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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

This study attempts to examine evolutionary theory and creationism objectively without engaging in an apology for or a criticism of either. It compares the presuppositions and assumptions of both systems, and examines the role of faith in religion and in the scientific theory of evolution. After discussing the nature of the scientific method and the development of the theory of evolution, the study explores the dichotomy of faith and reason, the ways in which these operate in theories of intelligent design and theistic evolution, and the question of whether scientific evolutionary theory can be considered to be a secular religion. The thesis argues that acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution is as dependent upon a faith commitment as is adherence to religion, though the type and quality of the two respective faith systems are very different and, therefore, worthy of comparison and contrast. The study concludes that, while science and evolutionary theory share many of the same features and characteristics of faith and presumption, it is presently not appropriate to claim that evolutionary theory is a secular religion, and that when this opinion is asserted it is worthwhile to analyze the motivation, conscious and unconscious, involved. / Thesis (PhD (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in association with Greenwich School of Theology, U.K., 2013.

This study attempts to examine evolutionary theory and creationism objectively without engaging in an apology for or a criticism of either. It compares the presuppositions and assumptions of both systems, and examines the role of faith in religion and in the scientific theory of evolution. After discussing the nature of the scientific method and the development of the theory of evolution, the study explores the dichotomy of faith and reason, the ways in which these operate in theories of intelligent design and theistic evolution, and the question of whether scientific evolutionary theory can be considered to be a secular religion. The thesis argues that acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution is as dependent upon a faith commitment as is adherence to religion, though the type and quality of the two respective faith systems are very different and, therefore, worthy of comparison and contrast. The study concludes that, while science and evolutionary theory share many of the same features and characteristics of faith and presumption, it is presently not appropriate to claim that evolutionary theory is a secular religion, and that when this opinion is asserted it is worthwhile to analyze the motivation, conscious and unconscious, involved. / Thesis (PhD (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in association with Greenwich School of Theology, U.K., 2013.

No description available.

Recent years have seen increased interest in using theism (the perspective that assumes that God is currently actively in the world) as a conceptual framework for scientific inquiry. This interest has built particular momentum in psychology where several scholars have expressed that traditional naturalistic approaches limit understanding and investigation of psychology's subject matter and thus are insufficient to fully account for human phenomena. Others have previously made the case for the consideration of theism as a legitimate alternative basis for psychological theory, research, and practice. This dissertation begins with that consideration and examines what would be required to move a theistic approach to psychology forward. In other words, if God is assumed to be active in the world (including the psychological world-theism), what difference would that make for the ideas, methods, and practices of psychology? As the current activity of God is the foundational assumption of theism, clarity about what that activity would entail is especially essential for those seeking to develop a theistic approach to psychology and to describe how their discipline would be different from that perspective. Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of clear and explicitly articulated conceptions of God's actions in and for psychology. This dissertation provides a conceptual analysis of the activity of God that synthesizes disparate approaches to divine action into a tentative conceptualization or taxonomic schema. This schema organizes the scholarly literature from across several major traditions into six major heads and elucidates multiple subordinate concepts. The conceptualization serves as an orientation to important issues such as strong v weak theisms, the limitations of naturalism, and practical theistic applications for psychology. Detailed illustrations of these concepts as applied to psychological theory, research (both in the qualitative and quantitative modes), and practice further demonstrate the utility of such a conceptualization. These examples provide a specific focus on the unique contributions of a theistic perspective over and against those of naturalism.