This thesis contends that Oakeshott’s political philosophy contributes to constructivism in International Relations by identifying the moral foundations of international society and law. The epistemological basis of this contribution is a methodological holism that is defended through arguments developed within British Absolute idealism. The opposition between concrete and abstract concepts grounds a theory in which knowledge is conditional because it is constructed on certain assumptions or postulates. Philosophy identifies and interrogates the postulates, exposes their limited value and maintains the logical autonomy of the various forms of knowledge, from a universal point of view. The concepts of tradition and moral practice are central in Oakeshott’s political philosophy, and indicate a theory of normativity in which moral reasoning and political activity are a form of argumentative discourse constructed by starting from the assumptions shared within a certain community. In this light, Oakeshott is compared to the exponents of the English School and to constructivism because of his definition of an interpretative approach, in which world politics is a normative engagement and the role of theory is to consider its presuppositions as well as its universal meaning. Moreover, it is shown that he offers a comprehensive theory of the evolution of international society and of the role of war that is consistent with his broader political philosophy. The theory of ‘civil association’ is the ground for an understanding of international society as an association between states constituted by the recognition of moral constraints on the actions of states. These constraints are institutionalised in customary international law, which is understood as a moral practice. Therefore, international society is grounded on an evolving morality resulting from the historical conduct of states. As such, Oakeshott’s political philosophy provides an understanding of international relations that is distinct from both Realism and Universalism.

Theorising about international relations has progressed in recent years, and dialogue between the concurrent disciplines of International Relations, political theory and international law has started to emerge. There is, however, work still to be done in fostering a genuine ‘International Theory’ containing the potential to truly transcend arbitrary disciplinary and methodological boundaries, particularly where the subject matter of the respective disciplines – namely, an inquiry into the means by which a true understanding of the nature and conditions of international relations may be realised – is trans-disciplinary in nature. My thesis seeks to reanalyse the poststructuralist critique of the discipline of International Relations from a contemporary perspective, made possible by the trans-disciplinary progress alluded to above. I choose poststructuralism as a means of considering the most radical attack on the foundations and methodological commitments of traditional IR as I believe the responses which originated from within the discipline – social constructivism in particular – did not go far enough in grounding a robust yet legitimate means by which to construct an understanding of international relations capable of transcending the challenge of poststructuralism. I consider such positions and the constitutive theory of Mervyn Frost in detail before examining the potential of a theoretical amalgamation of the philosophical constructivism of John Rawls with a holistic social constructivist conception of the nature of practical reasoning with norms, as expounded by Friedrich Kratochwil, to ground a ‘completed’ account of normative reasoning capable of overcoming the poststructuralist critique. Finally, I defend the Rawlsian conception of reasonableness (through an analysis of the interpretation afforded such by Peri Roberts) from the charge of overdemandingness levelled at it by Catriona McKinnon. I conclude by claiming that the Rawlsian ideas of reasonableness and public reason can, when combined with Kratochwil’s conception of practical reason, ground a valid response to the challenge of poststructuralism.

Neutralism - dissociation from the Cold War - can take many forms. As a doctrine it is to be found in its most comprehensive forms in Asia and Africa; and because its chief proponents are leaders of their countries, it is a profoundly pragmatic and eclectic doctrine. Yet it is deeply grounded in certain widespread hopes and fears, and is usually nourished by nationalism. Neutralist foreign policies are shaped by, and yet have come to shape, the style and scope of Cold War rivalries. Six forms of policy neutralism may be distinguished. These are: new state neutralism; pioneer neutralism; neutralization; buffer status; traditional neutrality; and erstwhile isolationism. Each of these types of policy represents different ways in which a state can become neutralist, and it is suggested how many- states fall into each of these classes. Nearly three quarters of the neutralist states in early 1961 are new states which have become independent since 1945* Many of them practise policies which are in some respects like those of three pioneer neutralists - India, Yugoslavia and Egypt. Since 1945 neutralism has been of growing significance internationally.

