Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Brazil and South Africa were both part of the global “third-wave” of democracy, the beginnings of their democratic transitions occurring in 1985 and 1994 respectively. Despite having been formerly subjected to decades of authoritarian rule, both countries experienced a modicum of democratic practice, however limited in franchise, under the previous regimes. The purpose of this study is to investigate the levels of support for democracy in Brazil and South Africa since democratic transition. Two types of political support are identified as crucial for democratic sustainability: diffuse support, or support for democracy’s intrinsic principles, and specific support, support which is conditional on the positive evaluation of the regime institutions and incumbents. These two types of political support are conceptualized as encompassing five levels or objects of political support, according to the Norris model: the political community, regime principles, regime performance (diffuse support), regime institutions and political actors (specific support). This study proposes that because vestiges of democratic norms and practices have been present within these countries’ political systems for some time, it is possible that they will manifest trends in support similar to much older, more established democracies. These global trends indicate that diffuse support for democracy is being maintained while specific support for democracy is waning. A longitudinal quantitative study was conducted, using consecutive waves of World Values Survey to operationalize support for democracy in terms of the five abovementioned political objects and the results of South Africa and Brazil compared. These results show that both case studies could be interpreted as having fairly high levels of diffuse support and decreasing levels of specific support for democracy. It is however acknowledged that results are not conclusive and further research is required, especially with respect to how respondents conceptualize the term ‘democracy’. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Brasilië en Suid-Afrika was albei deel van die globale “derde golf” van demokrasie, met die aanvang van hulle oorgang na demokrasie onderskeidelik in 1985 en 1994. Ten spyte daarvan dat hierdie twee lande voormalig aan dekades van outoritêre gesag onderwerp is, het albei, hoewel beperk in stemreg, ’n mate van demokratiese praktyk onder ’n vorige bestel ervaar. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die steunvlakke vir demokrasie in Brasilië en Suid- Afrika sedert hulle oorgang na demokrasie te ondersoek. Twee soorte politieke steun word geïdentifiseer as deurslaggewend vir demokratiese volhoubaarheid: verspreide steun – of steun vir die intrinsieke beginsels van demokrasie – en spesifieke steun – steun wat van die positiewe evaluering van die regime se instellings en ampsbekleders afhang. Hierdie twee soorte politieke steun word deur vyf konsepte voorgestel wat die vyf vlakke of voorwerpe van politieke steun volgens die Norris-model dek: die politieke gemeenskap, regimebeginsels, regimeprestasie (verspreide steun), regime-instellings en politieke akteurs (spesifieke steun). Hierdie studie stel voor dat, aangesien spore van demokratiese norme en praktyke vir ’n geruime tyd binne hierdie lande se politieke stelsels teenwoordig was, dit moontlik is dat hulle steuntendense sal toon wat aan baie ouer, meer gevestigde demokrasieë soortgelyk is. Hierdie globale tendense toon dat verspreide steun vir demokrasie gehandhaaf word terwyl spesifieke steun vir demokrasie aan die kwyn is. ’n Longitudinale kwantitatiewe studie is onderneem wat van opeenvolgende siklusse van die “World Values Survey” gebruik maak om steun vir demokrasie in terme van die vyf bogenoemde politieke voorwerpe uit te beeld. Die resultate van Suid-Afrika en Brasilië is daarna vergelyk. Uit hierdie resultate sou afgelei kon word dat redelik hoë vlakke van verspreide steun en dalende vlakke van spesifieke steun vir demokrasie in beide gevalle voorkom. Daar word egter erken dat resultate nie beslissend is nie en dat verdere navorsing nodig is, in besonder met betrekking tot respondente se begrip van die term ‘demokrasie’.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / This study focuses on the bidding for sports mega-events, their subsequent planning, and the politics surrounding these processes. The specific examples analysed here are those of the FIFA Football World Cup™ in Germany in 2006, and the forthcoming 2010 World Cup to be hosted by South Africa. The events are examined against a backdrop of increasing competition to host mega-events, spurred on by a widespread belief in the economic benefits that result from hosting, with a frequent disregard for the social and economic costs involved. Four central research questions are addressed in the course of this thesis. The first is the role of corporate actors and their influence on mega-events, the second is the question of what processes characterise both the bidding and planning stages of an event, including the main actors, agendas and discourses involved in both of these stages. Thirdly, the significance of hosting the World Cup in both the German and South African case is examined, and fourthly, the long-term implications of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup, both for the country itself and for developing nations more broadly, is considered. The research methodology used for this thesis is predominately qualitative, and utilises mostly secondary sources, including books, academic articles, press articles, and information off the official websites of the football