Many accounts of epistemic justification are initially plausible as accounts of justifiably coming to believe a proposition, but fail as accounts of continuing to believe a proposition. In this essay, I examine candidate theories of ongoing justification, arguing that those along both coherentist and foundationalist lines are inadequate. First, I argue that coherentism doesn't work by dividing such accounts into negative and positive theories. Negative coherentism fails because of its dependence on the principle of epistemic conservatism, against which there are decisive objections. Positive coherentism is also rejected because one can be justified in continuing to believe a proposition even if one's doxastic corpus fails to entail or make probable or in any way evidentially support the belief. Foundationalism is then considered. According to one sort of foundationalist, an agent is justified in continuing to believe a proposition only if she remembers the original justificatory basis of her belief. This sort of foundationalism suffers a fate similar to that of positive coherentism; it entails that many beliefs, which clearly are justified, are unjustified. Another kind of foundationalism, one that treats memory as a justification conferring process, is considered. This version is inadequate as it fails to account for the historical nature of justification and fails to account for the justification of unactivated mnemonic beliefs. In the essay's final chapter, I argue that the failure of both foundationalism and coherentism indicates that internalistic accounts are hopeless. Finally, a theory of ongoing justification along reliabilist lines is suggested, elaborated, and defended.

I explore the traditional contention that a priori epistemic warrants enjoy some sort of higher epistemic security than empirical warrants. By focusing on warrants that might plausibly be called 'basic', and by availing myself of an original taxonomy of epistemic defeaters, I defend a claim in the vicinity of the traditional contention. By discussing some examples, I argue that basic a priori warrants are immune to some sort of empirical defeaters, which I describe in detail. An important by-product of my investigation is a novel theory of epistemic defeaters, according to which only agents able to engage in higher-order epistemic thinking can suffer undermining defeat, while wholly unreflective agents can, in principle, suffer overriding defeat.

Luk Ching Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-134). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Internalism and Externalism --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- An Internalist's Tale and the Theme of this Thesis --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Varieties of Internalism and Externalism --- p.2 / Chapter A. --- Varieties of internalism --- p.3 / Chapter B. --- Varieties of Externalism --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Nature of Internalism-Externalism Debate --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- Looking Forward --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Humean Internalism and the Humean conception of Normative Reasons --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- Hume's Theory on the Role of Reason and the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- "Williams's Attack on Desire-independent Normative Reasons, Two Arguments for Williams and Their Weaknesses" --- p.22 / Chapter 2.4 --- Two Anti-Humean Arguments on the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter A. --- Nagel on Desires and the Justifications of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter B. --- Scanlon on the Role of Desires in the Justification of Normative Reasons and My Modifications --- p.34 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Strength of Desires and the Mechanism of Decision Making in the Humean and Anti-Humean models --- p.42 / Chapter 2.6 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism and a Remark --- p.45 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.48 / Chapter 3.1 --- PAI and the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Humean Motivation Theory and the Assessment of the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.52 / Chapter 3.3 --- Argument for the Humean Motivation Theory 一 The Direction of Fit --- p.59 / Chapter A. --- "Brief Analysis of Intentional Action, Willing, Goal, Intention and Motivating Reason" --- p.60 / Chapter B. --- Direction of Fit and the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.62 / Chapter 3.4 --- Four Arguments against the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.64 / Chapter A. --- Special Nature of Moral Beliefs --- p.65 / Chapter B. --- The Non-teleological Nature of Moral Actions --- p.70 / Chapter C. --- Argument of Intellectualized Motivation --- p.73 / Chapter D. --- Argument of Irrationality --- p.78 / Chapter 3.5 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.84 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.1 --- Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2 --- Argument of Incoherence --- p.88 / Chapter A. --- Exposition --- p.88 / Chapter B. --- Criticism --- p.92 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proper-grasp Argument --- p.105 / Chapter 4.4 --- Virtuous Person Argument --- p.110 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.117 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- After the Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.119 / Chapter 5.1 --- Two Problems of Rational Internalism --- p.120 / Chapter 5.2 --- Rejection of Rational Internalism and Appropriateness of Blame --- p.124 / Chapter 5.3 --- Weak Externalism and Morality --- p.129 / Bibliography --- p.132