Britain’s stormy relationship with the European Union is a frequently cited illustration of a Eurosceptic state par excellence. Possessive of a strong national identity, a unique island status, a plethora of wartime experiences and a tenacious hold over its sovereignty, Britain has long been invested with an ‘awkward partner’ status. This dissertation seeks to unravel such presuppositions to answer the central research question: how has British national identity been forged and constructed by competing political elite visions of Europe? I deploy a discourse analytic approach and the Self/Other nexus to examine elite configurations of Europe over three critical events in European integration history. The empirical findings suggest three things. Firstly,discursive constructions of Europe play a fundamental role in determining perceptions of national identity. Secondly, the emerging trend in poststructuralist discourse analysis that views the Other not as a single, radical, hostile adversary, but as a whole array of much subtler and less easily defined Others is pertinent to identity construction. Finally, although national identities are perceived as contingent on previous conceptualisations and shifts in identity are subsequently slow and incremental, the case of Britain actually reveals a range of discontinuities in its nationhood over the historical events.

Being a scholar of International Politics, David Mitrany has both the fortune and misfortune. It is his fortune that we can not ignore his thought when talking about the early construction of European Union. It is his misfortune that his functionalism is simplified to be a theory of economic integration by some scholars without probing into his core of thought. The purposes of this article are to make a complete discussion of David Mitrany and his functionalism and to review some critics with bias made by some scholars. Besides, we can know functionalism deeper by reviewing Mitrany¡¦s attitude toward the two Great Debates in theory of International Relations.

The core argument of this work is that the individualist conceptions of agency and responsibility inherent in the contemporary ethical structure of international relations are highly problematic, serve political purposes which are often unacknowledged, and have led to the establishment of an international institutional regime which is limited in the kind of justice it can bring to international affairs. Cosmopolitan liberalism has led to the privileging of the discourse of rights over that of responsibility, through its emphasis on legality and the role of the individual as the agent and subject of ethics; this has culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC, described by its supporters as the missing link in human rights enforcement, is a result of changing conceptions of agency and responsibility beyond borders – normative discourse has moved from state to individual, from politics and ethics to law, and from peace to justice, but I argue that it has not yet moved beyond the dichotomy of cosmopolitan and communitarian thinking. I contend that neither of these two positions can offer us a satisfactory way forward, so new thinking is required. The core of the thesis therefore explores alternative views of agency and responsibility – concepts which are central to international political theory, but not systematically theorized within the discipline. I outline models of agency as sociality and responsibility as a social practice, arguing that these models both better describe the way we talk about and experience our social lives, and also offer significant possibilities to broaden the scope of international justice and enable human flourishing. I end the research by considering the implications of these more nuanced accounts of agency and responsibility for ongoing theorising and practice.

Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history, and defence literature, sometimes at length, at others only in passing. Certain of his central insights have suffered distorting representations in recent years. This study is an attempt to analyse Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for understanding war – the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance, and passion. It aims to present a more accurate conception and one which is truer to Clausewitz’s intentions. It seeks to achieve this through an in-depth analysis and reinterpretation of the text of On War and Clausewitz’s other writings, conducted through the prism of the trinity and in the light of contemporary research on war. It draws on and synthesises many excellent existing studies, but argues that there is room for further clarification. It presents fresh perspectives into certain aspects of Clausewitz’s thought and emphasises elements of his theory that have been neglected. The interpretation is founded on three central approaches which place Clausewitz in historical context, considers critiques of his ideas, and recognises that the trinity cannot be understood in isolation, but rests upon ideas found in Clausewitz’s wider work. The trinity is a uniquely powerful framework for understanding the phenomenon of war. It cannot hope to answer all the strategic problems we face today – that was simply not what Clausewitz intended – but rather constitutes a mental guide for anyone interested in the subject, from commanders to university students. It focuses attention on the central underlying forces of war in their endlessly complex interaction. Once allowances are made for abstruse terminology and irregularities given the unfinished nature of On War, it is hoped that this thesis will underscore the timelessness of the trinity.