organisations involved. The main findings of this thesis are that while both countries in question had seemingly compelling reasons for hosting the World Cup, and while benefits can stem from the event, the longevity of such benefits is questionable, and the costs involved can be especially heavy in a developing context such as that of South Africa. Furthermore, those that stand to benefit the most from the events include transnational corporate actors, with the implication that significant financial gains never reach the host economy. Nevertheless, an ever-increasing willingness on the part of numerous nations to host mega-events means that the German and South African cases can provide lessons for future hosts, and South Africa’s World Cup has particular significance as a test case for mega-events hosted by developing nations. Finally, this thesis stresses the need for further research in this field. It also aims to break some new ground by examining the commonalities and contrasts to be found in the bidding and planning processes of a mega-event as carried out by a developed and a developing nation.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this Masters‘ thesis was twofold, namely, to contribute to a more holistic approach of the study of the motives of Chinese overseas investors and, secondly, to contribute to the adjustment of general FDI theory in such a way that it becomes more suited to the study of the motives of investors from any country of origin. FDI scholars who study emerging markets argue that general FDI theory needs to be adjusted because most of its theories are derived from studying outward FDI in an Anglo-Saxon context. The theories are therefore not necessarily applicable to investors from a non-Anglo-Saxon context. Furthermore, the study of the motives of foreign investors is of importance to policy makers of FDI host countries in order to create a balance between attracting FDI by deregulating, and controlling FDI by enforcing strict laws and regulations, thereby harnessing the full potential of incoming FDI. Therefore, the model that Lee (1966) developed in migration theory was introduced to FDI theory and tested by applying it to the case of the infrastructural investments in the DRC of a subsidiary of CREC, the world‘s largest contractor, namely CREC7. The main factors that influence the motives of CREC7 were investigated using the Four Factors Model, an adjusted version of Lee‘s model. A single-case study design was chosen in order to shed light on certain dynamics – in particular, the interrelation between the particular firm-specific, push, pull and intervening factors that influence CREC7‘s motives to invest in the DRC. In order to maximise the validity of this study, multiple sources of evidence were used, namely: documentation, face-to-face interviews and direct observations, the latter two of which occurred during August 2010. Lee‘s (1966) model indeed appeared to be useful for identifying the main factors that influence the motives of CREC7 for investing in the infrastructure sector in the DRC and the interrelatedness of these factors. The collected data from the desktop research and the fieldwork showed how conditions in the country of origin, conditions in the country of destination, firm-specific factors, and intervening factors influence each other in a highly complex way. In order to illustrate this complexity, the factors that influence each other most actively were grouped together in clusters. The two clusters of factors that were of specific importance for CREC7‘s decision to invest in the DRC, are: (1) relationship with the central government, access to finance, experience and skills, market access, and intervening factors; (2) experience and skills, experience of operating in a challenging institutional environment, high level of competition in the domestic market, high demand for infrastructure in the DRC, and the relatively low level of competition in large infrastructure projects in the DRC. Because the Four Factors Model uses broad categories of factors that apply to all foreign investors, this model can be applied to the study of the motives of foreign investors from both developed and developing countries, thereby contributing to make general FDI theory more relevant. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doelstelling van dié Meesterstesis is tweevoudig. Eerstens, om `n meer holistiese benadering tot die studie van die motiewe van Sjinese buitelandse beleggers by toe te voeg en tweedens om by te dra tot die aanpassing van algemene direkte buitelandse beleggings teorie dat dit meer bruikbaar vir die studie van die motiewe van beleggers, onafhanklik van hulle land van herkoms, kan wees. Algemene direkte buitelandse beleggings moet aangepas word aangesien meeste van die teorie ontwikkel is deur uitwaartse direkte buitelandse beleggings binne `n Anglo-Saxon konteks. Die studie van die motiewe van buitelandse beleggers is ook belangrik vir beleidsmakers aan die ontvangkant van direkte buitelandse beleggings aangesien `n balans tussen deregulasie met die doel om buitelandse beleggings aan te lok en direkte buitelandse belegging te reguleer deurmiddel van streng wetgewing en sodoende die volle potensiaal van direkte buitelandse belegging te ontsluit. Sodoende is die model wat Lee (1966) ontwikkel het in migrasie teorie toegepas op direkte buitelandse beleggings teorie en getoets op infrastruktuur beleggings in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) deur CREC7 `n vleuel van die grootste kontrakteerder CREC. Die hooffaktore wat CREC7 beïnvloed is ondersoek deurmiddel van die Four Factors Model, `n aanpasing van Lee se model, gebruik te