高基存. / "2001年7月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 參考文獻 (leaves 120-123) / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 7 yue" / Gao Jicun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 120-123) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 序言 --- p.iii / Chapter 第一章 --- 何謂基礎論？何謂融貫論？ --- p.1 / Chapter 第一節 --- 故事 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二節 --- 基礎論與融貫論的主要分別 --- p.4 / Chapter 第三節 --- 避免混淆 --- p.6 / Chapter 第四節 --- 倒退論證 --- p.8 / Chapter 第五節 --- 融貫論者的回應 --- p.11 / Chapter 第六節 --- 不可錯性 --- p.12 / Chapter 第七節 --- 何謂「融貫」？ --- p.17 / Chapter 第八節 --- 各種類型的基礎論與融貫論 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 戈德曼的可靠主義 --- p.21 / Chapter 第一節 --- 可靠主義者戈德曼 --- p.21 / Chapter 第二節 --- 知識論詞 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三節 --- 嘗試錯誤的進路 --- p.25 / Chapter 第四節 --- 原因要求 --- p.34 / Chapter 第五節 --- 提出可靠主義 --- p.35 / Chapter 第六節 --- 可靠主義的精確表達´ؤ´ؤ一種基礎論 --- p.38 / Chapter 第七節 --- 關於反事實情況的要求 --- p.41 / Chapter 第八節 --- 強與弱的證成 --- p.44 / Chapter 第九節 --- 對四種合理信念的要求 --- p.47 / Chapter 第十節 --- 笛卡兒的魔鬼世界 --- p.50 / Chapter 十一節 --- 訴諸客觀可靠性的錯謬 --- p.52 / Chapter 十二節 --- 基礎論中的融貫要求 --- p.55 / Chapter 十三節 --- 本章結論 --- p.64 / Chapter 第三章 --- 博朱爾的融貫論 --- p.66 / Chapter 第一節 --- 融貫論者博朱爾 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二節 --- 整體主義的證成結構 --- p.67 / Chapter 第三節 --- 融貫論四步曲 --- p.68 / Chapter 第四節 --- 「融貫」的意思 --- p.71 / Chapter 第五節 --- 三個質疑 --- p.76 / Chapter 第六節 --- 信念系統假定 --- p.78 / Chapter 第七節 --- 觀察信念的證成 --- p.81 / Chapter 第八節 --- 內省信念的證成 --- p.89 / Chapter 第九節 --- 輸入質疑 --- p.93 / Chapter 第十節 --- 可選擇的其他融貫系統 --- p.95 / Chapter 十一節 --- 真理問題的質疑 --- p.96 / Chapter 十二節 --- 信念系統假定的兩難困境 --- p.106 / Chapter 十三節 --- 倒戈相向的觀察要求 --- p.109 / Chapter 十四節 --- 融貫論中的基礎原則 --- p.112 / Chapter 十五節 --- 本章結論 --- p.114 / 結論 --- p.115 / 參考書目 --- p.120

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1985. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 24-25).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xv, 294 p.; also includes graphics (some col.). Includes abstract and vita. Co-advisors: Christopher Andersen and Michael E. Beeth, College of Education. Includes bibliographical references (p. 256-262).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xxii, 299 p.; also includes graphics (some col.). Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Arthur White, College of Education. Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-228).

Thesis (M.S.)--Middle East Technical University, 2003. / Keywords: Justification, Kinds of Justification, Truth, Truth Connection, Reality, Kinds of Reality, Knowledge, Conditions of Knowledge.

Thesis (M. Ed.)--York University, 2002. Graduate Programme in Education. / Typescript. Title on certificate page: Teaching question-based learning in elementary science education. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-102). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ71573.

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