Military intervention in internal conflicts represents a recurrent practice in international history. This thesis provides a theoretical framework for the study of the political and sociological processes that lead political elites to militarily intervene in internal conflicts. Following the renewed interest in political elites both in Sociology and International Relations, the thesis draws on Elite Theory to address the dual nature of political elites as both domestic and international actors. In doing so, it develops a framework for the study of military intervention centred on political elites that overcomes the limits of existing contributions on the subject. In particular, the thesis highlights how interventionary policies are shaped by three overlapping causal antecedents: elites’ contending ideological claims; elites’ struggle for both domestic and international power; and the relationship established by the intervener’s elite with elite and counter- elite groups in the target state. The thesis tests the plausibility of the proposed framework by examining US decisions in three cases: US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence (1898-1902); US intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918- 1920); and US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This analysis highlights three elements. First, ideological considerations set significant limits to US cooperation with leaders in the target country despite the strategic rationale for cooperation against common enemies. Second, the interplay between international and domestic political considerations represented a fundamental ‘push factor’, shaping the objectives US elites sought. Third, foreign elite groups played a crucial role in ‘pulling’ US interventions, both by representing local allies instrumental to Washington’s objectives and by directly accessing and influencing US decision-making processes. For the same reasons, the lack of these push and pull factors are key to explaining US non-intervention in the Spanish case. Overall, the thesis offers a twofold contribution to the study of military intervention. First, it explores how military intervention permits decision- makers to affect the ‘circulation of elites’ in both their own societies and in other societies. Second, it indicates how military intervention affects the international system by altering ideological homogeneity, international alliances and hierarchical relations between elites.

This thesis is concerned with one way in which political philosophy and international relations might co-operate more closely with one another. The approach so formed, international relations theory, is particularly important in order to analyse and try to resolve one of the more fundamental questions in modern politics. This question concerns the right ordering of two types of obligation, the one asserting that a man's obligations are first and foremost to the state of which he is a citizen, the other asserting that as a man he has obligations to the whole of humanity and that these have first claim upon him. The first part of this thesis is concerned with these two theories of obligations and the way in which they are embedded within the theory and practice of the modern state. The argument attempts to set out the basic structure of these two points of view in order that their evaluation may take place in later parts of the thesis. In the second place, the theories of Pufendorf and Vattel are considered in order to discover the manner in which they deal with these two points of view of obligation. Their theories are found to be unsatisfactory and a more adequate theory of international obligation is traced in the writings of Kant. The third part of the thesis attempts to build upon Kant in order to take some further steps towards a theory of international relations. This section begins with the argument that the philosophy of international relations is to be understood as part of a wider enterprise, namely a theory of societies with reference to their external relations. Accordingly, the thesis attempts to distinguish a variety of principles which might be at the heart of one society's relations with another. Through the use of a 'myth' the argument proceeds to arrange these principles into a hierarchy in order to represent their distance from or proximity to a condition where international relations are organised according to principles which have their bases in Kant's thought.

Since the late1990s, theorists have attempted to understand an apparent securitization of development within the policies produced by global governance networks and institutions (Beall et al., 2005; Duffield, 2007; Woods, 2005). The key assumptions central to much of the securitization of development debate are that; significant areas of the South are excluded from formal global economic networks, but are reintegrating through parallel economic activity; the discourses of security and development are linked by global governance institutions, such that significant areas of the South are conceived as an international security threat; the major agencies of global governance are unified through a liberal consensus, and pursue liberal change through the distribution of aid and through development programmes. This research is concerned with the ways in which this debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, and its limitations. This theoretical and empirical evaluation takes a number of forms including: an analysis of the policy discourse of key global governance institutions; an examination of world economic trends; a statistical project investigating the distribution of development aid; and a case study of development programming. This thesis argues that the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of global governance through its identification of both liberal societal transformation as a key rationale of global governance and the security development nexus as a central framework for North-South relations. It further provides important insights into the productive power of liberal global governance networks and develops a fruitful application of post-structural analysis to the problematic of global development. This research also identifies theoretical and empirical limitations within this debate. In light of these, an approach is proposed which takes greater account of firstly, the structural dynamics of the global economy and secondly, the internal contradictions and complexities inherent within the discourses of global governance. The former would involve greater engagement with the literature that demonstrates a complex and varied picture of global economic expansion and contraction. This research further suggests that the effect of the axiom that there can be no development without security is ambiguous. And also argues that the suggestion that global governance pursues liberal change through the distribution of aid needs qualification. Finally, further analysis to determine the utility of engaging with the governmentality literature is proposed.