maak. `n Enkele gevallestudie was gebruik om lig te werp op sekere verwikkelinge veral die interverhouding tussen verskeie faktore spesifieke tot die maatskappy en die mark wat werk op die beleggingsmotiewe van CREC7 in die DRK. Om die geldigheid van hierdie studie te maksimeer is verskeie bronne gebruik. Naamlik dokumentasie asook onderhoude en direkte observering tydens Augustus 2010. Lee (1966) se model was bruikbaar gewees vir die identifisering van die hooffaktore wat CREC7 se motiewe om te belê in infrastruktuur in die DRK beïnvloed asook die interafhanklikheid tussen hierdie faktore. The versamelde data het geïllustreer hoe omstandighede in die land van oorsprong, die land van ontvangs en omstandighede spesifiek tot die firma mekaar beïnvloed in `n baie komplekse manier. Om die kompleksitieit te illustreer is die faktore wat die meeste op mekaar inwerk in clusters gegroepeer. Die twee clusters wat die meeste op CREC7 se beleggingsbesluit ingewerk het is: (1) verhoudinge met die sentrale regering, toegang tot bevondsing, ondervinding en vaardighede, marktoegang en ingrypende faktore; (2) ondervinding en vaardighede, ondervinding om in `n uitdagende institutionele ongewing, hoë vlakke van kompetisie in die plaaslike mark, hoë aanvraag na infrastruktuur in die DRK. Aangesien die Four Factors Model breë kategorieë van fakore wat van toepassing is op alle buitelandse beleggers kan die model toegepas word op die studie an motiewe van buitelandse beleggers van ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende lande en sodoende daartoe bydra om direkte buitelandse belegging teorie meer relevant te maak.

Thesis (MA )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation in two democracies in Southern Africa: Botswana and South Africa. Mattes (2003), Barnett and Whiteside (2006) and others warned that in states with high HIV infection levels, the negative impact of the pandemic - especially in terms of socio-economic conditions, budgetary pressures and a loss of human capital in the state and the economy - was potentially so great that it may affect democracy detrimentally. In contrast, some scholars, particularly Anthony Butler (2005a) and Alex de Waal (2006), contended that although the pandemic had negative effects, democracies might survive it and that in some specific ways, democratic consolidation might even benefit from the its consequences. For instance, they argued that in South Africa, the civil society response to the government’s controversial HIV and AIDS policy deepened the institutional framework of democracy. The methodology for the above comparative analysis is based on the application of a minimalist multivariate model which, following the thinking of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) consists of both institutional and socio-economic factors. Factors are selected for their relevance to democratic consolidation, as argued by scholars such as Linz and Stepan (1996), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (1996), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Leftwich (2000). The chosen factors are the system of government (the relationship between the branches of government); the electoral system; political rights and civil liberties; economic indicators (affluence, economic growth and the reduction of inequality); human development (as measured by the United Nations Development Program) and civil society. This is a descriptive, qualitative, desktop study, using secondary literature in books, as well as articles. There is no empirical component, such as fieldwork, surveys or questionnaires. As stated below, such methodology may be used for further elaboration and refining of the findings of this desktop-based comparative analysis. The main finding is that currently, despite the cost and human implications of the disease, there are no indications that it is directly threatening to destroy the democracies of Botswana or South Africa. This finding differs from the more negative expectations of the scholars mentioned above. It is suggested that the increasing provision and effectiveness of antiretroviral treatment (ART) enables these democracies and their economies to avoid some of the ravages of the disease that seemed inevitable a few years ago. Furthermore, it is suggested that the comparative affluence of the two states in question shields them from some negative effects of HIV and AIDS and that this may be different in poorer Southern African states. This is an issue for further research. Such research should go beyond desktop research to include fieldwork and questionnaires. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die impak van MIV en VIGS op demokratiese konsolidering in twee Suider-Afrikaanse demokrasieë, Botswana en Suid-Afrika, vas te stel. Mattes (2003), Barnett en Whiteside (2006) en ander het gewaarsku dat die negatiewe uitwerking van die pandemie - veral in terme van sosio-ekonomiese toestande, begrotingsdruk en ’n verlies aan menslike hulpbronne in die staat en ekonomie - potensieel so groot is dat dit demokrasie nadelig sou beïnvloed. In teenstelling hiermee het ander akademici, soos Anthony Butler (2005a) en Alex de Waal (2006), geredeneer dat demokrasieë die pandemie mag oorleef ten spyte van die negatiewe effekte wat dit wel het en dat demokrasieë selfs op sekere wyses by die gevolge daarvan mag baatvind. Byvoorbeeld, het hulle geargumenteer, in Suid-Afrika het die burgerlike samelewing se reaksie op die Mbeki-regering se kontroversiële MIV en VIGSbeleid die institusionele raamwerk van demokrasie verdiep. Die metodologie vir hierdie vergelykende analise is gebaseer op die toepassing van ’n minimalistiese multiveranderlike model. Soos