific social scenarios while remaining broad enough to resonate with audiences around the world. Chapter 1 examines Cuarón’s Sólo con tu pareja (1991), del Toro’s Cronos (1993), and Iñárritu’s Amores perros (2000). I read the directors’ thematization of precarity, alienation, and abjection as resonating with audiences in Mexico and the US who experienced the jarring effects of neoliberalism. Chapter 2 discusses Cuarón’s A Little Princess (1995) and del Toro’s Mimic (1997), which I read as sharing a theme of dislocation that spoke to American, Indian, and Latin American societies that were being transformed at the end of the Cold War. Chapter 3 explores how del Toro, Cuarón, and Iñárritu responded to the post-9/11 political environment in Pan’s Labyrinth (2006), Children of Men (2006), and Babel (2006). Through their thematic concern with chaos and order, these films spoke to viewers overwhelmed by war, the torture and detainment of terrorist suspects, mass surveillance, harsh immigration policies, and the looming threat of terrorism itself. / 2024-11-14T00:00:00Z

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AbstractThis study began with the idea that the drone attacks launched by the United States on the northwest region of Pakistan since 2004 have not helped in the expressed aim of the US to win the war on terror. The study asked three main questions. It wished to discover why drone attacks in Pakistan had not helped to win the war on terror, the main reasons that these attacks have not been successful and how these attacks have led to the increase of the anti-US feeling in Pakistan. The study used a case study methodology that focused on gaining a qualitative insight from a range of perspectives including official government stances, the reaction of media and social media and the public reactions in Pakistan. The study analysis is supported by the theory of neoliberalism and neo realism as it deemed the most appropriate in this type of work.Conducted within the neoliberal and positivist perspective, the study concluded that the drone strikes have not helped to win the war on terror and that they are actually a major part of why this victory has not yet occurred. The cold-hearted manner with which the US seem to launch drone strike attacks have led to the development of the views that the US does not care for international laws and has no desire to take Pakistan sovereignty into account. The role of the media has helped spread the anti-US feeling far more rapidly than would have been previously possible in the region. The access to the Internet, the use of social media websites and the global coverage of the situation means that reports of civilian casualties has been a common occurrence over the past 10 years, and this has seemingly strengthened the terrorist resolve, turned the public against the US strategy and also led in some cases to the further radicalization of the Pakistani youth. When assessed through a neoliberal perspective, it was apparent that the strategy does not fit with the concept of international co-operation and that the actions of the US have led to the growth of anti-US sentiment. The main failing of the drone strike strategy could be said to be the fact that it was devised using a neorealist attitude in an increasingly neoliberal global society. The study also presented a number of policy recommendations and future areas of study based on the findings from this work.