gepostuleer deur Bratton en Van de Walle (1997), wat beide institusionele en sosio-ekonomiese faktore insluit. Faktore is gekies op grond van hulle relevansie tot demokratiese konsolidering (volgens vakkundiges soos Linz en Stepan (1996), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub en Limongi (1996), Bratton en Van de Walle (1997) en Leftwich (2000), asook vir dié se moontlike relevansie tot demokrasieë wat spesifiek deur MIV en VIGS geaffekteer word. Die gekose faktore is die regeringstelsel (die verhouding tussen die uitvoerende, wetgewende en regsprekende gesag), die verkiesingstelsel, politieke regte en burgerlike vryhede, ekonomiese aanwysers (welvaart; ekonomiese groei en die vermindering van ongelykheid), menslike ontwikkeling (soos gemeet deur die Verenigde Nasies se Ontwikkelingsprogram) en die burgerlike samelewing. Hierdie tesis is ’n literatuurstudie van ’n beskrywende, kwalitatiewe aard. Daar is gebruik gemaak van sekondêre literatuur in boeke, asook van artikels. Daar is geen empiriese komponent soos veldwerk en meningspeilings nie. Soos hieronder beklemtoon word, kan empiriese metodes in toekomstige studies gebruik word om op die bevindinge wat hierdie navorsing opgelewer het, uit te brei en dit te verfyn. Die hoofbevinding is dat daar tans, ten spyte van die finansiële en menslike koste van MIV en VIGS, geen aanduiding is dat die siekte ‘n direkte bedreiging inhou vir die voortbestaan van demokrasie in Botswana en Suid-Afrika nie. Hierdie bevinding verskil van die meer negatiewe verwagtinge hierbo uitgespreek. Dit word voorgestel dat die toenemende voorsiening en effektiwiteit van antiretrovirale behandeling hierdie demokrasieë en hulle ekonomieë daartoe in staat stel om gedeeltelik die verwoesting van hierdie pandemie te vermy, iets wat enkele jare gelede nog as onvermydelik beskou is. Verder word die voorstel gemaak dat die impak van die pandemie op armer Suider-Afrikaanse state vergelyk behoort te word met die bevindinge wat hier aangebied word. Sulke toekomstige navorsing behoort nie net literatuurstudie in te sluit nie, maar ook veldwerk en meningsopnames.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression and development. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperation policy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately, the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As a result of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which were previously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. The Cotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basis instead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group, represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together with Mozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent; from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities. Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverse and often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However, maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance to the economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partner of most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by the BLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was not negatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver. The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and will promote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free access was offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africa because of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA. Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experience increased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for the BLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in income losses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACU countries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most- Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents South Africa from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, the strict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby fail to support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will be included in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to more foreign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services will increase, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However, foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies. South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore be confronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized. From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions in the IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of the importance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to do so to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPA was initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, in its own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to the negotiations deadlock. Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterested attitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and the poorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreements have to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

Thesis MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Liberation movements came into being across the entire African continent as a political response to colonisation. However, Africa has in this field, as in so many others, been largely understudied, in comparison to revolutionary movements in South America and South East Asia. While many case studies on specific liberation movements exist, very few are comparative in nature. This study will do precisely that using the framework of Thomas H. Greene. The resistance movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, consisted of several organisations, but the ones that emerged as the most powerful and significant in the two countries were the ANC and ZANU respectively. Although their situations were similar in many ways, there were other factors that necessarily led to two very different liberation struggles. This study looks closer at these factors, why they were so, and what this meant for the two movements. It focuses on the different characteristics of the movements, dividing these into leadership, support base, ideology, organisation, strategies and external support. All revolutionary movements rely on these factors to varying degrees, depending on the conditions they are operating under. The ANC and ZANU both had to fight under very difficult and different circumstances, with oppressive minority regimes severely restricting their actions. This meant that the non-violent protests that initially were a great influence for the leadership of both movements – especially with the successes of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa and India, inevitably had to give way to the more effective strategies of sabotage and armed struggle. Like other African resistance movements, nationalism was used as the main mobilising tool within the populations. In South Africa the struggle against apartheid was more complex and multidimensional than in Zimbabwe. Ultimately successful in their efforts, the ANC and ZANU both became the political parties that assumed power after liberation. This study does not extend to post-liberation problems.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis seeks to provide a critical discussion of the contributions of the African Union towards the potential development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. Utilising Security Community Theory, and the framework for the study of security communities developed by Adler & Barnett (1998) it commences with an interrogation of the AU. This interrogation is arranged along the three tiers of the framework. The first tier is the precipitating conditions, which cause states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. The second tier investigates the factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third, and final, tier identifies the necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change. The study goes on and introduces three African case studies, which illustrate the contributions of the African Union towards the potential development of an African security community. The case studies are the African Union mission in Burundi, the African Union mission in Sudan, and the recent intervention of the African Union in the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. All three case studies were able to provide ample evidence to illustrate the AU’s contributions. The study concludes with two major findings. Firstly, this study is able to illustrate that the AU has made significant contributions towards the development of peace and security in Africa. Secondly, that the AU has made significant contributions at all three tiers of the framework, and therefore major contributions to the potential development of an African security community. However, the AU is still in its embryonic phase, and any prediction concerning the existence, or potential existence of an African security community would be premature. Even though there are ostensibly, positive developments in the area of continental peace and security this study is able to illustrate several remaining challenges to further contributions by the AU. The first is a lack of resources. The AU is heavily dependent on the contributions of its member states, and a number of members persistently fail to meet their contributions to the organization. A second challenge is the loosely defined relationship with the UN (and other external partners). It is crucial that a constructive relationship be established, if not, differences might antagonise the two organisations and negatively affect any future contributions of the AU towards the development of an African security community. Finally, the role of core states, most notably regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria will remain important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of an African security community. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis poog om n kritiese bespreking te bied van die bydra wat die Afrika Unie na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het sedert sy intrede in 2002. Deur gebruik te maak van Sekuriteits Gemeeenskap Teorie, en die raamwerk vir die studie van sekuriteits gemeenskappe deur Adler & Barnett (1998) begin die studie met n direkte ondersoek van die AU. Hierdie ondersoek vind plaas volgens die drie vlakke van die raamwerk. Die eerste vlak is die kondisies wat veroorsaak dat state hulself na mekaar orienteer, en n wil ontwikkel om hulle sake te koordineer. Die tweede vlak ondersoek die faktore vir die ontwikkeling van wedersydse vertroue en gesamentlike identiteit. Die derde, en finale, vlak identifiseer die nodige kondisies van afhanklike verwagtinge vir vreedsame verandering. Die studie gaan voort met drie Afrika geval studies, wat die bydra van die AU na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap illustreer. Die geval studies sluit in die Afrika missie in Burundi, die Afrika missie in Sudan, en die onlangse intervensie deur die AU in die na-eleksie krisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Al drie geval studies verskaf wye getuienis wat die bydra van die AU illustreer. Die studie sluit af met twee hoof bevindings. Eerstens, kon hierdie studie illustreer dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes na die ontwikkeling van vrede en sekuriteit in Afrika gemaak het. Tweedens, dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes op al drie vlakke van die raamwerk gemaak het, en daarom ook mondige bydraes tot die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het. Nogtans, is die AU self nog in n onvolwasse stadium, en enige voorspelling in verband met die bestaan, of oor die potensiele bestaan van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap is voortydig. Al is daar opmerkilike positiewe ontwikkelinge in die area van kontinentale vrede en sekuriteit, kan hierdie studie steeds verskeie uitdagings identifiseer wat verdere bydraes deur die AU kan hinder. Die eerste uitdaging is n tekort aan bevondsing. Die AU is hoogs afhanklik op die bydrae van sy lidmaat state, maar n paar lede mis aanhoudend hulle bydraes tot die orginasasie. n Tweede uitdaging is die ongedefineerde verhouding tussen die AU en die VN (en ander eksterne vennote). Dit is belangrik dat n konstruktiewe verhouding in werk gestel word, indien nie, kan verskille die twee organisasies van mekaar dryf en enige toekomstige bydraes van die AU na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits kompleks negatief beinvloed. Laastens, sal die rol van kern state, mees aanmerklik streek leiers soos Suid Afrika en Nigerie, belangrik bly om die sekuriteits kompleks te stabiliseer en verdere ontwikkeling in die toekoms te bevorder.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The petroleum industry concern itself with natural resource extracting activities which are highly sensitive for contributing to environmental degradation by oil spills or gas flaring. A large proportion of the world’s oil and gas reserves is located in developing countries where the presence of multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) is high as host countries often lack the infrastructure needed or are financially unable to conduct extracting operations on their own. The Niger Delta in southern Nigeria has one of the largest oil reserves in Africa and is one of the world’s leading oil exporters. MNOCs like Shell, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil and Statoil are some of the firms present in the Niger Delta region. The oil-rich area in the developing country poses high levels of political risk for the MNOCs. Local grievances, paired with environmental degradation and human rights violations by the oil companies, have led to a tense relationship between the local stakeholders and the MNOCs, with so-called petro-violence at the center of the oil conflict. Frequently, oil installations are sabotaged and crude oil is stolen, causing major financial losses for the firms, and armed attacks on oil facilities and kidnapping of MNOCs’ staff constitute the majority of political risks facing MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta. This study investigates how MNOCs can successfully manage such political risks, providing a business advantage in a challenging business environment. By addressing the companys’ own behaviour, the research analyses if social engagement through corporate social responsibility (CSR) can mitigate political risk in the Niger Delta. The study looks at two different MNOCs operating in the Niger delta, Shell and Statoil, and scrutinises their methods of implementation of their CSR initiatives. The difference in approaches to CSR is elucidated where Shell claims it has repositioned its approach from a top-down angle during the first years of conducting CSR projects, to a more stakeholder-oriented approach. Yet, their approach is still found to carry elements of the previous top-down approach, and has not resulted in satisfactory performance in relation to stated goals. Statoil undertakes a stakeholder-oriented bottom-up approach, executed with a high level of commitment. The stated CSR goals have to a great extent been met. By assessing the two companies’ CSR strategies in relation to the frequency of political risks experienced by each MNOC, the study finds that CSR has the potential to mitigate political risk depending on the approach to implementation, and could serve as a political risk management strategy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die brandstofbedryf is betrokke by die ontginning van natuurlike hulpbronne, ’n aktiwiteit wat hoogs sensitief is vir sy bydrae tot omgewingsbesoedeling as gevolg van storting van olie en opvlamming van gas. ’n Baie groot deel van die wêreld se olie en gas reserwes word aangetref in ontwikkelende lande. Die teenwoordigheid van Multinasionale Olie Korporasies (MNOKs) in hierdie lande is groot omdat daar gewoonlik ’n gebrek aan toepaslike infrastruktuur is en die lande ook nie finansieel in staat mag wees om die ontginning op hulle eie te doen nie. Die Niger Delta in die Suide van Nigerië beskik oor een van die grootste olie reserwes in Afrika en is een van die voorste olie uitvoerders in die wêreld. Shell, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil en Statoil is van die bekende MNOK wat ontginning doen in die Niger Delta gebied. Die olieryke gebiede in ’n ontwikkelende land kan groot politieke risiko vir die MNOKs inhou. Plaaslike griewe gekoppel aan omgewings besoedeling en menseregte skendings deur die oliemaatskappye het gelei tot ’n gespanne verhouding tussen hulle en die plaaslike belange groepe, en sogenaamde “petrogeweld” staan sentraal hierin. Heel gereeld word olie-installasies gesaboteer en ru-olie word gesteel, wat natuurlik groot finansiële verliese die firmas inhou. Daarby word gewapende aanvalle op die olie-installasies uitgevoer en van die MNOKs se personeel ontvoer. Al hierdie dinge vorm die groot politieke risiko’s wat die MNOKs in die Niger Delta in die gesig staar. Hierdie studie ondersoek hoe die MNOKs met welslae hierdie politieke risiko’s kan teenwerk om vir hulle ’n suksesvolle besigheid te vestig in ’n baie mededingende bedryfsomgewing. Deur te kyk na die maatskappy se eie gedrag, sal die navorsing analiseer of gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid deur korporatiewe sosiale verantwoordelikheid (KSV) die politieke risiko in die Niger Delta kan temper. Die studie kyk na twee verskillende MNOK wat in die gebied bedryf word, Shell en Statoil, en kyk noukeurig na die manier waarop hulle KSV inisiatiewe toegepas word. Die verskil in benadering tot die probleem word toegelig deur die feit dat Shell beweer dat hulle ’n bo-na-onder benadering in die beginjare van KSV projekte verander het na ’n beleid waar meer na die betrokkenheid van belangegroepe gekyk word. Tog word gevind dat daar nog oorblyfsels is van die bo-na-onder benadering en dat doelwitte wat gestel is nie bevredigend bereik is nie. Statoil daarenteen. Implementeer ’n onder-na-bo benadering met betrokkenheid van belangegroepe en ’n hoë vlak van toewyding deur die maatskappy. Die gestelde KSV doelwitte is grootliks behaal. Deur te kyk na die twee maatskappye se ervaring van politieke risiko in verhouding met hulle KSV strategieë bevind hierdie studie dat KSV wel die potensiaal het om, as dit suksesvol toegepas word, politieke risiko te temper en dus kan die as ’n strategie om sodanige risiko te bestuur.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As a wave of political uprisings swept across North Africa since January 2011, ridding the region of longstanding autocratic leaders, presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa were still imprisoning opposition leaders, deploying military and police to clamp down on protest, and promising their citizens change - all this in a bid to avoid being ousted by their own people. Leadership has long been the main constraint on political and economic progress in Africa. This study analyses African leadership and especially the role of the presidency as a cause of conflict and instability in Africa. The modern-day African president might no longer be the absolute autocrat from yesteryear, but he still rules with awesome power and vast state resources at his disposal. African leaders have assumed an imperial character; many regard themselves as largely above the law; accountable to no one and entitled to remain in power or to pass the sceptre to their offspring. Due to this rather imperial character, conflict has been inevitable in Africa. As a theoretical basis the study proposes a framework for analysing leaders’ behavioural patterns that contribute to conflict and instability domestically as well as regionally. Six relevant behavioural patterns are identified: political deprivation, patronage and clientelism, personalisation of power, use of the military, staying to office, underdevelopment and conflict. Additionally, and as a case study, this framework is applied to Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni. Each of the six behavioural patterns are analysed and evaluated in relation to Museveni’s rule of the past 25 years. Applying the framework demonstrates how Museveni contributed to conflict across the region in Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Museveni is found to be a power point man in the region and his imperial nature is likely to contribute to future instability and conflict in Uganda and the Great Lakes region. The study also addresses the genesis of the imperial African leader and investigates why, despite waves of democratisation and the expulsion of a few autocratic rulers in Africa in the late 1990s, the imperial character still persist today. Constitutional limitations are found to be one of the major reasons why absolute powers end up being vested in the hands of the president. Lack of proper separation of powers, and a culture conducive to suppressing the legislature and parliamentary role, provides additional reasons for this phenomenon. Furthermore, both internationally and locally, the leadership deficit in Africa is drawing continuing attention and even funding. However, in order for Africa to make progress in eradicating poor and unaccountable leadership, local initiatives should be further encouraged. The African Union Peer Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance are discussed as two African initiatives; also the Mo Ibrahim Index and Prize are evaluated. Although all three these initiatives are admirable in theory, they have failed to deliver because real commitment to action is lacking in most African countries. A speedy and conclusive solution to the problem seems unlikely because of the complex nature of humans and their environment. Thus, the aim of this study is to make a contribution to the scholarly body of work regarding the causes of African conflict, focusing on the African presidency as one cause of such conflict in Africa. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vanaf Januarie 2011 het ’n vlaag politieke opstande Noord-Afrika getref waartydens weggedoen is met langdurige outokratiese leiers. In Afrika Suid van die Sahara het heersers egter steeds opposisieleiers opgesluit en militêre- en polisiemagte ontplooi om opstande die hoof te bied, terwyl vae beloftes aan die bevolking gemaak word oor moontlike veranderinge. Swak Afrika-leierskap word dikwels beskou as ‘n belangrike faktor wat politieke en ekonomiese vooruitgang op die vasteland strem. Hierdie studie analiseer leierskap in Afrika, veral die rol wat die president speel in die skepping van konflik en onstabiliteit. Die hedendaagse Afrika-leier mag dalk nie meer voorkom as die absolutistiese outokraat van die verlede nie, maar hy regeer steeds met oorweldigende mag en ekstensiewe staatshulpbronne tot sy beskikking. Dit is duidelik dat die Afrika-leier dikwels ‘n imperiale karakter aanneem en homself verhewe ag bo die wet. In welke geval hy dus geen verantwoording hoef te doen aan enige ander party nie. Die hoofdoelwit blyk dikwels te wees om beheer te behou. Die gevolgtrekking wat gemaak kan word, is dat die imperiale karakter van die Afrika-president tot konflik kan lei. Die teoretiese basis van hierdie studie bied ’n raamwerk om die leiers van Afrika se gedragspatrone te bestudeer wat aanleiding kon gee tot onstabilitiet asook interne-en streekskonflik. Ses gedragspatrone is geïdentifiseer om hierdie proefskrif te illustreer: politieke vervreemding; beskermheerskap en kliëntilisme; personalisering van mag; gebruik van militêre mag om aan bewind te bly; gebrek aan ontwikkeling en konflik. In besonder word hierdie raamwerk toegepas op die president van Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, as ‘n gevallestudie. Hierdeur word aangedui hoe Museveni bygedra het tot konflik, nie net in Uganda nie, maar inderwaarheid ook in Somalië, Sudan, Kenia en die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) tydens sy bewind van die afgelope 25 jaar. Museveni word allerweë beskou as die “sterkman” in die streek en sy imperiale karakter sal heel waarskynlik ook in die toekoms bydra tot onstabiliteit en konflik in Uganda en die Groot- Merestreek. Hierdie studie spreek ook die oorsprong van die imperiale Afrika-leier aan en ondersoek waarom, ten spyte van die sterk strewe na demokrasie en die omverwerping van outokratiese leiers in Afrika in die laat 1990s, die imperiale karakter van sodanige leiers steeds kan voortbestaan. Konstitusionele beperkings word beskou as een van die hoofredes waarom totale mag in die hande van ‘n president beland. Gebrek aan behoorlike verdeling van mag en ‘n kultuur bevorderlik vir die onderdrukking van die wetgewende en parlementêre funksies, is bydraende redes vir hierdie verskynsel. Verder ontlok die tekortkominge van Afrikaleierskap plaaslik en internasionaal heelwat aandag en selfs befondsing. Die ideaal sou egter wees dat Afrika aangemoedig moet word om tot ‘n groter hoogte plaaslike inisiatiewe te gebruik om swak en onbevoegde leierskap te verwerp. Die African Union Peer Review Mechanism en die African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance word gesien as twee nuttige Afrikainisiatiewe. Ook die Mo Ibrahim Index and Prize word geëvalueer. Alhoewel al drie inisiatiewe in teorie goed blyk te wees, het dit misluk as gevolg daarvan dat ‘n verbintenis tot aksie ontbreek in die meeste Afrika lande. Waarskynlik is geen spoedige of permanente oplossing vir die konflik moontlik nie – grotendeels weens die kompleksiteit van mense en hulle omgewing. Dus is die doel van hierdie studie om ‘n bydrae te maak tot akademiese navorsing betreffende die oorsake van konflik in Afrika en dan spesifiek hoe die institusionele aard van leierskap in Afrika fungeer as ‘n bydraende oorsaak.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / Peace operations and security co-operations are expensive. Even though there are a variety of factors that influences peace agents when they consider approving a new, expanding an existing, or closing down a peace operation or security co-operation, one of these factors is the cost factor. If we were to isolate the cost factor it would follow that a reduction in the cost of peace operations and security co-operations, are likely to contribute to peace agents being more willing to approve new, expand existing or to give existing missions more time to consolidate before closing them down. There are a variety of ways how the cost of peace operations or security co-operations can be lowered. This thesis suggests an alliance with the private sector in the form of corporate sponsorships. In short, that peace operations and security co-operations be commodified and commercialised. This would entail introducing corporate sponsorship of some of the commodities that are used in peace operations and security co-operations, followed by the corporate sponsor using their involvement in the peace operation or security co-operation to their commercial advantage. The commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations should result in the relevant operations and co-operations benefiting in a cost-effective as well as practical effectiveness sense, whereas the private sponsor should benefit in either or both a financial (profit) or an image-making sense. The psychological theory supporting such an argument is that of social identity theory. This theory explains how positive connotations made with peacemaking in warlike conditions will motivate industries to use this opportunity to show that their products can succeed in such demanding circumstances. Accordingly, social identity theory provides us with evidence as to how the commercialisation and commodification of peace operations and security co-operations can succeed. We also support our argument by providing a case study, Operation Rachel, which serves as a successful example of an operation that was (partially) commodified and commercialised. Operation Rachel, which can be seen as either or both a peace operation and security co-operation, shows that in the case of security co-operations, these operations should be presented as peace operations during the commodification and commercialisation processes.